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CONTENTS COPYRIGHT

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INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XLII **January-March 1986** **No. 1**

ANTARCTICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
By Sanjay Chaturvedi 1

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY
By R. Rama Rao 27

SINO-SOVIET DETENTE IN THE MAKING
By T. Karki Hussain 38

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS : A QUEST FOR NORMALIZATION
By Nancy Jetly 53

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SAARC : PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION
By V K. Arora 69

BOOK REVIEWS

AFRICA : AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDY
A Review Article
By K.L. Dalal 85

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 89

K.D. KAPUR : Soviet Strategy in South Asia : Perspectives on Soviet Policies Towards the Indian Sub-Continent and Afghanistan
—Shivaji Ganguly

V. SIDDHARTHACHARRY : Jambudwipa : Blueprint for a South Asian Community
—Jagjit Singh

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INDIA 93

V.K. MURTHI and GAUTAM SHARMA : Rajiv Gandhi : Challenges and Choices
—R. Rama Rao

G.G. MIRCHANDANI and K.S.R. MURTHI : 1984 Lok Sabha Elections—Massive Mandate for Rajiv Gandhi
—V.K. Arora

A.K. BANERJI : Aspects of Indo-British Economic Relations 1858-1898
—A.K. Ray

SRI RAM KHANNA : Export Marketing of India's New Manufactures
—Sumitra Chisti

B.R. VIRMANI and PREMILA SETH (*Eds.*) : Evaluating Management Training and Development
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HAROOBHAI MEHTA AND HASHMUKH PATEL (*Eds.*) : Dynamics of Reservation Policy
—J.S. Gandhi

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER
By Ashok Jambhekar . . . 106

THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, the publisher of journal, is a non-government, non-profit and non-party organisation. It was founded in 1943 to encourage and facilitate the objective study of Indian and International Affairs. The Council, as such, does not express any opinion on any aspects of Indian and International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this journal are, therefore, those of the respective authors and reviewers, not of the Council.

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INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XLII **April-June 1986** **No. 2**

TWO DECADES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND SINGAPORE
By Pradeep Kumar Mehta 111

EVOLUTION OF AFGHANISTAN AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE
By H.A.S. Jafri 130

BHUTAN'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT : CHANGING PERCEPTIONS
By Manorama Kohli 142

INDIAN OCEAN : AN AREA OF TENSION AND BIG POWER PRESSURES
By S.N. Kohli 154

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN A SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
By Veena Kukreja 166

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN BANGLADESH
By Habibul Haque Khondker 177

BOOK REVIEWS

ETHNIC POLITICS IN PUNJAB—A Review Article
By M.S. Dhami 193

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 200

SAMUEL S. KIM : China, the United Nations and World Order —B.E. Shinde

KALIM BAHADUR, D.R. GOYAL, C. P. BHAMBHRI and V.D. CHOPRA : Inside Afghanistan —G.B.K. Hooja

SURENDRA CHOPRA (*Ed.*) : Sino-Indian Relations —Shivaji Ganguly

ANURAG GANGAL : New International Economic Order : A Gandhian Perspective —Girijesh Pant

V.R. PANCHAMUKHI : Capital Formation and Output in the Third World —Arun K. Banerji

INDIA 213

R.N. KAUL : Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah : A Political Phoenix

AND

M.K. TENG : State Government and Politics—Jammu and Kashmir —S. Bhatt

K.L. TUTEJA : Sikh Politics (1920-40) —Madan Lal

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DAVID SMITH : Ratnakara's Haravijaya— An Introduction to the Sanskrit Court Epic —Swati Ganguly

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER
By Ashok Jambhekar 220

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A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XLII **July-September 1986** **No. 3**

UNITED NATIONS' ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA: CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS
By Shanti Sadiq Ali 225

AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS IN GUJARAT
By Jayanti K. Patel 238

RATIONALISING INDIA-AFRICA ECONOMIC RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION COOPERATION
By R. R. Ramachandani 247

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: SOME ISSUES AND IMPLICATIODS
By Anirudha Gupta 274

ISSUES, CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF POVERTY IN NIGERIA
By Najeem Ade-Lawal 284

BURKINA-MALI WAR : IS NIGERIA STILL A REGIONAL POWER
By Segun Johnson 294

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH: FROM NASSAU TO LONDON
By Shivaji Ganguly 309

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BOOK REVIEWS

GROWTH AND POVERTY—A Review Article
By L.K. Jha 329

POLITICAL SCIENCE DIMENSIONS 341

JUDITH A. GILLESPIE AND DINA A. ZINNES (*Eds.*):
Missing Elements in Political Inquiry: Logic and Levels of Analysis —Rakhabari Chatterjee

EVERT VEDUNG: Political Reasoning —V.T. Patil

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER
By Ashok Jambhekar 346

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INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XLII **October-December 1986** **No. 4**

INDIA AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM : REALITIES AND PROSPECTS
By Sanjay Chaturvedi 351

UNITED STATES-INDIA RELATIONS : OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES
By Thom A. Travis 381

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN BANGLADESH
By Shyamali Ghosh 391

DEKHRUSCHEVISATION ACCOMPLISHED
By Ashok Modak 405

NON-ALIGNMENT : ITS CONTINUED RELEVANCE
By R. Rama Rao 432

GORBACHEV VISIT TO INDIA : A HISTORICAL PERSPECTVE
By S. C. Parasher 447

BOOK REVIEWS

CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION—A Review Article
By S. N. Dhar 459

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INDIA

Foreign and Security Policies

HEMEN RAY : How Moscow Sees Kashmir —R. Rama Rao 463

GAUTAM SHARMA AND R. S. NAGAR (*Eds.*) : India's Northern Security (China, Nepal and Bhutan) —Manoroma Kohli 466

UPENDRA BAXI (*Ed.*) : Mass Disasters and International Liability : The Bhopal case —Brojendra Nath Banerjee 468

Rural Development

S. R. MAHESHWARI : Rural Development in India : A Public Policy Approach —A. S. Seetharamu 471

Education

M. R. BHIDAY : From Isolation to Mainstream : Higher Education in India —M. D. Ushadevi 478

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER — Ashok Jambhekar 482

THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, the publisher of the journal, is a non-government, non-profit and non-party organisation. It was founded in 1943 to encourage and facilitate the objective study of Indian and International Affairs. The Council, as such, does not express any opinion on any aspects of Indian and International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this journal are, therefore, those of the respective authors and reviewers, not of the Council.

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ANTARCTICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

By SANJAY CHATURVEDI

During the 200-odd years, since the circumnavigation of the Antarctica by Captain James Cook (1772-1775), international interest in the continent has grown to such an extent that the frozen Antarctica is now at the centre of a heated political debate. The prophecy of Captain Cook that the world would derive no profit out of it, seems to be proving wrong. Antarctica has now ceased to be merely the most significant 'natural laboratory' and the site of important scientific experiments, it has become, under the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, a subject of 'innovative political experiment' in multilateral administration.[1] *The surrounding oceans, where seals and whales were once recklessly exploited, today harbour a new and fast growing fishery of immense potential,*[2] *while the prospect of offshore oil and gas exploitation lies on the horizon. With the tantalising speculations regarding the existence of more than hundred onland minerals in Antarctica (including gold, copper, lithium and uranium), it is only natural that an increasing number of states should take interest in this so far unnoticed mine.*[3]

Divergence of national interests, perceptions and positions within the Antarctica Treaty System in regard to who owns the Antarctic and its resources—particularly between the Antarctica claimants and the non-claimants—has always led to tensions, latent as well as manifest, within the Treaty System; recently a series of new developments like the United Nations' involvement in the Antarctic question have added to the complexity of the Antarctic political scenario. They have serious future implications for the delicate political equilibrium so far maintained on the continent under the Antarctic Treaty. The questions asked today are: Who owns the Antarctic and how significant are the benefits To be derived out of it? Who is to profit from them? and To what extent the possible uses of Antarctica are compatible with each other?

The essay purports to critically examine, in a historical perspective, the nature, scope and implications of the interaction between the United Nations and the Antarctic Treaty System. While taking note of the earlier attempts made to make possible a UN control of Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the functioning thereof during the 'sixties' and 'seventies', we shall focus our attention on the recent endeavour of some countries to involve the United Nations in the Antarctic Question. The study would include, of course, the nature and scope of the United Nations study of the **Question of Antarctica** *(November 1984) and the ensuing discussions. Thus we shall examine the perceptions of various states, and of the desirability and extent of the role*

* Mr. Chaturvedi is Senior Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Chandigarh.

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UN might play in Antarctica. We shall also take a special note of India's stand in this regard.

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT UN CONTROL OF ANTARCTICA

By 1947, Antarctica had come to be a bone of contention among Britain, Argentina, and Chile—each of them claiming the Antarctica peninsula. In fact, Britain and Argentina even exchanged fire over it. Perceiving a dangerous situation ahead, the United States desisted from staking its own claim to Antarctica and decided to reexamine its goals and policies.[4] A year later, the Department of State chalked out a plan for a proposed international administration of Antarctica by the United States and seven other claimants. The former would pronounce its sovereignty over the unclaimed sector.[5] This would be to 'forestall any Soviet attempt to become a territorial claimant' over any land on Antarctica. This was in response to USSR's stand that they 'have the best right by virtue of discovery and exploration.' Such a calculated move would not only put it 'on an equal juridical footing' with the claimant states but would also exert the required pressure for the 'internationalisation' of the Antarctica.[6]

The proposal was for an eight-power trusteeship under United Nations : 'It is important to our international position that we maintain our full support of the UN and that any onus of weakening and disrupting the UN would remain exclusively upon the USSR.'[7] Of course, the trusteeship system was conceived primarily as a temporary bridge—a means to protect and guide non-self-governing territories to independence. Article 76b of the UN Charter said that a basic objective of trusteeship system was 'to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories.' Without an indigenous population in Antarctica, the concept of trusteeship appeared meaningless and irrelevant to many.[8] Privately the British made it clear that they did not want any kind of UN involvement. More so, because it would offer the Soviets an opportunity to interfere.[9]

The United Nations was only two years old when the suggestion was made in the Trusteeship Council that polar regions be brought under UN aegis.[10] At that time the entire world—even Western governments—loved the United Nations, and the proposal as applied to Antarctica, in the opinion of some commentators, might have taken hold,[11] if it had not been linked with the North Polar region, where the Eastern and the Western bloc were already confronting each other fearfully. This however did not appear to be likely till the end of World War II, against the background of the development of various national interests in the Antarctica region particularly those of the claimant states.

Earlier in 1947, the *New York Times* had advocated for UN Trusteeship, saying that Antarctica should 'be held in trust for all the people of the

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world.'[12] The same year, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (a continuing body formed by Americans after World War I) recommended 'an international regime for the Antarctic continent...with direct administration by the United Nations.'[13] Towards the end of 1948, just weeks after the United States had called for a conference of the parties interested in the Antarctica, Dr. Julian Huxley, Director-General of UNESCO, urged upon the organisation to seek the setting up of an international Antarctic Research Institute, financed and controlled by the United Nations.[14] He suggested that one of the eight nations concerned put the question on the agenda for the forthcoming third session of UNESCO General Conference for discussion. The proposal received a lukewarm reception.

The United States preferred to await the outcome of the negotiations following its proposal.[15] The next year in 1949, Edward Shackelton, son of famous explorer, Member of British Parliament, and later a lord, argued that 'there is no problem in the world which the United Nations is better suited to handle.'[16] The argument that the trusteeship system was designed to protect people, not penguins, he contended, 'is an academic quibble.'[17] Interestingly, Shackelton made his case for internationalisation of Antarctica very weak by adding, 'with the possible exception of Graham Land on which the British feel they have established claims by effective occupation;' by this time, of course all the present claimants had made their bids.

Little more was heard about international controls for Antarctica until late 1955. Now the question was broached in the House of Commons in Britain. By this time the planning for a coordinated Antarctic research programme in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) was well advanced. A number of nations were busy preparing their ventures.[18] There was a tacit agreement among these countries to shelve the political problems attached to Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (July 1957 to December 1958). A renewed activity during the IGY revived interest in the idea of establishing an international regime for the area. For example, on 8 November 1955, when the British Anthony Eden was asked to propose to President Eisenhower and Marshal Bulganin to take steps in this direction, Eden reminded of the failure of the 1948 United States proposal.[19] He pointed out that in fact the sovereignty of Antarctica was vested in a large number of countries, and talking only with USA and USSR would not do.

Of the nations that would soon negotiate the Antarctic Treaty, only New Zealand came forward when in January 1956, Prime Minister Walter Nash proposed a UN trusteeship and the establishment of Antarctica as a 'world territory' under UN control.[20] The proposal witnessed a mixed response. Admiral Byrd of the United States commented : 'the proposal will have to be considered.[21] There was little official response, except an

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oblique one from Australia.[22] In June 1956, a lead editorial of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, warned that the 'rather vague national titles' cannot remain unchallenged for long. It proposed for a recognition internationally of the existing claims which would 'leave Australia in control of the Great Area directly south of her.'[23]

The official British response, quite in tune with that of Australia, came in the form of a reply by Anthony Nutting, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to a question in the House of Commons on 25 April 1956 : 'It was unlikely that any proposals to entrust Antarctica to UN would have any prospects of success....There is no provision in the United Nations Charter for accepting the sovereignty of this or that part of the World.'[24] Kenneth Younger from the Opposition, then enquired if it 'would not be worthwhile trying to get some kind of international negotiations to put an end to this absurd situation', meaning the conflicts with Argentina and Chile over the overlapping Antarctic claims. In reply, Nutting pointed out that the British proposal to take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had been rejected.[25] In addition, the United States' proposal of 1948 had also been rejected by all parties except New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In these circumstances, Nutting said, 'I fail to see what other offers we can make,' and indicated that UK fully intended to maintain its claims to the Antarctica territories.

On 21 February 1956, the United Nations was for the first time requested to take up the Antarctic issue. Arthur S. Lall, India's Permanent Representative requested that the "Question of Antarctica" be placed on the agenda of the 11th General Assembly.[26] The proposal encountered stiff opposition led by Argentina and Chile, and was subsequently withdrawn. In July 1958 another attempt was made by Ambassador Lall, and this time presenting a memorandum that read in part :

> (Antarctica's) mineral wealth... is believed to be considerable and its coastal waters contain important food resources. With the development of rapid communications, the area is coming to have practical significance for the welfare and progress of all nations....
> In view of the growing interest in and knowledge about the area, and in view of the fact that many countries including India are particularly interested in the meteorological aspects and implications of all that happens in Antarctica, it would be appropriate and timely now for all nations to agree and affirm that the area will be utilised entirely for peaceful purposes and for the welfare of the whole world.[27]

A novel point was added to the memorandum, not mentioned two years earlier. It stated : 'The Government of India believes that this limited purpose can be achieved without any nation renouncing such right as it

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may claim in Antarctica, or claims of sovereignty or other rights consistent with the Charter.'[28] It is difficult to say whether or not this made his proposal more palatable to the claiment states. Undoubtedly the time factor was not with him, as the preparatory meetings for the Antarctic Treaty were already under way and once again India was persuaded to withdraw its move. Thus the hopes of experienced scholars of Antarctic politics like Walter Sullivan, 'that success in this great experiment in international cooperation (IGY) would certainly strengthen sentiment within the United Nations for such an approach to the territorial problems of Antarctica,' were belied.[29]

Though the failure or withdrawal of the Indian proposal was the end of the matter, some agencies and comments from outside the United Nations kept the idea alive. For instance, the Tenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace appeared in 1957, reiterating in greater detail its argument for the internationalisation of the Antarctica under the United Nations.[30] Describing the region as 'a strategic centre from which naval and air fleets may control vital sea ways,' the Report averred that the 'world does not need another strategic area to be struggled for, and such a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union would appear to be inevitable if the continent is to be divided up by occupying powers as Africa once was.'[31] After describing its concept of UN administration, the Report concluded : 'Effective occupation in terms of international law has not yet taken place. Thus Antarctica is a continent in search of a sovereign. The UN ought to establish its sovereignty there.'

Some students of Antarctica politics however, expressed grave concern and doubts in regard to the proposed UN takeover of Antarctica. For instance, James H. Wolfe argued that the Antarctic territorial claims are based on power politics and, therefore, cannot be solved on the basis of International Law.[32] He wondered whether the issue of international politics should be made the object of law or would power always be the final arbiter ? And L.F.E. Goldie, writing for the *Australian Quarterly* commented :

> An international organization, be it the Trusteeship Council, or an agency of the General Assembly, or constituted independently of the United Nations, which controls resources of such great extent and value as those of Antarctica would inevitably become an arena of international political manoeuvers...it is surely naive idealism to 'depoliticise' Antarctica merely by handing its control to an international authority.[33]

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THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM : TENSIONS AND CHALLENGES

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was universally hailed as a unique, though modest, limited and relatively cost free attempt at international control which would keep the vast frozen, but potentially rich, continent of Antarctica protected from the scourge of cold war.[34] Otherwise the serene, untouched bottom of the *terrafirma* could well have become an object of international discord and disharmony.

The Antarctic Treaty explicitly committed its contracting members, and also those who would join later, to the principles of keeping Antarctic for 'peaceful' and 'scientific' purposes, in the 'best interests of mankind' and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations[35] The 'demilitarised' and the 'denuclearised' status of Antarctic is to be preserved and the disposal of the nuclear waste most strictly forbidden according to the Treaty.[36] The unprecedented clause of mutual inspection was incorporated in the Treaty to ensure that no activity contrary to the spirit and principles of the Treaty would ever take place.[37] The provision of membership for new entrants was an indication from the original Treaty members to establish a system that would be sufficiently open and flexible, though selective.[38] Thus the 'consultative status' in the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) would be awarded only to those states which successfuly demonstrated 'substantial scientific interest' in Antarctica (meaning thereby, sending of a scientific expedition to Antarctica and setting up of a scientific base). In the final and unanimous judgement of the original treaty members, the decision-making elite with a double-veto would comprise only the Antarctica Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs).[39] The countries with genuine interest in Antarctica and its science can accede to the Antarctica Treaty as ordinary members; hence a two-tier membership.

The Antarctica Treaty however, deliberatcly put the territorial claims and counter-claims on Antarctica as well as the respective positions and 'rights' of the other member states in a sort of 'legal cold storage'.[49] Without bypassing the issue of disputed Antarctica sovereignty, it was felt that no progress was conceivable in the direction of keeping Antarctica only for peaceful and scientific purposes. In the absence of the knowledge of the resource potential of Antarctica and poor polar technology it was thought prudent as well as practical by all the Antarctic Treaty members to keep the explosive sovereignty issue of Antarctica pending indefinitely, along with the related question of the ownership of its resources.[41]

Also, since Antarctica had hardly dawned in the realm of global consciousness the exclusive Antarctica Treaty Group could hope to manage concerned affairs, primarily related to Antarctic science, on its own without any 'outside' interest or interference for a considerably long period. And with mainly the scientific issues and problems to tackle, the Antarctica Treaty System with its slow ad-hoc decision-making mechanism had no

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serious difficulty whatsoever in regard to its functionality till the beginning of 1970. And this new decade turned out to be full of developments with significant and serious implications not only for its uninterrupted functioning but also for its so far unchallenged legitimacy.[42] The fact of growing global resource scarcity and the oil-crisis of early 1970s coincided with the sensational discovery of oil and gas in the Ross Sea sector of Antarctica. Thus more and more covetous national eyes turned towards Antarctica and its continental-shelf.[43] In addition, the speculations over the possibility of finding quite a large number of mineral deposits on the Antarctica mainland, based on various geological findings and the universally accepted Gondwana Land hypothesis,[44] passionately galvanised an increasing number of states besides a number of multinational corporations.[45]

Coming to the Antarctica Treaty System scene, with the vest economic potential of the area looming large on the horizon, the claimants became more vociferous and alarmingly assertive in regard to their respective territorial claims. It is significant to note that New Zealand, earlier a champion of UN control over Antarctica, became as alert and assertive as any other Antarctica claimant state, and so did Australia. The disastrous Falkland War between Argentina and Britain, linked as it was to their over-lapping claims on Antarctica, drew international attention to the southern-most continent and the question of its ownership—Who owns the resources of Antarctica ? Who would benefit out of them and how much ?[46] To the utter panic of the ATCPs the answers were missing at that moment. To make matters worse, the southern waters had thrown up by 1970 the largest fishery stock in the world in the form of 'krill'.[47] And the harvesters of this commercially profitable 'krill stocks' were not only the USSR and Japan (ATCPs, the insiders) but also the outsiders like, Taiwan and South Korea. Before the unmanaged overfishing of krill could do irreversible and irreperable damage to the fragile Antarctica eco-system, the ATCPs decided to put this item on their emergency agenda.[48] Adopting a bifocal approach[49] in regard to the unsettled territorial status of Antarctica, and maintaining the legal status-quo, the ATCPs concluded at Canberra the Convention on the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in May 1980.[50]

The next item on the 'Emergency Agenda' of the ATCPs was the once suspended (though, temporarily, due to the preoccupation with CCAMLR) issue of hammering out an Antarctic Minerals Regime to precede the Antarctic minerals exploration exploitation. It was acknowledged and appreciated at a number of consultative meetings that the path in this direction was beset with a number of complex problem areas.[51] Firstly, the unpleasant and troublesome question of the ownership of Antarctica and its resources which still remained unsettled. It was feared that it might not be possible to carry over the territorial dilemma further onto the mineral regime. Secondly, the fears of the powerful international lobbies of environmenta-

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lists had to be allayed that any mineral activity in the Antarctica would spell the doom of its fragile eco-system thus causing disaster at the same time to the global eco-system. And thirdly, in the wake of rising global interest in Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty System activities, the interests of the larger international community would have to be accommodated in one form or the other. While the first of the problem areas could be designated by the ATCPs as purely an intra-system problem which could be solved by the process of reconciliation and accommodation among the divergent positions the remaining two posed more serious challenges. With a view to encounter the latter considerable rhetoric was resorted to in the form of oral statements and passing of recommendations in the consultative meetings to reassure the environmentalists and the world community at large that their respective aspirations and needs would be looked after in the proposed minerals regime. On the contrary, in reality the ATCPs had blocked an Antarctic oriented FAO programme of the United Nations in line with its previous policy of keeping away the outsiders.

However, the following discussions would show the transformed international political reality and that the ATCPs just could not maintain their monopoly over the Antarctic and its future.

India sent its first scientific expedition to Indian Ocean-Antarctica in 1981 and successfully established its scientific presence in the form of *Dakshin Gangotri* on the Norway-claimed region, pronouncing that the Antarctic should serve the interests of entire mankind rather than those of a privileged few. Refusing to recognise the Antarctic territorial claims, India decided to despatch yearly scientific expeditions to Antarctica. Knowing fully well India's stand on the oceans and its commitment to the principle of the 'common-heritage of mankind' and its growing influence within the non-aligned group, it was but natural for the ATCPs to keep their fingers crossed and await the implications of India's revival of manifest interests in the Antarctic. What if India decided to take up the matter of Antarctica to the United Nations as it had previously done ? And certainly, the reality must have struck the ATCPs that the world of today is not like the world of 1956, and this time India would not be alone but supported by the majority of UN members belonging to the Third World. However it was a surprise, marked by a heavy sense of relief for the ATCPs, when India decided to join the Antarctic Treaty agreeing to abide by its provisions and principles. Seemingly India had decided to work out its strategy from within and not from outside the Antarctic Treaty System and not so surprisingly it was warmly embraced by the ATCPs as its fourteenth consultative member on 12 September 1983.[52]

However, at that time the developing countries' interest in Antarctica was expressed neither vigorously nor constantly. Isolated exhortations made little headway against the Antarctic Treaty System, even if some of

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the consultative parties began to refer to the need to prove that the system promoted the interests of the whole international community. For example, Ted Rowlands, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs opened the 1977 Antarctica Conference Meeting with the observation : 'Whether we like it or not, one of the tests of obligations imposed on us... is whether the decisions we reach are acceptable to the wider world commnuity. The test of that acceptability will largely depend on the clarity with which we are seen to be serving the long-term interests of the Antarctic and the world community rather than short-term illusions of national advantage.'[53]

Such statements might be dismissed as rhetoric designed to pacify the critics. But it is clear that ATCPs have at last been compelled to take note of the reality of interests of the international community in Antarctica.

One reason behind the failure of the 'global common' lobby in achieving success in the 1970s on the Antarctica Question was the developing countries' preoccupation with the UNCLOS (Law of the Sea) talks. The Antarctic Powers could well capitalise on this and they did, although admitting that eventually the application of the common heritage principle to deep seabed would have implications for Antarctica.[54] In 1979, an Antaretic Trcaty Group on Minerals commented that 'representatives were mindful of the developments likely to result from the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea.' A further cause of anxiety was the United Nations General Assembly's approval of the Moon Treaty, which proclaimed that the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies were the 'common heritage of mankind.'[55]

BREAKING THE ICE : THE MALAYSIAN INITIATIVE

At the time of signing the Law of the Sea Convention at Montego Bay in Jamaica (December 1982), Malaysian delegate, Ghazali Shafie made a statement : 'It is time now to focus our attention on another area of common interest... Antarctica where immense potentialities exist for the benefit of all mankind.'[56] In 1982-83 the Malaysian Government emerged as the leading advocate of a UN based alternative to the Antarctic Treaty System. In fact the Malaysian Government headed by its Prime Minister, Mahathir-bin-Mohammad, provided something which the advocates of 'global common' concept had hitherto lacked—namely consistency and thrust guided by a clear sense of purpose.[57] The Malaysian Government proceeded to engage in a well orchestrated campaign aimed at building up international opinion.

The Malaysian Prime Minister launched his campaign on 29 September 1982, a few months before the Law of the Sea signing ceremony, in a speech to the UN General Assembly expressing anxiety over the

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widening gulf between the rich and the poor—protecting the interests of the developing countries against the background of increasing global scarcity of the vital resources.[58] He dismissed the Antarctic Treaty as 'an agreement between a select group of nations which does not reflect the true feelings of the members of the United Nations and desired a new international agreement. In the year 1983, most significant moves took place in March at the Non-Aligned Summit Meeting held at New Delhi, where Dr. Mahathir succeeded in securing the backing of the Non-aligned Movement for at least part of his policy.[59] He sought a detailed study of the Antarctic question by the United Nations ultimately leading to the emergence of an alternative to the Antarctic Treaty. However, the economic declaration issued at the end of the conference restricted itself to considering 'that the UN should undertake a comprehensive study on Antarctica.'[60] Perhaps behind-the-scene lobbying by Argentina, one of the ATCPs, diluted the original demand for an outright criticism of the treaty so that the economic declaration just noted its existence.[61]

In order to provide greater international publicity for Antarctic questions, Malaysia aimed at mobilising the Non-Aligned Movement. As a part of this strategy, a frequent reference was made to the UN-Antarctic theme by the Malaysian Prime Minister. He also used his meetings with other governments to secure declarations of support at the United Nations.[62] In this manner, slowly and steadily Antarctica has become a significant global issue. Governments, like the Caribbean, which had earlier shown no interest in Antarctica came out partly because of their wish to end South Africa's involvement as a consultative party in the Antarctica deliberations.

The Malaysian desire to involve the United Nations persisted, causing considerable anxiety to the consultative parties. Diplomatic pressure was applied by some CPs on some of the critics.[63] These individual and behind-the-curtain efforts were paralleled by a note handed to the Malaysian representative at the United Nations on 29 July 1983 by the Australian Government, acting on behalf of all the CPs—the intra system differences not withstanding. This note emphatically attempted to project the solidarity of the CPs in opposing United Nations intervention. It warned that the revision or replacement of the treaty which Malaysia was aiming at would undermine this system of international law and order in Antarctica with very serious consequences for international peace and cooperation.[64] Significantly, the defence of the treaty had brought together not only the USSR and the USA but also Argentina and Britain. However, these individual and collective diplomatic efforts failed to deter Malaysia and its supporters. On 22 September 1983, Malaysia, Antigua and Barbuda, supported by such governments as Algeria, Pakistan and Singapore, succeeded in having the Antarctica item placed on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

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The agenda reference prepared the way for the passage of a resolution on Antarctica by the First Committee of the General Assembly. The UN Secretary General was the thereafter requested to prepare for the next Assembly 'a comprehensive factual study of all aspects of Antarctica, taking fully into account the Antarctic Treaty system and other relevant factors.' This should be done after consultations with interested governments and organizations, also seeking at the same time the views of the members of the UN on this matter. This would be considered as an integral part of the UN study.[65]

The First Committee's Report was adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1983.[66]

THE UN STUDY—VIEWS OF STATES

The "Study on the Question of Antarctica" prepared by the UN Secretary General was published in November 1984 and discussed and debated the same year by the General Assembly and later on by the UN First Committee (28-30 November 1984). As Peter J. Beck points out, 1 December 1984 was the 25th anniversary of the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, and ironically during the preceding few days, the First Committee of the UN had been discussing the Treaty System. On 30 November it adopted a resolution evading the efforts of several governments, led by Malaysia, to replace the Treaty by an alternative United Nations regime.[67]

Prepared at remarkable speed, and in a record time of about a year, under the direction of Viacheslav Ustinov (Under Secretary General for Political and Security Council Affairs), the UN Study was based on a range of source material, comprising responses and publications submitted by the member governments and interested organisations.[68] Obviously most of the information came, and in a generous manner, from the Antarctic Treaty members (especially the Consultative Parties) who have more knowledge and expertise on the various dimensions of the Antarctic. For instance, Australia's 159-page response was accompanied by two volumes of appendices amounting to 356 pages, with supporting publications. A few steps ahead, Britain contributed some 20 cratefuls of post-1925 research publications. Because of the time constraints and the difficulties in processing and analysing the vast range of source material (and much was either delayed or sent late), it could not have been possible for the Study to feed in all the information.

Still what has come out is quite a comprehensive and a reasonably up-to-date information on the various aspects of Antarctica in the form of a 116-page study. The Study begins with a brief chapter on Antarctica's geographical profile,[69] followed by chapters on the legal and political aspects[70] and the Antarctic Treaty System in practice.[71] The latter chapter

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is divided into six sections covering peaceful use, denuclearisation, international scientific cooperation, exchange of information, environmental protection and the resource regime negotiations. The fourth and the final chapter of the Study examines the nature of Antarctic science and resources.[72] There is no concluding chapter. Here it might be well to highlight the factual nature of a study, which is designed to permit UN members to draw their own conclusions.

It would be somewhat difficult to comment upon the objectivity of the UN Study though an attempt has been made to give a balanced picture of the various political views and national positions in regard to Antarctica. The Study presents a note of reference to a section of world opinion that views the Antarctic Treaty System critically and with suspicion,[73] in the context of the discussions in the First Committee of the United Nations from 28 to 30 November 1983. Since all shades of opinion on the 'Question of Antarctica' find a place in a concise and balanced, albeit bland manner, obviously the governments will read what they want in the Study. But in many places there exists a tacit admission of the merits of the Antarctic Treaty System. For example, referring to the 'generally unsatisfactory situation in Antarctica originating from the conflicting approaches of states to the sovereignty issue' the Study seems to be in agreement with the idea that without the Treaty 'a confrontation on a world-wide scale' might have easily erupted in the area.[74]

The Study does praise the Antarctic Treaty System in regard to the 'peaceful use of Antarctic.' It says :

> For nearly two and a half decades, Antarctica and its surrounding maritime areas have been free from militarisation of any kind, including nuclear weapons. No armed conflict has taken place in the area. Peace on the continent has been maintained to a large extent through the agreements embodied in the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty has provided a frame-work for the parties to the Treaty to carry out peaceful activities related to scientific research, exploitation of marine resources and protection of environment.[75]

In addition, the Study has hailed the Antarctic Treaty as no less effective in conservation.

> It would appear that no major danger has so far occurred to the Antarctic eco-system. Human activities in Antarctica remain very limited...and are being carried out in accordance with the strict rules and regulations imposed on such activities by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties.[76]

It has been quite difficult, as the above illustrations prove, for the Study to avoid such explicit value judgements or indeed to avoid more

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debatable factual statements : for example the claim that the first definite sighting of Antarctica was made on 28 January 1820 by Von Bellinghausen.[77]

What are more revealing and useful in revealing the political currents beneath the various national views on the questions of Antarctica are the three volumes of government responses. And these should be considered as an integral part of the United Nations Study. They provide a detailed and authoritative guide not only to the identity and arguments of the critics of the Antarctic Treaty System but also to the policies and activities of the Treaty Powers. They also come to the rescue of a student of Antarctica politics by providing information on countries from which Antarctic material is less accessible.

Critics of the Antarctic Treaty System

It would be useful to begin with the views of Malaysia which has spearheaded the offensive on the Antarctic Treaty System in the United Nations.[78] Desiring that the UN Study should not merely be a compilation of factual background information on the Antarctica, or merely a recitation of the views of member states and other relevant bodies, Malaysia demanded that it analyse in depth the similarities as well as differences in views of different states over the specific nature and operation of the Antarctic Treaty Regime as this alone would provide a 'broader basis and firmer foundation for international cooperation in Antarctica which would be acceptable to, and in the interest of the international community as a whole.'[79] The Malaysian Government wanted the Study to *interalia* examine in depth the significance of Antarctica to the international community in terms of international peace and security, international economy and more specifically the economy of developing countries with particular reference to its marine and, possibly, mineral resources. Underlining the significance of Antarctic scientific research for mankind, Malaysia demanded that the Study should critically examine the functioning of the Antarctic Treaty System vis-a-vis the objectives and principles enshrined in the Antarctic Treaty, and the role of the consultative and the non-consultative members.[80] Highlighting the question of the Antarctic territorial claims and the history and basis of such claims and the attitudes of Treaty States and non-Treaty States in this regard, the Malaysian response raised the following question :

> If non-claimant Consultative Parties assert that the entire continent and its resources are open to their use, why should such assertions not be made applicable to the international community ?[81]

Malaysia, doubting the significance and validity of these claims in international law, wanted the Study to consider a question :

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> If such claims to sovereignty have not been so recognised, why should Antarctica not be a 'common heritage' and invested in the United Nations ?[82]

In addition it expected the Study to cover the nature and scope of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the legal significance of such negotiations affecting the high seas, a review of the current negotiations for a minerals regime among the ATCPS, questions relating to the international management, national exploitation and benefit-sharing of such resources.[83] Highlighting the significance/danger of a situation in which there is no universal or wide international acceptance of a regime in Antarctica, Malaysia complained that the present machinery for Antarctica has not kept pace with contemporary global realities. It criticised the Antarctic Treaty System :

> The Antarctic Treaty System, with its two tiered membership, is unacceptable because of its exclusivity, its unaccountability, and its secrecy. Membership as Consultative Parties requires the ability to meet stringent qualifications...which can only be met by rich and scientifically developed countries.... While the Consultative Parties assert that they have managed Antarctica in the interests of mankind, it is obvious that the interest of mankind can only be defined and managed by mankind itself. The coincidence of the interest of mankind and the interest of the Consultative Parties is not inevitable or preordained.[84]

Focusing on the deficiencies of the Antarctic Treaty System and the unbearablly omnious presence of South Africa as a consultative member, it says :

> It is firmly of the view that Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind requires a regime that is truly universal in character and committed to serving the interest of the entire international community. In this respect, the exploration of Antarctica and its resources must be carried out for the benefit of mankind.[85]

The Malaysian Government thus approached the subject of Antarctica with an open mind and a sensitivity to the concerns of other member states.

The views expressed by most developing nations, including Antigua, Barbuda, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, the Phillipines, Sri Lanka and Zambia followed or echoed one or the other of the Malaysian guidelines, placing special emphasis on such aspects as participation (most notably, the allegedly exclusive nature of the system), the membership of South Africa and the distribution of Antarctic

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resource benefits.[86] This last issue led several delegations in the ensuing discussions in the UN First Committee (November 1984) to advocate the application of the 'common heritage' principle to Antarctica, that is, to follow the lead of developments regarding the deep sea-bed and outer space.[87] Perhaps the strongest attack on the Antarctic Treaty System was made by Ghana which said that Ghana cannot and will not continue to accept the present situation.[88] The Ghanian representative Ghebo, reserved his government's right to oppose any minerals regime drafted for Antarctica by an 'exclusive and selfish group', which needed 'to recognise and bow to the winds of change sweeping over that continent.'[89]

There were, however, some novel suggestions from some states in regard to the ways by which the Antarctic Treaty can be modified to accommodate the principle of 'universality.' For instance, Antigua and Barbuda[90] mooted the idea of amending Article IV of the Treaty with a view to replace the highly discriminatory membership requirement by a regional representative system. The members of the ATS, they suggested, should be elected on a rotational basis from among the member states of the various regions as estabiished by practice within the United Nations, except where such a member state is already a permanent member by virtue of being a contracting party. The procedure for decision-making should be clearly established and should not accord a veto to any state or group of states. Proposing the establishment of a Secretariat for the Antarctic Treaty within the United Nations, Antigua and Barbuda wanted the new decision-making body (comprising the representatives of the existing contracting parties and representatives of the regions) to assume such tasks and functions as are now undertaken by the Consultative Meetings of the ATCPS. Interestingly, in regard to Antarctic resource exploitation, it was proposed that, 'a system of licensing should be worked out with the benefits of such exploitation being placed into a special fund from which all nations can draw.' Funds should have three components as follows : grants to least developed states, soft loans to less developed states and hard loans to more developed states. This fund should be administered by the World Bank, but should be outside normal World Bank procedures. Last but not the least, a common concern of the group on the offensive was voiced demanding immediate suspension of the work on the minerals regime, currently being undertaken by the contracting parties until a new mechanism for administering Antarctica was established.[91]

A survey of the views of the other developing countries is suggestive of, the fact that the UN Study is being viewed as the first significant step in the direction of wider international discussion and debate on Antarctica and not as the final word. Nevertheless, with the exception of Malaysia, Antigua and Barbuda, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, the views of others lack clarity and thrust.[92] For instance Singapore does not seem to be sure of its stand in favour or against the UN control of Antarctica.[93] Views of

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small states like Surinam, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, Philippines and Nigeria, among others, are brief and almost similar—all desirous of an ideal and just management of Antarctica that would represent the best interests of mankind.[94] Philippines does talk of the urgent need for a UN Study on the 'effect of nuclear war on the Antarctica ice' that could raise the world-wide sea level.[95] Obviously the interest of most of the above-mentioned states in Antarctica is recent and it would be too early perhaps to demand a clear cut, final policy stand from them on the various aspects of the Antarctica Question.

However, it is significant to note that during the five sessions of formal discussions in November 1984, the UN First Committee followed the 1983 precedent, in the sense that they by and large produced the 'general statements of the wellknown views' rather than a meaningful debate.[96] There was, however, a significant difference of approach—Antigua being in favour of a 'reform' and 'democratisation' of the treaty-system while Malaysia preferred an alternative international regime.[97]

Protagonists' Stand

Interestingly, out of fifty-four states that responded to the UN Secretary General's call, nearly twenty-four happen to be the members of the Antarctic Treaty, consultative as well as ordinary. And at least on one point there is a consensus among all the ATCPs that the replacement of the Antarctic Treaty System by any other form of management is neither desirable nor practical. Australia sought to defend on behalf of all the ATCPs, stating at the outset that their divergent positions and attitudes on the Antarctic claims issue must be accepted as a 'fact of life' by all.[98] Dismissing the arguments of the critics—that the Treaty System is anachronistic, discriminatory, preserving the colonial territorial claims, is 'exclusive' and should be replaced by the 'common heritage of mankind' principle, as 'misrepresenting' and 'misconceived'—the Australian defence observed :

> Australia does not agree that the Treaty System is anachronistic. The principles and objectives of the Treaty...are as valid and effective today as they were 25 years ago. The Treaty is open to all, decisions are made by all those directly involved. The system has evolved to meet expanding requirements and continues to do so... it is difficult to conceive of any other formula which would work as well.[99]

Referring to the growing international interest in Antarctica and the criticism of the Treaty as 'secretive' and 'exclusive', Australia joined the rest of the ATCPs in claiming that the international and intergovernmental organisations like FAO had been closely associated with the conservation

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and 'responsible management' of the Antarctic marine resources. It further argued that ATCPs were taking early steps to enable wider international dissemination of information on Antarctica. The enthusiastic assistance rendered to the UN Study on Antarctica was cited as one of such steps. The charges of exclusiveness were attempted to be met by referring to its growing membership, including the accession to the Treaty by India and China among others :

> Its membership is diverse in political, geographic, social and economic terms · the mainpoint at issue here is not exclusivity, but rather the widely observed principle in international relations whereby those countries primarily engaged in a particular activity are responsible for management and decision-taking. This is sensible and workable.... It should be emphasised in this context that consultative parties share important obligations and responsibilities, what benefits there are, mainly in the scientific field, are made freely available to the international community.[100]

The ATCPs, with the exception of India, have always perceived a great threat to the functioning and legitimacy of the Treaty System from the principle of 'common heritage of mankind.' Moreover, the claimants perceive in the concept and its underlying principles an outright rejection of their claims. Without any exception, all the claimants have opposed it arguing that their claims are well founded in international law and supported by an effective occupation.

Possible Alternatives

Coming to the discussions in the UN First Committee, Sorzano, the United States' representative, suggested that there existed 'no justification for the presumption of a dichotomy between the UN System and the Antarctic Treaty System.'[101] In a similar vein, many delegates referred to the need for dialogue in order to achieve a consensus solution. Some delegates from the treaty power took a rigid line, almost verging on confrontation. There was an almost unanimous refusal to countenance either replacement or a parallel mechanism for the region ; the Argentinian and Chilean representatives went further, and indicated their refusal to participate in any other regime.[102] Nevertheless, in general the discussion remained on a low-key level and appeared to attract less official and media interest than in 1983.

The Malaysian objective had been the creation of a special UN committee composed of the representatives from the treaty powers and outsiders, charged to consider specific issues in order to advise the United Nations on an agreed way forward from the UN Study.[103] However, there was no significant support for the Malaysian proposal from the critics in the

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First Committee and received strong opposition from the Treaty members. Even the meeting of the Non-Aligned Governments in New York (1-5 October) had not supported the idea. In the words of the Australian representative, Woolcott, these expressed 'a strong preference to complete consideration of this item in a constructive manner at the year's session' and were not attracted by the implications of Malaysia's suggestion that the UN's involvement was only at an early stage.[104]

Protracted and difficult behind-the-scene negotiations were carried out between Woolcott and the Malaysian representative, Zain, with a view to avert a divisive brawl in the United Nations over Antarctica.[105] They resulted in a relatively mild resolution acceptable to all factions, merely thanking the Secretary General for the UN Study, and placing the topic on the agenda of the 1985 General Assembly.[106] Speaking on behalf of the treaty powers. Woolcott asserted that Malaysia's initiative had gone too far and that the Malaysian Government should reconsider its position and perhaps, even accede to the Treaty. Zain, the Malaysian delegate, expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome, which represented no real advance upon the 1983 solution :

> The draft resolution · is the best that we could come up with in the end.... What the draft resolution has done in essence is to postpone such in-depth discussion and any decisions we may wish to make to the 40th Session of the General Assembly.[107]

The First Committee adopted the resolution without a vote on 30 November,[108] and it was approved by the General Assembly on 20 December 1984.[109]

With the "Question of Antarctica" remaining on the UN agenda, the result of the publication of the UN Study and the formal discussions that followed were interpreted by some as a 'semi-defeat' for the Malaysian campaign and as 'a significant reverse for the developing countries.'[110] Woolcott welcomed the outcome as 'an excellent result for the Treaty powers.'[111] In any event, the UN debate did provide an invaluable amount of information on the various aspects of Antarctica, helping to educate the wider international community on the nature and significance of Antarctica which till quite recently had remained remote, obscure and forbidding and would never be the same again in the times to come.

CONTROVERSY COOLS—CONSENSUS BREAKS

After the 1984 UN debate on Antarctica, it became obvious that the question of Antarctica was still open and would further evoke a larger international response in the coming 1985 UN General Assembly Session. And so it eventually did. But in between, attempts were made by the

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ATCPs both at the political as well as diplomatic level to impress upon the critics that the breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty could lead to very serious implications for international peace and security. The most significant attempt in this direction was made in early January 1985, to cool off the controversy on the future of Antarctica as it stood at the end of 1984. The National Academy of Sciences' Polar Research Board (USA) hosted a 'workshop' for a three-way exchange of views.[112] The site of the workshop was an Antarctic glacier fieldsite—450 miles from the South Pole, and the participants for the meeeting were 56 diplomats and scientists from 26 nations. James H Zumberge, currently serving as the President of the US Committee on Antarctica Research, disclosed in an interview that the purpose of the workshop was to provide a forum for three opposing views on the future of Antarctica : should it continue to be under the administrative control of the Antarctic Treaty; should the Treaty be replaced by a structure that would internationalise Antarctica under the United Nations or an agency within the UN framework; or, should Antarctica be declared an 'international park'—forever off limits to scientific research and resource development—as advocated by some environmentalists ?[113] There were articulate spokesmen of the Malaysian point of view—that country's Ambassador to the United Nations, A. Zain, and Sierra Leone's UN Ambassador Abdul Koroma. China, which had recently acceded to the Treaty, was also represented along with the USSR. And the United States was represented by R. Tucker Scully—State Department's head of Ocean and Polar Affairs. Almost all the views, as were expressed on the UN forum, were duly represented, though this time against the backdrop of icy winds and low temperatures.

The workshop was primarily aimed at exposing the critics of the Antarctic Treaty to the harsh climatic realities of the Antarctic region, which it was hoped would dispel the notion that the Antarctic mineral exploitation lies in the near future, and the proposed mineral regime and the ongoing discussions in this regard were just to fill up the gap in the Treaty System, as the Treaty did not address itself to the resources question. The ATCPs wanted to drive the point home to the divergent shades of opinion that, as the 'stewards' of Antarctica, they had taken good care of the Antarctic environment, and hence, there was nothing to fear. It was also emphasised that the question of sovereignty in Antarctica had just been suspended and not finally decided with USA and USSR retaining rights' to make future territorial claims if need be. Therefore the 'common heritage of mankind' principles could not be applied to Antarctica, as this had been done in the case of oceans and outerspace. If the treaty should ever collapse or be replaced by another, a warning was sounded, this would change the attitudes of countries now working in Antarctica, thus jeopardising one of the great accomplishments of the Treaty—the demilitarisation of a whole continent.

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To quote James H. Zumberge :

> Opposing points of view were advanced very forcefully, but always with respect for all sides - there were no vituperative attacks. And perhaps that was a reflection of the impact of the ambience of the Antarctic on the attitude of the workshop participants and somebody joked that maybe we should move the headquarters of the UN down there.[114]

The ATCPs must have kept their fingers crossed till the opening of the 40th General Assembly Session due in November 1985, with the hope that the exposure to the Antarctic cold might have taken off some heat from the critics of the Treaty. But the events had something else in store. India and China susprised the ATCPs by joining the African nations in a UN Committee to vote overwhelmingly for the expulsion of South Africa from the Antarctic Treaty.[115] The voting held on 2 December 1985, indicated a support by 81, none against and nine abstensions. 35 delegations (among them 15 Consultative Parties) did not participate in voting.[116]

The matter was first raised in the United Nations First Committee on 30 November 1983 by Sierra Leone, acting on behalf of the African group. But it was not pursued.[117] As a Nigerian delegate pointed out, the demand for the ouster of South Africa from the Antarctic Treaty was a part of the pressure brought to bear by the international community on South Africa to make its withdrawal from Namibia. Significantly, for the first time since the question of Antarctica was raised at the United Nations three years ago, international consensus on the future of Antarctica was broken in such a curious manner with 35 delegations, including the ATCPs deciding not to vote on two draft resolutions in the General Assembly's Political Committee. One of them introduced by Pakistan and approved by the Committee (78 to nil with ten abstensions) sought to affirm that any exploitation of the resources of Antarctica should ensure international management and the equitable benefits of such an exploitation. The second resolution proposed by Malaysia, requested the UN Secretary General to update and expand his 1984 Study on the question of Antarctica. It was adopted with a majority of 80 to nil (nine abstensions). Malaysia regretted that there was no consensus on these two resolutions even when they did not aim at undermining the existing Treaty. However a demand was made for the ATCPs to inform UN about their activities and involve the specialised UN agencies.

On the other hand the Australian Ambassador, Richard Woolcott, currently Chairman of the New York group of ATCPs, regretted that the tradition of consensus on Antarctica had been broken even within the Antarctic Treaty System. He also made it clear that ATCPs would not participate in the voting on the two draft-resolutions.

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

THE FUTURE

The questions which now arise are whether the Malaysian viewpoint would prevail and the United Nations would slowly creep into Antarctica; or, with India, which is called the leader of the Non-Aligned among the ATCPs, the ATCPs would hold its ground. Again, whether the move of the African nations, assisted by India and China, would dog the Western Powers into the ATS. With the ghost of anti-apartheid and anti-racialism haunting them everywhere, these powers would find it hard to earn a legitimacy for their stand in the United Nations.

This is yet another example of a confrontation between these powers and the International Organization created by them with such fondness after World War II. Memories are still fresh in our mind as to what happened between UNESCO and USA and UK. One wonders whether the path would one day lead to USA and its allies' dissatisfaction with the entire UN system. There is no doubt that these countries are grilled during all the international gatherings whether held inside or outside the framework of UN. Such events have significance for the students of both Antarctica and the United Nations.

The day is not far perhaps when the members of ATS would grasp these realities and bring in an element of reformism. It appears necessary and possible on the eve of the Antarctica dawning on United Nations and the growing consciousness about what Antarctica has in store for mankind,

It is necessary because it would hold back the tide of mounting pressure by the non-aligned countries which are in great number and have thus become a force to reckon with in the United Nations. Correspondingly, it would be wise to respond to the aspirations of the peoples of the world stemming from their faith in the concept of 'common heritage of mankind.' Some kind of reform can be brought about because of India being in the unique position as a member of ATS on the one hand and a leader of the Non-Aligned on the other. Of course, India would have to reconcile these rather contradictory-looking roles. India can make the international community realize the positive achievements of the Antarctica Treaty and the dangerous implications in undermining it. On the other hand, it can work for reform within the Antarctic Treaty System, making it open not only to the interest of mankind but also to the basic principles of humanity, and the expulsion of South Africa from the ATS will have to be the first step in this direction.

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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY

By R. RAMA RAO*

Most developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean were, until recently, colonies of one or other Western power. The nations of Central and South America too were under the colonial rule of Spain and Portugal. But these Western powers had to vacate their Latin American colonies partly because of pressures by United States and partly because of indigenous freedom movements. In contrast, Asian and African people enslaved by European powers regained their freedom only when the latter had to retreat to their home countries after the Second World War. The United States had then also played its part in facilitating this retreat by Western powers. Colonial rule extending over centuries had effectively reduced the local inhabitants of colonial Asia and Africa to the status of serfs in their own countries impoverishing them and stifling their initiative. This was inevitable considering that the objectives of colonial rulers were to exploit the natural resources of their colonies and utilise the latter's geo-strategic locations to serve their own imperial interests.

OVERT AND COVERT THREATS

DEVELOPING nations have several features in common, namely acute poverty of large segments of their populations, slow economic growth and dependence on the export of one, or at the most, a few primary commodities for earning foreign exchange to meet the costs of importing goods and services needed for their survival. Additionally, they invariably face constant threats to their security from expansionist neighbours or one or the other great power directly or through proxies. The threats could be overt as well as covert; the latter sometimes are far more destabilising than the former. Overt intervention by a neighbouring country or by an external power invariably unites the country that is under attack except in cases where a strong dissident minority in the victim country chooses to side with the invaders. In the case of covert operations, the country is disintegrated from within, destroying the people's moral fibre. In such cases the external power acquires the ability to influence events within the target country and its environs at little cost and at no risk.

Conflicts in the Third World and Great Powers' Objectives

In the first three decades after the end of the Second World War there have been 119 wars; fortunately they did not involve the use of nuclear

*Mr. Rama Rao is at the Birla Institute of Scientific Research, New Delhi.

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weapons. These wars were fought over the territories of 69 countries in which the armed forces of 81 countries were involved. Almost all the wars were fought in developing countries.[1] If we consider the period 1945-1982, the interval from the end of the Second War to the end of the Falklands War, the world witnessed 148 wars of which only ten were fought in countries other than the developing world.[2] A developing country that is ravaged by war and in the process is perhaps even dismembered, would take years to recover from the effects of war. Developing countries continue to face direct military threats from Great Powers or their regional *surrogates*. Even more serious are covert threats from the Great Powers. Target countries in all the three continents, Asia, Africa and Latin America have been victims of covert operations and still are. Invariably, countries which a Great Power wants to destabilise or subjugate are subjected to covert operations on an extensive scale and at some stage, if considered necessary by the Great Power, such operations are reinforced by guerillas and mercenaries recruited from dissident elements in the target country as well as from the ranks of international gangsters. These irregular forces, armed, financed and directed by an external power, or powers, would seek to paralyse administration in the designated victim country and demoralise the public by destroying infrastructural facilities. The Great Power master-minding such operations could have one or more of several objectives. It might wish to initiate covert operations or cause such operations to be initiated in order to raise the level of security threats to the designated victim thus compelling the latter to divert its resources from development to defence. Alternatively, the Great Power may seek to 'soften' the target country so as to compel it to cede territory to a neighbour or it may simply seek to secure military bases on the territory of the victim and more generally to gain direct or indirect control over the region. Even these are not the ultimate objectives of some Great Powers, more especially of those that consider that they are dependent on the Third World for strategic materials. These powers are anxious to gain and retain control over irreplaceable natural resources of the developing world. Gaining access to and retaining control over key points in third world countries owning natural resources such as oil, manganese, tin, chromium, copper, platinum metals, radio active minerals, vanadium and other materials, is part of this strategy. By extension of the argument, denial of access to such raw material owning countries of the Third World, for the rival power is also part of the strategy. This in fact is the real reason for the Super Powers' arms race and their seemingly interminable cold war.

Most of the newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and the Latin American region, which are all part of the developing world have, during the past four decades, been victims of direct and indirect aggression and still face security threats in one form or another. The level of these

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threats have risen since the great powers are seeking military bases in countries which may be of strategic interest to them so that they could position rapid deployment forces, stockpile weapons and ammunition, build communication facilities and be ready for intervention in third world countries of the region. Such intervention could be either for ensuring that a pliable ruler stays in power in a client state or for toppling a ruler or government in a developing country pursuing an independent foreign policy.

Arms Sales to the Third World

Arms sales and gifts to third world countries and denial of arms sales to some among them have proved to be effective instruments of foreign policy by Great Powers.[3] Besides, arms sales subserve the economic interests of sellers by earning foreign exchange, providing employment for skilled workers, subsidising weapons research and development costs and enabling arms producing countries to clear their stocks of obsolescent weapons. These are substantial gains for the arms-exporting countries. Additionally, sellers acquire influenc over the policy-makers in the developing countries that buy weapons and related items. Another aspect of arms sales and/or gifts by Great Powers to third world countries is that in some cases, the gifts or sales of arms are made specially to enable the recipient to pose security threats whether by being able to launch a full scale attack or by acting as a launching pad for covert or guerrilla operations in a neighbouring country. In either case, the arms suppliers' intention would be to coerce the intended victim.[4] The history of developing countries over the past three decades provides numerous examples in support of these observations. The experiences of a few developing countries in the three continents may be considered by way of illustration.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

The larger countries of the region, namely Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are endowed with rich natural resources, especially Brazil whose full potential has yet to be developed. Mexico is endowed with oil while Argentina has developed its agricultural potential. All three would have developed rapidly but for difficulties resulting from their earlier fiscal and other policies. As of now they have accumulated huge external debts and their primary concerns during the rest of the decade would be to clear them. There need be no doubt that these countries will soon emerge from the trap into which seemingly useful foreign debts and 'aid' have landed them. Their experiences ought to serve as a warning to all developing countries to be wary of foreign 'aid'[5] since it may turn out to be extremely expensive economically as well as politically.

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Among the others, Venezuela is rich in oil and has developed fast. Ecuador too is rich in oil. Peru has developed its fisheries potentail. Bolivia has vast reserves of tin and other metals while Chile has copper reserves. The other countries of the South American continent too are well endowed with natural resources which they have to harness for the good of their people. The states of Central America may not all have such resources but they too have vast developmental potential. They have, however, to contend with two problems ; first, the lack of good neighbourliness among them which in the past led to frequent clashes as for example between El Salvador and Honduras. Secondly, they have to exist under the shadow of the United States which may not take kindly to countries whose regimes try to adopt independent foreign policies. The same is the experience of the countries of South America.

In terms of the Monroe Doctrine, USA has often intervened in the affairs of the countries of Central and South America. Such intervention, whatever the ostensible reason, in most cases stemmed from down to earth economic considerations. Thus in the early fifties, the United States intervened in Guatemala bringing about a change in regime so that the United Fruit Company could operate in that country unhindered. In the early seventies, Chile was destabilised because its President, the late Salvador Allende, was endeavouring to widen his country's contacts with the outside world. More recently, USA was encouraging El Salvador to maintain tensions with neighbouring Honduras. Grenada, a tiny state, was invaded and its regime changed, since the ousted regime wanted to build a modern airport on its soil in order to encourage tourism. The destabilisation operation against Nicaragua is continuing. In this case the United States is using CIA financed and trained 'guerrillas' based in El Salvador and Honduras to do the unpleasant task. Nicaragua has endeavoured to follow an independent foreign policy and America's objective apparently is to teach not only that country a lesson, but to other Latin American countries as well. USA has been steadily increasing the tempo of covert operations in Nicaragua.[6] According to some American observers, CIA's active policy may lead to direct intervention by US forces and eventually Nicaragua may become another Vietnam, but one at America's door step.

AFRICA

Most of the countries of Africa which were under colonial rule have regained their freedom. However, there is one country, South Africa, which, still in occupation of Namibia, is carrying on guerrilla operations in neighbouring Angola with the help of dissidents and is holding in bondage in South Africa itself almost three quarters of its own people under the infamous system of apartheid. South Africa has also not chosen to relinquish control over Namibia despite several United Nations resolutions

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The United States and Britain appear none too keen to secure South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. There could be several reasons. First, a free Namibia may impose restrictions on the exploitation of its uranium and other high value and scarce minerals. As of now, Britain through its multinational corporation, Rio Tinto Zinc, is fully exploiting Namibia's uranium mines, Second, both Britain and USA have invested in South Africa's industries and commerce and perforce have to be soft towards that country if only to safeguard their investments. Third, the United States would like South Africa and its proxy UNITA under Jonas Savimbi to continue to exert pressure on Angola so as to replace its present government by one under Savimbi or another leader amenable to the United States and South African influence.[7] In fact, this has been the American objective ever since Portugal withdrew from Angola and an independent left-oriented government of Angolans took over. To attain its objectives, US consistently supports covert operations inside Angola by dissident groups financed and supported by the CIA and South African agencies. Fourth, South Africa's shadow looms large on neighbouring African states – Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana which as part of their colonial legacy have to depend, in varying measure, on South Africa for trade and communications. The autonomous development of southern African states would be speeded up when a genuinely representative, government emerges in South Africa. Finally, in South Africa itself, the long suppressed Africans have begun to assert themselves. Should the racist minority rulers of South Africa realise that in their own long term interests, they should take steps to democratise the country's government, all would be well. The longer this process is delayed whether by covert operations or by other means the greater would be the probability of uncontrollable violence erupting in South Africa.

WEST ASIA

In West Asia, after Egypt made peace with Israel, alienating in the process fellow Arab countries, it was the general belief in Egypt and other 'moderate' Arab countries that Israel would not embark on further aggressive adventures and hopefully help enlarge the area of peace. However, these hopes proved to be ill-founded and Israel once again resorted to the use of force, this time invading Lebanon in order to annex the southern region and exterminate the Palestinian entity, in which task it has all but succeeded. Israel has proved once again that it is the pre-eminent power in the region and furthermore that Arab and still less the wider Islamic comity of nations are neither keen nor able to present a united front even when one of them is invaded or is being destablised by their common enemy.

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To add to the comfort of Israel and its principal supporter, a fratricidal strife has been raging in the Gulf region for over four years with most Arab states supporting Iraq and a few Iran. Ironically, this war was started by Iraq by repudiating the 1975 Agreement regarding Shatt-al-Arab which had been concluded by President Saddam Hussain himself and the Shah of Iran at Algiers. The agreement was in accordance with international conventions regarding the demarcation of the median line (*thalweg*) of the river which separates two sovereign states as their common boundary. This agreement restored the boundaries between the two states as they had been in 1913 in terms of a treaty concluded between the Turkish Empire, whose frontiers then extended up to the Shatt, and the Persian Empire. The British who were governing Iraq as the protecting power after the dissolution of the Turkish Empire had, to suit their imperial interests, extended Iraq's frontier at Iran's expense so as to include the entire river within it.

After unilaterally repudiating the 1975 Agreement, Iraq started its attack on Iran. For some time prior to the attack however, Iraq-Iran relations had steadily deteriorated because of Iraq's fears that Iran's Shia fundamentalism might subvert a considerable portion of its Shia population and not only undermine President Saddam Hussein's position but also destablise the country by instigating the Kurds as well as dissident Shia Iraqis to revolt. For its part, Iran although keen on converting Iraqi Shias to fundamentalism, was apprehensive that Iraq would provide bases for dissident Iranians who might, with external help, re-enter Iran and dislodge the Ayatollahs. Such a government in Iran would have been well disposed towards America as well as Iraq. Even now, if Iraq wins or if the Revolutionary Government in Iran falls because of cracks within, the United States and its allies in the Gulf region would be happy.

Earlier, when Iraq started the war, the general belief was that the United States, following its dispute with Iran after the Shia Revolution, wanted Iraq to start a war in order to encourage moderate elements within Iran to assert themselves and gain control over the country. When victory eluded Iraq, the United States and the West seemed to consider that a prolonged war in the region, provided it did not spread beyond the borders of the two contestants, would serve western interests just as well. Such a development would enable the West to sell their surplus arms to one or both the countries waging war as well as to their affluent neighbours. Further, the longer the duration of the war, the more impoverished the two countries would become and hence more amenable to western influence. A prolonged war would generate opposition within the two countries to their respective ruling groups and enable outside powers, such as the United States, to influence developments in the region with less effort and at little expense.

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The war has already disrupted oil production in both countries thus drastically reducing their export earnings. Their foreign exchange reserves, built up during the seventies, have been dissipated. On top of this, the costs of importing arms and of waging war have mounted—costs not merely in terms of dollars but even more in terms of destruction of or damage to infrastructural facilities and human suffering. Besides, there are the more serious threats of destabilising incumbent regimes and with that their countries as well.

India and countries of the Non-Aligned Movement have from the very beginning been endeavouring to persuade the two warring countries to agree to a cease fire and commence talks with a view to resolve their differences. The efforts of United Nations representatives too have been of little avail. The Islamic Conference states also sent emissaries to the two countries on similar missions but achieved little.

From Iran's point of view, the various mediatory missions did not have much to offer, since it wanted first an admission by Iraq that it started the war ; second, that President Saddam Hussein should step down from power, and third, that Iraq should reimburse Iran for war losses amounting to $ 150 bn. Although Iraqis themselves, once the war is over, may secure the resignation of President Saddam Hussein, they are unlikely to bring this about under circumstances which may suggest that Iraq has succumbed to Iran's dictates. Also Iraq would not be able to meet the huge indemnity that Iran is demanding, even if its oil facilities are repaired and earlier production levels attained. The other condition namely that Iraq should admit its guilt seems likewise to be difficult of fulfilment, since an aggressor can be compelled to admit that he has committed aggression only if he is decisively defeated on the battlefield or its government is brought down by popular uprising or external intervention.

Judging from developments so far, it is difficult to be optimistic about an early end to the war, although India and the Non-Aligned nations generally desire its early termination. Affluent Arab States too, who have been financing Iraq, desire an early settlement of the dispute although they may be equally concerned about the possibility of any settlement which may mean Iran's victory and the perpetuation of the rule of Shiite extremists in Iran. Most important, unless the Great Powers who are supporting the two warring neighbours stay neutral and stop arms supplies to both, peace initiatives of the Non-Aligned and UN organisations may not have a chance of success and the Gulf war may continue.

Pakistan's ruling elite may consider that continued tension in the Gulf region would be to their advantage on several counts. First, it would ensure that with the Gulf having become vulnerable to its shipping, Iran would increase its purchases from Pakistan, as indeed it has been doing for some time. Second, the continuation of the war and consequent uncertainties in the region would increase the demand for

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Pakistani personnel for security duties in the Gulf Arab States. Third, it would also raise the value of Pakistani bases in Baluchistan and Sind for America and finally, because of US presence on its soil, Pakistan would be able to negotiate with India from a position of strength.

SOUTH ASIA

It is six years since Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in response to President Babrak Karmal's request. Earlier, Pakistan had been endeavouring to persuade Afghan leaders, starting from the late President Daud, to join the United States' camp. After President Daud's assassination these efforts suffered a setback but were resumed and intensified when President Hafizullah Amin succeeded Taraki following the latter's assassination. Since then Afghan dissidents are being supplied with arms and sabotage equipment, trained in their use, financed and sent to Afghanistan for creating and maintaining unrest. Dissidents are regularly reinforced by the United States, Chinese and Pakistani saboteurs. Afghanistan can have peace and be able to provide facilities for emigre Afghan families to return only if and when US halts its covert operations inside Afghanistan and enables the Soviets to withdraw their forces and both the Super Powers guarantee Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment. Pakistan, for its part, would like the Afghan crisis to continue as that would mean the continuation of the flow of US funds into Pakistan for providing shelter and arms to Afghan refugees. Above all it would enhance Pakistan's value for the United States and China which would further reinforce Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India.

India's endeavour, in contrast, is to reduce regional tensions so that countries of the region could devote all their energies and resources for development in an environment free from great powers' interference. It was hoped that, President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachov at their recent meeting at Geneva (November 1985) would agree to call off destabilisation operations (by the US and its friends) in unhappy Afghanistan and withdraw troops (by the Soviet Union) simultaneously besides undertaking to respect that country's sovereignty and non-alignment. However, the summit meeting seems to have concluded only to continue talks regarding all outstanding issues. Thus it may mean business as usual for US, China and Pakistan regarding covert operations in Afghanistan.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Kampuchea, which is passing through a difficult period, Pol Pot,[8] who exterminated over a million of his own people and virtually destroyed the country's economy may be endeavouring to return with the support

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of China notwithstanding reports ro the contrary, while Heng Samrin with Vietnamese help is trying to restore normalcy and put the country back on its feet.

The Kampuchean Crisis began in fact, not with the flight of Pol Pot into Thailand, but in 1970 when President Nixon in order to mute domestic criticism of the conduct of the Vietnam War ordered American troops to march into Kampuchea.[9] The intervention served to destabilise a small country whose only fault was that it wanted to be left in peace. The dictator regimes that were in power in Kampuchea following the intervention were able to serve neither their American masters nor the people of Kampuchea. Pol Pot, the last of that species, literally uprooted millions of his people from their homes as part of his programme for levelling inequalities. So devastating has been the result that Kampuchea has to be recreated from scratch and its people rehabilitated, a task which the new government is tackling in earnest with help from Vietnam. However, Kampuchea is not being permitted to attend to its urgent task of rehabilitating its people because of threats posed by an expansionist China which is utilising dissidents to wage its proxy war inside Kampuchea from sanctuaries across Thai borders.[10] China's aim, obviously, is to gain direct access to the Gulf of Thailand from across north eastern Burma, Thailand and Kampuchea, and pose threats to Vietnam. China's long term objective is to dominate continental Southeast Asia, and gain control over the entire South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand and the Malacca Straits. Destabilising activities in Kampuchea and the continuing pressures on Vietnam from the north have to be seen as part of this strategy.

Countries of the Third World have to reckon with the realities of global power politics of today. One Super Power is endeavouring to establish its pre-eminence by controlling all critical sea lanes, securing military bases at strategic locations and islands of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean regions in order to dominate third world countries and contain the rival Super Power within its national frontiers. An important element of this strategy is to destabilise third world countries considered to be close to the Soviet Union.[11] India may come under this category, although some US security policy analysts have suggested that raising threats to India's security beyond a point may force India to exercise the nuclear option and move still closer to the Soviet Union.[12] Even so, Indian policy-makers have to recognise the harsh reality that the Super Power that now dominates South Asia and the Indian Ocean will not mind if its regional *surrogates* attack, occupy and, or otherwise destabilise a non-aligned neighbouring country such as India, provided the Super Power's own interests are not thereby affected. India obviously is not of concern for the United States since its former ambassador at the United Nations had suggested that India should be fragmented into five or six manageable bits.

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SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR PEACE

Although the most obvious threats to the freedom and integrity of developing countries arise from expansionist neighbours acting on their own or with the connivance of a Great Power, there are other threats too that developing countries have to counter. These arise from the trade policies of the rich and technologically advanced nations that are only interested in securing irreplaceble natural resources from the developing world. Unless developing countries learn to process their raw materials (copper, tin, other metallic ores and primary products) before export, their terms of trade would deteriorate further, with a corresponding reduction in their real income from exports. This in turn will mean further widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. The moral is to strive to aequire self-reliance not merely in defence but in economic development as well. Fostering closer South-South cooperation, strengthening the unity of the non-aligned group of nations and expanding their role in international fora are important not merely for ensuring the survival of weaker and non-aligned nations but also for preserving peace in the world.

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4 Julius Nyerere in "Devils Flunkey," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 January 1971, has observed : "You can trade with people you dislike. You can have diplomatic relations with governments you detest. You can sit in conference with nations whose policies you abhor. But you do not sell arms without saying in effect—'In the light of the receiving country's known policies, friends and enemies, we will be on their side. In case of conflict we shall want them to defeat their enemies."

5 A Pakistani political analyst, the late A. Chaudhary stated in *Dawn* (Karachi), 29 April 1984, that a developing country gets in fact only about 30 cents value for every dollar of foreign 'aid'. He also pointed out that foreign aid is self-financing, in that debtor nations continue to pay interest charges on aid and buy equipment from aid-giving countries at exhorbitant prices. Furthermore the equipment would often prove to be obsolescent

6 The United States is in fact stepping up aid to *CONTRAS* for intensifying guerrilla operations inside Nicaragua. See "Senate Approves Hike in Aid to *CONTRAS*—A Report from Washington," in *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 23 November 1985.

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7 The CIA has decided to step up its support to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA so that the latter could intensify destabilisation operation in Angola. See—"What Could Trigger a Super Power Conflict : A Study by Correspondents," *Sunday Times* (London), reproduced in *Times of India* (New Delhi), 17 November 1985. See also, Tanjug News Report of 23 November in *Patriot* (New Delhi), 24 November 1985, indicating that South Africa has massed a force of 20,000 troops including 150 tanks, 400 guns, 300 mortars and 80 aircraft and helicopters in Namibia close to the Angolan borders. South Africa's objective obviously would be to support Savimbi's forays into Angola. China has indicated its support to South Africa by secretly providing it with nuclear technology according to a Congressional source. See *Times of India*, 12 November 1985.

8 Pol Pot reportedly has now relinquished leadership of the Kampuchean dissidents operating from Thailand and has gone into retirement.

9 How popular the invasion of Kampuchea was with American troops can be judged from the fact that they marched into Kampuchea with banners reading: "We, the unwilling, are being led by the incompetent, to do the unnecessary for the undeserving."

10 In order to convince China that it continues to enjoy US support, the latter has decided to provide some funds for Kampuchean guerrillas operating from Thai bases. The US House of Representatives had voted to provide $ 5mn to Kampuchean guerrillas for combating anti-communist activities in July 1985. See, "What Could Trigger a Super Power Conflict," n. 7.

11 Daniel Ellsberg, the well known author of *Pentagon Papers*, has observed that smaller or less powerful countries towards which USA is ill disposed are considered to be either aligned with or have received aid from the Soviet Union. Daniel Ellsberg, *Nuclear Armaments : An Interview with Dr. Daniel Ellsber*, (Berkeley, California, 1980). See also, R. Rama Rao, *India and the Atom*, Birla Institute of Scientific Research, New Delhi, 1982 pp. 86-87.

12 Rodney W. Jones, *Nuclear Proliferation : Islam, the Bomb and South Asia*, Washington Papers, No. 82, 1981, pp. 81-82. Jones has argued that close US-China-Pakistan security ties are likely to be viewed with great concern by India leaving the latter no option but to move closer to the Soviet Union.
Hence, he suggests that US should 'avoid excessive or permanent polarization (in the Indian sub-continent) and provide security reassurance and support for Pakistan in such a way as to limit military threats to India...'

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SINO-SOVIET DETENTE IN THE MAKING

T. KARKI HUSSAIN*

Increasingly, the trend in Sino-Soviet normalization has acquired the kind of high visibility which compels serious attention within India. There are several valid reasons for our interest in the matter. Historically, both the Sino-Indian dispute and the Sino-Soviet split occurred in the fifties when the parties concerned had appeared to the outside world as friends and allies. In subsequent developments, the sixties began with a border war between India and China and ended with another border war between China and the Soviet Union. Although the nature of China's bilateral controversies, leading to actual confrontation with India and Soviet Union, were not identical in their origin and evolution, chronologically, its durability with either protagonist has spanned more than a quarter of a century.

More recently, an almost parallel movement towards a **rapprochement** *is taking place, formally signified by an ongoing process of seven rounds of Sino-Soviet consultations and six meetings between the Indian and the Chinese representatives till date. Although their initial differences concerning some political issues persist, China and the Soviet Union have been interacting with each other at a frequency which was unimaginable barely a couple of years ago. In 1985, for example, more than 70 visits were exchanged between the two erstwhile adversaries. Following the 27th Congress of the CPSU which ended on 3 March 1986, in the forthcoming weeks sometime, Soviet First Vice-Premier Arkhipov is scheduled to visit Beijing to review bilateral, economic, scientific and cultural relations. Later, in the summer of 1986, Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers will hold important talks with each other which are expected to contribute further towards normalization. Similarly, Sino-Indian contacts at several levels have also grown considerably.*

It may be explained that it does not lie within the scope of this article to examine the derivative triangular linkages present in the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Soviet issues or to argue that the apparent dynamic of the Sino-Soviet thaw would weaken India's bargaining position **vis-a-vis** *China and therefore a border settlement should be precipitated in order to match the pace of the evolving pattern in Sino-Soviet relations. Rather, the following presentation precludes any juxtaposition with the Sino-Indian problems and focuses almost entirely on certain initiatives*

Ms. Hussain is a UGC Senior Fellow at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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taken by the Chinese leadership which have rendered its earlier posturing somewhat obsolete and created an opportunity for it to weigh the Soviet factor afresh in the immediate perspective. Finally, the article seeks to analyse the imperatives behind Beijing's current moves within the larger framework of the primary objective of removing once for all the backward economic status of the country. However, to the extent that the process of Sino-Soviet normalization flows from the shifts in China's foreign and domestic policies, its implications for India are self-evident and for that very reason worthy of our deep interest.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE GREAT-POWER TRIANGLE

WITHOUT going into the details of China's foreign policy, it may be sufficient to note that while its objective has remained constant, its operational aspects highlight its transitional nature. Basically, the periodic adjustments which the Chinese force on themselves pertain to their desired equation with the Super Pöwers. Here, we are not concerned with the fact that Mao onwards, all its leaders have acted on the belief that China is destined to play an important international role, ideologically as well as in the diplomatic sphere, and, have encountered tremendous resistance from their Soviet counterpart who have viewed their own historical primacy as immutable. Rather, our immediate interest lies in tracing the outcome of the process of transition on Sino-Soviet relations in which the above factor has contributed to some extent.

Historically, relations between China and the Soviet Union have been characterised by an abrupt transformation of their cooperative essence into harsh conflict which spread on a gigantic scale, involving simultaneously the ideological premise, the domestic developments, and some external factors. It may be argued that Mao saw himself as the natural heir to communist leadership after the overpowering personality of Stalin disappeared from the political scene Mao's innovative contribution to Marxist-Leninist strategy for capturing political power in agrarian societies justified this self-image. Moreover, at a time when the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with the management of East-West relations, Maoism had begun to advance its own logic of dealing with the West, but on terms different from those employed by Khrushchev. The latter's pursuit of accommodation with the United States directly affected Chinese national interests, poised as the United States was against any concessions being shown to China However, Mao had sufficient agility to place the problem of Sino-US relations in the narrower ideological framework by consciously underplaying its nationalist context. Making a virtue out of necessity, Mao thereby played a significant part in projecting a distorted image of Soviet policy

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till such time that he began to perceive a change in the American attitude.

The US factor was only a part of the motivation and developed into a more tangible, active dimension at a later stage. It may be recalled that within China, a zenophobic perception, slowly evolving since the Great Leap Forward, had begun to take a commanding position during the peak years of the Cultural Revolution. In this period, China's foreign relations had come under considerable strain with several countries but had affected Sino-Soviet relations in the most serious manner. Thus, while differences had existed between China and Soviet Union in the fifties, it was only when Maoism emerged in an extreme form that they assumed the certainty of a military confrontation which came about in 1969. Earlier, the escalation of American armed intervention in Indo-China where the Maoists were deeply, albeit indirectly, involved on the opposite side had further complicated the outstanding scenario by highlighting China's vulnerable position as a result of its relative isolation. The breakthrough in Sino-US relations, for which Mao and Zhou Enlai channelized all their diplomatic efforts as enthusiastically as Nixon and Kissinger, may be viewed partly as a strategic response of the Chinese leaders to their perceived Soviet threat.

In the seventies, the triangular concept had picked up an effective momentum and seemed to be fully operational. In strategic terms, a major US objective in the Sino-Soviet conflict was aimed at pressurizing the Soviets by threatening to build up China's power. On their part, the Chinese remained highly critical of the Soviet Union in sharp contrast to an apparently blossoming intimacy with the United States under the banner of an anti-hegemony coalition of forces which became most vocal during the period immediately following Mao's death. Apparently, despite fundamental differences in systems, ideologies, organisations and structures, Sino-US relations have thrived on an anti-Soviet plank. They have both shared a common view of Soviet military strength, Soviet militant diplomacy in Africa, Soviet help in building Vietnam into a regional power and Soviet gains in South West Asia. While such a commonality of interests still remains intact, China has begun to redefine the parameters of its understanding with the US. A passing reference may be made to the fact that the Chinese verbal attacks on the Soviet global regional policies made during the last phase of the Carter administration had earned for it the dubious distinction of being NATO's 16th member.

At this stage, it may be appropriate to sum up the salient turns in Chinese foreign policy which in fact somersaulted from a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union against the United States in the fifties to strategic cooperation with the United States against Soviet Union in the subsequent period. However, as the eighties unfolded a changed

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global environment, alongwith the installation of an extreme right-wing American Administration under President Reagan, China began to distance itself from the United States under the rubric of an independant foreign policy. Thus, the revised world view of China shows a greater sense of objectivity and realism with its pronouncement of non alignment between the Super Powers. Lest the current shift be construed as equidistance, the Chinese leaders have hurried to elaborate that it is not an appropriate interpretation, 'for China ..equidistance is out of question. We cannot indiscriminately blame the USA and the Soviet Union equally for something which only one of them holds the responsibility or the main responsibility . . . . '[1] It may be noted that these views which were published in an important Chinese journal *Liaowang* in July 1984 formed part of a general outline of China's foreign policy, its essential theme being that China would not allow the United States to turn it into a 'card' for dealing with its opponent. Earlier, while on an official visit to the United States in January 1984, Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang had rather studiously refrained from making any anti-Soviet observation which came out as a sharp relief to Deng Xiaoping's scathing denunciation of Soviet behaviour during his 1979 American voyage. Simllarly, China censored public criticism of Soviet policies made by President Reagan when he visited China in April 1984.

Subsequently, the Chinese leaders have made pointed disclaimers about using one super power against the other and assert that 'China's policies towards the United States and the Soviet Union are made separately according to the conditions of bilateral relations rather than on the basis of any triangular considerations.'[2] Considering the fact that throughout its post-1949 history, China has tried to overcome its weakness by drawing on the support of one major power or the other, such statements may stem from a deliberately invoked amnesia and represent superficial rhetoric rather than the actual reality. However, it may be that while China has emerged as a part of the triangle, it deems it expedient to disentangle its Soviet policy from the triangular game in which the shots could be called by a stronger partner, specifically the United States, the basic stimulation of whose global policies derives from its ideological antipathy to communism. Presumably, the decline of China's appeal in the Third World as a consequence of its explicit fraternization with the United States has come as a stern reminder to its leaders. Besides, such an association, especially in the realm of military cooperation rather than being an ideal counterweight to the Soviet Union, was on the verge of becoming counter-productive as far as its own maneouverability of action was concerned. The realization has made China retrace its steps from the high peak of hostility by responding to the conciliatory overtures of the Soviet leaders. While being farthest from a middle road position, China since the 12th Party

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Congress in August 1982 has begun to stress its even-handedness by attributing to 'the Super Powers hegemonist practices and their rivalry throughout the world as the source of world tension.'[3] The trends reflect China's concern to maintain its own identity while pursuing the ideal of an equitable relationship in the over-all triangular complex. In an address rendered at the British Royal Institute of International Affairs on 6 June 1985, Premier Zhao claimed that 'China definitely will not enter into an alliance or strategic relationship with any big power. We seek a steady development of Chinese-American relations on the basis of the observance of mutual agreements by both sides, We hope to see normalization of Sino-Soviet relations through the removal of the existing obstacles,'[4]

OBSTACLES TO SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Without going into a detailed account of the issues raised by the Chinese over a major period of their estrangement with the Soviets, it may suffice to note that they have not accrued at the same time but were added up in reaction to certain developments in China's immediate vicinity and logically, therefore, should be reassessed in terms of their importance both in time and context. For instance, the Soviet response to China's dangerous decade of nervous defense-preparation in the form of underground shelters, grain storage and raising of more than 80 army divisions to face the Soviets was to build a formidable military force along the Sino-Soviet borders, both in quality and sheer numbers as suggested by development of approximately 135 SS-20s, 100 Backfire bombers and 52 military divisions armed to the teeth. Besides, the Soviet naval power in the Pacific has grown considerably, its regional fleet being the largest of its 4 fleets. Of late, though China wants the Soviets to reduce their heavy concentration of troops, it seems inclined to treat the Soviet military presence more as a challenge to the American position and to Japan than posing direct threat to its own security.

Ostensibly, the Chinese leaders continue to refer to the lack of progress in the political field and blame the Soviets for the *impasse*. There is no occasion where the Chinese leaders do not mention the three obstacles with devotional fervour. Li Xiannian, the Chinese President visiting Canada and US in July 1985, was at pains to reassure his North American hosts that Soviet intransigence in accepting China's preconditions on support to Vietnam, alongwith the presence of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan and on the Sino-Soviet frontier, could not be justified.[5] Deng Xiaoping repeated identical statements before a visiting Japanese delegation. Referring to the visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier Yao Yilin to Moscow, Deng told the Japanese guests that significant

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progress was registered in the economic field and the exchange of advisers and experts. However, owing to the persistence of the three major obstacles, there are limits to the development of Sino- Soviet political relations.

One may ask whether these obstacles continue to remain as insuperable as the above statements make them out. Specifically, whether Afghanistan constitutes a Sino-Soviet problem in the sense of threatening China's security, as the latter has emphasized repeatedly in the past, or it is a pressure-point, if not exactly a pretext, to prolong the negotiations the reasons for which lie beyond the simplistic connection projected by China. Arguably, the Soviet military intervention, over which the Chinese took issue with the Soviets while continuing to be a matter of disagreement, has become relatively unimportant in the unfolding complexity of a potential variable of political settlement in which the attitude of the United States above that of any other interested party, including Pakistan remains most critical. With regard to the Afghan situation, it may be relevant to note the remarks of CPSU General Secretary Gorbachov at the 27th Party Congress last February; in his very few references to external questions he promised to pull Soviet troops out of Afghahistan once other foreign forces withdraw. During his 5½ hour long Report to the Congress, which concentrated overwhelmingly on domestic issues, Gorbachev noted 'with gratitude that there is a certain improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with its major neighbour, the great Socialist China. Differences in attitudes remain, particularly over a certain number of problems. But we have also noted something else that we can work together and cooperate on an equal basis without harm to third countries.'[6]

As regards the Vietnamese stalemate, although China continues to exert military pressure on Vietnam and on the diplomatic front demands cessation of Soviet cooperation with Vietnam, a shift, howsoever slight, is discernible in its intractable hostility to the growth of Soviet influence in the region. This pertains to the use of Vietnam's naval facilities by Soviet Union. Notably, on 7 June 1984, an important representative of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Chinese State Council, Huan Xiang, while reviewing super power relations made a significant observation to the effect that 'the Soviet Union supports Vietnam, not because it has a special liking for it, but out of consideration of its entire military strategy in the Asia and the Pacific region. The Soviet Union urgently needs the naval bases in Cam Ranh Bay, Da nang...'[7]

While the sixth round of Sino-Soviet border talks was under way in Moscow, certain public comments made by China's most authoritative source had more than an ordinary meaning to it. On 17 April 1985, Deng Xiaoping reportedly said that the easiest obstacle to remove would be to encourage Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea. Deng

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further added that the Soviets could retain the bases provided to them by Vietnam. While such reasoning was meant to convey a Chinese reassessment of the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, in its narrower interpretation, the 17 April statement for the first time decoupled the presence of the Vietnamese forces inside Kampuchea from Soviet presence in the region by way of the base facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. In a press interview at Beijing on 21 June 1985, Huan Xiang argued that the Vietnamese troop withdrawal would lessen the threat against China from Dalat and Cam Ranh Bay. 'Under such circumstances, if the Soviet Union intends to retain its military bases in these two areas, we may tolerate it.'[8] It may not be far-fetched to speculate that China may gradually be coming round to a position that Sino-Vietnamese differences should not unduly affect the prospects of normalization with Moscow. The friendly jibes therefore should be considered real enough to balance the genuineness of a familiar Chinese litany against an implicit soft-pedalling on the so-called "obstacles", specifically the ones concerning third parties such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. It may not be premature to suggest that the slow improvement between Beijing and Moscow while still far short of a total transformation indicates more than symbolic change, the effect of which may gradually unfold beyond the narrow structure of ritual diplomacy.

ECONOMIC INTERACTION

Noticeably, in recent years, some concrete progress has taken place in the shape of intensified activity spread over economic, industrial and technical matters. China has begun to do brisk business with the Soviet Union after a chequered, negligible record in the past. The two nations signed a 14 billion US dollars worth Trade Agreement in Moscow during Yao Yilin's visit in June 1985, signalling a significant increase in their economic relations, an apparent stalemate on the political front notwithstanding. One may recall that during the initial years, given the economic blockade and trade embargo imposed by the United States, the Soviet market was the most important outlet for China's foreign trade, averaging about 60 per cent of its total world trade. Subsequent to the border clash in 1969, there was a drastic reduction in the volume exchanged. Throughout the seventies, Soviet Union accounted for just about 3 per cent of China's foreign trade which had meanwhile begun to leap westwards in a phenomenal manner. However, by the end of 1985, Sino-Soviet trade also had made a quantum jump, rising to 1.9 billion US dollars from an insignificant amount in 1982. The value of bilateral trade had increased by 170 per cent in 1983 and 60 per cent in 1984. According to latest calculations, the figures for 1985 have recorded an upward swing of 64 per cent over the previous year.[9] In this regard,

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reciprocal arrangement for Consulates in Shanghai and Leningrad have no doubt created additional channels of contact and communication, besides facilitating routine business transactions.

Similarly, border trade across the world's largest shared frontier had registered sizeable growth over a short time after an unremarkably dull phase and could become the catalyst for further normalization. Recently, Xinjiang has opened a third post for cross-border trade with the Soviet Union at Tacheng in the northwest of the province which had remained sealed since the dispute intensified between the two socialist neighbours, particularly in that remote region. The Chinese are also planning a rail link with contiguous Soviet territory for transporting Chinese goods to Europe along the ancient Silk Road through Soviet Central Asia but by speeding trains instead of vintage camels. So far, the two countries are linked by rail across their borders only in the extreme east on the Heilongjiang-Siberia frontier, and another one across Mongolia. The Chinese have further indicated their keenness to consolidate trade ties with the Soviets by exploring alternatives to barter trade, which has been the traditional form of economic exchange till recently.

Apart from projecting a boost-up of bilateral trade on a medium-trade basis, Yao Yillin's Moscow visit also underlined Soviet commitment for modernizing the Chinese industry. As part of the latest agreements, the Soviets have offered to modernize seventeen plants originally supplied by them in the field of power-generation, metallurgy, machine-building, energy and transport and to build seven new industrial projects. Here it may be pertinent to recall that it was with Soviet technology that the backbone of China's modern industry was erected. It is another matter that inspite of a long interrugnum of broken cooperation, the Chinese went ahead mainly on their own efforts to improvise as well as innovate on the Soviet model.

This factor itself has necessitated renewed Chinese calculation in tapping a hitherto defunct Soviet source directly, especially when it is being offered with matching eagerness and good faith. Soviet willingness for renovating and upgrading equipment is indeed functionally irresistible for the pragmatic Chinese leaders who are frantically searching for diverse avenues of worthwhile economic contacts To that extent, the Soviet offer partly answers some of the problems associated with an ambitious vision of taking China into the 21st century. Besides, Soviet re-entry into the field of China's modernization mollifies the hurt national pride of the Chinese when the Soviets abruptly withdrew their innumerable advisers, dismantled the plants and other equipment and took away the various blueprints of projects under construction. Thereafter, the Chinese were to pinpoint Soviet high handedness by accusing them of removing the dishes even while the meal was in progress!

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Over the past few years, specifically after Mao's passing away, howsoever half-heartedly at least in the beginning, the Chinese have been inclined to admit the fact that Soviet aid was fairly substantial and concessional and that it played a significant role in China's modernization in the first decade of the functioning of the socialist government. What is more important, however, is that the Chinese are obviously not in a position to overlook the fact that in effect, direct foreign linkage, while impressive to begin with, still largely represents trade interests rather than investment in Chinese industrialization. Before we proceed to discuss the various initiatives being taken by the Chinese to cope with the dynamics of their new economic policy in which the Soviets are expected to figure, it would be interesting to note as to how closely the latter are monitoring the process of foreign contribution to China's economic objectives.

According to a recent analysis which appeared in a prestigious journal of the USSR Academy of Sciences, some 50 per cent of foreign capital coming into China has been disproportionately invested in non-productive areas such as services, trade, tourism and other public utilities, thereby reducing its stimulating effect on the modernization of basic industry. Oil exploration has absorbed as little as a third of the available foreign investment Key branches of the processing industries which are considered important for technical progress account for merely 20 per cent of outside investment. The analyst concluded that China was being 'dragged ever more deeply into the international division of labour where it is for the most part like most other recipients of foreign capital, assigned a secondary role as a producer of raw materials and labour-intensive industrial goods.'[10] Such harsh generalisation may be generally resented by the Chinese but not unsurprisingly their own concerns broadly tally with the Soviet observations. Last year, for example, President Li Xiannian even while signing an agreement on nuclear cooperation with the United States could not refrain from alluding to the meagreness of the scale of economic cooperation during his meeting with President Reagan.

In recent months, the acceleration of economic activity under the general description of an open-door has also been instrumental in producing certain negative effects. Without going into lengthy details about the inevitable pressures on a socialist superstructure, and, some inherent contradictions in China's objective of ultimate self-reliance and the capitalist *liassez-faire* ethos, it may be sufficient for our purpose to understand that the Chinese leadership is in the process of refining its economic orientation without however jettisoning its liberal policies. In practical terms, it means that the performance of the Special Economic Zones, as much as their coastal expansion to include 14 more cities and the delta regions of the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers, have come under

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critical re-evaluation. For example, Shenzhen, the most spectacular of the 4 SEZs, not long back trumpeted as a model is now considered as an experiment on the ground that its benefit to the domestic economy and its export potential remain woefully restricted. The Chinese have realized that the zones remaining isolated from the domestic market could not serve as a model for attracting badly-needed foreign investment and technology into China. A comprehensive stocktaking of the actual performance has led to austerity measures by slashing the budget for infrastructural development of Shenzhen by 40 per cent and of the second largest one, Xiamen, by 20 per cent, However. as a testing ground for rationalising and introducing new concepts and techniques, the experiment has yielded precious dividends and is valued and sound enough to be applied to the north where the Soviets are the prospective partners in China's industrial development. Lately, Heihe city in Heilongjiang province has mapped out an ambitious development strategy of marking the bordering town with Soviet Central Asia as primed for economic take-off. Being advertised as a northern version of Shenzhen by no less a personage than the Party's General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, the new strategy aimed at introducing investment, new technology and skilled manpower to the resource-rich but sparsely populated and underdeveloped region revolves around the geographical advantages of Soviet industrial power. The port at Heihe happens to be situated a few minutes off the Soviet town of Blagoveschensk. The above measures and Soviet responses thereof offer credible testimony to the fact that China and the Soviet Union are no longer on inimical terms and the thaw has definitely set in.

ACCELERATING CULTURAL EXCHANGES

On the cultural front, growing interaction in the field of arts, language, dramatics, etc., has steadily become the norm rather than an exception. For the first time since the fifties, a Soviet satirical play on bureaucratic functioning is currently performing in Shanghai. Instances of other firsts are galore. Recently, the first Soviet expert to work in Southwest China after a gap of 25 years has arrived at the Foreign Languages Institute in the capital of China's most populous province, Sechuan. From 19 August 1985 Russian language lessons were reintroduced on Chinese Air—which heralded the first public Russian programme since the sixties. An official Chinese spokesman was quoted as saying, 'Soviet Union is China's largest neighbour... We have no reason to ignore Russian.' A Bolshoi presentation in the Chinese capital in October 1985 took place after more than a twenty year interval and drew rave notices.

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PARTY-TO-PARTY TIES

Till date however, party links have not been restored although there are strong indications that they have informally buried the hatchet. It may be worthwhile to remember that these links were severed in 1966 on China's initiative. Evidently, the party-level relations are on the mend. Reflecting revisionsism of the historical roles of the exalted figures of the Communist pantheon, for example, the Chinese language edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, published in September 1985, excised the section on the political philosophy of Stalin included in its original English version.[11] It may be recalled that China's criticism of Stalin had been muted even at the time of the 20th Party Congress revelations of his excesses, and ever since had remained critical of the manner in which de-Stalinization was launched under Khruschev. Further, a changed environment is plainly discernible in the familiarization and renewal of contacts at higher political levels, such as the reciprocal visits of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Chinese National Peoples' Congress to the Federations of Trade Unions of the two countries. Not unexpectedly, such activities are being interpreted in certain quarters as carefully orchestrated steps towards possible resumption of ties between the two countries' parties in the near future and broadly point the way the wind is blowing. China's desire to re-establish party-to-party relationship was categorically mentioned by Vice-Premier Li Peng who represented his country at the funeral of the Soviet Secretary General Chernenko in Moscow. On the occasion of Gorbachev assuming the Soviet leadership in March 1985, Hu Yaobang congratulated the new incumbent—a first time gesture in nearly twenty-five years of bitter silence. In his message, the Chinese Secretary General spoke warmly of 'the two great neighbours and socialist countries' and spoke of China's willingness 'to work towards further developing relations in the political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields.' Since the mid-sixties, Beijing had not acknowledged Moscow as a socialist country.

IDEOLOGICAL PULLS AND PRESSURES

A critical link in Sino-Soviet relations is the ideological factor with its domestic economic component which paradoxically had created enough trouble in the past between the two. Today, China and the Soviet Union find themselves caught in similar circumstances which were never prominently so obvious in the beginning. This partly explains the subtle change in Moscow in favour of some of China's recent policies, which earlier were being, dubbed as 'petit-bourgeois pragmatic zig-zag.' Mention may be made of the recent media analysis of China's domestic

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developments.[12] While cautioning that China's revolution could give way to bourgeois ideology, Soviet commentaries have offered positive evaluation of the impact of the reform on China's stagnant economy, its industrial and agricultural growth and productivity in various other sectors of the national economy. While the two nations are at different stages of development and their leaders belong to different generations, both Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev have individually arrived at a somewhat parallel conclusion that a successful model of socialist economic development is still eluding their grasp. A drastic revision, long overdue, is needed to counter the dogma which considers economic liberalization as incompatible with Marxist ideology. In this respect, the Chinese have become the fore-runners of the Soviets by introducing structural and institutional reforms and more important, allowing significant concessions to individual enterprise. The latter have only now begun to push promised reforms under the Gorbachev dispensation which in effect has inaugurated the post-Brezhnev era in the true sense. The Soviet scene, however, has not caught the world by surprise in terms of either speed or the scope of the new policies.

By the same token, the Chinese rather than the Soviets are awkwardly placed. In the past, by aligning too close to the United States, superficially at least they conveyed the impression of an ideological swing away from socialism. Their stubborn animus towards the Soviet Union quite often drowned the ideological kinship under a deluge of tabulations of Soviet misdeeds which were traced to imperial traditions which in their contemporary manifestation were seen to be prompting their subversive policies as well as encouraging their insatiable urge for world-wide expansionism, etc. Rhetoric apart, however, ideology and national interest were never mutually exclusive in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The two states, for the lengthier period of time, were simultaneously ideological rivals and national adversaries to each other. One may also recall that by the sheer persuasiveness of Maoist polemics the Soviets had been made to appear as virtual outcasts by the so-called genuine revolutionaries for the sins of an incipient, hesitant flirtation with the capitalist world.

Today, of course, the puritan Chinese themselves have radically changed their thinking. Subsequently, many sympathetic elements in the Third World and elsewhere have been led to wonder as to how the Chinese genius would reconcile its growing unorthodox linkages with the capitalist system and the ultimate goals of a classless society Finally, it may not be easy for the Chinese leaders to sustain an ideological consensus for long around the idea that whatever stimulates production is consistent with socialism without jeopardising the indivisible strength of the party which remains the fountain of supreme power and gives them enormous leverage to shape the destiny of the nation in conformity with their

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weltanschauung. However, interestingly enough, while Deng Xiaoping has repudiated some tenets of Maoism, including Mao's iconoclastic attitude towards the Party, he remains essentially a Maoist to the extent that he is determined not to allow the scope of reforms beyond an acceptable framework which could adversely affect the conceptual and effective legitimacy of Marxist-Leninist-Mao-thought as a tool for state power and drag the polity in an undesirable direction. It may not be fanciful to believe that the Chinese find conciliation with the Soviet Union as an opportune measure to defend their position *vis-a-vis* the internal alignments to the right.

In the process underway, the Chinese no longer discuss the Soviets as an anti-model as they did during the climatic change-over from an alliance relationship to that of acute rivalry. In fact, their political system, while having some indigenons characteristics, essentially remains patterned after the Soviet model. At present, when they are frenetically attempting to dovetail the latter with a Japanese-like model of economic transformation, they have every reason to look more objectively at the Soviet achievements What is more important, in essence there exists a strong similarity between the pragmatist Deng Xiaoping and the pioneer of liberalization within the Soviet society, Nikita Khruschev who tried to modify Stalinist heritage by his attack on the personality cult and the advocacy of economic reforms as against organised distribution. The Chinese leaders, specifically, Deng Xiaoping and his age group such as Chen Yun and Peng Chen have lived through the acrimonious controversy between Khruschev and Mao and presumably remind themselves of the lessons they should have drawn from the Soviet errors. It may be recalled that in response to Mao's abrupt collectivization to stem the liberal trends which had flowered during China's First Five Year Plan with some reasonable success, Khruschev speaking from personal experience had observed: 'We cannot achieve communism until we have abundance. We cannot have abundance until we lower costs. And we cannot lower costs without the yardstick of the rouble.' Obviously, Mao was not wrong in giving the sobriquet of China's Khruschev to his domestic opponents, among whom Deng Xiaoping was also included.

APPRAISAL

As the reforms unravel mixed results, the Chinese find themselves in an ambivalent position, necessitating a credible self-assurance within the broader jurisdiction of the socialist process underway elsewhere, especially within Soviet Union which has achieved superpower status by dint of persevering with the socialist process. In a meeting with the leader of Norway's Socialist Party, Koritzinsky last year, Hu Yaobang had

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emphasized the fact that the current economic restructuring within China was in line with the general principles of socialism. Hu went on to add that 'socialist construction throughout the world is going through an experiment' More recently, in January 1986, while defending the open door reforms to an important gathering of more than 8000 party, government and military cadres, Hu observed that China had entered the phase of rejuvenation by taking the road to 'socialism with Chinese characteristics.' The parting message of the Chinese General Secretary was that the Party must develop a "socialist civilization", both ideological and material.

Whatever reservations the Soviet leaders may have about the Chinese situation, they themselves are inclined to opt for some change rather than continue with the *status-quo*. Although Khruschev genuinely introduced some long-pending basic reforms which were carried forward by his successors, the last two decades have been marked by unimpressive economic growth, partly attributed to Soviet preoccupation with matching military power to the American challenge, but which also owed to the Soviet inability in striking boldly at the root causes of the accumulated inefficiency of a command economy. In the post-Brezhnev era, starting with the brief regime of Yuri Andropov and picking up momentum under the present leadership of Gorbachev, the Soviet scene is headed for comprehensive reforms if not radical transformation which was highlighted most conspicuously in the 27th Party Congress Programme when Gorbachev affirmed : 'Life itself forces us to take a new look at theory in such areas as the relationship between productive forces and industrial relations, and on the definition of socialist ownership or the relationship between commodities and money.'

It may be no exaggeration to suggest that there is a lot that the two can learn from each other. Unlike the Chinese who have bemused the world by their u-turns both in their developmental strategy and some violent fluctuations in their foreign policy, the Soviets have appeared as over-cautious, ever-slow conforming beings. They could as well do with a bit of Chinese impetuosity. Similarly, the Chinese who at times have erred on the side of excess may draw some inspiration from Soviet consistency. As the two perceive their self-interest in restoring normalcy in their relations, they have come a long way on the route to *detente* which could even be described as *defacto* normalization on the principle of peaceful coexistence. This implies a realization on the part of both that they have travelled a long distance away from the framework of the fifties during which they found it impossible to balance ideology and national interest within the framework of a "special relationship."

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SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS : A QUEST FOR NORMALIZATION

By NANCY JETLY*

I have always thought that it is important, even essential, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and, as far as possible, cooperative relations. It would be a tragedy, not only for India, and possibly for China, but for Asia and the whole world, if they develop some kind of permanent hostility.... Friendship cannot exist between the weak and the strong, between a country that is trying to bully and the other which agrees to be bullied. It is only when people are more or less equal and when they respect each other, that they can be friends. That is true of nations also. We did work for the friendship of India and China and despite all that has happened and is happening, we shall continue to work for it. That does not mean that we should surrender anything that we consider right and that we should hand over bits of territory to China to please them. That is not the way to be friends with anybody or to maintain our dignity or self respect.[1]

THESE words of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India and virtually the architect of Sino-Indian friendship, ring true and clear years after the voice has been stilled and the passion and fire stoked by the Chinese betrayal coolled down. The continuing validity of Nehru's approach—combining firmness with flexibility, restraint with accommodation—remains unquestionable today when India and China are engaged in a political dialogue to normalize relations putting the hysteria and bitterness of the 1962 hostilities behind them. India's approach to Sino-Indian normalization must needs be governed by the twin factors—both closely interlinked and indeed mutually reinforcing—of imperatives for friendly ties with China and the need for maintaining its honour and integrity.

PROCESSES OF NORMALIZATION

The gradual thawing of relations between India and China, the two most populous and powerful nations of Asia, assumes considerable significance in contemporary international political relations in view of its positive impact on peace and stability in Asia and the world in general. Although it was as early as 1969 that India, in a bid to end the

*Dr. (Mrs) Jetly is Assistant Professor South Asian Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawharlal Nehru University. New Delhi.

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deadlock in Sino-Indian relations, offered to hold talks with China without setting any preconditions, the process of normalization has remained slow. This has been so partly because the initial response from China—on whom rested by far the greater responsibility for setting the tone of the relationship—remained at best uncertain and partly because India, still haunted by the trauma of national humiliation in 1962, remained understandably hesitant to display any undue keenness for forcing the pace. China did not respond immediately to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's offer for resumption of a dialogue, Chairman Mao Zedong's famous smile at the Indian *Charge d' Affaires* notwithstanding, and it was not until after 1971 that it showed some signs of recasting its posture towards India and coming to terms with the new strategic and political realities in the region in which India had emerged as a major force. It may be pertinent to note here that while the border question—by itself a complex issue raising the thorny question of irreconcilable stands on the validity of international historical treaties on the one hand, and the primacy of the lines of actual control on the other—remains central to Sino-Indian normalization, relations between the two countries have assumed increasingly over the years the undeniable aspect of being a reflection of mutual perceptions of the prevailing strategic environment, both at the regional and global level. Sino-Indian relations are thus shaped not only by considerations of mutual status and role, but also by the larger factors of regional and global polity. This would serve to explain, in a large measure, the fairly well set pattern of hostile coexistence between the two countries; both the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai phase of the early fifties and the actual hostilities of 1962 representing the heightened —to some extent even contrived—manifestations of the two extremities in the relationship. India's perception of a long-term threat from China has got sharpened by the steadily growing Sino-Pak Entente as also the disquieting implications of Sino-US *rapprochement* China's barely concealed distaste of India's links with the Soviet Union also queers the pitch for any substantial progress in normalization.

That India was aware of China's dilemma is borne out by New Delhi's carefully maintained low profile despite China's unprecedentedly harsh criticism of India's role in the emergence of Bangladesh as well as Sikkim. Calling the merger of Sikkim as yet another of India's expansionist acts after dismembering Pakistan, China declared its full support to the people of Sikkim in their just struggle for national independence. Chinese media kept up its hostile propaganda against India, accusing it of harbouring hegemonist and expansionist ambitions towards its neighbours, indulging in nuclear blackmail and aspiring to become a sub-Super Power in collusion with the Soviet Union. The Indian Government, however, refused to rise to the bait and showed remarkable restraint

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in reiterating its desire for normalizing relations with China. India's policy of combining flexiblity with firmness bore fruit in 1976 when, after many a false start, diplomatic ties between the two countries were upgraded to the ambassadorial level after a gap of nearly fifteen years.

Janata Interlude

Hopes for a more meaningful and constructive relationship received a fillip when China extended a whole-hearted welcome to the Janata Government, the emergence of which, it held, had revealed the infrnctuousness of Soviet efforts to influence the Indian elections. The optimism generated by the seemingly pro-western orientation of the new government was, however, soon belied by its reluctance to make any dramatic changes in the basic tenor of Indo-Soviet relationship. The new government made it abundantly clear that notwithstanding its desire for exploring the possibilities of further improvement in relations—by resuming trade and identifying fields of further economic cooperation to reciprocal advantage—it was in no hurry to force the pace of normalization, or minimise the complexity or importance of the issues between the two countries.

India continued to reiterate its desire to work for removlng irritants in order to tackle mutual problems in a climate of mutual respect and dignity, but stressed that resolution of the bouudary question—a complex and politically vital issue—was central to the restoration of confidence and full realization of normalization between the two countries. China maintained, on the other hand, that the boundary question was a complex one bequeathed by history and efforts needed to be made to improve bilateral relations seeking common ground and reservlng differences. This would, in turn, generate a favourable atmosphere for the resolution of the dispute when time would be 'ripe' for its settlement.

It was thus clear that Vajpayee's visit to China in 1979—in response to the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's invitation—was indeed going to be a difficult and delicate mission notwithstanding the optimism generated by the prospects of the first high level meeting between the leaders of the two countries since the Sino-Indian hostilities in the sixties. China's massive armed incursion against Vietnam—raking embarassing memories of China's 'punitive' action against India in 1962—timed as it was with the Indian Foreign Minister's presence on Chinese soil, however, created a poignant and wholly unexpected situation for Vajpayee who had to cut short his visit abruptly. A visibly chagrined Vajpayee conceded that China's blatant reference to the 1962 attack on India had indeed 'created hurdles in the path of normalization', but maintained that his exploratory preliminary contact had helped to un-

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freeze the boundary and the common willingness of the two countries to reflect further on the possible ways to resolve the crucial question was indeed a significant step forward. India had, on its part, assured China that its asylum to Dalai Lama had been given in deference to his spiritual position and that it would not stand in the way of the refugees returning to Tibet, should they consider it suitable to return. It was, however, obvious that besides receiving an assurance from China regarding the extension of support to insurgents and anti-constitutional activists within India being a 'thing of the past', India had little to feel confident about China's stand on Kashmir and Sikkim. Vajpayee reiterated that national interests would remain supreme and the question of surrendering any Indian territory to China did not arise: 'The Janata Government stands committed to the 1962 Resolution of Parliament.' He also made it clear—in a veiled reference to the Soviet Union—that India wanted to improve its ties with China in a bilateral context and such improvement could not be at the cost of established friendships.[2]

A New Phase

India thus was in no hurry to force the pace to suit the Chinese interests, but it was willing to explore all avenues to build a new relationship of friendship and cooperation which it considered imperative in the interests of both countries. Thus after her return to power in 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also continued efforts to keep up the political dialogue with China. In the course of a meeting between the Chinese Premier, Hua Guo Feng and Indira Gandhi in Belgrade in May 1980, both sides reiterated that better Sino-Indian relations were essential to peace and stability in Asia and that there was need for mutual consultations as also avoidance of confrontation for an amicable solution of their bilateral problems.

Soon after, Vice Premier Deng Ziapeng, in an interview to an Indian newspaper on 21 June 1980, came out with the proposal of a "package" deal to solve the boundary question on the basis of Chinese recognition of the actual line of control in the east in lieu of Indian recognition of status quo in the western sector. Reacting coolly to the proposal, Indian Foreign Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao submitted in the Lok Sabha on July 1980 that ways other than the package solution could prove more 'effective.' India, on its part, hoped to settle the border question in a spirit consistent with national honour and interests of both sides on a basis of equality. It, however, considered the fact of the two governments coming to grips with the longstanding and complex border problem after a considerable lapse of time as a positive step.

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Reciprocating China's desire for improvement in bilateral relations as exercising positive influence on world affairs, and Asian affairs in particular, Rao made it clear that India had never accepted the premise that China was making any concessions in the eastern sector by giving up territory which it alleged had been illegally incorporated into India, but welcomed the prospect of the settlement of the eastern sector without any 'particular difficulty.'[3]

Meanwhile, India's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea—dubbed promptly by China as a stupid decision taken under Soviet pressure—led to the abrupt postponement of the Chinese Foreign Minister's visit announced in response to India's invitation in 1980. Downplaying China's apparent pique, Narasimha Rao instead termed it as a routine postponement resulting from prior commitments and maintained that notwithstanding its sincere desire for normalization, India was quite content to leave the pace to China and respond accordingly. Meanwhile, an Indian official spokesman stated pointedly that normalization in Sino-Indian relations did not require an identity of approach on all issues.

In the event, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, visited India in June 1981. The ensuing talks, while making for no substantial progress, provided yet another occasion for a formal restatement of known positions from both sides. China maintained that it was a developing country belonging to the Third World which needed a peaceful international environment as also exchange of experience with other countries to facilitate its task of national reconstruction. In view of turbulence in the international situation since the 1980's as a result of Super Power rivalry and expansionism, China indicated its willingness to work in active cooperation with India to make a concerted effort to oppose aggression and interference from outside and to safeguard peace in Asia and the world. India, on its part, expressed concern at the increase in outside Power-presence in the neighbourhood and reiterated the need for efforts to eliminate the causes of tension. India, Narasimha Rao stated pointedly, believed in cooperation with all and its friendship with any one country was never at the cost of friendship with any other country: 'Nor would we allow ourselves to be influenced by the changing relations between our friends *inter-se*.'[4] At a Press Conference, held soon after, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was more forthright about the state of Sino-Indian relations: 'We cannot pretend that bilateral relations between India and China have been good . . . . The issues between us are most difficult and even ... emotional. But nothing can be solved without basic goodwill and effort.'[5]

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Ongoing Dialogue

The only tangible gain ensuing from the visit was the decision to hold official level talks regarding both 'bilateral problems and bilateral exchanges', which apparently followed an understanding between the two sides that border settlement, although central to full normalization of relations, need not be made a precondition for improvement in relations in other areas. Subsequently the first official talks—the first such meeting in twenty years—were held in December 1981 and five subgroups formed to deal with matters concerning boundary, trade and economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and science and technonlogy. Although no spectacular progress was anticipated in the first round in view of the fairly wide differences between the two sides, the discussions revealed that there was no consensus on even an agreed set of principles for negotiating a border settlement. In the very first round, China came out with a set of five 'guiding' principles' underlining the need for a fair, reasonable and comprehensive solution of the border problem through friendly consultations in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation. On its part, India put forward a set of six 'working propositions' for an early and 'just' solution taking into account the legitimate right of both sides on the basis of a commonly agreed approach and basis. India also hoped that steps would be considered to create a favourable atmosphere and the border issue taken up on a 'sector to sector' basis.

It was in fact not until the fourth round of talks held in October 1983 that some breakthrough was made in the semantic impasse when the two sides moved from a reiteration of known respective points of view and general commitment to peaceful coexistence to a concerted effort to evolve a set of mutually acceptable principles which would guide further discussious towards the early settlement of the intratacble boundary problem. China now relented to agree to discuss India's sector by sector approach, albeit on the clear understanding that this would be linked up finally to China's own proposal for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects. However, the fifth round of talks, contrary to expectation in some quarters, failed to make any substantive progress in terms of an accord on procedural principles although differences between the two sides were claimed to have been considerably narrowed down to enable substantive discussions on the border settlement in the next round. It was clear that notwithstanding the formulation of some extremely general principles permitting a certain degree of flexibility on both sides, basic differences on the primacy of historical evidence, custom and traditions for demarcating the boundary line remained unbridged. China remains committed to a comprehensive and reasonable settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the *de facto*

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position on the borders. The sixth round of talks held recently in November 1985 has only confirmed the existing divergences in approach, although it was claimed by the Indian spokesman that in the course of the talks starting with a survey of the eastern sector, the two sides had achieved a 'clear understanding of each other's position.' Although it proposed to take up the western sector—the core sector—in the next round of officials' talks, it would be only reasonable to assume that the progress towards a satisfactory resolution would be at best slow and halting.

While the border question remained intractable, China meanwhile came forward with a proposal in June 1985 for reciprocal opening of missions in the two countries—missions at Lhasa, Shanghai, Bombay and Calcutta remain closed since 1961—and resumption of Indo-Tibetan border trade as meaningful steps towards an overall improvement in Sino-Indian relations. Although India can have no objection to the proposal in principle, its response remains visibly cool in view of lack of any tangible progress on the border question which it considers central to any normalization. It has indeed reasons to fear that too fast a pace of normalization would only suit the Chinese interests in putting the boundary settlement in a limbo. It is for similar reasons that India remains noncommittal on China's repeated pleas for summit talks. Although the Indian Prime Minister has accepted the invitation to visit Beijing in principle—an invitation had been first extendend by Vice Chairman Yao Yilin in November 1984 and since repeated hy Zhao Ziyang in October 1985—he has made it abundantly clear that a Summit, if necessary and at an appropriate time, would have to follow extensive preparations and adequate steps to find solution to the outstanding problems between the two countries. Although it is patent that only a major political thrust can effectively break the deadlock, a summit meet does not appear to be on the cards. India, not disinclined to upgrade the talks to the political level, if found necessary, feels that a Summit without adequate diplomatic spadework to evolve an acceptable accord would only prove counterproductive at this stage. New Delhi's guarded response to both the proposals for a summit as also the opening of the consulates stems from its perception that China's basic premise of working for an overall improvement—particularly in the absence of any clear indication of its willingness to negotiate an equitable border settlement—only detracts from the centrality of the border dispute. This remains so notwithstanding the fact that Rajiv Gandhi and Zhao Ziyang, at a meeting in New York in October 1985, reiterated that the border position was not an insurmountable problem and needed to be addressed on a priority basis in order to effect a speady settlement, Hopes for evolving an agreed approach to the border pro-

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blem have indeed been belied by the fact that six rounds of talks have been held without achieving any breakthrough in substantive matters. That there has been no discernible progress in tackling the core problem during the course of officials' talks which have been by and large dominated by procedural aspects, would seem to spell a bleak future for the whole exercise. China's keenness for upgrading the talks to the political level only underscores the limited nature of the ongoing talks.

Increased Economic and Trade Contacts

This is however, not to minimise the inexorable logic of the increase in bilateral cooperation in a number of areas. Sino-Indian relations have not stood still since the dramatic breakthrough in 1976 and faster pace of cultural and technological exchanges and increased economic and trade contacts have undoubtedly tended to strenghthen the long-term prospects of normalization between the two countries. Various programmes of scientific and technological exchanges for mutual benefit have also been finalized. Both countries have also agreed to a regular exchange of visits of academicians and journalists in a bid to strengthon cooperation. A number of Indian trade delegations have visited China. Delegations representing various Chinese corporations have also visited India from time to time. China has also participated in various trade fairs held in India. At the last round of talks, an agreement was reached between India and China on a settlement of the long pending dispute over the acquisition of property of the Iadian Embassy in Beijing as also compensation for the land seized in 1967.

As for prospects of Sino-Indian trade, China's open door policy and its massive drive for modernization in the agricultural and industrial fields undoubtedly makes it a potentially attractive market for India for the supply of intermediate technology. Some potential areas like chemicals and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, textile, light machinery, hotels and automobiles can be tapped profitably for joint ventures. China in turn can help India in setting up biogas plants, mini steel and cement plants. It is in this context that the Trade Agreement signed between India and China on 15 August 1984—to be renewed automatically every three years—according each other's commerce the most favoured nation treatment and envisaging a boosting of bilateral trade marks a modest but significant advance in bilateral relations. The Agreement provides for a regulated framework for commerce between the two countries which had been resumed on an ad hoc basis since 1977 after a break of almost fifteen years. India envisages the present volume of tradc—$ 60 million out of which India's share is only $ 10 million—to be raised to one billion dollars in the next five years. Although India stands a good chance in exporting labour-intensive technology and knowhow to China,

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this projection would appear to be rather ambitious given the practical contraints in terms of the level of Indian technology *vis a-vis* more sophisticated technology from Japan and the United States.

Also, the present size of bilateral trade between India and China remains practically insignificant in terms of the percentage of their total trade. The growth of trade has also not been uniform and since 1980-81, the balance has been consistently unfavourable to India. Fluctuations in the total turnover and lack of complementarity in the needs of the countries does not make for much optimism either. Despite growing contacts, economic cooperation in terms of industrial collaboration is virtually non-existent. China has also not shown much interest in India's engineering items, agricultural machinery or transport equipment. Further, Sino-Indian economic relations have moved parallel to the state of their political relations—trade was in fact resumed only after diplomatic relations had been resumed at the ambassadorial level in 1976—and given the prevailing state of Sino-Indian relations, it may be premature to expect any spectacular results in terms of positive economic interaction in the near future.

PARAMETERS OF SINO-INDIAN DIALOGUE

Indeed, it needs bearing in mind that no matter how the contours of Sino Indian normalization unfold themselves, relations between the two countries will always be marked by an element of competition and contest. It would be flying in the face of reality if one were to revive the illusion of bygone years—in order to facilitate the process of normalization—without taking into consideration the inherent logic of the unalterable reality of geographical proximity and national rivalry. It needs to be clearly recognized that China's claims to vast tracts of Indian borders are related in the main to ideological and power factors. The primary motivations behind the border dispute were more political than territorial and it was essentially a part of a much broader and deeper conflict implicit in the very geopolitical configuration of the two countries, particularly after the elimination of Tibet as a buffer zone. The fundamental objective of the entire Chinese strategy as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few thousand miles of mountainous territory—not all which was strategically vital to China—as to eliminate India as a power of some consequence from the Asian scene China's policy in South Asia—imposing a deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962, tarnishing its image as a great Asian country, systematically eroding its special ties with its Himalayan neighbours, exploiting sub-continental dissensions by embarking on a deliberate policy of collusion with Pakistan and above all weakening

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the political stability of India through clandestine support to Mizo and Naga insurgents—has been essentially an exercise in isolating India and eroding its influence in the region.

China continues to represent a deep concern for Indian policy-makers, notwithstanding a growing feeling that it has neither the will nor the means to challenge India in the sub-continent. China's emergence as a formidable Power both in conventional terms as well as nuclear power capability—strengthening not only its military position but also its bargaining power—has resulted in a vast power gap with its neighbours. Nevertheless India's emergence as a major force since the seventies ensures that while it may not be in a position to dominate others, no other Power in South Asia can challenge its preeminence. This makes for China's continued politico-strategic stakes in reducing India's influence by keeping up millitary and political pressure on India as also building up the other regional states as a counterweight to India. A stable peace between India and China would, therefore, have to rest not only on a satisfactory resolution of the border dispute on agreed principles—necessarily involving some territorial concessions in a process of give and take—but also on a clear recognition of their relative power status and geo-political stakes in the region. China's peaceful settlement of its border dispute with its smaller neighbours like Nepal, Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan and its steady refusal to adopt a similar conciliatory tone to India, Vietnam and Soviet Union—with whom it shares more than two thirds its boundary—reinforces the premise that China views the border question as part of the larger question of its relations with neighbouring states. So long as the basic problem of political coexistence between India and China is not resolved, a mere settlement of the border dispute—undoubtedly the key factor in Sino-Indian normalization—would by itself be of little significance in the long-term prospects of friendship and cooperation. Although the validity of India's sustained efforts in working for steady development of relations with China highlighting the primacy of the border question cannot be under-estimated, it bears pointing out, if only to put the whole question of Sino-Indian normalization in proper perspective, that a viable settlement between India and China cannot be reached in a strictly bilateral framework but would have to take into consideration a host of contentious issues of varying import in the context of broader regional and global factors.

China's Response

In recent years, China's pronouncements on South Asia have come to manifest a positive trend for a measured development of Sino-Indian

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relations. It has adopted a low key profile on sub-continental dissensions and generally favoured amity and cooperation among the countries of the region in its bid for creating a peaceful environment in its neighbourhood. Its enthusiastic support for SAARC as a forum for peace and economic development can be viewed as a positive step in this direction. Opening of high level border talks with Bhutan would also seem to reinforce this trend. However, China's relations with India's neighbours—obviously aimed at counterveiling India's power and influence in the region—show no appreciable change. The strategic significance of China's special relations with Pakistan goes far beyond a normal bilateral defence arrangement which provides for China's large scale assistance in the military build-up of Pakistan in terms of supply of considerable quantities of arms and ammuntion as well as help in the manufacture of weapons. Reports of Chinese help to Pakistan in developing nuclear capability—notwithstanding repeated denials by both countries—add a new and disturbing dimension to the existing politico-strategic collaboration between the two countries. This has indeed long-term implications for India's security, particularly because it threatens to seriously affect the present balance of power in the region. Upgrading of the Karakoram Highway—opened to traffic and trade since 1983—and the opening of the Khunzreb Pass on the highway providing for the establishment of border posts along the Pass in Pak-occupied Kashmir, gives China a potentially intrusive presence in India's strategic western sector. In view of its virtually unchanged stand on Kashmir, Chinese moves cause continued concern.

Similarly although China has in recent years refrained from engaging in blatant anti-Indian propaganda, there has been no visible reduction in its hobnobbings with Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. Its sympathy for the Sri Lankan Government with regard to its perceived security threat from India in the context of the Tamil separatist movement, stems primarily from its objective of keeping up sustained diplomatic pressure on India. China's unequivocal support for Bangladesh on the Farakka issue and for Nepal on the Zone of Peace proposals—neatly dovetailed as it is with its regional strategy of counterbalancing India—tends to negate its professed desire for regional peace and stability. India has also no reason to take kindly to China's ominous silence on Sikkim as an integral part of India. This is in stark contrast to India's own unambiguous stand on Tibet over which China's legal claim is perhaps more dubious. China's refusal to concede India's special ties with the strategically sensitive state of Bhutan is yet another sore point. This is so despite India's acquiescence, if not encouragement, of the recent Sino-Bhutanese border talks which by itself is a slideback from Nehru's categorical assertion that Sino-Bhutanese boundary fell within the scope of Sino-Indian dis-

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cussions and India would not be agreeable to China dealing with it as something apart from India.[6]

At the global level, China has been at pains—particularly since the beginning of the 1980's—to project an independent foreign policy. It has not only worked assiduously for a thaw in its relations with the Soviet Union, but is taking an increasingly independent stand *vis-a-vis* the United States on a number of global issues of import. Projecting itself as a developing country belonging to the Third World—seen as a major force against hegemonism and imperialism—its stance towards the Non-Aligned Movement in general remains favourable. China's professed desire for a peaceful international environment in view of its need for national reconstruction and economic development and its praise for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's initiatives to improve the situation in South Asia and his active role in international affairs is indeed reassuring. This is undoubtedly a far cry from its assessment in the sixties and seventies when India was viewed as a lackey of one Super Power or the other and dubbed as a 'sub-Super Power' posing a great threat to its smaller neighbours. This makes for a strong community of interests between the two countries on a number of issues like nuclear disarmament, institution of a new international economic order and South-South cooperation.

At the same time, the clash of interests inherent in diversity in the regional interests as also perception of some vital global issues like Super Power rivalry, Big Power presence in the Indian Ocean and Indo-China cannot be glossed over. Dialogue with India is not an isolated gesture but fits in with the overall policy of China as a major Power in pursuance of the recent shifts in its global policy. China's interest in an unbroken spell of peace and tranquility on its borders—reinforced by its geo-political stakes in view of the Soviet push to Afghanistan—quest for modernization of its economy and need to strengthen its stilll tenuous hold on Tibet underwrites its strong incentive to solve its problems with India. Its posture towards India will continue to be shaped by its own domestic priorities and international compulsions of which India's own policy towards China would be just one element.

Border as a Key Factor

It is thus that India's policy of caution remains essentially sound. Any attempt to whittle the realities of the South Asian power structure and security environment in a deliberately created maze of good neighbourliness may result in weakening of the Indian position without any corresponding gains in terms of sustained goodwill and cooperation from China. A plea—heard in some quarters—for effecting a

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speedy settlement of the border even on the basis of the present *status quo* in the interests of a durable understanding between India and China can hardly stand close scrutiny. It is quite patent that efforts for normalization between the two countries would remain essentially handicapped till a satisfactory solution to the border dispute is found. As late as April 1985, Indian Foreign Minister, Khurshid Alam Khan made it clear that the boundary question remained a crucial issue 'dividing' the two countries.[7] China's package deal—a formal reiteration of Zhou Enlai's 6 points propounded in New Delhi in 1960—in effect freezes the *status quo* which is loaded in favour of China. Shorn of diplomatic finery, the proposal envisages India's *de jure* acceptance of the *de facto* occupation of its territory by China. The sweet reasonableness of the Chinese offer is eroded considerably if one recalls that at least 2000 square miles of territory—gained forcibly before and during the 1962 hostilities—lies between the lines of actual control in April 1960 and the present *status quo* in the western sector. Nehru, it may be pointed out, had inceremoniouly rejected the offer on the ground that any barter tactics on the border were clearly unacceptable to India. Although it is obvious that India has little chance of retrieving the lost territory without recourse to a major war, China can hardly be expected to give up Aksai Chin in view of its vital strategic interests in the area. No government in India can, however, afford to offer any terms which are substantially different from those that Nehru had spelt out in 1962 in terms of restoration of the 8 September 1962 line, predating the armed clashes on the Himalayan borders. This would of course entail Indian acceptance of a frontier which would not be in conformity with either the November Resolution or the traditional and customary line that India rests its case on, but would ensure return of some crucial areas in Ladakh like the Chip Chip Valley, the Galwan Valley, Lanak La and Demchok that India so valiantly fought for and so effortlessly lost in the 1962 War. Ceding of the Chumbi Valley or the areas around Kailash and Mansarover by China also hardly seem attainable alternatives in the context of existing realities. It has become increasingly clear over the years that the border question can only be solved by a political approach and not in a moral-legalistic framework. It is thus that China needs to come up with more meaningful proposals that can help bring about a negotiated settlement with honour to both sides. India has already given up its insistence on the vacation of the occupied lands by China as a precondition for resumption of negotiations with China. Any far-reaching territorial concessions by India in the absence of any matching gesture by China can only prove embarassing to New Delhi in the long run.

Those who plead for deliberate dilution in Indo-Soviet ties in order to woo China are treading a more dangerous path. First, China itself is in-

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ching forward to mend its fences with the Soviet Union, although no spectacular breakthrough seems imminent in the near future. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachev seems more inclined than his predecessors to have cordial relations with China. Second, the continuing convergence in Sino-American goals to sustain Pakistan poses an insidious challenge to India's own position. China's moves to improve Sino-Indian relationship without any dilution of support to India's neighbours, notably Pakistan, would only reinforce the need for Indo-Soviet links. New Delhi cannot afford to take a short-term view of its national interests in terms of the border settlement with China that may rebound against it in the long run. Further, in the context of India's unflinching stand on not undertaking a nuclear weapons programme—the logic and compulsions of such policy need not be detailed here—close relations with the Soviet Union would be a *sine qua non* for combating a possible nuclear threat from China. India would of course have to strike a delicate balance between a certain amount of risk inherent in a relationship of relative dependence on the Soviet Union—particularly if Sino-Soviet dialogue bears fruit—and the need to counter the threat that Sino-US-Pak axis poses to its security as well as regional peace and stability.

It is also held in some quarters that a border settlement with China would reduce appreciably India's need for a sustained military build up on the Himalayan frontiers. While it is true that a border settlement would indeed relieve some of the pressure that India faces on its northern frontiers, it would be erroneous to think that India, in view of the serious security problem *vis-a-vis* China, can afford to have a let up in its defence preparedness to meet any Chinese threat—nuclear or conventional. So long as the present high level of Chinese military presence in Tibet continues—it has already built 8 major airfields there and stations 2,50,000 troops—India's large scale deployment of forces on its Himalayan frontiers would need to be maintained.[8] As long as the dynamics of military competition between India and China remain unaltered, India's diplomacy alone cannot be an effective substitute for defence preparedness. In fact, a durable framework of Sino-Indian friendship would need to be underpinned not so much by a legal settlement as by an overall military balance of forces. It is no mere coincidence that it was only after 1971—when India managed the sub-continental affairs to its satisfaction and limitations on the Chinese power in the region were clearly revealed—that China accepted the logic of the situation and made some readjustments in its policy towards India. There is indeed a continuing rationale for military build-up to seek peace with China with honour. Enhancement of India's strength and defence capability so as to make it unwise or impossible to repeat any adventurism *a la* 1962 and expansion of areas of cooperation with China in its quest for Sino-Indian amity

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need not be mutually exclusive and can in fact be simultaneously explored to meet the multi-dimensional challenges from China.

PROSPECTS

India's great urge to come to terms with China is no longer overbearing; but this is not to arguc that India should drag its feet in seeking improvement of relations with China—a major neighbouring country with whom it shares a long border. Continued stalemate on the border not only serves to condone a militarily active border—although no border clashes have been reported for a number of years—but also curbs India's diplomatic manoeuvrability, limiting its potential role in the region and the wider world It is in India's abiding interest to have peaceful and cooperative relations with its powerful neighbour. But the imeprative need for spelling out clearly the parameters for a meaningful dialogue cannot be overlooked.

A number of issues—China's view of India's legitimate interests in the Himalayan states, its stand on Sikkim and Kashmir, its reported involvement in Pakistan's nuclear programme—would need to be sorted out in a spirit of mutual accommodation and goodwill. It is only in the context of such wider political understanding that tne border dipsute can be settled in a spirit of mutual confidence. India has a great stake in Sino-Indian amity and cannot remain impervious to the imperatives of conciliation. This is however not to suggest that India can accept China's views on its neighbourhood—having vital bearings on its politico-strategic interests—just to create conditions for Sino-Indian friendship. China itself, it bears pointing out, has linked its border issue with the Soviet Union to the wider question of Soviet policies in the neighbourhood and is showing no keenness to settle the issue on the basis of the status-quo. It may also be usefull to recall here Nehru's plea for a balanced approach—still not widely understood or appreciated—towards Sino-Indian ties,

> Neither country can run away from...[its] geographical position. Therefore we have to think in long range terms apart from the short-term objectives we have. The short-term problem oppresses us as we have to meet the questions of today and we have to find answers to these questions. But in approaching the present it is not a wise policy to weaken ourselves from the long term point of view.[9]

India indeed faces an arduous task ahead. New Delhi can ill afford to be burdened by the dead weight of the past; but negotiations with China are bound to be slow and halting. However, even though there are no

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soft options in sight, the momentum of Sino-Indian normalization can hardly be reversed. This would make for continued optimism with regard to the future of Sino-Indian relations

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

SAARC : PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION

BACKGROUND

SOUTH ASIA as a region stands distinctly due to its geography, history, economy and culture. Most of the countries of the region share a colonial history. The region maintains a distinct cultural unity because of common religions and languages. Poverty, population, unemployment and slow economic growth rates are the common problems of South Asia. Nearly one billion population of these seven countries--now comprising South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)[1] --accounts for 20 per cent of world population living on 3.3 per cent of earth surface area. India the core country in South Asia has 72 per cent of the region's area and 77 per cent of its population and generates 78 per cent of the GNP. This region has the singular misfortune of being the only area to be without any form of regional cooperation[2] which could help moderate frictions arising out of short term economic interests and encurage trade, industrial and technological ties among the seven countries.

Regional cooperation in South Asia is not a new concept. Recent attempts in this direction project clearly a much felt need among the ruling elite and opinion makers in this region that there is an inherent geographic and cultural unity in South Asia that needs institutional expression of some sort, however vague or feeble this expression may be. However, it did not materialise due to certain inhibitions on the part of the South Asian nations. For instance, there was a misapprehension in certain Indian quarters that under Pakistan's leadership other nations of the region might gang up against India. Similarly, smaller nations tended to feel uncomfortable about possible Indian dominance due to India's size, population, developed economy, and wider technological base.

In 1979, late President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh mooted the idea of South Asian regional cooperation. There were meetings at official level to give it a shape. Once the proposal for SAARC had been accepted, albeit at the level of officials, Bangladesh Government prepared a working paper which was circulated in November 1980 to the countries of the region. Bangladesh working paper identified the areas in which prospects of cooperation could be worked out for mutual benefits of the countries of the region. This paper provided a forum for further discussions. Preliminary meetings were held in Colombo (1981), Islamabad (1982), and Dhaka (1983). The SARC was formally launched in August 1983. These meetings at Secretary and Foreign Ministers level had prepared the ground for regional cooperation, defined its objectives, identified possible

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areas of cooperation and recommended an integrated programme of action in agreed areas.[3]

SAARC FORMATION

With the formation of SAARC at Dhaka on 8 December 1985, regional cooperation among South Asian nations has been institutionalised. During their speeches, President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, President Ershad of Bangladesh, President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka and King Wangchuk of Bhutan hoped that what is "contentious" and a "political taboo" in SAARC today should not remain so later. Gen. Zia of Pakistan pressed for regional agreements to build confidence. He proposed that all seven countries make a collective pledge renouncing the threat or use of force against one another, take steps to banish nuclear weapons and consider creation of a system at the proper time of consultations on matters of common concern to SAARC members. President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka stressed that India 'can by words and deeds, create the confidence among us so necessary to make a beginning.' However, President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka and President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan sprang a few surprises in their addresses suggesting for SAARC a role that is a mix of security grouping and the South East Asian ASEAN grouping which has been advanced as an admirable model to follow. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India minced no words to dispel the feeling of mistrust among the neighbours. He said that the model that was being evolved for SAARC was in accordance with the realities of the region, not seeking to melt our bilateral relationships into a common regional integrity but rather to fit South Asian cooperation into our respective foreign policies as an additional dimension. Summit of the seven Heads of Government, Rajiv Gandhi added, 'broadens the vision of South Asian cooperation. It gives a new impetus and fresh direction to our endeavours. Above all it fosters peaceful and good neighbourly relations between the countries.' King Birendra of Nepal said that it was common concern of each country to preserve the independence and security in the region.

Declaration and Charter of SAARC[4]

SAARC formation was completed with the adoption of its Charter and the signing of the Summit Declaration[5] of pious, peaceful intentions and plentiful promises.

Salient features of Dhaka Declaration and Charter adopted on 8 December were that the Heads of States of seven countries realised that SAARC would play an important role in accelerating the pace of economic and social development ; promote national and collective self-reliance

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and further the cause of peace, progress and stability in South Asia and the world.

Recognising peace in the world as basic to removing poverty and hunger, the summit called for an end to the arms race, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and stressed the Non-Aligned Movement demand for a new economic order in which the needs and goals of the poorest of the poor countries were recognised.

The goals set for SAARC in its Charter include : (1) Promote quality of life, accelerate economic growth and provide opportunity to all to live in dignity ; (2) strengthen collective self-reliance, contribute a mutual trust ; (3) active collaboration in the economic, technical and scientific fields including cooperation with other countries and international forums ; and (4) increase people to people contacts and information between the nations of region. The summit also decided to set up a study group to examine the problem of drug trafficking and its impacts on the security and stability of member states of SAARC.

VARIOUS ISSUES

Collective economic benefit has been the main rationale as well as drive behind SAARC, but even economic cooperation is dictated so heavily by political constraints that it looked pretty hard to exploit the region's potential.

The South Asian region has been an interplay of the politics of no war and no peace syndrome. Politics of conflict dominates at present. The centre piece of South Asia's political system is the Indo-Pakistan relationship ; in the absence of a satisfactory resolution of conflicts between the two states mutual distrust and hostility will continue to simmer even after the SAARC formation. It may be more pragmatic to assume that in South Asia the resolution of conflicts will result in the economic and political success of SAARC. SAARC, at best, can lead the two to table but can not make them talk for resolution of their conflict.

Intensification of the arms race in the sub-continent between India and Pakistan since 1971 is another irritant and may mar the future prospects of SAARC. Both India and Pakistan, if they realise that a peaceful and stable South Asia will free their energies so that they can play positive and major roles regionally and internationally, that itself will be a major achievement for SAARC.

Another issue is Nepal's water resources. Allocation of Ganges water at Farraka in Bangladesh between India and Bengladesh remains a sore point. With the formation of SAARC it is assumed that an amicable answer could be found out more easily in a regional framework, treating this as an economic rather than a political problem.

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In certain regional organizations, like EEC, politics may play a negligible role in the economic decisions of the organizations, but not so for South Asia where politics will dictate the degree of economic co-operation so that the prospects of the latter is tied to the progress of the former. Speech of King Jigme Wangchuck of Bhutan at the Summit is relevant in this regard. He expressed doubt and felt that it might neither be possible nor desirable to limit SAARC discussions to issue of a non-political nature, for the political climate of the region would certainly cast a long shadow over the deliberations. One can say that at best, SAARC has made a beginning towards economic, cultural and social cooperation in a limited manner among member states. SAARC's priorities will be predominantly economic cooperation, the removal of artificial barriers to trade and avoidance of mutual competition in seeking markets outside the region. The mechanism provided, in principle, for consultations on problems specific to the region could prove useful at a later date provided serious economic and political content, based on shared interests, values and objectives, can be developed gradually within the SAARC forum.

To a critic, the Dhaka Declaration (adopted unanimously of course), obscures far more than it reveals about the state of the political art and of the reality of interstate relations in the South Asian region. It incorporates very little that is concrete in terms of regional cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, technical, and information spheres and offers very broad, often fundamental formulations that leave themselves open to a variety of interpretations in each country, especially when one recalls that they issue jointly from the Governments of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and so forth. At the consensual level there will be disappointments that India has not succeeded in placing the business of economic development—trade, industry, energy and so on—squarely within the scope of SAARC. In other words, the recognition that the South Asian region can be treated in a special way as an economic zone, and that substantive developmental activity can be facilitated and perhaps coordinated activity on a regional basis is still being resisted—presumably under the misconceived apprehension that India as the biggest and most developed economic power in the region will be tempted to dominate the larger market. This is comparable, of course, to the insinuations and hang-ups that are being expressed by some of the regional statesmen and other critics concerning tendencies towards "hegemonisms" at the political level.

India's position was spelled out clearly by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his address to the Summit which stands as a guarantee for those who always cherish a negative attitude towards India. SAARC has materialised after painstaking efforts over the past five years. If the seven countries can add further dimensions to it, that is to be welcomed. As expected by

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other nations of the region it will only be served if India alone showed magnanimity. Other nations should duly reciprocate for fruitful cooperation.

Reactions in India

In some ways there were mixed reactions in India. While generally, the national dailies welcomed the regional association they were not certain if this could successfully achieve the goal of regional cooperation and friendship given the contrary relationships between some of the states in the region. It was being observed that some of these countries are even experiencing destabilisation as a result of terrorist activities, assassinations and insurgency aided and abetted by foreign sources. As to, who is playing what role remains a guessing game. But for making SAARC a success, pragmatic and unbiased approach is needed not only by India but all the members of SAARC.

One New Delhi daily editorially commented that 'The character of SAARC is laudable enough but the temptation to graze in further pastures which had caused an unnecessary rivalry in securing markets for their produce (in several cases the same produce like tea and jute) will have to be consciously curbed if the region is to witness meaningful co-operation.' It then added that as 'basic to such cooperation must be a realisation that national interest is best served by the absence of hostility.' It is, therefore, "encouraging" that, the South Asian nations have 'decided to promote all round mutual cooperation in agriculture, health and population control, meteorology, postal services, rural development, science and technology, sports, arts and culture, telecommunications and transport.'[5]

Another New Delhi newspaper raised some doubts about the outcome of SAARC:

> The history of civilisation is the history of man's attempts to tame wild forces within him and without him,the failure of such enterprises and their resumptions. SAARC is without doubt one such attempt. It can easily flounder under the strain of the contradictions that abound in the region. Indeed, it will be a near miracle if it does not and instead helps the participant countries to cooperate with one another in tackling the heart-breaking tasks that confront them.[6]

Hence the daily observed 'if SAARC is an achievement, it is also a challenge ; indeed, it is more of a challenge than of an achievement....'

One leading english daily in its editorial comments welcomed the formation of SAARC in general terms. However, in a note of caution it observed : 'SAARC, like all other new born, perhaps would have to go through a period of teething trouble. But the agony could be greatly

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reduced if the seven members were to subject themselves to a period of a self-imposed moratorium on raising bilateral issues involving SAARC members...'[7]

The Indian Expresss (New Delhi) said that 'The historicity of the event is self-evident, so is the need to protect and nourish the association to enable it to play the role chartered for it. Indeed, although bilateral problems fall outside the Charter of SAARC, an overall umbrella of goodwill and cooperation can make them so much easier of solution. All this of course assumes the availability and display of the necessary political will and purpose.'[8] One Chandigarh daily commented that by creation of SAARC, 'mistrust cannot be removed overnight but certain inhibitions can be overcome, and Dhaka summit seems to have achieved this limited aim....'[9]

The Hindu of Madras was quite sceptical about the significance of the Dhaka Summit. It said: 'Nobody but the naive, or those with unacceptable external politico-military designs on the region, really expected the meeting of the Heads of States and, or Government, of South Asian countries 'to set the Meghna on fire—or produce results that would transform the qualitative features of political, economic and security relationships in South Asia.' The daily added that, 'Historical and recent developments, especially in the political, economic and psychological arenas, have meant that at a qualitative level there is still a long way to go before South Asian regional cooperation can be turned into anything other than the soft option it is.' In short nobody 'expects it to become an institutional framework for resolving contentious and bilateral issues and problems—indeed the SAARC Charter would seem to rule this out.'[10]

Regional Impact

The SAARC Summit was also welcomed with varying notes in the other South Asian countries. One leading daily of Pakistan described it as a 'A new era in south Asia.' It declared that the Dhaka Summit was certainly a high point in the new mood and spirit as reflected in the process of South Asian cooperation set in motion in 1981.

It however, pointed out that a lot will 'depend on whether the member nations will show the wisdom and prudence to take advantage of the goodwill and understanding generated by the new enterprise' for resolving 'bilateral disputes and differences' and thereby creating a climate of regional peace and stability.[11]

Another Pakistani daily thought it 'an experiment worth trying out.'[12]

The Dhaka daily, *Holiday*,[13] commending the role played by Bangladesh as the host of the Summit, stated that it was 'quite a diplomatic feat that Bangladesh could finally persuade leaders of six South Asian nations to assemble in Dhaka' to moot 'regional cooperation' amid so much 'div-

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ersities plaguing South Asia.' In conclusion, it stated that bilateral disputes within the region remain to be resolved.

The *Bangladesh Times*[14] lauded the new role played by President Ershad and the initiatives that he had taken in convening the SAARC Summit in Dhaka.

The *Rising Nepal*[15] (Kathmandu) underscored the realistic approach of the SAARC leaders. Then it went on to add that the SAARC Summit opened a 'new chapter' in South Asia. The daily anticipated a better future for the region.

Commenting, presumably, in the context of the current situation in Sri Lanka, the island-state daily *Sun*[16] (Colombo) noted that 'regional cooperation in the economic spheres is inevitably tied up with improved political relations among states.' 'The two processes' it stated 'are complimentary' and 'need to be reinforced if regional independence is to be made a reality.'

Reactions Outside the Region

Among the major external powers, Peoples Republic of China, United States and Japan welcomed the formation of SAARC.

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang hailed the Dhaka summit as 'an event of great significance in the South Asian region.'[17] In a telegram to Bangladesh President Ershad, he said, 'China is delighted to see that, thanks to the joint efforts of the seven countries, gratifying progress has been made in the South Asian Regional Cooperation initiated by Bangladesh.' SAARC, according to the Chinese Premier, was in the interest of the peoples of all the South Asian countries for it was deemed to bring peace in the region ; Zhao wished the summit a great success.

The Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, in a congratulatory message, noted the successful outcome of South Asian Regional Cooperation Movement. Prime Minister R.J.L. Hawke of Australia stated how his country believed in the value of regional cooperation.

The US President Reagan, in his message to the Summit Chairman expressed his country's willingness to stand ready 'to provide appropriate assistance at your request in launching programmes of regional cooperation.'[18]

The United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller wished "every success" to the first regional Summit of SAARC in Dhaka. In his message to the Summit Chairman, the UN Secretary General had declared in an optimistic note that the summit will open 'a new era of progress' in South Asia and help reduce regional tensions. The UN chief extended his sincere good wishes to President Ershad and other Heads of State and Government present in Dhaka for the historic conference of the SAARC. He further stated that he had followed with satisfaction 'the positive

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developments of this new regional organization in the past few years.' Indeed, it was no coincidence that the venue of the conference was Dhaka in Bangladesh which had first proposed the idea of South Asian Regional Cooperation.[19]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Admittedly the basic pattern of cooperation in South Asia has been essentially characterized by bilateral initiatives among various neighbours. However, as noted above, in recent years the seven South Asian countries, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives are giving serious thought to regional cooperation on an institutionalized basis. In many ways, the SAARC Summit in Dhaka last December took some initial steps in this direction. It will be too early if not oversimplistic to pass a judgement on the South Asian ventures with reference to EEC or COMECON. The significance or the potentialities of the SAARC have to be highlighted in terms of political, social and economic challenges that it has to confront.

In considering the ultimate development of the SAARC it should be noted that it could entail greater responsibility on India's part in participating in such a multilateral experiment. Given the varying resource bases of the respective South Asian countries, such an eventuality seems to be unescapable in the context of the SAARC. Regional cooperation is a multilateral interaction guided by the principle of collective advantages. It would appear for many years to come, if SAARC has to function as a credible institution India may have to underwrite various technical and economic requirements of other nations of the region. If on the one hand it calls for India's capacity to do so on a continual basis, on the other hand it entails shedding of some inhibitions and complexes on the part of its neighbours.

Be that as it may, the moot point still remains, whether the SAARC could create a congenial climate to expedite the process of tackling bilateral issues that have complicated the region for long. When SAARC achieves his goal, one could say it has overcome a greater obstacle than any other regional venture has done so far.

V. K. ARORA*

* Mr. Arora is Assistant Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

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1 SAARC comprised of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ceylon, Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan.
2 Other regional groupings besides security pacts are : ASEAN, OAU, EEC, OPEC, OAS, ANZUS, GCC and COMECON.
3 For detailed accounts of these meetings see Imtiaz H. Bokhari, "South Asian Regional Cooperation : Progress, Problems : Potential and Prospects." *Asian Sur-* pp. 375-80.
4 Texts of these documents are re produced at the end.
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I SAARC SUMMIT DECLARATION
(8 December 1985)

THE Bangladesh President, the King of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of India, the Maldives President, the King of Nepal, the Pakistan President and the Sri Lanka President met in Dhaka on 7 and 8 December.

They underscored the historic significance of their first ever South Asian summit meeting. They considered it to be a tangible manifestation of their determination to cooperate regionally, to work together for finding solution towards their common problems in a spirit of friendship, trust and mutual understanding and to the creation of an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared benefits.

They recognised that periodic meetings at their level were central to the promotion of mutual trust, confidence and cooperation among their countries.

The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that their fundamental goal was to accelerate the process of economic and social development in their respective countries through the optimum utilisation of their human and material resources, so as to promote the welfare and prosperity of their peoples and to improve their quality of life. They were conscious that peace and security was an essential pre-requisite for the realisation of this objective.

The leaders of the South Asian countries reaffirmed their commitment to the UN Charter and the principles governing the sovereign equality of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs and non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of other states. They reiterated that the UN constituted the most important forum for the resolution of all issues affecting international peace and security.

Formidable Challenges

They also reaffirmed their deep conviction in the continuing validity and relevance of the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement as an important force in international relations. The Heads of State and Government acknowledged that the countries of South Asia, which constituted one-fifth of humanity, were faced with the formidable challenges of poverty, economic backwardness, low levels of production, unemployment and pressure of population compounded by exploitation of the past and other adverse legacies.

They felt that, bound as their countries were by many common values rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural and historica l traditions, regional cooperation provided a logical response to these problems. They were

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conscious of their individual and regional strengths, their potential as a huge market, their substantial human and natural resources and the complementarities of their economies. They were confident that with effective regional cooperation, they could make optimum use of these capacities for the benefit of their peoples, accelerate the pace of their economic development and enhance their national and collective self-reliance.

They were convinced that their countries, which had made important contributions to the enrichment of human civilisation, could together play their due role in international relations and influence decisions which affected them. They emphasised that strengthening regional cooperation in South Asia required greater involvement of their peoples. They agreed to increase interaction and further promote people-to-people contacts at various levels among their countries. To this end, they decided to take steps to create awareness and public opinion in the region.

The Heads of State and Government welcomed the progress already made in the implementation of the integrated programme of action in the nine mutually agreed areas. They expressed their desire to consolidate and further expand cooperative efforts within an appropriate institutional framework in a spirit of partnership and equality.

The leaders were convinced that they could effectively pursue their individual and collective objectives and improve the quality of life of their peoples only in an atmosphere of peace and security. In this context, they expressed concern at the deteriorating international political situation. They were alarmed at the unprecedented escalation of arms race particularly in its nuclear aspect.

Threat of Self-Extinction

They recognised that mankind today was confronted with the threat of self-extinction arising from a massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. The arms race intensified international tension and violated the principles of the UN Charter. The leaders called upon the nuclear weapon states for urgent negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty leading to the complete cessation of testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. In this connection, they welcomed the recent meeting between the US President, Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva and expressed the hope that the meeting would have a positive effect on international peace and security.

The Heads of State and Government expressed deep concern at the continuing crisis in the global economy. They underscored that deteriorating economic and social conditions had seriously retarded development prospects in South Asia and other developing countries. Sharply falling commodity prices, deterioration in the terms of trade, intensification of protectionist measures, spiralling debt burden and a decline in the flow

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of external resources, especially concessional assistance, had caused a serious setback to the economic development of the developing countries. These had been compounded by natural disasters and a precarious world food security situation affecting developing countries.

They also expressed concern over the diminishing capacity of international financial and technical institutions to respond effectively to the needs of the disadvantaged and poorer countries and regretted that the spirit of multilateral cooperation had begun to falter and weaken. This was particularly disturbing in the face of inccreased inter-dependence of developed and developing countries and the fact that economic revival of the North was closely linked to economic progress in the South. They believed that developments in the past decades had clearly demonstrated the structural imbalances and inequities inherent in the existing international economic system and its inadequacy to deal with problems of development.

The leaders strongly urged that determined efforts should be made by the international community towards realisation of the goals and targets of the international development strategy as well as the substantial new programme of action for the least developed countries. They called for urgent resumption of the North-South dialogue and early convening of an international conference on money and finance for development with universal participation.

Historic Importance

They were conscious of the historic importance of the Dhaka Summit and reiterated their conviction that the launching of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries which they had established at this meeting, would place regional cooperation on a firm foundation, play an important role in accelerating the pace of economic and social development of their countries, promote the objectives of individual and collective self-reliance and further the cause of peace, progress and stability in their region and the world.

Source :—*Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 9 December 1986.

II SAARC SUMMIT CHARTER
(8 December 1985)

The Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka,

1. Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and non-alignment, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force

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and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes ;

2. Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice and economic prosperity are best achieved by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbourly relations and meaningful cooperation among the countries of South Asia which are bound by ties of history and culture ;

3. Aware of the common problems, interests, and aspirations of the peoples of South Asia and the need for joint action and enhanced cooperation within their respective political and economic systems and cultural traditions ;

4. Convinced that regional cooperation among the countries of South Asia is mutually beneficial, desirable and necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the quality of the life of the peoples of the region ;

5. Convinced further that economic, social and technical cooperation among the countries of South Asia would contribute significantly to their national and collective self-reliance ;

6. Recognising the increased cooperation, contacts and exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute to the promotion of friendship and understanding among their peoples ;

7. Recalling the declaration signed by their Foreign Ministers in New Delhi on 2 August 1983, and noting the progress achieved in regional cooperation ;

8. Reaffirming their determination to promote such cooperation within an institutional framework ;

Do hereby

Agree to establish an organisation to be known as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, hereinafter referred to as the Association, with the following objectives, principles, institutional and financial arrangements.

Article I

OBJECTIVES

1. The objectives of the Association shall be :

a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life ;

b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to life in dignity and to realise their full potentials ;

c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia ;

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d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems ;
e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields ;
f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries ;
g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interest, and
h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

Article II

PRINCIPLES

1. Cooperation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit.

2. Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but shall complement them.

3. Such cooperations shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations.

Article III

MEETINGS OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT

1. The Heads of State or Government shall meet annually.

Article IV

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

1. A Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the member states shall be established with the following functions :

a) To formulate policies of the Association,
b) Review the progress of cooperation under the Association,
c) Decide on new areas of cooperation,
d) To Establish additional mechanism under the Association as deemed necessary,
e) To Decide on other matters of general interest to the Association.

2. The Council of Ministers shall meet in regular session as often as possible. Extraordinary sessions of the Council may be held by agreement among member states.

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Article V

STANDING COMMITTEE

1. The Standing Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries shall have the following functions :

A) Overall monitoring and coordination of programmes of cooperation,
B) Approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities of their financing,
C) Determination of inter-sectoral priorities,
D) Mobilisation of regionl and external resources,
E) Identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies.

2. The Standing Committee shall meet as often as deemed necessary but at least once a year.

3. The Standing Committee shall submit periodic reports to the Council of Ministers and make reference to it as and when necessary for decisions on policy matters.

Article VI

TECHNICAL COMMITTEES

1. Technical Committees comprising representatives of all member states shall be responsible for the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the programmes in their respective areas of cooperation.

2. They shall have the following terms of reference :

A) Determination of the potential and the scope of regional cooperation in agreed areas,
B) Formulation of programmes and preparation of projects,
C) Determination of financial implications of sectoral programmes,
D) Formulation of recommendations regarding apportionment of costs,
E) Implementation and coordination of sectoral programmes,
F) Monitoring of progress in implementation.

3. The Technical Committees shall submit periodic reports to the Standing Committee.

4. The chairmanship of the Technical Committees shall normally rotate among member states in alphabetical order every two years.

5. The Technical Committees may, *inter-alia*, use the following mechanisms and modalities, if and when considered necessary :

A) Meetings of heads of national technical agencies,
B) Meetings of experts in specific fields,
C) Contacts amongst recognised centres of excellence in the region.

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Article VII

ACTION COMMITTEES

The Standing Committees may set up Action Committees comprising member states concerned for implementation of projects involving more than two but not all member states.

Article VIII

SECRETARIAT

1 The Council of Ministers shall consider, at an appropriate time, the establishment of a Secretariat for the Association and its organisation, functions and funding modalities.

Article IX

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. The contribution of each member state towards financing of the activities of the Association shall be voluntary.
2. Each technical committee shall make recommendations for the apportionment of costs of implementing the programmes proposed by it.
3. In case sufficient financial resources cannot be mobilised within the region for funding activities of the Association, external financing from appropriate sources may be mobilised with the approval of or by the Standing Committee.

Article X

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.
2. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations.

Source: *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 9 December 1985.

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BOOK REVIEWS

AFRICA : AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDY

A Review Article*

AFRICA, like Asia, is still a geographical concept more than a politico-economic entity. The Americas and Europe are more homogenous continents. Europe has had many wars and conflicts but has common cultural and economic features. The Americas, in spite of its great size and variety, has considerable homogenity in languages and races. Africa is in a more disadvantaged position than Asia. Asia has maintained, notwithstanding colonial exploitation, a great deal of its historical and socio-cultural organisations which have sustained it during long periods of foreign subjugation. Africa's cultural heritage and civilization has received grievous battering from colonial exploitation leaving a deep sense of isolation and it has made its historical evolution disjointed. It is this which makes the study of African problems of special significance to a social scientist. Do political and economic experiences of Africa throw up any new concepts or models in political and economic theories and organisations ?

Africa has the largest number of least developed countries. But the basic problems of development are not dissimilar to those in developing Asia and Latin America. The economies of African countries have to overcome exploitative forces both foreign and domestic and the problems of consolidating national identity are common. African countries, like other developing countries, face the unresolved issue of democratic versus totalitarian forms of government ; of choice between centrally planned economies and liberal market-oriented economies. The ideological conflicts have however been contained through subscribing to the principles of non-alignment.

African problems have been uniquely complicated by racial conflict in its southern region which is endowed with immense and diverse mineral resources and which could act as an engine of growth for the whole of Africa. African energies are still trapped, unlike in large parts of Asia and Latin America, in this fateful struggle to end *aparthied* and racial exploitation. Asia has had a Gandhi and a Mao. Latin America has had Simon Bolivar and Castro. These leaders have moulded the destinies of large sectors of population far and wide within their own countries and outside. They gave a new hope and faith to their countrymen in themselves by making them a part of a new world-wide movement. Africa no doubt, also

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* Harjinder Singh : *Africa : An Economic and Political Study* (UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1985), 224 p., Rs. 150.

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has had great leaders in Nkrumah, Nasser and Kenyatta. The influences of these leaders have by and large been confined to their own countries.

India's studies on the political and economic problems of Africa have matured in the last decade or so. Increasing number of our universities have established African studies departments and more and more students and research scholars are studying and dissecting the African political and economic scene through research based on personnel investigation in Africa. There is also greater interaction between African and Indian scholars. Indian writing on Africa now is getting liberated from British and French academic dominance. African organisations like the Organization for African Unity and the Economic Commission of Africa are still not as active and productive in throwing up issues and their possible solutions as their counterpart organisations in Latin America and Asia. However, the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies have been active enough in gathering and analysing primary data on the basis of which alone reasoned and objective research on different aspects of political and economic developments in Africa could be undertaken.

Harjinder Singh's book looks at the African polity and economy through the study of developments in three key African countries, i.e. Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Namibia. A large body of statistical material compiled by international organisations—African and of the United Nations—has been analysed with a great degree of patience and insight. Ethiopia has undergone revolutionary transformation in the last decade from a paternalistic totalitarian government of Emperor Haile Selassie to that of a socialist government inspired by the Soviet achievements. The analysis in the book points to the grim reality of problems of food security and developments defying political forms and institutions either of the extreme right or extreme left. Political and economic problems of Zimbabwe are of a different sort. Under the Ian Smith UDI Government, Zimbabwe, in spite of international handicaps, made remarkable economic progress and both industrial and agricultural production increased and diversified. The new state of Zimbabwe, governed by African leaders popularily elected, has the task of maintaining the tempo of economic development. Next to South Africa, Zimbabwe has the most developed industrial and agricultural infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. The book admirably pinpoints the difficult task of maintaining, let alone accelerating, a rate of growth in Zimbabwe under a democratic form of government which could be a model not only for Africa but for a large number of developing countries.

I am impressed by the historical framework in which the political and economic problems of Namibia have been analysed in the book. The tragedy of the Namibian people comes out starkly in the space of a few pages. The chapter on the migrant labour system in South Africa brings out lesser-known aspects of the economies of migratory labour laws in South Africa. Economic realities have their own logic which often run

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contrary to political and ideological inclinations. It is a tribute to the maturity of our scholars, like the present author, that they are not carried away by their liberal or radical political views in unravelling economic trends. This is the only way to enhance the acceptability of their analysis and justify the effort necessary for undertaking studies of political and economic developments in African countries.

An acid test of the success of Indian studies on African developments is whether they have helped to establish a relationship of warmth, confidence and friendship between Indian scholars and their African counterparts with potential of percolating to an ever widening circle of Indians and Africans. Notwithstanding close and fruitful cooperation at inter-governmental levels—both in multilateral and bilateral fora - there is a growing pyschological and credibility gap between Indians and Africans, be they in Africa or in India. It will be a sterile scholarship which does not help forge strong human bonds. Without personal contacts, trust and give and take, institutional and organisational cooperation will lack conviction, strength and life. We have now a large number of highly qualified Indian experts working in many African countries and there are African students and experts studying and under training in Indian institutions. Their work as well as leisure should be intimately interwoven with each other to reflect the high objectives and liberal aspirations reflected in the various Indian studies on African political, economic, social, cultural and literary sectors.

Many African countries, once politically stable and commercially good partners of India, are passing through a period of political and economic turbulence. Should we put our economic and trade relations with them in cold storage ? New studies are necessary to explore innovative policies which are consistent with our basic commitment to African progress. Africa in its myriad facets—social, economic, cultural, artistic, musical and literary and in its flora and fauna—provides an invaluable input for our own national development. It would be suicidical for us to allow these assets to be wasted or frittered away in the face of temporary difficulties. We always had the ingenuity but today we have the technological and economic clout not to be overawed by the current slide back in African economic development.

South Africa is passing through new convulsions. Will there be a more or less bloodless change towards majority rule in South Africa and Namibia as in Zimbabwe ? Or will there be armed conflicts before *apartheid* ends and representative majority rule is established ? A period of extreme uncertainty and instability in the whole of the Southern African continent is likely to ensue before Namibia becomes independent and *apartheid* ends in South Africa. We have nearly a million persons of Indian origin in South Africa. What should be our policies and what will be our options ?

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Intellectual vigour and integrity of Indian studies of African politics and economics have its most difficult challenge ahead of it. Harjinder Singh's book is a valuable contribution in helping us to face our future in Africa.

New Delhi. K. L. DALAL*

*Mr. Dalal was formerly with the Indian Foreign Service.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

K. D. KAPUR : Soviet Strategy in South Asia : Perspectives on Soviet Policies Towards the Indian Sub-continent and Afghanistan. Young Asia Publications, New Delhi, 1982, iii, 548 p., Rs. 150.

IN many ways, the Soviet South Asian strategy evolved more or less autonomously in the wake of the British withdrawal from the region in 1947. This may be adduced to the structural changes within the international system brought about by the process of decolonization set by India's independence in August that year. The Russian/Soviet South Asian policy in the pre-1947 era was an off-shoot of the rivalry between the Russian/Soviet state and British imperialism in the Near East. From Moscow, South Asia was seen more as a staging ground for British imperialist designs against the Central Asian territories of the Russian/Soviet State. This is how Afghanistan developed as a buffer state (mutually acceptable) between British India and Russia

The process of decolonization in South Asia tended to bring about a change in the Soviet interests; they now sought to cultivate friendly relations with the newly independent states of South Asia with a view to break the chain of isolation imposed for long by the Western imperialist powers (notwithstanding the friendship of the war years). An additional consideration was to ensure greater security for the Soviet state. Even earlier, it may be recalled, one of the principal security goals of the besieged Soviet state was to set up a ring of friendly states on its periphery. That policy was so designed as to derive maximum security through minimum costs. This can provide a reference frame for understanding the developments of the post-1947 Soviet South Asian strategy as studied by Dr. Kapur.

In studying the post-1947 Soviet South Asia strategy, Kapur has competently handled the subject matter from different standpoints. He has dealt with the Soviet South Asian goals as influenced by history, ideology, geopolitical and security compulsions and the need for maintaining peace and stability. Additionally, he not only examines the problem from the global standpoint but also highlights the long range and the short range Soviet policy goals in the region.

Thematically, Kapur's study is structured around eight chapters supplemented by introductory as well as concluding notes. The first chapter provides an overview of the evolution of the Soviet South Asia policy from 1947 to the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The second chapter highlights the various ramifications of the Tashkent Declaration that marks the emergence of the Soviet Union as a mediatory power in the sub-continent. In some ways it is the high point of Soviet involvement in the region. Chapter three deals with Soviet attempts to befriend Pakistan in the post-Tashkent phase. Chapter four deals with the Soviet role in the

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context of the Bangladesh Crisis and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. Chapter five studies Soviet policy towards the sub-continent in the aftermath of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. Chapter six focuses on the Soviet response to the 1971 War in the sub-continent. Chapter seven follows the post-Bangladesh Soviet South Asian strategy. Finally, in chapter eight Kapur brings the study upto the Afghanistan Crisis of 1979 and the consequent Soviet response. Kapur has also made references to the global ramifications of the Afghanistan Crisis.

The study seems to have been somewhat broadly conceived. While packed up with lots of facts, it lacks certain methodological rigour and a systematic analytical presentation. Perhaps, this could have been avoided if the author had organised his study around a few select case studies on South Asian crises within a comparative frame of reference. This would have helped in producing more substantive generalizations on the Soviet South Asian policy in operation. What is more, the author at times seems to have repeated some of the concepts/sub-themes of the book.

It however does not take away the merit from the book under review. The author should be complimented for having undertaken such a study on an important aspect of the South Asian political system. He has done well to bring out a well researched study—on Soviet South Asia policy—not only for the international relations specialists but also for the benefit of those lay readers who are equally interested in the subject.

Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi.

SHIVAJI GANGULY

V. SIDDHARTHACHARRY : Jambudwipa : Blueprint for a South Asian Community. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, xi, 461 p., Rs. 200.

THIS book is a recipe for the transformation of existing nation states' of the Indian sub-continent, or rather of the northern arc of the Indian Ocean from Iran to Irian into a 'technocratic multicellular confederation' militarily strong enough to resist the interventions in their internal affairs and pressures of the two Super Powers—the United States and the USSR. The author calls the proposed federal union of these states *Jambudwipa*.

According to him, the era of nation states has now ended with the advent of super sophisticated and costly nuclear weapons and the ability of the Super Powers to afford them. Consequently the existing nation states of the Indian sub-continent, and their neighbours further afield, will always remain client states of one or other of the two Super Powers, unless

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they band themselves into a super power, that is, a league of nations able to hold their own. The biggest obstacle to the emergence of such a super power or league of the Indian Ocean littoral states is the very real 'dread' (author's word) of the smaller states like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, etc., that they will be 'swallowed whole' by India, the largest nation state of the Indian sub-continent, 'the keystone of the Northern Zone of the Indian Ocean' and the heart of *Jambudwipa*. He further believes that this dread of India by its neighbours can only be exorcised by the subdivision of India into a large number of smaller states. (Example : The Uttar Pradesh state should be split into nine mini states). Although he overtly avoids suggesting further partition of India into independent states like the partition of erstwhile Pakistan into present day Bangladesh and Pakistan, this or something as near to it makes no difference. For he makes no secret of his belief that the balkanization of India is the only way of assuring its neighbours that regional cooperation between the states of the Indian sub-continent will not pave the way to their eventual merger with India. The author will, no doubt, object that balkanization is not what he means when he suggests the division of India into smaller units of not more than 10 million people. But the phraseology he uses to cammouflage his real intention will not deceive any discerning reader. The following is a fair sample of his own description of his vivesection proposal repeated with many variations in his book :

> But unless statesmanship is willing now to reincarnate 'India' in a new, more 'universal' pattern abandoning the will-o-the-wisp of a titanic shape and accepts with protean suppleness a new multiple form, the true independence of india and other nation-states of the Zone sought to be built up and secured severally will crumble into desert sands barren of any *raison d'etre*.

If it means anything, it simply means that further division of India into small states of around 10 million people each is a necessary condition for the emergence of *Jambudwipa*. Indeed, he goes a step further. At page 93 he states 'the separation' (he means liquidation) 'of the Centre from the states is a *sine qua non* for the renascence of the people of India (Bharat).' Unless India splits itself into a number of states of much smaller size, so that its neighbours no longer consider it a Big Brother or Bully anxious to devour them, none of the existing sovereign states in the Zone will join to form the proposed Union.

Although the author is an experienced diplomat and learned scholar, he cannot see that the upshot of the sub-division of India he proposes will be precisely the opposite of what he intends. The sub-continent will be plunged into the same state of turmoil and chaos as prevailed before its

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conquest by the British two centuries ago. The author apparently believes that what happend here then will not occur now. He probably assumes that a reasonably planned form of society with scientists and saints in lieu of charltons and ambitious politicians in charge will prevail. It may be that this will happen in the long run, but that is very different from assuming that it is just round the corner. Since the author naively makes this assumption, he is unable to grasp the tremendous hold of religious bigotry, fundamentalism, parochialism, communal as well as caste loyalties and the like in our society today. He does not realize that because of their persistent hold in our midst creatures of the earlier ages will come marching into the present if India is sub-divided and the Centre weakened in the way he suggests.

However, granting that my apprehensions are groundless, it is difficult to see how the new state of *Jambudwipa* can arise under his own assumptions. Even if the Zone somehow becomes a set of small sovereign states from Iran to Irian, it is not likely that these states will 'evolve' (his word) into the Leviathon he calls *Jambudwipa* entrusted with 'only' defence, production, foreign affairs and communications which presumably includes transport. Obviously there can be no defence nor defence production to match the strength of Super Powers without the confederating states surrendering their fiscal autonomy. Neither can it conduct foreign affairs without controlling foreign trade as well as technological-cum-industrial collaborations with foreign countries outside the Zone; nor can it manage the Zone's communication and transport infrastructure without controlling its industry and trade. There is no reason to believe that the rulers of the constituent states of the proposed conglomerate will be any different breed of men willing to cede their authority in these matters to someone else. Indeed, on the author's own premises, they will not combine to conjure the giant that will swallow them all except the one who controls the monster they create. What amazes one is the naivety of the proposal so obviously unreasonable by common sense considerations. Perhaps common sense is not as common as is commonly presumed.

Finally, I will conclude by saying to the author 'No thank you, we in India do not want your *Jambudwipa* even if it redeems your expectations. We cannot afford to pay its price, the fragmentation of our motherland.'

New Delhi.

JAGJIT SINGH

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INDIA

V. K. MURTHI and GAUTAM SHARMA : Rajiv Gandhi : Challenges and Choices. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, 141 p., Rs. 75.

THIS short volume by two political commentators seeks to analyse, as indicated in the title, the challenges facing Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the choices available to him to steer the country on the road to economic progress and political stability. The authors have presented their analyses and suggestions in five chapters—"The Inheritance," "Wanted Statesmanship," "Garibi Hatao," "Cleaning the Augean Stables" and "Peaceful Coexistence." A short index at the end serves to assist readers in finding quickly references to the text when necessary.

The first chapter "The Inheritance," recounting the legacy to which Rajiv Gandhi is heir, deals briefly with the state of affairs leading to and immediately in the aftermath of the assassination of Indira Gandhi. This chapter could have discussed more extensively our failures and successes since Independence to facilitate the evolution of plans for the future.

The second chapter gives the texts of the Punjab and Assam Agreements concluded by the Prime Minister with late Sant Longowal and Assam leaders respectively and concludes with some useful suggestions such as the need to redefine the role of governors, of fixing statutorily the shares of the Centre and States from national revenues, an effective voice for States in the determination of prices of principal agricultural commodities and review of Articles 256 and 257 of the Constitution regarding administrative links between the Centre and States.

The chapter on "Garibi Hatao" likewise contains a number of suggestions. Some of these, such as creating adequate facilities for the technical or 'trade' training of unskilled personnel and encouragement for industrialists to build new industries in rural areas, have been made by scholars and public men before but deserve to be reiterated as often as possible. Likewise, the need for weeding public sector units of undesirable and inefficient elements and ensuring that this sector fulfils its designated role, deserves to be stressed.

In fact, considering the investments that have gone into building units of the public sector (Rs. 30,039 cr. as on 31 March 1983, compared to the total paid up capital of Rs. 4083 cr. for all non-governmental undertakings as on 31 March 1982), the nation is not receiving its due from a number of public undertakings. There is no doubt that these units serve a social purpose too but that is best achieved when the units are managed efficiently, produce goods of acceptable standards and at competitive prices and create surpluses with which to finance their own technological development and growth. The authors would have done well had they examined

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and discussed the subject more closely. The chapter concludes by calling on Rajiv Gandhi to reorient developmental programmes so as to 'make a direct impact on the lives of the poorest section of our populace' (our people ?).

"Cleaning the Augean Stables," the fourth chapter, predictably discusses some aspects of corruption in public life. It is unfortunately true that political corruption has grown to frightening proportions since Independence and more particularly since the late sixties. Remedial action has, no doubt, to start from the top as the authors suggest. Public funding of election expenses to candidates of recognised political parties, declaration (and verification) of assets of public men and opening to public scrutiny party funds will all help, but corruption can be erased only if the public cease to acquiesce in corruption, thus abetting the offence.

The civil servants (using that term to denote all government servants other than members of the armed forces), with honourable exceptions, appear to the common man to be neither efficient nor diligent nor incorruptible. Besides rationalising the day to day work of government offices, there is need for imposing stern punishment on officials found guilty of corruption. Concurrently political and administrative leaders must endeavour to reward competent and honest workers and discourage those that are of doubtful integrity and are inefficient.

The last chapter dealing with "Peaceful Coexistence" advocates a peaceful approach to the settlement of disputes with neighbours. This message ought to be addressed to India's aggressive neighbours since this country, despite having been the victim of unprovoked aggression by neighbours on five occasions since Independence, has been maintaining that all bilateral issues between neighbours ought to be settled through negotiations.

In respect of China, there seems to be a suggestion that India may settle the Aksai Chin issue if China vacates the Ladakhi area south of the Karakoram. This reviewer would like to stress that China invaded Tibet and in fairness to the people of Tibet, ought to vacate the whole of Tibet retaining only nominal suzerainty which China was accorded under the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Further, in any case, the entire Aksai Chin plateau is part of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and has to be vacated by Chinese occupation forces. Chinese leaders are farsighted and will, hopefully, see the wisdom of vacating their aggression in the long term interests of all peoples of the region.

Regarding Pakistan, as the authors have pointed out, 'there are some lingering signs of the hangover of the past.' Besides, sub-continental problems have become more complicated beause a Super Power needs Pakistan for furthering its own geo-strategic objectives in the region. This is the reason for Pakistan receiving 'state of the art' weapons and electronic equipment despite its on-going nuclear programme. It may suit Pakistan's leadership to maintain a certain degree of antagonism towards

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India for domestic reasons as well as for the purpose of creating suspicions among minorities in India.

In the case of Bangladesh, India has always endeavoured to be of help as the average Bangladeshi is well aware. Otherwise, lakhs of Bangladeshis would not be trying to seek refuge here every year. But India has to draw the line somewhere and erecting the proposed fence need not be proceeded with only if Bangladesh takes effective measures to prevent its people from crossing over to India. In the case of Farakka too, India has been not only just but generous. Even generosity has its limits. Bangladesh's water problems can be solved if it objectively examines the possibilities of harnessing the Brahmaputra waters.

Sri Lanka has sought to internationalise a domestic problem—a problem created by intolerance and racism—leading to organised violence by state agencies on a defenceless and hardworking minority. If driven to extremes even a docile population will endeavour to assert themselves as some Sri Lankan Tamils are now doing.

The authors would have done well to discuss some of these issues forthrightly. The publication is timely and can add to one's library of books on current affairs. Nevertheless, the publishers by exercising a little more care could have avoided proof reading errors.

New Delhi. R RAMA RAO

G. G. MIRCHANDANI and K. S. R. MURTHI : 1984 Lok Sabha Elections—Massive Mandate for Rajiv Gandhi. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1985, xii, 244 p., Rs. 100.

ELECTIONS in India have become a routine affair. The Eighth Lok Sabha Elections aroused some special interest because of Rajiv Gandhi's direct involvement in it after Mrs. Indira Gandhi's assassination. The election results were more or less on anticipated lines. However, Telegu Desam of Andhra Pradesh emerged as the largest Opposition Party in the Lok Sabha while the Communist Party (Marxist) in West Bengal could not hold its position of 1980. The Janata Party also had a setback in Karnataka.

The book under review is the result of a UNI-DCM computer based study. This type of study is new to Indian readers and contains a lot of charts and statistical information.

The book is divided in two parts. Chapters I to IV—record developments from Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in 1980 to her assassination

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in October 1984. Chapters V to XII, record the entire election process from the very beginning.

In the Chapter on "Unity Moves", the authors rightly observe that 'efforts for opposition unity came to naught owing to mutual antagonisms....' Much more than this, the choice of a leader was always a stumbling block in their otherwise cordial negotiations. During the Janata Party regime this fact came to the forefront. Ultimately the Janata Party regime came to a grinding halt because of the choice of a consensus Prime Minister. Chaudhary Charan Singh, over a brief spell of Prime Ministership, gave the Congress (I) an opportunity to stage a comeback with a thumping majority. This development explains quite explicitly that a conglomeration of parties with different ideologies cannot work. Even the 'conclave' idea of the opposition did not go far. On this, Mrs. Gandhi rightly observed that, the opposition leaders did not give high priority to happenings like terrorism, violence and extremist activity. Their approach was parochial and self-centered.

Centre-State relations during 1980-84 were in a flux ; this was due to the role of the governors who wrongtly dismissed State Assemblies in Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir State. These developments with commentary and reactions are recorded in Chapter III. Opposition parties at this stage made some headway towards unity, but their moves were of no consequence and the Congress (I) further consolidated its position vis-a-vis the Opposition.

With the brutal assassination of Mrs. Gandhi (October 1984), the political climate in India was charged with violence and uncertainty. Rajiv Gandhi, groomed to take high office ever stnce the death of his brother Sanjay Gandhi had to reluctantly accept the Prime Ministership of India. However, the responsibility accepted by him was discharged with utmost diligence, sobriety and calmness despite the critical times that prevailed after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination when the whole of northern India was in the grip of communal violence and rioting. As Prime Minister of India he warned : 'I cannot and will not allow this.' This warning had a tremendous effect and things started improving thereafter. Rajiv Gandhi took many important decisions to restore peace and harmony in Delhi. These events are properly recorded with comments in Chapter IV and provide systematic reading

Soon after the interim period of ministry forming at the Centre and reorganising the party, Rajiv Gandhi announced the holding of the Eighth General Election a few days before schedule. In Chapters V to XII the whole process of election is described from beginning to end. Election results, as expected, gave a thumping majority to the Congress (I) and a massive mandate for Rajiv Gandhi. Besides the sympathy wave, the results may be attributed to few other factors. The opposition parties were disunited and because of this the prevailing dissensions within the

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Congress were reduced to a bare minimum. Antulay and Dhote in Maharashtra, and a few others elsewhere were exceptions which did not make much difference to the election results. The Indian electorate, the authors have rightly observed, were an educated one thanks to the 'seven elections to Parliament and scores of elections to State Assemblies.' They rightly voted for a change, i.e. from Mrs. Gandhi to Rajiv Gandhi. In all the regions, except Andhra Pradesh where the Telugu Desam gave resistence to Congress (I), results were in favour of the Congress (I) and it broke all previous records. In West Bengal, the CPI (M) could not maintain its position of 1980. The Tamilnadu State Assembly, which simultaneously went to the polls, also registered a victory for AIDMK which was in alliance with the Congress (I).

While reading the book many charts and statistics sometimes fall heavy on the mind, but it is unavoidable. With the rapid increase in the use of computers at every level, such studies are bound to be useful and in course of time would naturally be preferred by scholars. The usefulness of such a study is in its rapidity and its results.

Indian Council of World Affairs, V.K. ARORA
New Delhi.

A.K. BANERJI : Aspects of Indo-British Economic Relations, 1858-1898. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982, xvi, 225 p., Rs. 120.

THIS study attempts to deal with India's external financial transactions during the colonial period enhancing our stock of knowledge on Indo-British economic relations for the years 1858-1898. In the first chapter of this book, the author has also explained clearly why he offered a forty-year estimate rather than for eighty nine years, i.e., upto 1947.

The author has taken immense pains to base this work on a vast multitude of source materials and the scheme of presentation is also logical. He rightly observes that during the period 1858-98, trade increased at a much faster rate than either population or the national product. Further, the rupee value of exports and imports almost quadrupled, even though there were often larger year-to-year fluctuations. This phenomenon was of course to be expected as trade increases the demand for a country's products and opens up new possibilities of further division of labour and specialisation.

This book further attempts to unfold the various implications for the economy of this relatively high growth rate of trade in India. The trade generally seemed to have succeded only to a limited extent in expressing

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its dynamism on the economy of dependent India due to various factors. The most important factor was trade, predominantly of the exchange of agricultural products for manufactured goods for consumption, rather than investment.

According to the author, apart from the import of railway materials during these forty years, other imports of machinery and millwork for investment was only of Rs. 56 crores. Some imports, like iron and steel, seriously affected domestic income and employment. Further, a succession of quite devastating famines, resulting in loss of available capital assets like cattle and minor irrigation sources, impoverished a large body of the agriculturists.

In the opinion of the author, even imported foreign capital was not put to optimum use by the colonial government in India. About one-fourth of the loan was raised by the government for meeting the home charges and an equal amount for railways with guaranteed dividends where the cost to the country was much higher than what the bare dividend percentage would indicate. As all managerial and technical positions were occupied by the British, there were no fall-out benefits either.

This book does not however examine thoroughly the effects of the steady fall in exchange value of Indian currency which is an important and closely related topic and which needs further in-depth probing. Nevertheless, this book is a rare and excellent addition to the sparse literature dealing with India's external financial transactions during 1858-98, which has wider utility to students and research workers in the different fields of political and economic history.

Directorate of Economics and Statistics, A.K. RAY
New Delhi.

SRI RAM KHANNA : Export Marketing of India's New Manufactures. University of Delhi, Delhi, 1985, vi, 488 p., Rs. 240.

INDIA's balance of payments crisis has been endemic leading to a search of various measures to correct the yawning deficit. Lately, expanding exports have assumed an important role in India's policy response to the crisis in the external sector specially in view of decline in official aid and increased debt repayment liability during the Seventh Plan. Over the last two decades, export expansion of new products which have a growing market has become central to policy treatment. The international demand for a number of Indian products, specially primary products has been either declining or stagnant. It was found necessary, therefore, to identify

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new products which could be increasingly exported with careful planning, thus enhancing the export earnings of India along with a number of attendent benefits such as increase in employment, efficiency marketing strengths, etc. This obviously called for identifying specific segments of exports whieh needed special attention. Hence, the debate on traditional and non-traditional products began.

The author of the book under review, therefore, rightly examines the origin and evolution of the concept of non-traditional exports. This is a neat description of the developments that took place in this regard. But the reader really does not know whether the author would like to consider all non-traditional exports as equivalent to new manufactures or not. Non-traditional exports is a slightly broader concept than the new manufactures because a number of products entered the export trade of India which were not manufactures in the post-independence period. The debate on this semantic aspect has been detailed here because the entire thrust of export production effort has to be understood in this context.

The emphasis on newness (p. 51) is right. But newness for India does not mean newness to the world market which the author appears to hint at.

The introductory chapters of the study include a lot of information which may appear to be relevant, but really does not have a significant bearing on the main subject of the study.

There are some areas where the conclusions of the author are not fully substantiated by adequate facts and analysis. In this context, one can cite the conclusion that the author has arrived at, that exports of new manufactures have generated higher employment based on the rise in exports and rise in employment. Here, there is some evidence to suggest that India's exports of new manufactures are capital intensive in order to meet the requirements of international markets. Hence their high employment effect is not conclusive.

The author has concentrated on one of the most vital aspects of India's export promotion—international marketing strategy of Indian firms. On account of the fact that they are late comers in the field, they have to fight hard in international markets to gain the share. In this regard the author has provided substantial insight into the behaviour of Indian exporters dealing with international markets and various perceptions of importers of Indian goods. Many conclusions arrived in this study were known. Yet a systematic research base for these apparent understandings has been a good addition. There are also some interesting conclusions that the author has arrived at. The objectives of 'maximum sales' followed by 'maintaining employment' have emerged as important objectives of the firms.

Yet another significant conclusion of which one gets adequate statistical proof in this study is the export orientation of the small companies. 'It is significant to note that SSI units are more export-oriented than DGTD

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units which are large scale in size. (p. 255) Bigness by itself, therefore, is no guarantee for export orientation. Further, reinforcement of this finding is the client satisfaction rates. 'In an inter firm comparison, SSI units have a higher average CSR of 61.9 per cent as compared to 55.0 per cent and 53.3 per cent of merchants and DGTD units respectively.'

The study, in addition to many other aspects, also focuses attention on the possibility of the withdrawal of cash assistance and possible pricing strategy of exporting firms in India. Significantly, many exporters argue that they would have to raise the price following the withdrawal of CCS in stages. Surprisingly, not many firms gave an answer by suggesting the alternative—searching for cost reduction in order to compensate for the loss of CCS. There were, however, some firms in each category of exporters who could continue offering their existing prices despite the withdrawal of assistances. 'Surprisingly the largest share of such firms (19 per cent) came from small scale exporters.'

The study overemphasises governmental infrastructure for promotion while overlooking the infrastructure of firms to promote international trade of their companies. Yet another important aspect that the study has overlooked is the performance of companies with international collaboration arrangements. This classification would have been useful to understand the role of international collaboration arrangements in international marketing strategies of firms in India. The chapter on export promotion is well done.

Indian Institute of Foreign Trade,
New Delhi. SUMITRA CHISTI

B. R. VIRMANI and PREMILA SETH (*Eds.*) : Evaluating Management Training and Development. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1985, vi, 420 p., Rs, 190.

THE importance of training for better performances has been increasingly recognised both in public administration and management of private enterprises. A number of training institutions have come into existence both at the national level and at the state level. Various kinds of training courses are contemplated—both pre-service and in-service. The training courses are both general and in special areas such as financial management or personnel management. An increasingly large number of executives, in the public and private sector, are having opportunities to participate in the programmes. The legitimacy of training is being recognised. Recently, the Government of India have initiated a programme of providing refresher courses for all the four thousand officers of the Indian Administrative Service within a period of twelve months. The training is

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expected to provide both technical skills and behavioural skills. They have to provide both knowledge and motivation.

Inspite of this awareness of the legitimacy and relevance of training, questions continue to be asked as to whether training has been able to fulfil the expectations. The expectations are in terms of better performance. How can one measure the impact of training in terms of better performance ? Can such an impact be measured and evaluated ? The answer to such a question is not easy for many reasons. And yet it is important for the continued recognition of the legitimacy and relevance of training that such a question should be raised and answered. This is what the book under review seeks to do. It is based on a case research programme related to some of the training courses conducted at the Administrative Staff College where the authors work as faculty members.

The difficulties regarding the evaluation of the impact of training arises from the problems related to the transfer of what the participants might have learnt in the course of their training to the performance of their job in their organization. The performance depends on a number of factors which collectively may be described as the organizational climate. If it is not conducive to change or innovation, the participant may not be able to tranfer the knowledge to his work. The work in an organisation, particularly in government, is rigidly bound within the parameters of rules and regulations which the participant by himself is unable to change. He is just a cog in the wheel—one individual in a whole big system which he by himself cannot control or change. The participant, therefore, feels quite helpless in transferring the benefit of his training to practical work situations. No doubt, the participant would be able to make some effort if his boss is appreciative. But if he (the boss) has little interest or has a negative attitude then opportunity to the trainee to give the benefit of his participation in the training course is nil.

One prior condition, therefore, of creating a successful climate for the introduction of the lessons of training in a practical work situation is to provide for the involvement of the boss right from the very beginning, even before the participation of an executive in a training programme. The organization, and in particular the boss, should have a great deal of interest in training. He should have a sense of commitment. He should in fact identify the important areas of training and make a careful selection of the officer or the executive who is to undergo the training. There should be prior briefing—a discussion between the boss and the participant—and after the participant returns to his organization he should have a further discussion with his boss. There should also be contacts and consultations between the training institution and the organization from which the participants are deputed for training. The course design itself must be based on an understanding of the requirements of the organization which should be reflected in the

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programme of training. If this is not done, then the training course itself may tend to be theoretical with little connection with the practical reality. The training institution shall send pre-training questionnaires to the trainees which would increase their awareness of the content of the training. There should be direct links between the objectives of the programme and the inputs of the course as well as the expectation of the participants from the course. Thus the success of a training programme depends on a congruence of perceptions of the organization deputing personnel for training and the training institution as also between the participant, his boss and the trainer. If this is done then the training will be properly designed. geared to specific objectives and the participant will be able to assimilate a great deal from the trainer, and what is more important would be able to transfer what he has learnt to his work situation. These are the important lessons that arise out of the action-research conducted by the authors.

These are not new ideas but they are important ideas particularly in the current context when so much is said about administrative reforms whose success critically depends on a comprehensive programme of training.

That every training course should be evaluated is accepted on all sides. However, the manner in which evalution should be done is not quite clear. The procedure universally adopted is to administer a questionnaire at the end of the training course where views of the trainees are solicited regarding the good points and the bad points of the training programme, its strength and weaknesses, what the trainee has learnt from this course and what suggestions he has got. But these responses contain only the immediate reactions of the participant and give no information as to the extent to which training would lead to better performance, which is really the goal of the training programme. In order to facilitate better performance, an innovation that was introduced in the Administrative Staff College was the preparation of the "Job Improvement Plan" at the end of the training course by each participant. But even this is no guarantee that the training would lead to better job performance or whether the transfer of learning to the job would take place. Better performance can be only by seeing the performance of the trainee in his work situation at the end of the training programme. This requires an elaborate process of follow-up which is not easy for any training institution to undertake. However, for purposes of the action-research on which this book is based, the authors did undertake a follow-up—the results of which are recorded in this book.

Evaluation of training is an integral part of the training process and, in fact, must be a continuous process.

Indian Institute of Public Administration,
New Delhi. P. R. DUBHASHI

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HAROOBHAI MEHTA and HASMUKH PATEL (*Eds.*): Dynamics of Reservation Policy. Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, 320 p., Rs. 160.

THIS book is a welcome addition to the materials already available on the intensely controversial issue of 'reservations.' It is so easy to be led or misled by invective and passion on this contemporary problem that it virtually becomes impossible to draw a line between the 'scientific' and 'subjective', 'analytical' and 'opinionated.' In this book, there are in all eight papers contributed by ten authors, preceded by a Foreword by the retired Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court—P.S. Poti. Contained are also two appendices, respectively on the "Recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report" and "Preamble and Relevant Provisions of the Constitution." It is instructive also to have a look at the intellectual background of the various contributors. In terms of formal disciplines, two are sociologists, three economists, two trained in law and one a management expert. In addition, one is a journalist and another an administrator. It seems, therefore, that the issue under consideration has been examined in a broad and balanced perspective. As one goes through the papers however, one finds all of them converging in a common plea for the perpetuation of caste-based reservations—both as regards admissions in various educational institutions as well as regarding jobs and promotions. A departure is however struck by Justice Poti in his Foreword, who even while not giving a final vote against the existing policy of reservations on the basis of caste, does boldly point out that, 'It may be possible to find a few families in the most backward classes who have reached a level at par with the generality of the population. Should such sections be endowed with the benefit of reservations available to the backward classes ?' (p. 18) But, even he maintains that the whole thing must be decided at the level of a national debate; he does not oppose this policy in unequivocal terms.

The arguments advanced by proponents of the reservation policy run somewhat along the following lines. That backward and depressed castes have suffered economically and socially for centuries is a given fact. As such, the reservation policy which has continued only for a few decades cannot set right so soon the wrongs done to these castes over several hundred years. Hence, the policy must continue. As against the argument that such a policy is beneficial only to the upper crust of these castes, turning them into elites vis-a-vis their own caste brethren, the authors in this book argue that this is bound to happen. Ghanshyam Shah in "Caste, Class and Reservations" for example, views it as an inevitable attribute of the capitalist system. G.L. Bhagat, "Social and Educational Backwardness," counters it by stating that a long-time social stigmatisation of the castes has strengthened their economic backwardness, and as such needs tackling through 'reservations.' Mahesh Dave in "Backward Classes

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and Reservation," brings forth a two-fold attack on the opponents of the reservation policy, Firstly, he argues that the continuation of caste-inequalities has produced a huge mass of *hereditary backward classes* (emphasis supplied), and as such they need to be protected through reservations. Secondly, he says that despite pursuing the reservation policy for the last thirty years, higher castes continue to get ever increasing representation in the jobs. He also argues that 'merit,' which is often seen reflected through examinations and marks, is not always an evidence of competence, since it is heavily conditioned by environmental factors. Thus, selection on 'merit' does not necessarily bring in a better in-take. Another salutory effect of caste-based reservations is that these ex-marginal social groupings are now brought into the main social stream. Thus,

> ...a caste-based reservation policy is not contradictory to the process of secular social transformation. In fact, it is the first step towards secularisation of the existing traditional social structure for it would strengthen the weaker castes.... It is only when deprived and ostracised sections join the process of social transformation that traditional concepts such as casteism disintegrate. It then becomes irrelevant whether or not such groups are included in the list of backward or scheduled castes. (pp. 135-136)

But, despite all these arguments in support of the reservation policy, a few questions remain unanswered. First of all, how does one reconcile constitutional condemnation of casteism with protection-reservation based upon the caste title ? As long as the present policy continues, not only the people belonging to backward castes would continue to look upon certain 'benefits' as a natural corelate of their caste status, but also the non-benefitting castes or the high castes would acquire increasingly greater solidarity in opposition to these benefits. In other words, 'caste' as the crucial axis of socio-political mobilization would acquire a near-perpetuity and would violently come against the *dream* of evolving a fully secular society. Let's also not forget that in a poverty-ridden democratic society, any manner of 'organization', once proved strategic can hardly be shaken off unless the society in question fundamentally improves its economic status from 'poor' to a 'developed' society. And, when and if, such a vista were to be realized in the case of Indian society—decades after, 'caste' would have been further congealed as a strategic principle of social mobility into the conscious and sub-conscious fabric of society beyond the purview of its wishful removal from our midst. Too much emphasis upon caste as the selector for conferring certain reservation benefits would also make us commit another economic injustice, viz, ignoring the plight of those hapless poor who do not bear the caste title of the backward castes.

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Finally, even if one were to accept the continuity of the existing reservation policy on the vote of moral, humanistic, historical reasons, one must devise the mechanisms for absorbing or neutralizing the ill-effects of the kind of caste backlash that we have seen in the recent months in Gujarat. The pointer is not towards pusilanimity, but towards realism and political vigilance

Centre for the Study of Social Systems, J.S. GANDHI
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the Social Sciencess.

ABBAS, Khwaja Ahmed *Indira Gandhi* : *The Last Post*, Popular, Bombay, 1985. vii, 116p., Rs. 50.

This is a concluding volume of the trilogy on the life and death of Indira Gandhi—the other two are *The Return of the Red Rose* and *That Woman*. This volume covers her career during the emergency years, her years in political wilderness when she was defeated in 1977 and her government was thrown out of power, and comeback to power in 1980 and finally her tragic assassination. The book concludes with an exclusive interview with Rajiv Gandhi.

BALDEV SINGH (*Ed.*) : *Jawaharlal Nehru on Science*: *Speeches Delivered At the Annual Sessions of the Indian Science Congress*. Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1986, xvi, 107 p., n.p. Paper.

Collection contains messages and addresses beginning from 1938 when Jawaharlal Nehru sent a message to the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Science Congress held at Calcutta upto the 50th session held in Delhi in 1963. It also contains his address to the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science at the University of Ceylon, Colombo, 1962

BANERJEE, Brojendra Nath *India on Threshold of the 21st Century*. Paribus Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 1986, 388 p., xxiv, Rs. 200.

Analytical study of policies of the Government headed by Rajiv Gandhi, installed on 31 October 1984, for the speedy modernisation of the national economy and development of the country's scientific and technical potential. The author discusses impact made by the Prime Minister in the first year of his prime ministership on the global politics, dynamism provided to India's foreign policy, and at home the policies introduced with regard to cleaner politics : curbing of black money and terrorism ; education ; organisation for better, effective and efficient management and governance ; and industrialization, agriculture, trade, taxation and investment—all intended to preserve unity, stability and interests of the nation, to fulfill aspirations of the poor and downtrodden and to carry the nation forward to the 21st Century. The study also focuses on the policies of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her personality.

BASKAR, J. Paul *In Search of Refuge* : *A Brief Case Study of Sri Lanka Tamil Refugees* (Social Education Series, 1), Peace Trust, Dindigul, 1985, 33p., Rs., 3 Paper.

Explains problems of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka with regard to their basic rights and treatment meted out to them which have forced them to leave Sri Lanka. It also explains socio-economic conditions of the Tamil refugees and their experiences and aspirations . Data provided in the booklet is useful.

BERBEROGLU, Berch (*Compl & Ed.*) ; *Indian National Liberation and Class Struggles*: *A Collection of Classical Marxist Writings*. Sarup & Sons, Meerut, 1986. iv, 262 p., Rs. 110.

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Collection of classical Marxist writings on India. The first part contains writings of Marx and Engels starting with Marx's articles in the *New York Daily Tribune* in the 1950s. Correspondence between Marx and Engels is contained in the second part. Third part includes Lenin's theses on the national and colonial questions and other writings, commentary and letters dealing directly with developments in India. Excerpts from documents of the various congresses of the Communist International between 1923 and 1931 are given in part four. The collection unfolds profound understanding and sympathy of Marx, Engels, Lenin and the leadership of the Comintern had for India and Indians' struggle for national class liberation.

BURNEY, Sayed Muzaffar Husain *Iqbal and National Integration*. Haryana Sahitya Akademi, Chandigarh, 1984, xiii, 54 p., Rs. 8, Paper.

Keynote address by the Governor of Haryana under the auspices of University of Bhopal on 14 January 1984 at Bhopal. Through Iqbal's poetry, the address provides insight into his thoughts on nationalism, national unity, secularism and his concept of self or 'khudi' and humanism.

DE, Nitish *Administrative Innovations for Poverty Alleviation Programmes* (Occasional Paper 2-85). Ministry of Personnel, : Public Grievances and Pension, Department of Personnel and Training, Training Division, New Delhi, 1985,23 p., n.p., Paper.

Analysis of functioning of poverty eradication programmes and public agencies involved in it. It suggests that the agencies will have to guard against rigid bureaucratic structure and displacement of the primary task by invoking confusing and delay causing rules and action for the effective implementation of the programmes.

DEVA, B.C. *Indian Music* Rev. Edn. 2. Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1986. ix, 174 p., Illus., Rs. 36.

Recipient of the first doctorate in musicology offered by Gandharva Mahavidyalaya, Ph. D. in psycho-acoustics in speech from Poona University and trained in Hindustani vocal and Karnatak music as well, introduces in this study the basic concepts of Indian music. He discusses *raga* with scales and figures, tone, rhythm, forms of composition, *kheyal*, *thumri Kriti*, folk base of classical music particularly the devotional forms and folk and concert instruments. In this survey the common features of Hindustani and Karnatak music are also highlighted. Approach of the study is historical.

GUPTA, Amit Kumar *Forest-Fire in the Sundarbans* : *The Communists and the Kakdwip Rising, 1946-50* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 28). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1985. 80 p., n.p., Paper.

Monograph discusses peasant rising of Kakdwip in the Sunderbans against the big bourgeoisie, the princes, the landlords and the money-lenders by the leftists who formed All India Kisan Sabha in April 1936 and Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha in March 1937 for the struggle of the toiling masses. It discusses the system of existing landlordism, and *Tebhaga Movement*, i.e. movement for two-third share for the share-croppers.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Background to Evolving a National Information Policy*. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, I985, iii, 23 p., Rs. 10, Paper.

Information contained in this brochure is about the various laws which affect the press, and the guidelines which have been issued from time to time to the official media units by Government. It also contains a brief note on Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Press Council of India,

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Labour and Labour Welfare*. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi 1985, 57 p , Rs. 20, Paper.

Based on published sources, this brochure deals with the objectives and programmes formulated for the welfare of labour in the country, and implemen-

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tation and achievements of the welfare and economic programmes for labour undertaken under successive plans.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Simultaneous Interpretation In Lok Sabha.* Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1985, ii, 40 p., Rs. 8, Paper.

Simultaneous interpretation system for interpreting the proceedings from English into Hindi and *vice versa* was installed in the Lok Sabha Chamber in 1964 and further extended to provide simultaneous interpretation into English and Hindi from twelve other Indian languages. This brochure describes techniques of simultaneous interpretation in general and its use in Lok Sabha in particular. Note on selection and training of parliamentary interpreter is also included in it.

JOHARI, J.C. *International Relations and Politics : Theoretical Perspective.* Sterling, New Delhi, 1985, x, 408 p., Rs. 175.

Author of several books, presents in this volume theoretical understanding of the subject in a manner to make the task of readers easier and interesting.

KAUL, B.N. *India in Vortex.* Pulse Publishers, New Delhi, 1985. xii, 200 p., Rs. 80.

Historical and objective analysis of US attitude towards India, which according to the author has always been and is still inimical and responsible for growing threat to India's security. To prove his point, the author discusses US arms aid to Pakistan, militarisation of Indian Ocean, Sino-US strategical collusion and our border relations with China, Sri Lanka ethnic problem, relations with ASEAN, arms race in South Asia and our policy of non-alignment, peace and disarmament. The author observes that the role of Soviet Union and other socialist countries is in contrast to the US in this regard.

MISRA, Satish *India-GDR : Three Decades of Relations* (India and Socialist Countries Series). Patriot, New Delhi, 1986. viii, 112 p., Rs. 30, Paper.

The study discusses in details economic, political and cultural relations between the two countries. It traces the course of development of relations beginning from 1954 when first official contact was established in the form of a trade agreement. It also discusses question of recognition of GDR and ultimate recognition by India in 1972 which led to intensification of bilateral relations in all fields. Ph. D. thesis submitted to Humboldt University, Berlin (East).

NEHRU, Jawaharlal *Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964.* Vol. VI. *1947-1949. Ed.* by G. Parthasarathi. Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1985. 547 p., Illus, Rs. 150.

First volume of fortnightly letters covers formative period full of problems and challenges faced by the country immediately on attaining independence. This collection provides insight into the evolution both of Nehru's thought and official policy on the vital problems such as rehabilitation of refugees, integration of states particularly with reference to Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad, and on framing of Constitution and formulation of new foreign policy. These letters expound his ideas and aspirations which he shared with his colleagues and also the reasons for whatever decision he took and courses of action he pursued. It is a basic text in nation-building and in open statecraft and reveals a great mind and a large heart at work.

PARMANAND, *New Dimensions in Indian Politics : A Critical Study of the Eighth Lok Sabha Election.* UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1985, ix, 175 p ., Rs. 100.

Analysis of Lok Sabha Elections held in 1984. It discusses the background, election manifestos of various political parties, election campaigns, spectacular victory of Congress (I) and the mandate it received in various regions of the country and trend thereof, and how the new Lok Sabha is idifferent from the earlier ones structurally and functionally. Basic data and names of the members elected

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with names of constituency from where they are elected and party they represent are given in the appendices.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi Visits USSR. Soviet Land Booklets (On behalf of, Information Department of USSR Embassy in India), New Delhi, 1985, 67 p., n p., Paper.

Collection of selected speeches, statements and interviews of the Prime Minister of India and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev during the former's visit to the USSR from May 21 to 26, 1985.

RAMAMOORTHY, P. *The Role of the Communists in India's Struggle for Freedom.* Tamil Puthakalayam, Madras, 1985, iv, 80 p., Rs. 9, Paper.

Communist Party of India (Marxist) leader replies to the charges against the communists that they sabotaged the Quit India Movement, spied on Congressmen on behalf of the British Government, abused Gandhiji and Subhash Bose and that they served the interests of the Soviet Union and not the interests of India. He refutes all these charges with the help of the official documents and the resolutions and minutes of the Working Committee and the All India Congress Committee and highlights the contribution of the communists to the freedom movement.

SEAL, Brajendranath *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1985. viii, 313 p., Rs. 100.

Presents the Hindus' work of constructing scientific concepts and methods in the investigation of physical phenomena, as well as of building up a body of positive knowledge which has been applied to industrial technique and Hindu scientific ideas and methodology, which deeply influenced the course of natural philosophy in Asia—in the East as well as the West—in China and Japan, as well as in the Saracen Empire. It provides a comparative estimate of Greek and Hindu science based on original texts.

SRINIVASAN, R. (*Ed.*). : *Freedom and Dissent* : *Essays in Honour of Minoo Masani on His Eightieth Birthday.* Democratic Research Service, Bombay, 1985, xiv, 234 p., Rs. 120.

The essays contributed by close associates of Mr. Masani to this felicitation volume on his eightieth birthday present him as an exponent of the Indian liberal tradition. The values cherished by him and his affirmation of need for a pure public life, for freedom and for the right of the lone individual to assert his view point are reflected in an analytical and historical manner. The essays also discuss importance of free press and mass media, populism in Indian politics, foreign aid, consumer movement, state encouragement to the arts and academic leadership—the subjects which interested and engaged him. It provides aspects of his personality and political philosophy. Contributors to this volume are J.R.D. Tata, N.A. Palkhivala, Soli Sorabjee, S.P. Aiyar. Peter Bauer, A.H. Doctor, R.M. Lala, Cushrow Irani, Ajit Jain, S.V. Raju, F.A. Mehta, Mehra Masani, etc. The volume contains, dialogue of Frits Boekestein, Netherlands' Minister for Foreign Trade with Minoo Masani.

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TWO DECADES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND SINGAPORE

By PRADEEP KUMAR MEHTA*

In recent years, developing countries have paid increasing attention to expand economic cooperation among themselves. Several factors contributed to it. For instance, it was realized that during the past two decades technological and financial dependence of developing countries on the developed had significantly increased.[1] *As a result the developing countries became highly vulnerable to international fluctuations and their bargaining power had been greatly curtailed. This caused an adverse effect on the developing countries, including exploitation, transfer of inappropriate technologies, setting of wrong priorities in development planning and worsening of the situation on account of various socio-economic problems such as income distribution, unemployment, regional disparities and dualism.*[2] *As such regional cooperation among developing countries has come to be considered as one of the strategies to control their excessive dependence on a few industrial countries.*

A development strategy heavily dependent on imported development inputs increased substantially the demand for foreign exchange which, in turn, asked for a rapid export growth. This led many developing countries to adopt an outward orientation. Ironically for the developing countries, export prospects became dull overtime in the face of growing protectionism by the developed countries which were major export markets for them. As a result, export performance of many developing countries was found to be poor. Considering the average annual growth rate for 1965-73, and 1973-83,[3] *it was found that, of the 77 developing countries export growth rates declined in 56 and in 33 of them it was negative in the latter period. There were only 5 countries which could achieve an export growth rate of more than 10 per cent per annum, of which in 2 it declined over the period. Taking all the developing countries together, the export growth rate declined from 5.2 per cent per annum for 1965-73 to 4 per cent in 1973-80 and further to 3.39 per cent in 1981 and 3.2 per cent in 1982. Since the developing countries were dependent, to the extent of 70 per cent of their exports on developed (capitalist) countries, the protection measures adopted by the latter countries became very crucial. For instance, it was estimated that as a result of new protection measures adopted by the industrial market economies on sugar alone caused a loss of export revenue to the tune of $7.4 billion in 1983.*[4] *In this situation it was obvious on the part of the developiug countries to explore the possibility of trade among themselves.*

* Mr Mehta is Lecturer Economics, SGTB Khalsa College, Delhi University, Delhi

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INTRODUCTION

As a result of efforts made by the developing countries, economic cooperation among them has grown in various fields, especially foreign trade. Looking to the direction of trade originating from developing countries (see Table I), one gets a clear picture of growing intra-developing countries' trade, particularly since the seventies. However, significantly it was still only one fourth of their total exports. The growth of such trade was faster when the trade originating from OPEC countries was excluded, which is likely to be largely in petroleum and its products. The share of such trade had increased from 20 per cent in 1970 to 28 per cent in 1980. It appears therefore that as regards the trade among developing countries the significance of non-petroleum items had increased. This became futher evident by the fact that the significance of intra-developing countries' trade in manufactures (excluding OPEC countries) had increased from 41.6 per cent in 1973 to 74.1 per cent in 1982.[5] This shows that incremental export has largely originated from the manufacturing sectors which expanded rapidly in almost all developing countries during the past two deeades of development.

TABLE I

Significance of Intra-developing Countries' Trade in Total Trade of Developing Countries (%)

Year	Originated from all DC's		Originated from all DC's excluding OPEC countries	
	to all DC	to all DC excluding OPEC countries	to all DC	to all DC excluding OPEC countries
1965	20.91	19.20	21.34	19.21
1970	19.78	17.84	20.02	17.48
1975	23.27	20.14	25.37	19.42
1980	24.82	20.96	28.04	21.07

Source : *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1983.*
DC : Developing Countries
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Apart from trade, in recent years, increasing cooperation was also witnessed in the fields of investment and technological know-how.[6] Many newly industrialized developing countries, such as Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, Maxico, India, etc., have established industrial ventures outside their respective national boundaries. They also participated, to a varying extent, in the ventures established by other countries. Their activities were also witnessed in service sectors like hotels, banking,

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insurance, etc. In addition to it firms from developing countries won contracts for turnkey projects especially for construction works, and management contracts. In many such contracts they succeeded despite stiff competition from the firms of developed countries. Developing countries also formed a few regional and sub-regional cooperation ventures though most of them were not very successful.

Keeping in view all available evidences it can be stated that economic cooperation among developing countries has been expanding in all possible fields ever since the seventies. Furthermore, this trend is likely to continue, rather at an increasing pace, in years to come. Conceptually, prospects for cooperation among developing countries would depend, apart from other factors, upon the extent of complementarity which can be defined as the extent to which resource endowment and production patterns of one country can meet the requirements of partner countries and vice-versa. A high degree of complementarity would offer better prospects for cooperation among the countries. The complementarity between two countries would emerge largely from diversities in resource endowment and levels of development ; wider variations in both the respects would enlarge the scope for complementarity.

INDIA-SINGAPORE : DIVERSE DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES

Keeping this in view, at the outset, an attempt has been made to look into some of the indicators of development and resource endowment of the two focus countries, *viz.*, Singapore and India. (See Table II) The Table reveals that with respect to both population and size, the two countries were at different extremes. While India, a continental country, is one of the few largest countries of the world, Singapore is a tiny city state. Similarly, India is found to be well endowed with various mineral resources notably iron ore, coal, bauxite, manganese, mica, graphite, etc., while Singapore is a typically mineral-scarce country in which not a single mineral is commercially exploited.[7] Wide variation can also be noticed in terms of resource-based activities. In 1982, while in India the primary sector generated 33 per cent of GDP by employing 71 per cent labour force, in Singapore a mere 1 per cent of GDP had originated from this sector employing 2 per cent of the labour force.

If per capita GNP and per capita energy consumption can be considered as indicators of levels of development, Singapore was much ahead of India. Moreover, the former grew much faster than the latter. This shows that variations in the levels of development were not only high but also increased considerably. Further, Singapore's development was lopsided in favour of services and industry, especially machinery, transport equipment and petroleum refinery,[8] while India's development was fairly diversified ; though the modern sectors were more significant as

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TABLE II

Selected Indicatars to Exhibit Diversities Between India and Singapore

Sr. No.	Indicator (unit)		Year	Singapore	India
1	Population (million)		1982	2.5	717.0
2	Area (000 sq. km.)		---	1	3288.0
3	GNP per capita (US $)		1982	5910.0	260.0
4	Annual average growth rate (%)		1960-82	7.4	1.3
5	Per capita energy consumption (000 of Kg. of oil equivalent)		1981	4492	158
6	Share in GDP : (%)	Agriculture	1982	1	33
		Industry	1982	37	26
		Services	1982	62	41
7	Share in manufacturing value added (%)	Food and Agriculture	1981	5	13
		Textiles and clothing	1981	3	18
		Machi. and trans. equi.	1981	55	20
		Chemicals	1981	4	14
		Other manufactures	1981	33	35
8	Share in labour force (%) :	Agricultural	1980	2	71
		Industry	1980	39	13
		Services	1980	59	16
9	Export as a share of GDP (%)		1982	196	6
10	Net inflow of external capital (US $/capital)		1982	58.40	2.41

Source : *World Development Report, 1985*, various pages.

compared to the conventional sectors. To reflect on external dependence two measures were selected, *viz.*, export as a percentage of GDP and per capita net inflow of external capita. Both the indicators reflect a much higher level of external dependence in case of Singapore, an open economy,[9] than that of India, a highly restrictive trade regime.[10] As a matter of fact the policy prescriptions of the two countries varied sharply, i.e., whereas India has pursued a policy of freedom tempered by controls, Singapore became an exponent of *laissez faire*.[11] It ean be stated therefore that the extent of diversity was very high in all different respects. One may therefore expect a high and increasing complementarity and, in turn, good scope for bilateral economic cooperation between them. An attempt has been made in this paper to throw light on growing economic cooperation between the two countries.

GROWING ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Bilateral Trade

During the sixties bilateral trade between Singapore and India remained very low ; moreover it declined overtime. (See Table III) The average

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annual percentage change between 1962 to 1968 was found to be negative for both way flows : —9.5 per cent per annum for Singapore's exports to India and —1.8 per cent per annum for Singapore's imports from India. (See Table IV) As such, in 1968 the value of the two-way commodity flow was merely $24 million. Obviously, its significance to the total trade of the two countries was also low. In such nominal trade, the balance was in favour of India. The low and declining bilateral trade can be explained as follows. Being a highly restrictive trade regime, India's overall imports, including imports from Singapore, were low during the sixties. Moreover, the types of products imported by India,

TABLE III

Bilateral Trade Between Singapore and India

(million US $)

Year	Singapore's exports to India	Singapore's imports from India	Balance
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)=(2)—(3)
1962	14.64	19.52	— 4.88
1968	6.32	17.45	— 11.13
1970	10.00	22.58	— 12.58
1973	22.01	46.85	— 24.84
1975	41.95	57.82	— 15.87
1976	45.81	73.63	— 27.82
1977	143.00	78.00	+ 65.00
1978	273.00	83.00	+190.00
1979	226.00	101.00	+125.00
1980	447.00	115.00	+332.00
1981	568.00	130.00	+438.00
J982	542.00	190.00	+352.00
1983	438.00	348.00	+90.00

Source : *Direction of Trade, 1984* and back volumes.

TABLE IV

Annual Average Percentage Change in Bilateral Trade (%)

Period	Singapore's exports to India	Singapore's imports from India
1962-68	— 9.47	— 1.77
1968-75	82.80	32.33
1975-81	208.72	20.80
1970-73	40.03	35.83
1973-77	137.43	16.62
1977-81	74.30	16.67
1981-83	—11.45	83.85

Source : Based on Table III.

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largely food items and development inputs, were not on the export list of Singapore. In the sixties, Singapore's external trade was largely in the form of entrepot trade in which it re-exported the items of neighbouring countries to the western developed world.[12] Trade with India certainly did not fit in this framework.

During the seventies, circumstances changed significantly. India gradually liberalized its trade regime to meet the imbalances and deficiencies in the domestic production system, especially for capital goods and intermediate items. Likewise, Singapore opted for an aggressive outward-oriented strategy to stimulate the tempo of growth and to meet the declining tendencies in entrepot trade. In this changing environment, prospects for bilateral trade in many new sectors emerged. The two-way commodity flows, therefore, started growing in the post-1970 years. For the entire seventies, expansion of Singapore's exports to India was faster than that of Singapore's imports from India. For instance, for the years 1973 to 1977, Singapore's exports to India had increased by as much as 137per cent per annum while its imports from India increased by only 16.6 per cent per annum. As a result, since 1977 the balance of trade turned increasingly in favour of Singapore ; so much so that since 1978 the quantum of favourable balance had exceeded the quantum of its total imports from India.

In the early eighties however, Singapore's exports to India have declined at a rate of 11.45 per cent per annum from $ 568 million in 1981 to $ 438 million in 1983. Contrarily, Singapore's imports from India had increased rather sharply by $ 158 million (i.e. by 80 per cent) between 1982-83. As a result the favourable balance for Singapore came down to $ 90 million in a total trade of $ 786 million, which was just a little more than one fourth of Singapore's imports from India.

Composition of Bilateral Trade

Having found that the bilateral trade between Singapore and India has grown overtime during the past decade, it would be interesting to know the broad changes in sectoral composition and finally to identify the commodities which became increasingly important in bilateral trade. To reflect on shifts in commodity compositon a nine sectoral classification was adopted.[13]

A_1 : Food and Beverages
SITC 0 & 1
A_2 : Crude Agricultural Raw Materials
SITC 2−(243+251+266+267 to 286) +4−(431)
N_1 : Metals and Minerals (excluding fuels)
SITC 271 to 286

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N_2 : Mineral fuels & Lubricants
SITC 4
L_1 : Light Manufacturing final products with relatively low skill requirement
SITC 612, 613, 629, 632, 641, 642, 652, 653, 655, 656, 657, 665, 666, 831, 841, 842, 851, 891 to 899.
L_2 : Light Manufacturing final products with relative high skill requirement
SITC 541, 691 to 698, 733, 812, 821, 861 to 864
L_3 : Light Manufacturing intermediate products
SITC 243, 267, 431, 611, 621, 631, 633, 651, 654, 667
K_1 : Intermediate goods of Heavy and Chemical Industry
SITC 251, 266, 5—(541), 661 to 664, 671 to 689
K_2 : Heavy Machines and Transport Equipments
SITC 7—733

Singapore's imports from India in Sixties and Seventies

Table V presents Singapore's imports from India following the above-mentioned classification. It shows that between 1962 and 1968, Singapore's imports from India took place increasingly in primary products and development inputs. Among the primary products, crude agricultural raw materials (A_2) and mineral fuels (N_2) gained significance while primary food items (A_1) maintained the earlier balance. As such, almost half of the bilateral imports in 1968 were formed of these three categories.

In addition to them the significance of all the three categories of development inputs (K_2, K_1 and L_3) had also increased from 6 per cent to 17 per cent. Light manufacturing final goods with high skill requirement (L_2) too maintained their significance while such goods requiring low skill (L_1) lost markedly. The growing significance of development inputs can be attributed to the fact that during the sixties India's development efforts were largely oriented towards development inputs rather than light manufactures. It may be added however, that during the sixties total bilateral imports had declined; as such bilateral imports under some of the sectors had declined in absolute terms even though their significance had marginally improved.

Unlike in the sixties, bilateral imports grew overtime in the seventies. Between 1968 and 1975, increase in bilateral imports was observed in all the sectoral categories. Such increase was however more in the three sectors associated with development inputs and in crude agricultural raw materials, as a result of which their significance had increased to 32.6 per cent and 12.1 per cent respectively. Amongt he rest of the sectors, only L_2 gained while L_1 continued to lose, as observed during the sixties. Moreover, A_1 and N_2 also lost their respective significance during this period.

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TABLE V

Product Nature of Singapore's Imports from India (%)

Sectoral categories	1962	1968	1975	1981
A_1	31.84	31.34	22.90	19.10
	(6215.2)	(5468.5)	(13,241.5)	(25,381.8)
A_2	1.50	6.17	12.05	4.28
	(292.8)	(1076.6)	(6967.7)	(5687.7)
N_1	1.72	0.75	0.81	0.90
	(335.7)	(130.9)	(468.4)	(1196.0)
N_2	2.74	11.76	6.06	Neg.
	(534.90)	(2052.0)	(3504.1)	(25.0)
L_1	49.85	20.21	15.82	20.37
	(9730.7)	(3526.4)	(9147.6)	(27,069.5)
L_2	4.45	4.88	7.50	5.76
	(868.6)	(851.5)	(4336.7)	(7654.4)
L_3	1.65	3.52	10.64	15.02
	(322.1)	(614.2)	(6152.4)	(19,959.2)
K_1	3.04	6.87	11.71	10.09
	(593.4)	(1198.8)	(6771.1)	(13,408.5)
K_2	1.13	6.52	10.25	15.68
	(220.6)	(1137.7)	(5926.9)	(20,837.0)
Total	97.92	92.02	97.74	91.20
	(19,114.0)	(16,056.6)	(56,514.2)	(121,194.8)

Source : Based on *Foreign Trade Statistics for Asia and the Pacific*, various issues. The figures in breackets show bilateral imports in absolute terms.

Bilateral imports have further grown rather sharply in the most recent period, i.e. 1975-1981 by more than 100 per cent (from $58 million to $133 million). In this period too, bilateral import of development inputs, particularly K_2 and L_3, have gained significantly. The imports under K_1 have also grown, but could not keep pace with the total bilateral imports and thus its share declined. Still, 40 per cent of total bilateral import in 1981 was contributed by the development inputs. Another import observation was that the import under L_1 grew fast so much so that unlike in the former periods it significantly increased from 15 per cent to 20 per cent. The fact that imports under both L_1 and L_3 had increased sharply shows that India's light manufacturing products with low skill requirement gained competitive strength to such an extent that they could increasingly penetrate a market as competitive as Singapore. Though the significance of the L_2 item has declined, it is encouraging to note that import under it too increased by around 75 per cent.

Unlike manufacturing products, primary products by and large lost significantly, so much so, that bilateral import under A_2 and N_2 had declined even in absolute terms.

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On the whole it emerges that Singapore's imports from India have increasingly shifted in favour of manufacturing items, especially the development inputs. Such imports can be attributed to the variations in levels of development of the two countries, particularly to the fact that India's industrial structure was fairly diversified and capable of producing a large number of products varying from simple consumer items to sophisticated machines and intermediate products of diverse nature. In addition to manufacturing products, India also exported some primary products—largely agricultural—particularly food items. This can be attributed to variations in resource endowment of the two countries specifically in terms of agriculture and agro-based activities.

Singapore's Exports to India in the Sixties and Seventies

Following the same classification, Singapore's export to India is presented in Table VI. The table shows that till the mid-seventies bilateral export of mineral fuels (N_2), capital goods (K_2) and intermediate goods of heavy and chemical industry (K_1) had increased consistently. As such,

TABLE VI

Product Nature of Singapore's Exports to India (%)

Sectoral categories	1962	1968	1975	1981
A_1	2.18	5.96	2.27	1.99
	(319.1)	(376.9)	(952.3)	(11,245.4)
A_2	78.75	21.10	1.88	9.10
	(11,526.6)	(1334.2)	(788.7)	(51,423.6)
N_1	0.64	5.36	1.40	3.25
	(93.69)	(338.9)	(587.3)	(18,365.6)
N_2	14.33	37.75	56.26	55.33
	(2097.5)	(2386.9)	(23,589.0)	(312,666.5)
L_1	0.27	1.50	1.92	1.66
	(39.5)	(94.8)	(805.5)	(9380.6)
L_2	0.16	1.30	2.26	0.76
	(23.4)	(82.2)	(948.1)	(4294.7)
L_3	0.07	0.05	0.38	2.99
	(10.3)	(3.2)	(159.4)	(16,896.3)
K_1	0.25	0.93	13.54	12.65
	(36.6)	(58.8)	(5680.2)	(71,484.4)
K_2	0.98	9.57	15.67	6.07
	(143.4)	(605.1)	(6573.7)	(34,188.2)
TOTAL	97.63	83.52	95.58	93.78
	(14,290.1)	(5281.0)*	(40,096.8)	(529,945.1)

Source and Notes : *Foreign Trade Statistics for Asia and the Pacific.*

* As much as 16.5% (1041.4 thousand dollar) of bilateral trade was contributed by the items of SITC 9 (goods not classified by kind).

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they combinedly contributed as much as 85.5 per cent of total bilateral export in 1975 against only 15.6 per cent in 1962. The N_2 alone accounted for more than half.

Likewise, the significance of light manufactures too increased though the share even in 1975 was as low as only 5 per cent. Among other sectors, the A_1 and N_1 had registered an increase in bilateral export in absolute terms after 1968, though the total was as low as just 4 per cent in 1975. Unlike all these sectors, the crude raw materials (A_2) lost sharply from 79 per cent in 1962 to less than 2 per cent in 1975.

Between 1975 and 1981, bilateral exports increased more than ten fold. As such, all the nine sectoral categories have registered an increase in bilateral exports. In terms of shares, while fuels (N_2) and intermediate goods of heavy and chemical industry (K_1) have almost maintained their significance or nominally lost; light manufacturing intermediate (L_3), crude raw materials (A_2) and metals and minerals (N_1) have gained. Nonetheless the former, particularly N_2, continued to be in a commanding position. It is interesting to note that all the four groups belong to intermediate products (processed and unprocessed both). This shows that dominance of intermediate items had further increased from 74 per cent in 1975 to 84 per cent in 1981. All other sectors including capital goods, could not keep pace with the fast growing export and hence lost their significance. Still it is encouraging to note that bilateral export of capital goods from Singapore to India increased fivefold over a period of just six years.

It emerges, therefore, that Singapore increasingly exported intermediate goods, especially fuels and modern inputs, as also capital goods. This may be attributed to the economic structure of Singapore which was found to be heavily in favour of industrial and service sectors. Evidences are available to show that in the course of any outward-oriented development strategy, the petroleum refinery, petroleum-servicing industries and capital goods sector emerged in a big way. Obviously, these products emerged prominently in the export basket of Singapore. From India's angle this can be attributed to a vast domestic demand for various development inputs, a part of which cannot be met by domestic production due to imbalances in production linkages or because of the fact that production capacity was yet to be established. Evidences regarding cooperation between the two countries in the field of petroleum are available.

Prominent Commodities in Bilateral Flows

Looking to the shifts in the sectoral pattern of bilateral trade between the two countries, it emerged that the two countries, both of which are nowadays commonly known as newly industrialized countries,[14] were trading increasingly in manufactures, particularly in development inputs. At the same time, some primary products too figured prominently in the

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bilateral trade. Many of the commodities traded between the two countries can be considered as dynamic products in view of the fact that bilateral trade in them grew very fast, especially in the most recent period. An attempt had been made to identify those dynamic products. For this purpose, all the commodities at SITC-3 digit level were arranged as follows :

(*i*) *Matured Prosperous Products* : Commodities in which bilateral export/import increased over all the four points of time in terms of share (a.1) or atleast in absolute terms (a.2).

(ii) *Products that became Prosperous after 1968* : Commodities in which bilateral export/import declined detween 1962-68 but increased thereafter in terms of share (b.1) or atleast in absolute terms (b. 2). Some products emerged after 1962 but before or in 1968 and bilateral trade grew in them (b.3).

(iii) *Products that became Prosperous after 1975* : Commodities in which bilateral export/import declined till 1975 or exhibited no trend till 1975 but grew between 1975-81 (c.1). Some products emerged after 1968 but before or in 1975 and bilateral trade in them grew (c.2).

(iv) *Newly Emerged Products* : Products in which bilateral export/import was noticed in recent years only i. e., after 1975 (d).

(v) *Non-Prosperous Products* : All the remaining products including those in which the trade had declined, was very insignificant, or there was no trade at all are considered non-prosperous, at least for the immediate future.

Looking to Singapore's imports from India in the above-mentioned framework, as many as 109 groups accounting for 87 per cent in 1981, were found prosperous. See Table VII. Interestingly, at aggregate level their significance had declined between 1962-68 which shows that the prosperous products were largely associated with categories b and c in terms of share.

Considering individual groups, it was observed that many of the prosperous products were the items commonly used for development purposes. For instance, 10 of the 13 groups associated to capital goods (SITC 71 and 72) had shown an increasing trend. It includes all the seven groups associated to non-electric machinery, four of which appeared under a. 1, two under a. 2 and one under c. 2. As such, the significance of non-electric machinery had increased from 0.35 per cent in 1962 to 9.15 per cent on 1981. Of them, important were the unspecified non-electric machinery (SITC 719—5.3%)[15], agricultural machinery (SITC 711—2.1%) and metal working machinery (SITC 715—1.2%). In case of electric machinery, three of the six groups exhibited an increasing trend but only one, *viz.*, unspecified electric machinery (SITC 729—2.2%), could contribute a significant share. In the remaining two groups, *viz.*, electric power machinery (SITC 722—0.7%) and domestic electric equipment (SITC 725—0.4%) the bilateral import was less than $ 1.0 million.

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Likewise, some prospects were also noticed in transport equipment (SITC 73) in which three of the six groups have exhibited increasing tendencies but the level of bilateral import was still low. Only road motor vehicles (SITC732—3.1%) could contribute significantly. The other two items were : non-motor vehicles (SITC733—0.45%) and aircraft (SITC734—0.02%).

TABLE—VII

Prosperous Items in Singapore's Imports from India (000 US $)

Nature of Products	No. of Groups	1962	1968	1975	1981
(a) *Matured Prosperous Products*					
a.1	11	191	598	10,187	35,768
		(0.99)	(3.44)	(17.60)	(27.65)
a.2	20	1368	2034	8228	14,891
		(7.01)	(11.66)	(14.23)	(11.21)
(b) *Products that Became Prosperous after 1968*					
b.1	7	3641	1877	6926	28,128
		(18.66)	(10.75)	(11.99)	(21.18)
b.2	8	4270	2503	8088	15,248
		(21.88)	(14.34)	(13.99)	(11.47)
b.3	9	—	211	907	3289
			(1.21)	(1.52)	(2.47)
(c) *Products that Became Prosperous after 1975*					
c.1	18	5616	2309	1900	9866
		(28.79)	(13.23)	(3.29)	(7.42)
c.2	7	—	—	262	1209
				(0.45)	(0.91)
(d) *Newly Emerged Products*	7	—	—	—	6348
					(4.78)
TOTAL	109	15.086	9544	36,565	116,037
		(77.33)	(54.65)	(63.12)	(87.09

Source : *Foreign Trade Statistics for Asia and the Pacific.*
Note : Figures in brackets show share to total bilateral imports.

Apart from capital goods, some other development inputs were also found prosperous. However, in most of them the level of bilateral import was low. For instance, Singapore imported chemicals (SITC 5) from India under all but one group and 10 of them exhibited an increasing trend. However, in eight of them bilateral import was as low as $ 0.6 million or less. In the other two; *viz.*, coal, petroleum, chemicals, etc. (SITC 521—4.54%) and synthetic dyes—indigo and lak (SITC 531—0.8%) however, it was somewhat high. Similarly, four groups of metal manufactures (SITC 69) also exhibited an increasing trend but only tools (SITC 695—1.24%) could contribute more than 1 per cent. In other two, *viz.*, base metal household equipment (SITC 698—0.88%) and metal manufactures (SITC-

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698—0.82%), the respective shares were rather low. And in still another, *viz.*, metal tanks (SITC 692), the level of import was as low as only $ 0.4 million.

Among all groups, clothing (SITC 841) was most important, alone contributing 14.3 per cent of bilateral imports in 1981. Its import grew rapidly, though only after 1968, from just $ 1.7 million in 1968 to to $ 5.8 million in 1975 and further to $ 18.8 million in 1981. It is interesting to note here that all other textile items (SITC 65) sharply lost their significance from 31.4 per cent in 1962 to just 4·7 per cent in 1981. This shows that over time India shifted to more processed items. Leather (SITC 611), another resource-based item, was also found prosperous though its significance was only around 2 per cent in 1981. Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones (SITC 667) were next to clothing in terms of importance, contributing 11 per cent in 1981. Moreover, its import by Singapore from India grew consistently over the four points of time so as to reach a level as high as $ 15 million.

In addition to manufactures, a number of primary products too exhibited increasing tendencies. Seven of such products accounted for one fifth of bilateral import in 1981. Of them five, *viz.*, fruits, fish, tea, spices and animal feedstuffs, were food items and two, *viz.*, cotton and unspecified crude vegetable materials, were crude materials. Of them animal feedstuffs were most important, alone accounting for 7 per cent in 1981. It was followed by spices (3.6%) and others (1.5% to 2.5% each). There were 16 more prosperous products (8 crude agricultural materials, 7 food items and one vegetable oil) but their significance was low to the extent that they combinedly contributed just 2 per cent of bilateral import in 1981.

Similar to Table VII, Table VIII presents the significance of prosperous items in Singapore's export to India. It reveals that as many as 103 groups, accounting for more than 90 per cent of bilateral exports, were prosperous. In 1968, they contributed only 80 per cent since the SITC 9, which contributed as much as 16.5 per cent, was not covered by categorization owing to non-availability of disaggregate information.

Among various categories, the a.2 was most important in which 23 groups appeared contributing almost half of bilateral export in 1968, more than two-thirds in 1975 and more than three-fifths in 1981. As mentioned earlier, bilateral export under all these groups increased consistently in absolute terms but not in terms of share. Next in importance were the items which gained significance specifically after 1975. Such items accounted for 16 per cent in 1981.

Among individual items, the single dominating item was petroleum refined and its products (SITC 332), which alone accounted for 55 per cent in 1981. Its bilateral export grew fast since the late sixties particularly after the oil price boom—from $ 2.1 million in 1962 and $ 2.4 million in

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1968 to $ 23.6 million in 1975 and to $ 315.5 million in 1981. An increase more than 13 times between 1975 and 1981 can be attributed to the fact that in the early seventies large export-oriented petroleum refinery capacity was set up in Singapore while in India it remained short for domestic needs. Of course, the impact of the second oil price boom was also there.

In addition to it, there were nine more groups, each contributing more than 19 per cent, which exhibited increasing tendencies and combinedly accounted for one fourth of bilateral export in 1981. They include vegetable oils (SITC 422—4.75% & 431—2.79%), crude rubber (SITC 231—3.54%), non-ferrous metal scraps (SITC 284—2.54%), chemicals (SITC 512—1.74% & 521—3.71%), iron and steel tubes and pipes (SITC 678—1.2%), tin (SITC 687—1.86%) and unspecified non-electric machinery (SITC 719—2.4%). It can be noted that all of them are either processed or unprocessed intermediaries. Further, except two, *viz.*, SITC-521 & 678) all gained significance after 1975.

TABLE VIII

Prosperous Items in Singapore's Export to India (000 US $)

Nature of Products	No. of Groups	1962	1968	1975	1981
(a) *Matured Prosperous Produets*					
a.1	—	—	—	—	—
a.2	23	2272 (15.52)	3148 (49.79)	28.647 (68.29)	347.901 (61.57)
(b) *Products that Became Prosperous after 1968*					
b.1	—	—	—	—	—
b.2	7	672 (4.59)	578 (9.14)	2,823 2,823	15,141 (2,68)
(c) *Products that Became Prosperous after 1975*					
c.1	23	11,202 (76.53)	1264 (19.99)	387 (0.92)	91,774 (16.24)
c.2	20	—	—	5061 (12.06)	21,485 (3.80)
(d) *Newly Emerged Products*					
d	22	—	—	—	34,756 (6.15)
Sub-total	103	14.146 (96.64)	5062 (80.06)	39,201 (93,44)	522,362 (93.33)
SITC 9	—	347 (2.37)	1040 (16,47)	1849 (4.41)	32,387 (5.73)
Total		14,493 (99.01)	6102 (96.53)	41,050 (97.86)	559,749 (99.06)

Source : *Foreign Trade Statistics for Asia and the Pacific*
Note : Figures in brackets show share to total bilateral export.

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All other prosperous groups, as many as 93 in number, were less important in the sense that each accounted for less than 1 per cent of bilateral export in 1981. Even combinedly, they contributed just 15 per cent of which 9.4 per cent was contributed by only 21 groups : 16 development inputs (11 intermediates and 5 capital goods) and 5 consumer items (4 manufactures and 1 primary food item). Further, 8 of the intermediates were processed items associated with heavy and chemical industry : 3 chemicals (SITC 561,581 and 599), 2 iron and steel items (SITC 671 and 673), 2 metals (SITC 683 and 686)1 waste materials (SITC 251). The other three were unprocessed intermediates (SITC 221,283 and 292). Likewise, among capital goods two were non-electric machinery (SITC 711 and 718), two were electric machinery (SITC 722 and 729) and one transport equipment (SITC 733). It may be noted that the only item of transport equipment was in fact a final item. Other consumer items include four manufactures (SITC 861, 891, 899 and 892) and one primary item (SITC 122). All these consumer items combinedly accounted for 2.44 per cent in 1981.

PROSPECTS

A glance over the commodities which exhibited increasing tendencies clearly reveals, at the outset, that for two way trade such products were sufficiently large in number. Moreover, in a majority of them the bilateral flows were in low order contributing less than 1 per cent even in 1981. Even total bilateral trade was not much with respect to their total trade. Therefore, significantly good scope for trade expansion can be foreseen, particularly in those items in which the prevailing level of bilateral trade was low. The observations further reveal that prospects were largely in manufacturing items, expecially the development inputs, though some of the primary products may continue to flow between them. While Singapore may offer more of intermediate products, especially those which require high skill, India is likely to offer a variety of manufactures especially those which require low skill, and various development inputs. It appears therefore that increased trade between the two countries is likely to originate largely from manufactured items particularly those which are commonly used for development purposes. Such a pattern was as per expectations since both the countries are newly industrialized countries having different economic orientation and structure. Their policy framework too differs significantly.

Cooperation in the Fields of Investment and Know-how

As has already been mentioned, both the countries have made significant progress, though to a varying extent, towards industrialization. They were, therefore, found to be cooperating in the fields of investment and technical know-how too, in addition to trading commodities.

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Being highly competitive, Singapore naturally was difficult to penetrate. First Indian venture in Singapore started production in 1971 in the field of automobile ancillaries with 47 per cent Indian equity participation. Till the mid-seventies this was the only project in Singapore while the list of Indian ventures in Malaysia, a next door neighbour of Singapore, expanded rapidly to touch a level as high as around 30 in number. However, in subsequent years, many ventures with Indian participation started production. By the end of 1981, there were 8 projects under production of which 6 were in the fields of engineering and electrical items, one in soft drinks and remaining one in palm kernel processing. India's equity investment in then was Rs. 23.52 millions. For the eight projects, Indian equity ranged between Rs. 0.15 million to Rs. 11.20 million ; in four, Indian equity was less than one million rupees, in the other two it was less than Rs. 2.5 million, in one it was Rs. 6.4 million and in another it was Rs. 11.2 million. Four of these projects involved cash remittance of Rs. 7.4 million, of which Rs. 4.8 million was associated with only one project engaged in high precision tools since 1977.

TABLE IX

Technology-transfer from Singapore to India

Year	Number of Foreign Collaborations Approved	Sector	Nature
1981	3	Single spindle automatic lathes	Design and Drawing
		Marine paints	Technical
1982	2	Precision tools dies and moulds	Technical
		Marine paints	Technical
1983	—	Carbon, metal film resistors	Technical
1984	3	—	—
		2000 tonnes DWT ocean going cargo vessels specially designed for shallow water operation	Drawing and Design
		Electronic data entry text editing-computerized type setting	Finance
		End finishing of production : tubes and pipes as per API specification	Finance
1985 till Sep.)	5	Gents webbing belts	Finance
		Plastic opthalmic lenses	Technical
		Multi-user, multi-processer super micro computer	Finance*
		Bag closing sewing heads for bag closing machines	

Source : India Investment Centre, *Monthly Newsletter*, various issues

* With two firms, one from USA and another from Singapore.

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The profile of Indian ventures in Singapore expanded further in the eighties. By March 1982, there were 14 ventures under production with Indian equity worth Rs. 26.8 million (5.8 per cent of the total Indian equity in overseas ventures) and another 10 under implementation with equity of Rs. 45.9 million (6.4 per cent of the total Indian equity in overseas ventures under implementation). In another one year i.e., 1982-83, two more ventures started production but still there were 11 projects under implementation. The areas in which Indian ventures were engaged or were likely to engage included : soft drink, palm kernel processing, tea blending, bottle closer, kitchen machines, steel furniture, steel office equipment, mechanical seals, automobile ancillaries, special steel precision ERW tubes, micro/mini computer, silicon semiconductor, and high precision tooling. In addition to them, a number of ventures were in service sectors, *viz.*, trading/marketing or both, consultancy in industrial sectors like chemicals and paper plants, technical management, leasing services, tea auction centre, shipping and off shore activities.[16]

Similar to India, Singapore has also participated in overseas ventures by contributing capital and technological know-how.[17] However, its presence in India was not observed till 1981. Looking to the collaborations approved by the Government of India, it was observed that between 1981-85, some 13 proposals of collaborations with Singapore were approved. (See Table IX)[18] Except for a few collaborations approved between 1984-85, all were for technical know-how and for design and drawing. It shows that investment by Singapore in India has just begun. However, the important fact is that a beginning has been made. This phenomenon may get momentum in the coming years, especially in view of the fact that several measures of liberation have been initiated in India since March 1985 to modernise and improve the competitiveness of several sectors.[19] Equally important is the fact that in view of emerging labour scarcity in Singapore, a shift in favour of high technological areas has been planned.[20] As a matter of fact, already approved collaborations clearly show transfer of modern technology from Singapore to India.

The indepth review of growing economic cooperation between India and Singapore, the two developing countries which differ significantly in terms of resource endowment and in levels of development, brings out a couple of important conclusions. First, that the two countries were expanding economic exchanges at an increasing rate in all possible fields including trade, as also technical know-how and investment. Second, that the emerging cooperation was largely associated with the modern sectors especially those which catered development needs. In other words, the two countries commonly known as newly industrialized countries, were helping each, other in their development efforts.

It can be established therefore that the countries with diverse resource endowment and at different levels of development have potentiality to

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expand economic cooperation among themselves, to a varying extent. The realization of such prospects would largely depend upon the efforts made by the traders and investors and the extent of official support extended to them. Since both the countries have emphasized, especially since the seventies, on better economic ties with developing countries, their bilateral economic relationship bas strengthened rather fast after the mid-seventies.

In this situation, more interaction among the investors and technocrats on the one hand, and policy-makers on the other, would prove highly productive. Moreover, permanent exhibitions with continuous updated informations regarding each other's capacities can also go a long way in bringing the investors and traders of the two countries close to each other. The banking system can also stimulate the tempo of economic cooperation by arranging credits for viable projects of cooperation.

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EVOLUTION OF AFGHANISTAN AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE

By H.A.S. JAFRI*

Afghanistan, a mountainous and landlocked country having an area of 6,50,000 sq. kms. and an estimated population of 16 million finds earliest reference in Bharat Samhita, *a treatise by Varah Mihira, the famous Indian astronomer. The ancient names of the present cities of Kandhar (Gandhara), Kabul (Kubah) and Balkh (Balhika) find their earliest mention in the* Rig-veda. *It was in the region presently known as Afghanistan that Brahminism and Zorastrianism had their origin and two of the most important monu-ments* Rigveda *and* Avesta *came into being. Again it was Afghanistan through which Buddhism penetrated into Sinkiang and later on in the eleventh century Islam found its way into the Indian sub-continent. Earlier, part of the Persian and Alexander's empire, the region came under the rule of the Turkoman Dynasty in the tenth century; later it was conquered by Mongol Emperor Tamerlane about 1400. A new Asian empire began to emerge under Babur who captured Kabul in 1504 and Delhi twenty two years later. It was, however, only in 1747 that Ahmad Shah Abdali unified different autonomous tribes to give the present Afghanistan a definite shape. That has been described by some as the Durrani Empire and not a nation state.*[1] *The state boundaries of Afghanistan could be firmly identified only by the end of the nineteenth century and Afghanistan emerged as an independent state after the third Afghan War in 1919.*

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

LIKE most other countries, Afghanistan cannot claim to be a nation state. There are a large number of ethnic groups and more than twenty languages are spoken. The simple fact of nearly ninety-nine per cent population following Islam has not bestowed on it the status of a nation-state. An interesting feature of Afghan society is its transnational character in the sense that, essentially a tribal society, most of the tribes are found in neighbouring countries. That had in fact made the task of delimiting the boundaries difficult and proved a continuous source of trouble with the neighbours—presently a major irritant with the neighbour in the south and the east. There are different races, tribes and sub-tribal groups.[2] Pasthuns belonging to the Aryan race constitute more than sixty per cent of the Afghan population. There are Tadjiks of Iranian origin, Turkomen, Uzbeks, Kirghis and Qizilbashis of Turkish origin. Hazaras, Baluchis and Nuristanis are other important ethnic groups. Among the

* Dr Jafri is Reader Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

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illiterate people mostly, a person's first loyalty is still his extended family—a sub-tribal group—and Afghanistan has witnessed many political changes on ethnic grounds.[3] There have been intra-tribal and inter-tribal conflicts. The Pashtuns who have controlled power ever since the times of Ahmad Shah Abdali have powerful sub-tribal groups inspiring the change of government from time to time. Even though King Amanullah was ousted from power because of modernizing a traditional society, the attacks led by Bacha-Sagah against Amanullah had roots in Tadjik resentment of Pashtun domination.[4] The very fact that his rule was short-lived establishes the supremacy of the Pashtun tribes over others. The subsequent murder of Nadir Shah in 1933 and the destabilizing attempts were part of intra-tribal rivalry. True to an Afghan proverb they have never been at peace except when they are at war and that explains the Afghan Government keeping the issue of Pashtunistan alive to keep the tribal attention diverted and to some extent also the organized raids by the *Mujahedins* against the present government of Afghanistan. At the same time, the presence of Soviet troops notwithstanding, despite the large supply of arms and ammunition, the resistence to the Babrak Karmal regime has weakened due to tribal discord.[5] The tribal conflicts have, however, resulted in the overall backwardness of Afghanistan.

An Agricultural Economy

The economy of Afghanistan is fundamentally agricultural. About eighty-five per cent of its people are engaged in agriculture or animal husbandary, which together account for seventy per cent of its gross national product. These two furnish about eighty per cent of the country's exports, provide raw material for rudimentary industry and supply most of the basic food requirements. Afghanistan has remained industrially backward with its manufacturing activities geared to the production of the simpler type of consumer goods, including textiles and cement. It is heavily dependent on imports for capital goods, processed raw materials and manufactured consumer goods such as petroleum products, steel, automobiles, machinery, electrical equipment and medicines. Since 1956 the Afghan economy has been guided by a series of five year plans laying emphasis on development of transportation, communications, agriculture, irrigation and industry. Efforts have also been made to expand educational and training institutions to meet the growing demands for technical, scientific, professional and administrative personnel. Though there has been flow of aid and assistance from all directions, the lion's share is that of the Soviet Union.[6] Whenever the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was sealed because of political differences, Afghanistan had no alternative but to use the Soviet transit route for contact with the outside world. The Soviet Union had taken keen interest in building

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roads and developing the communication system in Afghanistan. There was continuous exchange of personnel between the two countries, and between 1957 to 1974 the Soviets trained as many as 60,000 Afghan technicians and 5,200 specialists.[7] While sending experts and advisers, the Soviet Union kept in view the contiguity factor; the experts were mostly from Soviet Central Asia. Thus what has happened in Afghanistan today has been the logical culmination of the process started as early as 1950. With the overthrow of monarchy in 1973, Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union further increased. During the last few years of his rule, King Zahir Shah was not able to pay the desired attention to economic development. Daud who succeeded him got busy in consolidating his own position and failed to take any effective measures towards the much needed economic reforms. Noor Mohammed Taraki, his successor, introduced radical socio-economic reforms which were not acceptable to the tribal and religious leaders. The net result of these political developments has been decline in productivity, and economically Afghanistan has been further pushed backwards. Babrak Karmal, the present ruler has been proceeding slowly but steadily and only if he is allowed time and a free hand, the Afghan economy would be soon back on the rails.

THE POLITICAL SET-UP

Having briefly seen the structure of Afghan society and the state of its economy, a word about its political traditions. Ever since its unification under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1747, Afghanistan had been a monarchy. Before the twentieth century western style democratic institutions were unknown to this part of the world. Yet some of the practices associated with democratic society were present in Afghan tradition. In accordance with tribal customs Ahmad Shah did not occupy the throne by use of force; he was elected King. Contestants to the throne represented various tribes and Ahmad Shah in fact could be elected because he lacked a strong tribal base of his own. It was expected he would function with the help of other powerful chiefs. And so he could rule and expand his empire only on the basis of political compromise and accommodation with the powerful leaders of other clans.[8] He established a Council of nine Provincial *Sardars* each responsible for the people in his own province. Another institution that acquired importance during this period was *Loya Jirga* (Great Assembly). Representing various currents of opinion, the Assembly was summoned to decide matters of national concern. These two bodies, roughly comparable to the present-day Cabinet and Parliament, provided the monarch with useful machinery for not only consultation with his advisers but also for the implementation of decisions and programmes. The downfall of several rulers after

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Ahmad Shah resulted partly from their failure to respect and use these medieval instruments of governance.

At the lower levels, *jirgas* considered matters of local concern. Whenever a clash occurred between two or more *jirgas*, or a matter required wider consultation, an expanded *jirga* was convened. Decisions were not taken by a vote but by consensus. In its deliberations, the *jirga* relied on *riwaj* (custom) as interpreted by the elders or on *Sharia* as expouned by Mullahs. Religious to the core, which perhaps has been an unifying force also, the Afghans dare not ignore the Quranic dictum, which on the one hand asks the rulers to work in consultation and on the other, ordains the subjects to follow the rulers. As interpreters of Islam, the religious leaders or Mullahs therefore acquired considerable hold over the Afghan polity, which continues to date. While the opposition to the present Babrak Karmal regime is said to be mainly religious and from religious leaders,[9] Article 5 of the new Constitution, promulgated subject to the approval of the *Loya Jirga*, clearly states :

> Respect, observance and preservation of Islam as a sacred religion will be ensured in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and freedom of religious rites guaranteed for Muslims. Followers of other faiths will also enjoy full freedom of religious practice as long as this would not threaten tranquility and security of society.
> No citizen is entitled to exploit religion for anti-national and anti-people propaganda or other actions running counter to the interests of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan. The government will help the clergy and the religious scholars in carrying out their patriotic activities, duties and obligations.[10]

Article 29 reiterates, 'full freedom of practice of Islam as a sacred religion for Muslims and freedom of religious rites in the case of followers of other faiths, according to law.'[11] The present Government of Afghanistan has gone a step further and set up an Islamic Affairs Department. This has been done with a dual purpose—to assuage the feelings of deeply religious people who condemn this government as one by atheists and to coordinate the functioning of Mullahs at various levels. The department also brings out regular bulletins entitled *The Message of Truth* assuring Afghans of the government's commitment to preserve Islamic traditions of the country.[12] The above references to religion are most comprehensive as compared to similar clauses in previous constitutions. The first Constitution of Afghanistan promulgated on 9 April 1923 simply declared Islam to be the official religion of Afghanistan.[13] Similarly the provisions in the Constitutions promulgated on 31 October 1931 and 1 October 1964 were identical in nature and declared Islam to be the official religion.[14]

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The reasons for the elaborate provisions in the present Constitution are obvious. No earlier regime was required to establish its credibility among the religiously orthodox people. Doubts about its character notwithstanding, the present regime has also taken lessons from the opposition by Mullahs to the modernization steps taken by King Amanullah which ultimately had contributed to his overthrow and specifically provided that religion shall not be exploited for anti-national purposes. The mere incorporation of this clause may, however, do nothing except provide legitimacy for the government's repressive policies.

Reverting to the political structure, Afghanistan had first a set of written rules for governance in 1921. These rules had a brief existence and were replaced by the Constitution of 9 April 1923. It lasted for less than a decade and Afghanistan had a new Constitution on 31 October 1931. The 1931 Constitution was in force for the longest duration; it was on 1 October 1964, replaced by a new democratic Constitution providing for the establishment of constitutional monarchy. It however, did not get a fair trial and to some extent at least the expectations aroused by this Constitution paved the way for the overthrow of the monarchy and setting up of a Republic. There were a few more exercises before the present Constitution, which pending the approval by the *Loya Jirga*, was put into effect on 21 April 1980. Traditionally however, the Constitution had litte meaning for the local population which held tribal traditions to be supreme and continued to abide by them. The Constitutions were mostly meant for outside consumption. To an illiterate Afghan, it could be King's rule which he had been used to for years or 'foreign' rule. But now, the situation has considerably changed over the last twenty years; with the growing rate of literacy and exposure to the outside world the Afghans have started assessing the performance of the government in the light of the written word. It was perhaps because of this that the Babrak Karmal regime came forward with a new Constitution within six months of its existence and has taken care to cater to all sections of the population. For the first time the Constitution records with appreciation—'the patriotic part played by tribal elders and all members of tribes which ensure peace, fraternity and tranquility in their areas,[15] and assures to preserve and develop the best and most valuable works which comprise part of the cultural heritage and traditions of all natlonalities, tribes and clans of this country.[16] Further, 'the Government will guarantee for the nomads, tribes and live-stock breeders vast opportunities to use pastures free of charge on an equitable basis and guarantee for the nomads the right of unhindered passage in national territories. The Government will help the nomads, tribes and live-stock breeders through grant-in-aid, favourable bank loans and other aids in order to enable them to grow more animals, mark their products and raise their material, cultural and living standards.'[17] Here a brief reference to some of the important provisions of the earlier Consti-

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tutions would help in the better understanding of political developments in Afghanistan over the years.

The first Constitution of April 1923 acknowledged the 'extraordinary services rendered to the cause of progress and independence of the Afghan nation by the King,' and pledged 'itself to the royal succession of his line on the principle of male inheritence through selection to be made by His Majesty and by the people of Afghanistan.'[18] An interesting feature of the Constitution was that while the King continued to be all powerful—the Council of Ministers, an institution introduced for the first time, was appointed, chaired and dismissed by him—the Constitution made clear that 'the affairs of the country are administered by the Ministers of the Government . . . . Each Minister is responsible for his Ministry and therefore the King is not responsible.'[19] Following the Westminister model, this was the crude way of saying the King could do no wrong.

The 1931 Constitution similarly eulogised the King's position : 'In appreciation of the devotion shown and services rendered by His Majesty, Ghazi Mohammed Nadir Shah Afghan in obtaining the independence and deliverance of the land of Afghanistan and the uprooting of oppression and despotism. the Afghan nation in general has recognized His Majesty as a fit and worthy King of his country and has accepted him as such with the greatest esteem and respect . . . . The noble Afghan nation therefore agrees that the Crown of Afghanistan will be transferred to the family of this King and that the succession to the throne will be in accordance with the selection of His Majesty and the People of Afghanistan.'[20] With regard to the Council of Ministers, a bit of sophistication was introduced. While they continued to be appointed by the King, their meetings were to be presided over by the Prime Minister and they were responsible to the National Council (Lower House of the Afghan Parliament).[21]

References to the person of the King are misssng in the 1964 Constitution put into effect on 1 October. The Constitution simply declared Afghanistan to be a constitutional monarchy; an independent, unitary and indivisible State,' [22] and goes on to enumerate the powers of the King with the preface that 'in Afghanistan the King personifies the sovereignty.'[23] The Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers continued to be appointed by the King but were made responsible to the Lower House of Parliament which for the first time was also given the power to remove them by a vote of no confidence. Contrary to the practice prevelant in parliamentory democracies, the ministers were not members of either house of Parliament and even if they were elected, they were required to resign from the membership consequent on their appointment as Ministers.[24]

The unicameral legislature called State Council, partly nominated and partly elective, was to be only an advisory body according to the 1923 Constitution.[25] The Constitution provided for the setting up of an

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independent judiciary and guaranteed for the first time fundamental rights to Afghan citizens.[26] The 1931 Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature; the *Shura-i-Milli* (National Council) was to be an elected house, the Upper House called the House of Nobles was to consist of 'experienced and farsighted persons who will be selected and appointed directly by the King.' Though a long list of powers and duties were assigned to the Parliament, it continued to be essentially a deliberative and advisory body.[27] The chapter on fundamental rights was retained and so were the provisions relating to the functioning of an independent judiciary.[28] The classification of the courts and their power were left to be prescribed by the regulations in both these constitutions. The 1964 Constitution was thus a definite improvement as compared to the previous two documents and reflected the confidence of the King, on one hand, and growing aspirations of the Afghan people on the other. The Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature which it acknowledged 'manifests the will of the people and represents the whole of the nation.'[29] While the *Wolesi Jirga* (House of People) was to be an elected house, the *Meshrano Jirga* (House of Elders) was to consist of one-third appointed and two-thirds elected members. The Parliament acquired full control over law making and the finances of the country. The *Loya Jirga* (Great Council) one of the most important tribal institutions was for the first time accorded a constitutional status and its composition defined.[30] This was perhaps done with a view to check this great body from being misused. The scope of the chapter on Fundamental Rights was enlarged to include the duties of the people also,[31] and the Afghan citizens for the first time got 'the right to form political parties in accordance with the terms of law' provided that : '(i) the aims and activities of the party and the ideas on which the organization of the party is based are not opposed to the values embodied in this Constitution, (ii) the organization and financial resources of the party are open.'[32]

The introduction of this clause in the 1964 Constitution had a background. Following the Second World War, a group of young western educated people had formed *Weesh Zalmian* and were commonly known as *Jawanane Bedar* (Awakened Youth). The party was led by Abdul Aziz. It, along with another group called *Watan*, demanded the separation of powers, attacked members of the royal family, opposed orthodoxy and advocated freedom of speech and the press. The government at first did not take them seriously, and to counter the opposition in a democratic way formed a pro-government party *The Khalq*. The arrangement did not work and the gradual emergence of opposition caused anxiety to the government.[33] An offensive was launched to curb all political activity. Sixty members of the Afghan Democratic Party, accused of having planned to overthrow the government, were arrested on 19 May 1950.[34] Other leaders were also arrested and a ban placed on opposition newspapers.[35]

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Thus an effort was made to throttle the process, which once started could not be completely checked. The underground movements continued to grow, ultimately creating a situation when the incorporation of the clause relating to political parties became inevitable. Further, the government had perhaps thought that in view of the clause all political activities would be subject to public scrutiny. The fact that the government, through the Constitution, had subjected the emergence of political parties to the values embodied in the Constitution—namely the principles of Islam and constitutional monarchy—delayed the passing of relevant laws, relating to political parties resulting in further encouragement to the unofficial underground groups.[36] Mere incorporation of certain safeguards in the Constitution could do nothing and that ultimately proved fatal for the very survival of monarchy.

Another significant departure from the past and a definite step in the direction of democratie functioning was that the members of the Royal House, defined in Article 24 of the Constitution, were barred from joining political parties or hold the offices of the Prime Minister or Minister, member of *Shura* (Parliament) and Justices of the Supreme Court. This too had a background. After the death of Nadir Shah in 1933, his young son Zahir Shah was proclaimed the ruler without any rivalries, an unusual thing for Afghanistan. The uncles of the present King, who had sacrified their personaal interests, were entrusted with the entire responsibilities of government. That inadvertently had helped lay the foundations of constitutional monarchy. Sardar Hashim Khan, the eldest uncle, had acted as Prime Minister till 1946 when the office passed on to Shah Mehmud his younger brother. As Shah Mehmud failed to do much, the coveted office of Prime Minister passed on to Mohammed Daud Khan, son of a deceased uncle, in 1954. Daud from the very beginning had indicated his strength and it was during his regime that Afghanistan moved closest to the Soviet Union. The King, who had not so far disturbed the status quo, felt threatened and in the name of ushering in real democracy handed over the office of the Prime Minister for the first time in 1963 to a commoner, Mohammed Yusuf. And herein lay the relevance of Article 24 of the 1964 Constitution. It was an attempt by King Zahir Shah to check the influence of any other member of the royal family at his cost. Of all the people, Zahir Shah faced the biggest challenge from Mohammed Daud who had strengthened his hold over the people by improving the economy of Afghanistan during his tenure as Prime Minister. With active participation in government and politics, as was possible in the absence of the above-mentioned clause in the Constitution, some sort of family changeover, not unconventional for monarchies, could have been facilitated. Even if Daud for a minute was inactive, with the popular support which they still had among the illiterate and tribal people, some of the other members of

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the royal family would have captured political parties or government jobs to oppose the King in a democratic manner. There is however no denying the fact that the clause as such did appear to strengthen the democratic nature of the Afghan political system. But in retrospect one cannot help feeling it would have been in the larger interest of Afghanistan had both the clauses, relating to the members of royal family, as also subjecting parties to the values embodied in the Constitution, not been incorporated. One could perhaps balance the other.

OVERTHROW OF MONARCHY AND AFTER

While Zahir Shah could not check the growth of the underground communist movement, Mohammed Daud Khan was waiting in the wings to revenge his unceremonious ouster in 1963. Taking advantage of Zahir Shah's foreign tour in 1973, Daud exploited the general dissatisfaction to stage a comeback exactly a decade after his ouster, once again in the name of establishing real democracy. He could not however control the situation. His arrival on the scene, coupled with the overthrow of the monarchy, had aroused fears of Afghanishtan's total dependence on the Soviet Union. There was no escape. The neighbour on the north could not quietly watch Daud once again trying to balance by initiating a dialogue with Pakistan and Iran, the American allies.[37] And so he was overthrown. A more trusted Noor Mohammed Taraki was installed as head of the Republic in April 1978. With an image of a communist, with internal infighting and without the presence of Soviet troops, he could not survive ; in less than a year power passed on to Hafizullah Amin.[38] The situation in Afghanistan was such that no ruler could have been successful without either the support or help of the Soviet Union or the help and the support of the religiously orthodox section of the population. There were desertions from the Army and *Mujahedins* from across the border in Pakistan were a constant threat. The Soviets had expected Hafizullah Amin to rely on Soviet help alone, but when they found that while asking for help to consolidate his position, he was also initiating a dialogue with the rebels and other forces not very conducive to the long-term Soviet interests, Babrak Karmal, residing at Czechoslovakia, was sent to Afghanistan along with Soviet troops to replace Hafizullah Amin in December 1979 and end this drama once and for all. Already aware of religiously orthodox regimes in Iran and Pakistan and apprehensive of the growing strength of the rebels, who if allowed to succeed could only result in the installation of a similar regime in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union took the desperate stand of not only sending its troops to Afghanistan but also asking them to stay till the situation turned favourable to them. With the present regime the stakes are very high. The Soviet Uuion would definitely not allow

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the opportunity to slip out of its hands so easily particularly in view of the Soviet desire to play an important role in the region and in view of Afghanistan's strategic importance. Babrak Karmal finds himself in a tight situation with the presence of the Soviet troops on the one hand, and the offensive launched from the Pakistan side of the border on the other. The Soviet Union insists, and perhaps Babrak Karmal knows that he may also not remain in power without the presence of the Soviet troops and unless the propaganda warfare and continuous instigation and help from across the border on the south is stopped. Karmal in the meanwhile, has not remained a silent spectator and has been going ahead to consolidate his position and restore the much needed peace for development in Afghanistan, With a new Constitution within the record period of four months and with glowing tributes to the Afghan tradition at every stage, the present government has initiated a number of economic reforms. Karmal, it appears, has not forgotten the advice of Amir Abdur Rehman who more than eighty years ago had warned 'his sons and successors' not to 'introduce reform of any kind in such a hurry as to set the people against the ruler . . . they must adopt all these gradually as the people become accustomed to the idea of modern innovations.' That invariably delays the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, most likely, till such time as the Russians, on the pattern of Central Asian Kingdoms, are able to transform Afghanistan into a modern society.

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they remain suspicious of each other and are apt to fail one another at the critical moment ; or else one tribe will wait to see how it fares with those already in it before unsheathing their own swords.' p. 60.

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BHUTAN'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT : CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

By MANORAMA KOHLI*

For about a decade now one has been noticing some changes and shifts in the land-locked dragon kingdom of Bhutan's perceptions of its strategic neighbourhood—India and China. The two Asian giants situated in the south and north of Bhutan are so vital in geo-political terms that their attitudes towards this buffer state as also their relative capability distribution in the Himalayan region and in South Asia will always determine practically all foreign policy considerations of Bhutan. It need hardly be stressed that Bhutan is strategically important for both its big neighbours because of its location. This is the most compelling reason for both India and China to strive for special and friendly relationships with this Buddhist theocratic state. The tri-junction of the Chumbi Valley (Tibet), Sikkim (India) and Bhutan in the eastern Himalayas is of key importance for the security of the sprawling continental mass of India as well as that of China Being only about six miles from the Chumbi Valley, the passes in Bhutan. as also Nathu La are perceived by the Chinese as likely routes for invasion from the south. Evidently a very friendly, and if possible, a dependent Bhutan will give additional security to Tibet and hence to the Chinese mainland.[1]

IT was precisely Bhutan's strategic location that led India to include it in the defence parameters of its northern frontier in the context of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute of the 1950s. As a matter of fact ever since the close of the nineteenth century the British Indian policy-makers had come to realize the importance of a friendly Bhutan for geo-political and geo-strategic reasons. Any advances that China or any other great power achieved in the region comprising Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim was considered a similar setback for the British-held Indian territories. In short it can be contended that both India and China seem to be involved in a zero-sum game as far as this Himalayan region is concerned. The gain of one is looked upon as a set-back to the interests of the other.

The cultural complexion of Bhutan also adds to its strategic relevance to its neighbourhood ; Bhutan is a confluence of two cultures—Indo-Tibetan. Culturally speaking its population can very easily be divided into two distinct regions eastern and western. The Bhutanese who live in the areas east of the Pele La range have some identification with the people and tribes from India's north-eastern parts. In terms of language, physical

* Dr. (Ms.) Kohli is Professor Political Science, Panjabi University, Patiala.

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characteristics and customs, etc., they are different from those who inhabit the western districts of Bhutan. The *Kham* immigrants, who came from eastern Tibet, many centuries back, settled down in the western parts of Bhutan. The language they speak is quite distinct from the language spoken in the eastern parts. The immigrants from Nepal, during the last two centuries, came to reside in the valleys in the southern and eastern parts of Bhutan. They possibly got mixed up with the *Koches* of north Bihar and Bengal, the *Rajbansis* of north Bengal and the *Shan-Ahoms* of Assam. It is for this reason that Indian influence on the people of Bhutan in the south and east is most striking. The large-scale immigration from across the two frontiers of Bhutan was responsible for the building up of religious institutions and traditions of the kingdom. Guru Padmasamhava, who is respected next to Buddha and was the founder of Buddhism in Bhutan, came from Nalanda. Legend and tradition have it that the Indian chiefs under the tutelage of Kamrup ruled Bhutan till about the 7th century when it got exposed to incursions from Tibet. Ever since the thirteenth century the Tibetan Buddhist Lamas migrating into Bhutan were responsible for the large scale conversion of the Bhutanese to the Buddhistic faith. It is this fact of history that has gone into the formulation of the Bhutanese image of Tibet as their spiritual suzerain. Indeed, Bhutan continued maintaining its tributary relationship with Tibet till the very recent past. Lhasa was the sacred land for the Bhutanese and a visit to Lhasa was the cherished desire of practically every Bhutanese.

But, despite close and intimate relationships with either India or Tibet, the people in Bhutan came to cultivate a distinct and a strong sense of ethnic and cultural identity that made it shut its doors to the penetration of all alien cultures. Aloofness from the outside world—beyond the Himalayas—was the chosen policy of the rulers of the dragon kingdom for the preservation not only of their physical existence but also their cultural identity. In this respect the physical and cultural instincts coalesced so closely that the threat to one was conceived to be a threat to the other.

CHINA AND BHUTAN'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Derived primarily from its location, coupled with its small size and limited capability *vis-a-vis* both its neighbours, the paramount consideration before Bhutan is its own preservation. Therefore any event or issue in the region, immediate or distant, to the extent of a decisive shift in favour of either India or China is likely to be reacted to very strongly and with a certain amount of anxiety. There is therefore no need to stress the fact that it was the developments in Tibet in 1950-51 and the impact of the 'loss of Tibet' which formulated Bhutan's perception of its 'new' neighbour—China. The 470 km. long common boundary with China and its

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claims on some of the Bhutanese enclaves not only involved it in a controversy but also exposed the *Drunk Yul* to a new threat, the size and magnitude of which had not been experienced earlier by the people who felt safe and secure in their mountain fastness. This was in fact the most dominant factor which made the ruler of Bhutan end the centuries-old secluded status of his country. A closed Bhutan was now perceived to be an open invitation to the Chinese subversive and expansionist strategies into the Himalayas as also in the plains region of Assam and West Bengal of India. It was feared simultaneously, and not without reason, that the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese would encourage the latter to exploit cultural and religious ties which persisted between the people of Bhutan and those of Tibet to the diplomatic advantage of the Middle Kingdom. The arguments which China had presented in the beginning of the twentieth century to secure a position of over-lordship on Bhutan did lurk in the minds of both of the Indian policy-makers and Bhutanese royalty. As early as 1907 the Chinese Amban had said :

> China, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim might be compared to the five principal colours, *viz.*; yellow, red, blue, black and green. A skilful painter may so arrange the colours as to produce a number of beautiful designs or effects. In the same way if we would cooperate with one another, we may presumably promote the interests of all.[2]

Some thirty years later in 1939 Mao Zedong had included Bhutan in the list of the 'lost territories' of China.[3]

While these statements are more of archival importance, the more recent argument of theirs that Tibet is the Himalayan palm and Bhutan, like Nepal, Sikkim and Ladakh, are its phalanges was taken as a measure of Chinese *irredentist* claims on the Himalayan region. This contributed a great deal in moulding Bhutanese perceptions of China. The suppression of the Tibet Revolt of 1959 only confirmed the early apprehensions leading to the severence of all ties with Tibet and through Tibet with China. Fears were being fed with some reports that China was contemplating to form 'a Himalayan Federation', under its leadership.[4] Such statements and reports did undoubtedly threaten both Nepal and Bhutan who felt the need to protect their independent existence. The possibilities of subversive communist activities in the valleys of Bhutan loomed so large on the horizon that the economic hardships which followed from the closure of trade links with Tibet got ignored and the Dragon Kingdom closed its doors to Tibet.

Bhai—Bhai Strategy of China

Nevertheless, Beijing visualized sooner than later, that the role desired of it in the Himalayan region could be possible through diplomacy of

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'normalisation and friendship', rather than through war or occupation of the small Himalayan neighbours of Tibet. Almost immediately after the occupation of Tibet, policy initiatives in this direction were undertaken. An effort to a direct opening to Bhutan was made in 1953 by sending gifts to the Bhutanese ruler. Two years later, China issued visas directly to the Bhutanese, ignoring the 1949 Treaty with India. In 1961 China made an offer of assistance to Bhutan but was rejected by the Maharaja[5] who rather expressed satisfaction with the aid being received from India. That China did not wish to alienate both Nepal and Bhutan was evident from Mao's later writings which appeared in late 1950s and in which both Nepal and Bhutan had been dropped out of the list of the 'lost territories.' Premier Zhou En Lai in one of his communication's with Nehru on the question of boundary dispute expressed China's desire 'to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other,'[6] It is also possible that China felt the need to correct the impression of its expansionist designs, based as some of them were on British sources. Hence fresh diplomatic initiatives were launched in Nepal and Bhutan. Beijing was quite successful in this regard as far as Nepal was concerned. Kathmandu shifted from its position of 'special relationship' with India to that of 'equidistance' between New Delhi and Beijing. Hence the Chinese initiatives in Bhutan in the 1950s and in 1961 were in line with this strategy.

BHUTAN'S RESPONSE TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT

Without however breaking off from the defence parameters of India, Bhutan, like Nepal, did not wish to antagonize China when the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, involving Thimpu, also raised its ugly head. In 1961 in the course of one of his visits to India, Maharaja Jigme Dorji Wangchuk said that, 'We do not want to be either friends or enemies of China.'[7] This was, in fact, the reaction of a typical buffer state placed between two big countries. However, the armed clash of 1962 between India and China established that the capability distribution in the Himalayan region was more in favour of China than India. This, coupled with the fear of the penetration of communist culture, left no choice for Bhutan but to rely on India for its security. Moreover, a legal framework for this kind of relationship had already been set when India and Bhutan signed the Treaty of 1949. The choice therefore was limited ; there was even a lesser scope for a neutral position for Bhutan. The die was therefore cast in favour of India.

The conflict of 1962 was a great blow to the position and prestige which India enjoyed in the Himalayan region. It did reflect upon its capacity to execute its role as a protecter.

One decisive change which took place in Bhutan as the threat from China came to be perceived in larger terms was to give up its closed

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door policy and to achieve strategic development as fast as possible. The road building programme which began in 1958 had to be given first priority, followed thereafter by its economic planning programme. Five Year Plans, which started with full Indian economic assistance in the beginning of 1960s, had to be expedited. Developmental needs received priority and the Dragon Kingdom started opening its gates to the outside world slowly, step by step, under the advice and guidance of the Indian Republic. At the same time, certain misconceptions of the Bhutanese ruling elite of India, just before and immediately after the independence of India, got cleared. It was in this context that the treaty relationship of 1949 got sanctified. The treaty served the interests of both the parties.

BHUTAN ASSERTS INDEPENDENCE

The opening of the decade of the seventies witnessed the fulfilment of Bhutan's desire for independence as it became a member of the United Nations in 1971. In 1973 it joined the Non-aligned Movement. These changes in its political status got Bhutan involved in the international political process and was reflected in its diplomatic stance both towards India and towards the rest of the world. The membership of the United Nations, in particular, enabled its leaders to have an exposure to a new world—a world of intricacies and multilateral diplomacy. At the same time it was provided with a window, independent of India,through which Thimpu could glance over the world spectrum. Participation in the UN deliberations enabled Bhutanese delegates to meet diplomats and political dignitaries from countries situated in the close neighbourhood of Bhutan and those from the Great Powers. Certain identity of interests, such as for instance with Nepal, on the question of the rights of land-locked countries, got formulated in consequence to this common participation. Late His Majesty King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk had remarked that this event was 'as important as when Shabdrung Rimpoche came to our land bringing unto us the message of Truth and Dharma.'

The year 1971 also saw the emergence of Bangladesh and new geo-political realities in South Asia. It gave India an undisputed status of a paramount power in South Asia. In Bhutan's foreign policy considerations these developments did not go unnoticed.

But it was the happenings in Sikkim during 1973-75 which were pertinent from the point of view of Bhutan's perception of India and the changed status which it acquired as a consequence to the Indo-Pak War of 1971. The merger of Sikkim into the Union of India did certainly heighten Bhutan's quest to protect its separate political identity. There were indications that the Dragon Kingdom would explore new vistas of bilateral ties with some neighbouring countries so as to reduce its almost

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complete dependence on India in matters of trade. There were unconfirmed reports that Bhutan did not want to have administrative advisors from India any longer.[8] The Sikkimese developments in Bhutan's close neighbourhood also aroused some misgivings regarding the motivations and intentions of its southern neighbour. Bhutan had to be reassured by India on this count. His Majesty came to New Delhi on an informal visit in September 1975. This was followed by two formal visits, one in August 1976 and another in April 1977.[9]

Even if at the official level, and on the surface, Indo-Bhutanese ties remained undisturbed and unaffected it would be too unrealistic to assume that Bhutan did not perceive of any uncertainties on account of developments in Sikkim regarding its own status and position. As noted above, the visits of the Bhutan ruler were certainly indicative of some kind of stress in the Dragon Kingdom following Sikkim's merger.

These doubts were soon put to rest with India's reassurance, friendly disposition and its commitment to preserve and respect the independent status of Druk Yul, but the event certainly provided an opportunity for Beijing to exploit. India was conscious of this fact. Some indications were available on the occasion of the coronation ceremony of the present Maharaja in June 1974. An official Chinese delegation led by Ma Mu Ming visited after a lapse of about sixty-five years. *The New China News Agency* described the visit as a 'new page in the friendly contacts of the two countries.' It was a chance for China to revive broken bridges of communication with Bhutan. The Chinese congratulatory message took special notice of the 'desires of the Bhutan Government in developing its economy and safeguarding its national independence.[10] It was felt that by doing all this Beijing was trying to offer Thimpu a model of bilateral relationships which was different and better than what New Delhi had given. As a matter of fact the Middle Kingdom had never been tired of repeating that what India had offered to Bhutan was only a legacy of its 'imperial interests' which it inherited from the British. The Chinese had labelled India as a 'hegemonist' power wanting to perpetrate its dominance over its small Himalayan neighbours. In regard to Bhutan therefore, its persistent efforts had been to wean it out of Indian bonds. The happenings in Sikkim, the liberation of Bangladesh and Bhutanese urges to play an independent role all came handy and gave the necessary feedback on which the Chinese could rely for the attainment of that objective in the mid-1970s.

Towards 1978 manifestations of the altered diplomatic image of Bhutan were clearly discernible. The Bhutan Mission in India was renamed as the Royal Bhutan Embassy. Many in India interpreted this event as a beginning towards 'a qualitative change in the Indo-Bhutanese connection.' The same year the two countries signed an agreement permitting the latter to sell its exportable surpluses to third countries if India was not

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in a position to buy them. The Maharaja of Bhutan also expressed a desire to have air links, a concession which materialised three years later in 1981.

In 1979 Bhutan established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh, the first country after India. This initiated a new and the latest phase in Bhutan's diplomatic history – the diversification of its external relations. It was in the year 1979 that some broad but sure hints of Bhutan's quest towards an independent and somewhat assertive role were received causing flutters in the South Block. The first was of course the urgency shown by Thimpu to have a boundary settlement with China. During the rainy season some Tibetan graziers had entered into the territory of Bhutan. Although this was almost an annual feature the intrusions in 1979 were found to be on a larger scale than in the former years.[11] Both India and Bhutan protested. But, while Beijing responded to the note sent by Thimpu, no reply was sent to New Delhi.[12] This showed that China considered the matter as falling within Bhutan's exclusive jurisdiction. Besides, the large scale intrusions were looked upon as per design by the Chinese. It was a pressure tactic used by China to impress upon Bhutan the need of opening a direct dialogue with Thimpu, ignoring New Delhi altogether. When Druk Gyalpo remarked that 'to leave the border undemarcated would be to the disadvantage of Bhutan in the long run',[13] it was inferred that perhaps Bhutan was wanting to open direct talks with the Chinese on the subject. In any case the stand taken by Druk Gyalpo was not in conformity with that of India which always viewed the question of the Sino-Bhutanese boundary as an integral part of the larger issue of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The keenness shown by the Maharaja might have been a simple concern to have the longstanding issue of the demarcation of boundary with China settled. But, judged in the framework of the Treaty of 1949, it appeared to be untraditional. The Chinese 'strategy of intrusion' alongwith its diplomacy of 'equal friendship' both worked in the same direction ; namely to have an independent diplomatic channel established with Bhutan.

The second indication that Bhutan was asserting its position as an independent nation state came at the Non-aligned Summit Conference at Havana in 1979 on the question of the admission of Kampuchea. While Bhutan supported the claims of the ousted Pol Pot regime of Kampuchea, India was in favour of keeping the seat vacant.[14] As a matter of fact Bhutan's stand was the same as that of China and some ASEAN countries. That Bhutan did not vote identically with India on a world issue did not happen for the first time. In fact, both in the United Nations and non-aligned conferences Bhutan voted counter to India on the issue of the rights of the land-locked countries. Likewise the Bhutanese Foreign Minister, way back in 1974, when asked by some Indian newsmen to specify any area where Thimpu did not follow New Delhi's policy line had said, 'we

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do not feel any need to follow India's active pro-Arab policy. But the Kampuchean issue was viewed more seriously. Some observers in India grew apprehensive that Bhutan might become a supporter of the Chinese strategy in South and South-east Asia.

Thirdly, the Druk Gyalpo, while addressing a Press Conference in Bombay in September 1979, expressed the need for 'updating' the Treaty of 1949.[15] It looked as if Bhutan was not satisfied with the treaty and might soon ask for its revision. However, these calculations were soon put to rest as His Majesty, only a couple of months later, clearly denied the need for a change.[16] Whether or not there was any formal change in the treaty the fact is that Bhutan no longer subscribed to its earlier interpretation. The Druk Gyalpo, way back in 1960, had said that, 'We are not hundred per cent independent because of the 1949 Treaty.'[17] But in 1974 the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tsering had held that the treaty does not bind Bhutan to accept each and every advice given by India in conducting its foreign relations. To quote the Foreign Minister :

> ...the advice given to Bhutan by India in foreign policy matters is entirely optional and it is upto Bhutan to follow it or not.[18]

India does not openly contest this interpretation indicating a tacit recognition of the altered situation. In short the Treaty of 1949 without having undergone a formal revision has been diluted considerably as a result of India's liberal interpretation.

BHUTAN'S RESPONSE TO NORMALIZED SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

If the strategic and foreign policy considerations of Bhutan centre much around the individual policy initiatives and strategies of its two neighbours, equally important is the mutual relationship of the two. It has been seen how an open rupture and a military conflict between India and China threatening Bhutan motivated it to give up its closed door policy. It was also the primary factor behind the choice to lean towards India. By the same standard a *rapprochement* between the two should invite a different kind of reaction. But, there is no denial of the fact that the understanding between India and China beyond a limit when Bhutan starts feeling the loss of its vantage position would give rise to some fresh misgivings and doubts. In particular, in regard to its bilateral ties with India, it might call for some kind of counterbalance. In the year 1979 as the Janata Government in India, in pursuit of its policy of 'beneficial bilateralism,' took some forward steps towards normalisation of relations with China some such concerns were voiced in the National Assembly of Bhutan. A few members expressed the desire for establishing direct communication with China. Commenting upon this, Dawe Tsering stated :

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> Some National Assembly members felt that if China and India became friends Bhutan would lose all importance for Peking and New Delhi. They thought that we should make our our own efforts to develop ties with China or be left out in the cold.[19]

Complete normalisation of relations between India and China is still a far cry. In view of developments during the last three or four years one does not expect a major breakthrough in the very near future. But, looking at the perceived reactions of Bhutan in 1979-80 it seemed quite likely that it would explore the possibility of using China to balance relations with India.[20] Such a response will look to be logical in view of its strategic location and other geo-political interests *vis-a-vis* India and China.

BHUTAN'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS SINCE 1981

Over the last five years or so there has been further expansion in Bhutan's external contacts and as a consequence reduced dependence on India. Bhutan's trade and economic relations have diversified. This is inevitable as Thimpu looks more and more towards the outside world, beyond India, and taps all likely sources of foreign aid and development. In 1961, when the First Five Year Plan was introduced in Bhutan, India was the exclusive donor and New Delhi gave the entire amount. But in the latest plan over forty per cent of the finances are from countries like Japan, Australia and some multinational agencies for foreign-based voluntary associations. This does not include aid from international institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The Indian contribution is around 42 per cent of the overall foreign help.[21] The first ever credit of $ 3 million was awarded to Bhutan by the World Bank in 1983.[22]

Besides, Bhutan has opened new trade contacts with countries in South Asia. In 1983, Bhutan and India signed a new trade agreement replacing the earlier agreement of 1972. The new agreement simplified the procedure to facilitate Bhutan's trade with third countries.[23] Some of the countries with which Bhutan is having trade contacts are Bangladesh, Nepal, Singapore and Hong Kong. For a land-locked country as Bhutan is, there are several geophysical constraints that economic independence even to a functional extent may not be possible. But as the economic links expand horizontally its reliance on New Delhi will also decline.

As in the case of economic aid, similarly in the supply of advisers and experts also Bhutan has been looking beyond India. Not only are there experts from international funding bodies like the World Bank, UNICEF, etc., who help Bhutanese officers in the framing of their plans and drawing strategies and projects but experts from European countries like Switzerland and even the United States are being invited.[24]

A parallel development in the political and diplomatic fields has also been progressing. Bhutan opened its first diplomatic mission outside India

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in 1978 in Bangladesh. In 1982 it appointed honorary consuls in Singapore and Hong Kong. In 1983 Nepal and Bhutan established formal diplomatic relations.[25] In 1985 diplomatic channels were opened with countries outside Asia. Non-resident diplomatic contacts were opened with Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands and EEC.[26]

A major breakthrough in the expansion of Bhutan's external contacts came in 1983 with the inauguration of the Druk Air Service. This has also enabled Bhutan to overcome the 'Inner Line Regulations' under which all foreign travellers entering Bhutan were to obtain a permit. This Thimpu considered to be a hindrance to the growth of the tourist industry which was an important source of foreign exchange for Bhutan.

Bhutan's multilateral diplomatic activities have also witnessed an upward trend. In 1982-83 Bhutan participated in sixty-seven international conferences and seminars. More recently it has become one of the seven sponsoring members of South Asian Regional Cooperation and is the Chairman of a committee of experts (postal services) constituted to explore collaboration in the identified areas of regional Cooperation in South Asia. Thimpu was one of the venues where preparatory talks for the launching of SAARC were held. It was also chosen as the meeting ground for the diplomats seeking a resolution of the ethnic problem of Ceylon. To quote Bhutan's official weekly *Kuensel*, Bhutan is emerging as an 'Eastern Geneva' a venue for peace-making efforts in South Asia.

As the political and economic horizon of Bhutan expands and it interacts increasingly with the outside world the Bhutanese perceptions as those of its most immediate neighbourhood, will acquire certain ramifications, like diversification, an urge towards an independent posture on international questions particularly those which affect it more pertinently.

From this point of view the most important development was of course the opening of direct border talks between Bhutan and China. In 1984 a Bhutanese delegation visited China and held talks at Beijing on the question of the settlement of their boundary dispute. Another round of talks was held in Bhutan in 1985. The event of 1984 is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it marks the opening of direct contacts, though for a limited purpose, between the two countries. This may pave the way for the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relations. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is evident that henceforth the Bhutan-China border issue will not be considered an integral part of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. One will recall Prime Minister Jawaharlal's remarks that the Government of India is the only competent authority to take up with other governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations. This is how the Treaty of 1949 was understood both by India and Bhutan at that time. As such if any rectification was to be made regarding their boundary it must be 'discussed along with the boundary of India.' From the events of 1984-85 it is clear that both India and Bhutan do not adhere to that meaning of

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the treaty ; indeed they have a more liberal interpretation of the words 'aid and advice' of the Government of India used in Article 2 of the treaty.

The fact of the matter is that over the years and decades the image of a relentless China, as perceived by other Asian nations, ever engaging itself in permanent revolutions has come to be replaced by a fresh image of a pragmatic and more approachable China.[27] As a consequence Bhutan's threat perceptions of China have also receded considerably since 1962. On the the other hand, events like the merger of Sikkim and India's pre-eminent status in South Asia might arouse feelings and urges somewhat like those which are echoed in Kathmandu sometimes.

But despite all this there is still a great deal of convergence of interests between India and Bhutan. Their strategic perceptions, both of the regional and international environment, are broadly common. Both have not ceased to have all security concerns from the side of China. This security concern is likely to persist in future also, if for no other reason than common geographical boundaries between the two and open door policies pursued by both. Therefore 'friendship with India will always continue to be the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Himalayan Kingdom,' as stated by Maharaja Jigme Singye Wangchuk on his visit to India in March 1982.[28] Highlighting the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Bhutan *Kuensel* wrote :

> India and Bhutan stand out not only as the friendliest of neighbours but the truest of allies in their quest for peace, friendship and goodwill in the world.[29]

The communist culture of China is another inhibiting factor in bringing the Buddhist Kingdom of Bhutan too close to China. Therefore even if Thimpu decides to open diplomatic communication with China, a possibility which cannot be ruled out, it will be unrealistic to imagine that it will become a willing partner in the development of a regionalistic or global strategic consensus.

It will perhaps be more unrealistic to think that Bhutan will look towards a non-Asian great power for the fulfilment of its diplomatic and economic desires. Its options are far too limited in this regard. In short one does not visualise a strategic framework of Bhutanese conception as will call for a decisive break with the existing one even though some changes, adjustments and modifications are brought in, as they must, now and then and with the changes in stance—political and diplomatic—of Bhutan.

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INDIAN OCEAN : AN AREA OF TENSION AND BIG POWER PRESSURES

By S.N. KOHLI*

The Indian Ocean has become an area of acute tension—a peril zone with conventional and nuclear naval vessels of the major powers staging a permanent presence in the area. Naval task forces, because of their inherent mobility, can constitute a powerful projection of military might. That is why the non-aligned countries of the Indian Ocean are exercised over the threat posed to their national security from the high seas. They can hardly forget that the powers that dominated and colonised them for centuries came to the area via the high seas. They also remember that, even in the decades since the Second World War there have been several glaring instances of naval might being used by the Big Powers to exert military pressure in almost every ocean. The concern expressed by nations who do not want a return to gun-boat diplomacy and domination by military forces is, therefore, indisputably legitimate.

Rivalry and competition are not new trends in international affairs or in the Indian Ocean. They were imported into this ocean by the colonial powers, when they sought to oust one another from enjoying the fruits of colonisation. Today, they exist in the Indian Ocean area for a variety of stated and unstated reasons.

When the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1971 a resolution proclaiming the Indian Ocean 'a zone of peace for all times,' people in many countries heaved a sigh of relief. Those countries whose merchant vessels plied the Indian Ocean hoped that a zone of peace would guarantee their security and enable them to develop economic contacts with different countries of the world. For champions of peace throughout the world demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean would mean elimination of one of the world's most dangerous hot-beds of tension. This however, did not happen. The safeguarding of vital interests of the Big Powers provided to them enough justification for an unprecedented escalation of military presence in the area.

There was a time when the 'vacuum theory' was universally peddled by the western powers and their mass-media. It postulated that the withdrawal of British naval power from the Indian Ocean would create a void which if not filled by the United States and its allies would invite Soviet presence. The non-aligned countries felt very strongly that if at all there was a vacuum, it should be filled by the littoral states, who alone would be responsible for the security of their waters. Though the vacuum theory is

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* Mr. Kohli is a retired Admiral of the Indian Navy.

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seldom mentioned now, the quantum of the Big Power naval forces in the Indian Ocean has steadily increased.

STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

THE Indian Ocean is about 76 million sq. kilometres in area. The region on the littoral consisting of 44 states, some with no access to the sea, is predominantly agricultural and in spite of strenuous and partially successful efforts, the industrial base is either non-existent or very weak. The rich endowments of the area include tea, coffee, cotton, coal, iron, bauxite, copper, lead, manganese and gold.

Considering the population, food production is less than the needed requirements of the littoral countries. The vast mineral resources and commercial crops add to its strategic importance in relation to the industrially advanced countries. Significantly, almost 90 per cent of the trade of the littoral countries is West-oriented; intra regional trade is insignificant.

To the Great Powers, the Indian Ocean region offers excellent prospects of economic exploitation. A number of countries, which have not embarked upon economic development, have shown heavy dependence on the Great Powers who give aid in order to increase their own influence and for this purpose to spread discord in this area.

The Indian Ocean has a number of strategically and widely spread islands whlch offer excellent harbours and flat land for airfield complexes eminently suitable as bases. Diego Garcia is a classic example.

The nations of the Indian Ocean account for half the oil produced in the free world, two-thirds of its uranium production and one-third of its gold output. About a quarter of the world's trade is handled in the ports of the Indian Ocean. The enhancing of the Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been attributed to ensuring oil supplies. The fact that these naval forces can not only protect oil routes but also intervene powerfully in various local situations is conveniently glossed over.

The possibility of any one big power in a unilateral act of self denial withdrawing from the Indian Ocean is remote at present. Big Powers are pursuing policies counter to the interest of the non-aligned littoral states of the Ocean despite repeated protests from the latter. As in the bygone days, the navies of the littoral countries are weak in comparsion to those of the Big Powers. The new political patterns that have emerged have brought to evidence certain rivalries and conflicting interests of regional powers.

Thus as an area of extraordinary potential for natural resources, an area crossed by trade routes vital to outside powers and those belonging to the region, an area of conflicting Big Power political and economic

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interests, and an area of certain regional turbulences, the Indian Ocean is today the pivot of world affairs.

INTERESTS OF LITTORAL AND BIG POWER STATES

The clamour about Big Power presence in the Indian Ocean is said to have started when the United States first stationed its nuclear submarines armed with inter-continental nuclear-tipped missiles in the Indian Ocean, an area geographically well located to cover many significant Soviet as well as Chinese targets from there. The USSR is then credited with attempting to counter this by sending its own warships to the Indian Ocean. This is not to state however, that other powers do not have interests in the region, which they wish to protect. In fact, the involvement of various littoral states also in the Indian Ocean region is obvious and understandable.

In order to secure a better understanding of the nature and extent of involvement of various littoral and non-littoral states in the Indian Ocean it would be necessary to study the interests of these states in the region.

United States Follows 'Forward Base' Concept

The United States has considerable economic interest in the region; undoubtedly the safety of its oil supplies from the Gulf region weighs heavily with it. Resultantly, the strength of the United States Forces in the Indian Ocean exceeds that of the navies of all adjoining countries put together. It has been estimated that by the year 2025 some of the strategic materials available on land, needed not only by developed but by all countries, would have been exhausted. The effort is, therefore, to tap the vast wealth of the oceans including the Indian Ocean. The United States of America is perhaps the most advanced in the technological resources necessary for this purpose. It is pertinent here to note the stand taken by the Reagan Administration on the Convention of the Law of the Sea Conference.

We must not forget that the developing countries, comprising the Indian Ocean region, form a substantial market for the finished goods of the United States. One of the thrusts of US policy in the area, therefore, is the creation of a politieal climate favourable for the protection of its economic interests.

Important developments have recently taken place in West Asia and in the Indian Ocean region causing the United States to increase its military presence in order to be able to protect the oil fields in the region as also to counter the increasing Soviet influence. With the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the United States has lost an important ally and the Soviet interven-

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tion in Afghanistan has taken that region out of the United States' sphere of influence. Today newer anxiety prevails over the area which is still ridden with conflict. Opinion in some quarters is that with the growing wealth and political awareness among the people in the Gulf region, there is far less support for military alliances, the thrust being on procuring sophisticated arms for self-protection. Because of this it has become necessary for powers like the United States to maintain a permanent military presence rather than operate only through surrogates.

A separate Indian Ocean Command has been set up by the United States and a Rapid Deployment Force of 230,000 men conceived in 1980, immediately after the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, has been entrusted with the task of carrying out punitive operations in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Persian Gulf, if and when the need arises.

The RDF is a truly awesome military force consisting of not less than 5 Army Divisions, 2 Marine Divisions, 2 Wings of B-52 bombers, 3 Aircraft Carriers and a large number of escort and supply ships which are part of the US global plan.

The goal of the RDF is not only to stop Soviet infiltration or invasion, but also any kind of instability that might prove dangerous to US interests in the area. In the Persian Gulf, the RDF is intended explicitly to give the United States the capability to force its way in and not wait for an invitation from a friendly government. To make the RDF fully effective it needs huge stockpiles of combat-ready weapons within the area and base facilities for its aircrafts and ships. Towards this purpose, the United States has acquired the necessary bases or base facilities in Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Oman and Somalia. Their most important base for effective deployment of the RDF is Israel.

If Israel is the Western sheet anchor of America's evolving strategy for rapid intervention in West and South West Asia, Pakistan has been elected to be its eastern plank. Like Israel, Pakistan has presented itself as a crucial strategic asset for the United States. When the Reaganites came to power on the crest of a tide of hawkish sentiment it was easy for Pakistan to persuade them to accept its offer of cooperation in their anti-Soviet crusade. Nor was the Reagan Administration particularly disturbed by the fears expressed regarding the Zia regime's stability or that Pakistan was clandestinely embarking upon a nuclear programme. Zia obtained a large assistance package of $ 3.2 billion including the most sophisticated F-16 fighter-bombers and other arms. In spite of denials there appear to be indications that Pakistan's territory on the Arabian Sea coast will be made available to the United States for the construction of a naval-cum-air base.

The countries of the Indian Ocean which are militatily weak cannot but take serious note of this ominous development in their vicinity ; their very survival may be in jeopardy by a switch in US strategic interests or their

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coming to the assistance of friendly countries which may choose to settle scores with a neighbour. The littoral countries have cause to remember that they were colonised and held in subjuqation for centuries by countries with powerful navies and strong armed might. These are the considerations which impel them to seek world agreement on the Indian Ocean becoming a zone of peace in which they can be left to their own devices and be responsible for the security of the area.

The USA and Western Powers have taken the position that any conference on the Indian Ocean is inopportune so long as the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan continues.

The 11 sq. miles Diego Garcia Island was detached from Mauritius in 1965 and bought by the British to incorporate it in the British-Indian-Ocean-territory. Diego Garcia was subsequently leased to the United States by Britain and has now become the most important naval base for the furtherence of US strategy in the Indian Ocean and also the most difficult stumbling block in any future plan to demilitarise the Ocean and establish a zone of peace here.

Following the 'forward base' concept, possibly to fight another war, if necessary away from home, the United States has built over 60 naval bases in foreign countries in the post-war years. US fleets have been involved in nearly 20 armed conflicts in different parts of the world including China, Greece, the Philippines, Korea, Guatemala, Lebanon, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, Panama, Congo and Cambodia.

The great advantage of a full-fledged base is sometimes sought to be minimised by saying that no naval forces are stationed there. Under normal conditions no ships need be permanently based there, but the inherent mobility of maritime forces enables them to be brought to this ocean within a matter of days. Diego Garcia with its recently enlarged facilities for anchorage of a large number of ships, including the largest aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines, an airfield complex for long-range reconnaissance aircraft, supply aircraft and strategic bombers and the necessary support and logistic facilities, would then be capable of meeting all the needs of the ships and aircrafts to enable sustained operations in the Ocean area. The littoral states have legitimate misgivings at the presence of this powerful base in the centre of the Indian Ocean.

Another important development is the permission granted by the Sri Lankan Government to allow the crew of American warships in the Indian Ocean to go ashore for rest and recreation to Trincomalee which is a one-time strategically important British naval base on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka. Trincomalee is also to serve as a refuelling station for American warships in the Indian Ocean.

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Soviet Strategy for Greater Influence

Like the United States, the Soviet Union was never a colonial power in Asia. Soviet support in the Indian Ocean region to the struggle of various states against colonialism, racism and other forms of exploitation has won it a number of friends and this friendship is nursed and cemented with economic ties and contacts. The official stand of the Soviets has been that their military presence is to defend itself against the threat posed by positioning of US ballistic missile submarines and carrier task forces which can attack its richly endowed southern parts. In addition, it is through the Indian Ocean that the only all-year sea route between the two flanks of the USSR passes; it is therefore important that this route be kept usable and open.

There are, however, a number of other factors responsible for Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean region. Soviet Russia would like to extend its commercial, diplomatic and military influence in an area earlier dominated by the West. The Soviet offer of arms and technological assistance and low interest credit to radical Arab regimes for the last two decades helped to offset Western influence. But after the set-back to its influence by the embarassing defeat of Egypt and Syria by Israel, the Soviet Union is anxious to restore its hold in the region.

One facet of this strategy for greater influence in the region is exhibited by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. A major factor perhaps was to exert a check on the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, as in Iran, and to protect Soviet Islamic areas from such tendencies. Other reasons for this presence are that it brings Soviet Russia nearer to the Gulf States, placing it in a better position to protect these. Further, Afghanistan meets its lack of air power in the region; with bomber aircrafts stationed in Afghanistan it is better able to counter the United States' military presence in the region. Control over Afghanistan provides Russia with a much larger border with Iran and brings it closer to a long cherished desire for influence in the region. The Soviet Union is also nearer to India with which it is developing increasing economic ties, nearer to warm-water ports in the Indian Ocean and placed in a better position, according to a section of opinion, to foment rebellion amongst the Baluchis of Pakistan in retaliation perhaps to reported US arms supplies to Afghan rebels.

The USSR has completed six years in Afghanistan and it is difficult to say whether this presence is likely to be permanent or not. Here, it would be relevant to mention, that the British despite their very best efforts could never retain a hold on Afghanistan.

Moscow's aim in the Indian Ocean region appears to be to maintain a naval presence that will enable the rapid deployment of Soviet naval forces.

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It can be seen therefore, that the two Super Powers have definite interests in the region which they would like to protect. The fact that one attributes its presence to designs of the other, each adopting a 'holier than thou' attitude, is no source of comfort for the littoral states of the region which see to their great discomfiture the increasing military presence of both Super Powers.

France : Increased Presence

France has of late considerably increased its military presence in the Indian Ocean. It has more than 10,000 troops and 25 warships permanently in the area between Port Djibouti, Port Mayotte, the base of Reunion and the stations of the Malagasy Island, Glorievers, Juande Nova, Basaa da India and Europe and Tromalin. There is no doubt that since the Socialist President Mitterand came to power, France has attached increased importance to the Indian Ocean. France has reportedly agreed to provide security to the 100 Island Group, that constitutes Seychelles, from outside *coup* attempts.

Present Chinese Influence Limited

The present Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean is limited. However, there has been rapid naval expansion in China recently and a growing realisation of the necessity of sea power in areas where its vital national interests are at stake, *viz.*, seizure of Paracel Islands with a navy-led amphibious operation. There is in China a build-up of a naval technological base within its financial and industrial capacity. The possibility of Chinese claims to the Spratley Group of Islands being enforced by sea-power cannot be ruled out. Close Soviet ties with India, Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the constant Chinese fear of encirclement are other factors which may lead to increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that China tacitly approves the United States presence in Diego Garcia to counter the Sovict presence. China may look for base facilities for warships in the Indian Ocean area in the near future as its presence would partly be reassuring to friends like Pakistan. Of course improvement of Sino-Indian ties should help dispel Chinese fears.

Japan's Trade Interests

Japan is interested in the Indian Ocean region as it is a great industrial and trading nation; it imports from the region oil and raw materials for industries, and exports its products to the region which forms a good future market for it. Indian Ocean's trade route is vital for Japan. It is

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estimated Japan gets 73 per cent of its oil imports from the Persian Gulf.

Australia Allows US Military Bases

Australia has taken shelter under the United States' umbrella. The latter have set up their own bases in Australia and have full access to the country's military bases. The possibility of a link between China, Japan, USA and Australia to counter Soviet naval presence cannot be ruled out.

Indonesia Supports Peace Zone Concept

Indonesia is an archipelago and sea communications are important for the economic viability of its territory. It is also an active member of the non-aligned group of countries, supports the peace zone concept and has friendly cooperative relations with its neighbours.

Sri Lanka Accords Rest Facilities to US Naval Forces

The island state of Sri Lanka, with a strategic location, has managed to remain non-aligned and been a very vocal advocate of the zone of peace concept. Sri Lanka has maintained close ties with India and has important trade links with China and Pakistan. A recent development, somewhat inexplicable, is the permission accorded by the country to US naval forces to use the strategic harbour at Trincomalee for rest and recreation.

Pakistan Gives Half-hearted Support to Zone of Peace Concept

Pakistan, a Muslim country geographically close to the Gulf, has a large number of trained military personnel. The bulk of its foreign trade moves by sea ; 85 per cent of its oil comes from the Gulf and its vital imports are ferrous, non-ferrous metals and various types of machinery ; exports are cotton in various forms, rice, wheat, hides and skins amongst others. Pakistan has strong bonds with certain Arab countries of the Gulf who help it financially and whose armed forces it helps to man and train. In 1971, Saudi Arabia loaned Pakistan naval hard-ware. Today there is rapid build up of modern military hard-ware in the Gulf and if the 1971 step is repeated there is an increased threat to India. Pakistan's friendship with China, in the event of such an eventuality will stand firm and will continue for strategic and political reasons. Recent reports indicate that China has given Pakistan its know-how for manufacturing nuclear weapons and that the United States has supplied bulk of the 40 F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan. A high percentage of Pakistan's budget is spent on defence and it has given only half-hearted support to the zone of peace

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concept. Because of the fact that Indo-Pakistan ties have not yet normalised, acquisition of sophisticated weaponry by Pakistan has led to an arms race in the region. Pak training and support to anti-Indian terrorists is proving another stumbling block.

Increased Bangladesh-US Cooperation

Bangladesh, a young nation ridden with economic problems, continues to be in a very fluid political situation under Gen. Ershad. China is the major power assisting Bangladesh economically and in the development of its armed forces. There are indications of greater Bangladesh-US co-operation ; unconfirmed reports regarding US interest in the St Martin's Island continue.

Iran : A Changed Situation

There was a set-back in Iran's military programme after the ouster of the Shah. The changed situation resulted in a worsening of relations with the United States and created insecurity in the minds of the latter with regard to Soviet influence over Iran.

A number of other littoral states of the Indian Ocean are in the process of developing naval power and have attained varying degrees of achievement. The emphasis is on concern for self-defence as also guarding maritime interests in the area for states such as Malaysia, Singapore, Iraq, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

India's Firm Stand on the Existence of Foreign Military Bases

India views with concern the increasing Big Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. It has provided strong support to the zone of peace concept and given stiff opposition to the existence of foreign military bases in the region, firmly espousing non-alignment. Nevertheless, its naval development is not commensurate with its maritime interests and strategic position. But its endeavour is to solve outstanding issues with all its neighbours and strengthen economic ties. India values its independence and is determined to stand its ground whatever the obstacles. But again, it has no desire to exert a pre-dominant influence in the Indian Ocean and is opposed to the concept of any one power or concentration of powers dominating the Indian Ocean. The supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan and the reported attempt by it to manufacture an atomic bomb is a disconcerting development for India. As it is, India has the problem of exposure on three fronts. Even if Bangladesh does not openly resort to hostilities, its forces perched on the border will tie up considerable Indian forces ; similarly the Chinese forces on the northern border.

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The island republics of the Indian Ocean are acutely concerned about their security and they do not want it to be underwritten by one or the other major power. They would rather develop their own self-defence requiring, in the initial stages, assistance from a competent friendly neighbour with matching interest in the islands.

From the above analysis it would be clear that there are a myriad factors covering the interests of various states in the Indian Ocean. There is no doubt however, that an increasing military presence leading to an arms race is very much against the interests of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. The leaders of a number of these littoral countries have in recent times spoken strongly in favour of the zone of peace concept. These countries are India, Madagascar, Seychelles, Malaysia, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen.

It was the increasing apprehension of the developing nations that they would not be able to derive benefit from the wealth of the ocean that led them to force an agreement on the Law of the Sea Conference.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION : A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH

The final act of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was signed by 119 countries on 10 December 1982. This marked the culmination of the longest and most complex multilateral negotiations in the history of international law. It took nine years and long sessions as well as a series of very informal negotiations in between to reach agreement on a comprehensive delicately balanced package of 321 articles.

India can be proud that it is the only 'developing' country to be given the status of a pioneer in seabed mining. Four multinational consortiums, headed by American companies, a French consortium, the Soviet Union and Japan are the others so recognised. Recognition as a pioneer will give India priority in obtaining contracts from the proposed international Sea-Bed Authority to mine the sea-bed.

An important part of the Convention concerns the exploitation of the resources in the seas outside national jurisdiction which has been declared 'a common heritage of mankind' by the United Nations. To oversee this, an international Sea-Bed Authority will be set up with a mining arm known as *Enterprise*.

President Reagan has rejected the Convention on the ground that the provisions for deep-sea mining in international waters are too restrictive for US private enterprise. The developing countries feel that this is another instance when the developed countries, who have a virtual monopoly in deep-sea mining technology, will do them out of any benefits to be drawn from exploiting the valuable polymetallic nodules from international waters which have been declared 'the common heritage of man.' The unilateral mining of the nodules from these waters is sure to

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result in confrontation and strife and recourse to international law. This, however, will not deter the powerful developed nations.

The other important provisions of the Convention are a 12-mile territorial sea, 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone and a maximum of 350 miles continental shelf. Economic resources of these areas exclusively belong to the coastal states.

This is a major achievement for the Third World. Traditionally, resources in the coastal areas of the developing countries were exploited by distant maritime powers, since all areas beyond three nautical miles were considered as 'High Seas.'

'Unimpeded Transit Passage' through international straits will provide free passage for naval forces through the straits which fall in the domestic jurisdiction of coastal states with the extension of the territorial waters. This has been a major advantage for the Super Powers and those that have strong navies. Mobility is the crux of the power of a Navy. It is the Navy which is active in peace time moving clandestnely throughout to safguard political interests.

ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Non-aligned Movement is an important factor in world developments. Despite the fact that certain differences have appeared among non-aligned states, the overwhelming majority have not changed their view on the problems of the Indian Ocean. They have continuously reaffirmed their determination to work to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Friends from the non-aligned countries of the Indian Ocean may in despair well ask what should be done under the circumstances. The Big Powers are so overwhelmingly superior in military strength that any military solution is out of the question. There are, however, other ways in which pressure can be brought to bear on these powers.

The Indian Ocean states should relentlessly continue their efforts to build up world opinion against the obduracy of the Big Powers.

Another way in which littoral states could prevent Big Power meddling is to solve any existing differences bilaterally or with a regional approach. The outsiders who maintain military forces in the area must never be given the opportunity to fish in troubled waters.

Thirdly, there is a great need for economic interdependence among the littoral states. This could be achieved by pooling resources, but above all by removing suspicions and creating better understanding that regional development means the development of all Individual countries. The nations of the Indian Ocean should be allowed to utilise the oceanic wealth in a

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cooperative manner so as to remove the limits to economic growth caused by land-based national resources.

Fourthly, on a wider plane, the Indian Ocean countries must continue to strive for a new international order based on mutual respect, on equitable economic patterns and healthy political relationships between the developed and developing nations. Whilst so doing, they may need to take a practical view of world affairs and build up adequate defences against the threats they face. Unitedly they can, in the coming years develop into a cognisable reckonable forum-for-peace whose attainment by persuasion and negotiation appears despairingly elusive.

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PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA : A REGIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By VEENA KUKREJA*

India is the most populous democracy and largest developing country with a democratic system. It is interesting to note that India, surrounded by non-democratic regimes in the region, belongs to a small group of developing countries, such as Malaysia, Sri Lanka (highly questionable in the wake of the recent Tamil crisis), and some Caribbean countries where parliamentary democracy has so far been successful. Most of the Third World part of the globe is dominated by military regimes or civil-military coalitions. This is what happened in a number of young nations of Asia and Africa which having adopted, upon achieving independence, the Westminster model of democracy, had to experience varying levels of military intervention and erosion of democracy.[1]

It is hard to deny that India's most remarkable political achievement has been to maintain for over three decades the world's largest democracy. The record is more remarkable in view of the appalling problems of low economic development, sharp differences in income, mass poverty, illiteracy, ethnic antagonism, and absence of any linguistic unity.[2] *Such a situation is not in conformity with a democratic system which the government should rest on the active consensus of those who were governed. As an essential condition for the stability of democracy, mostly economic factors,*[3] *high degree of education,*[4] *sense of identification*[5]*, and a relatively small nation or a gradual historical change*[6] *are mentioned. But all these interpretations do not at all fit the Indian situation ; they are without explanatory force.*

However, when one turns to neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh for comparative illumination, the Indian puzzle grows. Though these countries match closely to India in a number of ways relating to history, colonial experience and post-independence problems, yet they have experienced frequent military interventions. In sharp contrast to India these two partitioned states of Pakistan and Bangladesh have—except for brief spells in each 1947-58 and 1971-77 and 1972-75 and 1976-79—essentially been under military rule. The persistent praetorion traditions of Pakistan[7] *and Bangladesh indicate that the armed forces have attained not only a fairly entrenched position in the political structure of the respective countries. but it has beeome extremely difficult to combine this position with the recognition of civilian political forces within any generally acceptable constitutional framework. Therefore, the consolidation of parliamentary democracy in India, despite*

* **Ms. Kukreja is Lecturer Political Science, Janki Devi Mahavidyalaya, University of Delhi, Delhi.**

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numerous difficulties in the way of its survival, represent a unique case in South Asia as well as in the Third World. This article seeks to explain this phenomenon of remarkable combination of political stability and orderly political development within a South Asian regional comparative perspective which has often been called Indian "Political Miracle."[8] While in mid-1965 pervasive violence and instability in the domestic politics of developing countries was endemic, (for example, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda became victims of military coups) the Indian political system could successfully stem political decay and instability in India. This article attempts to explain the relationship between the political democratic traditions, level of political institutionalization role of dominant party, and political leadership and democracy.

A country may be politically highly developed with modern political institutions while still very backward in terms of modernization, defined in terms of 'adaptability' 'complexity', 'autonomy', and 'coherence' of its organization and procedures.[9] According to Huntington, India has ranked high 'not only in comparison with other modernizing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but ulso in comparison with many more modern European countries.[10] The survival and sustenance of stable and effective parliamentary democracy in India (during two decades) the after independence rested largely on the Congress Party,[11] the Indian Civil Service[12] and charismatic Nehru. India, not only inherited these two organizations, i.e. the Congress and the administrative system, but two highly developed 'adaptable', 'complex' 'autonomous' and 'coherent' institutions prepared to assume primary responsibility for these functions.[13] Additionally, the relatively slow pace of modernization, and social mobilization in India did not create demands and strains which the party and bureaucracy were unable to handle so long as these two organizations maintained their institutional strength.

It is not an exaggeration to say that no other country upon achieving independence, following World War II, and the era of decolonization was as well prepared as India in terms of political democratic experience and institutionalization for self government. It is often said that both India and Pakistan under the colonial rule inherited the same experience of representative institutions. It is, however, not true. As Wilcox comments : 'Pakistan inherited the rural idiom of politics. Lahore was its only genuine city, and it was the capital of the most bureaucratized and carefully controlled province in India, the Punjab.'[14] The only Muslims of the sub-continent who enjoyed the benefits of participation under the British rule were the communal minorities of Western India, the English literate, secular moderates of the cities and Zamindars of the United Provinces. Pakistan's provinces were parts of an authoritarian culture. 'The Punjab and Sind were ruled by feudal land

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owning families who were zealous of their autocratic prerogatives and scornful to popular politics...the other significant elite from the Muslim provinces was the civil and military bureaucracy which also scorned the notion that the masses should direct the activities of the state.'[15]

The qualitatively different impact of colonial rule on India and Pakistan has been described by Iftikhar Ahmed in terms of both class and state formation which largely stemmed from economic and strategic considerations of Britain. Pakistan, unlike India, he observes : 'inherited a military-bureaucratic state structure, a strong landed class, an almost non-existent industrial-bourgeoisie and a weak commercial base. These classes lacked a social base, and were dependent on the state for their economic and political power.'...He further submits that 'democratic' institutions, such as legislative councils, and independent judiciaries, and democratic practices such as elections which—had been established in Bengal, Madras and Bombay—were only introduced in the Punjab at the end of the 19th century, and into the North West Frontier Province and Sind in 1920, into Baluchistan never.'[16] Thus, 'the strongest traditions and structures of politics' that Pakistan had inherited were 'autocratic and viceregal' in nature.[17]

Besides, the successful operation of democracy in India was partly a product of long experience with political ideas and practices and partly the integration of these with traditional Indian values. In ancient India, along-with the overall monarchical framework one could find some institutions of *Samiti* and *Panchayat* which seemed supportive of some notion of democracy.[18]

So far as political institutionalization is concerned, in countries like Pakistan and Sudan institutional evolution was unbalanced.[19] In these countries civil and military bureaucracy were more highly developed than the political parties and the 'military has strong incentives to move into the institutional vacuum on the input side of the political system and to attempt to perform interest aggregation functions.'[20] This pattern, of course, has been common in Latin America.[21]

Where new states emerged from colonialism, with little or no inheritance of political institutions, the stability of the political system depends directly on the strength of the party. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has institutionalized mass support. Its strength reflects the scope of that support and the level of institutionalization. To the extent that party becomes the central institution of a society linking social forces and individual ambitions to the political system, it plays a significant role in moderating the effects of social mobilization and intra-party elite conflicts. The modernizing countries which achieve high levels of actual and presumptive political stability possess at least one strong political party. The Congress, Neo Destour, Mapai, Partido Popular Democratic, and Republican

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People's Party are the important examples. The difference in political stability between India and Pakistan in the 1950s were measured by the difference in organization strength between the Congress Party and the Muslim League.[22]

The propensity of a political system to military intervention varies inversely with the strength of its political parties. Countries like Mexico and Turkey which developed strong political parties also found the road to reducing military involvement in their politics. On the other hand, as Huntington maintains, 'The decline in party strength, the fragmentation of the leadership, the evaporation of mass support, the decay of organizational structure, the shift of political leaders from politics to bureaucracy and the rise of praetorianism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy the capitol.'[23]

During the formative phase of nationhood, the level of institutionalization in India, has largely been possible because of the strength of the ruling Congress Party which is often described as the heart of the Indian miracle. In this context, institutionalization of mass party organization before sixty two years of independence coupled with its experience of party politics for three generations of Indians, have attributed to the success of democracy in India. Conversely, after World War II most countries lacked strong political parties. Most parties were too young to have demonstrated any real adaptability; the principal exceptions were several Latin American parties and the Congress Party in India. Otherwise, most parties were not only young and elite based but also still led by their founders. The institutional strength of a political party is measured, in the first instance by its ability to survive its founder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to power. The adaptability of the Congress Party was 'reflected' as Huntington maintains, 'in its changing leadership from Banerjee and Besant to Gokhale and Tilak or Gandhi and Nehru. On the other hand, weak parties depend upon their leaders. The deaths shortly after the independence of their countries of Senanayake in Ceylon, of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan and of Aung San in Burma, directly hastened the disintegration of their political parties. That the deaths of Gandhi and Patel in India had no such affect on the Congress was not due just to Nehru.'[24]

The different functioning of the Congress and the Muslim League also account largely for the dissimilar beginnings of independent rule in India and Pakistan. Although, the Congress and the Muslim League both displayed strong Central direction, yet the leadership of the Congress was 'collective' not 'dictatorial' like that of the League.[25] By the time of independence, the Congress was able to establish the norm of disciplined cooperation and wide range of discussion within the Congress leadership; on the other hand, tradition of the Muslim League had been to keep control of the party in a small group instead of indulging in popu-

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lism sought by the Congress. Its leaders never permitted discussion within the party. This explains why within the one year of independence (especially after the passing away of Jinnah) the Muslim League disintegrated into varying factions and cliques, whereas the Congress was able to supply initial momentum to the new government.[26] Similarly, the Awami League in Bangladesh, which was built around the charismatic personality of Mujib, had a weak organization, multiple factions, and the party machinery relied heavily on the *Bangabandhu*. Thus the political system of Bangladesh depended more on an individual than on institutions. As a result, after the assassination of Mujib, Bangladesh was plunged in confusion and instability.[27]

In India, even more recently, the Congress has proved capable of absorbing the shock of the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and the stability of the regime appears more assured than even before. It has moved away from any degree of dependence on one outstanding leader; it having handled smoothly a series of leadership shocks and massive redistribution of political power. It has absorbed the rapid rate of social change in the country side and prevented alienation and apathy from reaching explosive proportions. It is noteworthy to mention here that following independence, the Congress, unlike other movement parties of South Asia, such as Muslim League, Anti Fascist People's Freedom League, United Nationalist Party, Nepali Congress, and Awami League—which also originated as a 'mono-functional' organization and 'functional exigencies' of freedom struggle—has neither been reduced to mere skeleton nor faced electoral erosion.[28]

Additionally, except for a brief period (1969-71) and (1977-79) the Congress has enjoyed a near monopoly of governmental power. This has been called one party dominant system characterized by 'interparty competition but no alternation in power.'[29] The obvious reason for the Congress dominance was its 'movement' and 'Aristotelian' character. The Congress, as a most perceptive scholar of Indian politics has observed, has been a unifying agent not merely in the obvious 'horizontal' senses in which it holds together a range of opinions and interest, but also in the important 'vertical' sense that it brings into contact and interpretation all levels of the most sophisticated to the most simple and traditional.[30] In other words, Congress acted as an umbrella, open to diverse groups connected by a variety of links : caste, economic powers, religion, personality etc.[31] This 'open' character of the Congress Party in respect of both its internal texture and its interaction with other parties has shown a very special case, set apart equally from the alternating form of competitive party system and from the varieties of one party state.[32] There has been a most important 'openness' in relations between Congress and the other parties. This is not merely an absence of barriers, but there is positive communication and interaction between the opposition

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parties and certain sections within the Congress itself. Thus they address themselves not so much to the electorate as to like minded political groups in the dominant party.[33] The result has been the emergence of a 'Congress system', to borrow Kothari's apt term, in which the Congress 'internalised' the political competition. This internalisation became possible through an elaborate system of viable faction,[34] whereby the rest of the parties worked as 'parties of pressure' and lying on the periphery of the system, they influenced the intra-party competition between the Congress factions.

Pakistan and Bangladesh, to all appearances, started with their equivalent to the Indian Congress Party in the shape of the Muslim League and Awami League respectively. But the Muslim League was a body which flattered to deceive. It had not been much of an organization in any part of prepartition India as it was most substantial in the Muslim-minority provinces which by definition could not be Pakistan. 'The tragedy was that it had been possible to secure Pakistan with a minimum display of organizing capacity, idealism, interest and fear—the greatest of these being fear had seemed to control sufficient Muslims under Jinnah's sway."[35]

Furthermore, an examination of the party politics in Pakistan shows that the Muslim League was never able to establish the same level of political dominance in Pakistan that the Congress did in India. Unlike the Congress Party, the Muslim League failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a broad-based national party seeking to lead the nation on the road to democracy and planned economic development due to its weak and narrow political support base. The Muslim League was also not comparable in organizational terms to the Congress Party Although it took credit for the creation of Pakistan or rather failed and faltered in coping with the different sets of post-colonial challenges of political articulation and political aggregation. Whereas in India the Congress Party was not only a mass party but also performed the tasks of interest articulation and aggregation and has played a predominant role in Indian politics for more than three decades.[36] Although all parties perform interest aggregation functions, the dominant party performs the aggregation function *par excellence* as it aims at 'promiscuous accommodation and aspires to make its support structure coterminous with the entire politically relevant public.[37] Though all parties face the dilemma of reconciling the conflicting requirements of maximum adaption to its societal environment and maintenance of internal integration,[38] for the predominant party it assumes a special importance. 'Not surprisingly', as M.P. Singh observes, 'most predominant parties seek to meet this dilemma by either transcending social cleavages by a charismatic leadership or by building a coalition of diverse social groups through skilful reconciliatory leadership. Or, in more favourable clircumstances, the

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predominant party may well use both affective and instrumental leadership types in combination to maximize its goals.'[39]

The aggregate character of the Congress was a source of great strength. Nehru and his successors could use the 'inheritance legitimacy' of the party as the main formula to mobilise support and to conceal intra-party tension. Thus the mobilization of electorol support based on the sub-systems largely resisted the growth of structural differentiation. The Congress apparently has been capable of mobilising sub-systems and its elites and to absorb them. Largely because of its very openness the Congress organisation at the lower middle levels is an amalgam of caste, communal, linguistic and other groups. Therefore, involvement of the Congress in the local affairs provided participation in the traditional process of according legitimacy to the party as the caretaker of the people.[40]

The Indian experience shows that there is no incompatability between one dominant party regime and genuine parliamentary democracy as speculated by some Western observers. This can be explained through its absorptive and retentive capacity, its non-monolithic character and still greater accommodation and thereby strengthening of the parliamentary system.[41] Congress has effectively performed the role of political accomodation and political integration. Congress has always been a party with a soft-cell organizational frame[42] which is sometimes exaggerated to the extent of the image of a 'mass rally.' It is true that the mass rally image of the Congress has been visible at least since the 1920s; movements, it has also operated through a reasonably institutionalized organization, whose decline and disappearance has recently been highlighted by several observers like Kothari and others.[43] However, 'these observers', as M.P. Singh succinctly observes, 'have failed to look beyond the obvious tendency of personalism and *ad hoc* style of functioning in the party and to appreciate the fact that under the changed circumstances of 1970s and 80's the Congress could have been hampered in effectively adapting itself to rapid transformation in its social milieu had it sought to operate through a formailzed structure. Flexibility would therefore appear to be a functional response to the new context in which the Congress suddenly found itself.'[44]

Besides, in contrast to the Muslim League, the Congress committed itself to a programme of social and economic change in line with the modernization theory. The Congress, thus, provided the new government of India with a programme of action, whereas the policies pursued by the Muslim League in Pakistan, during its first decade of independenee, were thoroughly inimical to social change and national consolidation. The reasons were simple. The Muslim League in pre-independence times was too locked in the fight of partition to develop a social and economic programme of action as did the Indian Congress. Behind these dissimilar objectives was the very different class basis of those who set the tone of the two movements. The Congress

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drew its strength from the urban classes of northern India, the League largely from the wealthy Muslim landlords, who abhorred the reform programme of the Congress.[45]

Thus, the Congress played a double role as a parliamentary party and as a movement of social reconstruction which operated directly among the people outside the parliamentary institution.[46] In this context Nehru maintained, 'The Congress necessarily has to function as an electoral organization, but that is not its only or its most important task....We cannot allow Congress to shrink now into just an electoral organisation.... Our party organization must be something more than a party. It must win confidence and respect by patient and self-sacrificing service, and thus live in the hearts of our people.'[47]

The Congress, which grappled with myriad problems, such as those of social descrimination, economic inequality and poverty, showed its commitment to change the society through legislative action, adopting planning as an instrument of social change. Thus, the Congress Party played the role of a selector of socio-economic issues and as the government became the authoritative mechanism for socio-economic change, through parliament as the method of change. In this context, a lot has been done by populistic arousal of public expectation from the government. For example, *Garibi Hatao* (removal of poverty) became the rallying point, as if expressing the aspirations of the landless labourers, the poor peasants, the middle class employee and the workers. A direct communicative link was established between Indira Gandhi, as the leader of the Congress Party and the common man, through these two words.[48] In sum, *Garibi Hatao* in 1971, 'Government that works' in 1980 and 'clean administration' in 1984 became the catch words and left a magical impact on the masses of the country.

Hence, the Congress wants to be more than a party. However, its socio-economic programme remained diffuse. The leadership realises that the Congress can maintain its aggregate character only if the programme remains vague. This pragmatism of its leaders helps the predominant Congress to make, with relative ease, compromises on populistic slogans policies and tactics.

Another referent of party strength is organizational complexity ; it is revealed by the linkages between the party and socio-economic organizations such as labour unions and peasant associations. In Tunisia, Morocco, Venezuela, India, Israel, Mexico, Jamaica, Peru, Chile and a few other countries such linkages greatly extended the appeal and bolstered the organisation of the major parties.

In sum, the Congress—the oldest party of South Asia—coupled with its nation-wide mass base, experience the three generations under the outstanding leadership of Gandhi and Nehru has much better fitted than any other South Asian political organization to provide a parliamentary

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basis for effective government. Moreover, the Congress as a strong political party displayed the capability to expand participation through the system and thus to pre-empt or to divert anomic or revolutionary political activity. Secondly, it moderated and channeled the path of newly mobilized groups in such a manner as not to disrupt the system. Additionally, a strong party provides the institutionalized organisation and procedures for the assimilation of new groups into the system. Huntington considers the development of such party institutions the pre-requisite for political stability in modern societies.

The foregoing analysis of the successful operation of parliamentary democracy in India and its failure in the neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh shows that, unlike Pakistan and Bangladesh, India has escaped the fate of military rule mainly due to a strong party system and a competent mediating political leadership committed to the social and economic goals which maintained civilian control and kept the tradition of a politically aloof military intact. Pakistan and Bangladesh, on the other hand, suffered from institutional poverty and leadership crisis especially after the departure of Jinnah and Mujib and consequent dearth of well organized political parties to steer the ship of democracy in both the countries respectively. In due course the growth of regional and parochial forces, unconstitutional acts of politicians and open defiance of the norms of democracy encouraged political instability which reduced the effectiveness as well as the legitimacy of the government machinery and facilitated the process of military intervention in the politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

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19 Hamza Alavi in his marxist analysis maintains that post-colonial societies inherit overdeveloped apparatus of state in relation to the structure of the colony and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled. At the moment of independence the weak indigenous bourgeoisie finds itself unable to subordinate the relatively highly developed bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state. Moreover, the bureaucratic military apparatus of the state is able to maintain and even extend its dominant power in society, being freed from direct metropolitan control. By that token it acquires a relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus which has often culminated in an overt seizure of power by it. See Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-colonial Societies : Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* (London), No. 74, July-August 1972, pp. 59-81.

20 Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* n. 9, p. 84.

21 In countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru and Argentina, the military was the country's best organized institution and thus in a better position to give objective expression to the national will than were parties or interest groups. See, John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, 1964), p, 143.

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22 Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, n. 9, p. 408.
23 Ibid, pp. 408-9,
24 Ibid., pp. 409-10.
25 See Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. 1, (London, 1968), p. 259.
26 Ibid., pp. 259 and 314.
27 For an excellent account of Bangladesh party politics see Rounaq Jahan, *Bangladesh Politics : Problems and Issues* (Dacca, 1980), pp. 79-92 and 93-127.
28 For the details of the developments and regression in South Asian party systems see P.C. Mathur, "Origins and Development of Party System in South Asia," in P.C. Mathur and S.P. Verma (*Eds.*), *Domestic Political Science in South Asia* (Jaipur 1985), p. 246.
29 See Rajni Kothari, "The Congress System in India," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV no. 2, December 1964 and his "Congress System Revisited: A Decennial Review," *Asian Survey*, Vol, XIV, No. 12 December 1974, pp. 1035-1101. Also see Morris Jones, "Dominance and Dissent : Their Interrelation in the Indian Party System," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 1, No. 7, August 1966, reproduced in his *Politics Mainly Indian*, n. 8, pp. 213-32 and his *The Government and Politics in India* (London, 1964), p. 153.
30 Morris Jones, *The Government and Politics in India*, n. 29, p. 153.
31 See Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation* (Chicago, 1967).
32 For elaborations see Morris Jones, "Dominance and Dissent : Their Interrelation in the Indian Party System" in his *Politics Mainly Indian*, n. 8, pp. 213-32.
33 Rajni Kothari, "The Congress System in India," n. 29, p. 1162,
34 Ibid
35 Morris Jones, "Pakistan : Post-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh," *The Political Quarterly* (London), Vol. XXXIII, April June 1972, p. 195.
36 For a comprehensive and authoritative account of the nature and functioning of the Congress Party in India see Morris Jones, *The Government and Politics in India* n. 29, p. 148-54 ; Stanley, Kochanek, *The Congress Party of India* (Princeton, 1968); Rajni Kothuri, *Politics in India* (New Delhi, 1970), pp. 152-79) and M. P. Singh, *Split in Predominant Party* (Delhi, 1981).
37 M.P. Singh, Ibid., p. 26.
38. S.J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties : A Behavioural Analysis* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 5-6.
39 M.P. Singh, n. 36, p. 27.
40 Horst Hartmann, *Political Parties in India*, (Meerut, 1982), pp. 49-56.
41 For details see Morris Jones, "Parliament and Dominant Party : Indian Experience," in his *Politics Mainly Indian*, n. 8, pp. 196-212.
42 Morris Jones, "The Indian Congress Party : A Dilemma of Dominance," in his *Politics Mainly Indian*, n, 8, pp. 234-63 and S.R. Mehrotra, "The Early Indian National Congress, 1915-1918 : Ideals, Objectives and Organization," in B.R. Nanda (*Ed.*), *Essays in Modern Indian History* (Delhi, 1980), pp. 42-62.
43 See Rajni Kothari's recent writings in *Seminar*.
44 M.P. Singh, "Whither Indian Party System : A Crisis of Indian Pluralism," a paper presented at a seminar on "Domestic Conflicts in South Asian States : Emerging Trends," South Asian Studies Division, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi, 18-20 October, 1984, pp. 8-9,
45 Gunnar Myrdal, n. 25, pp. 320-25.
46 Horst Hartmann, n. 40, p. 54.
47 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 23 January, 1964.
48 N.L. Madan, *Congress Party and Social Change* (Delhi 1984), pp. 4-6.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN BANGLADESH

THE question of science—its development and application—is of central importance in the context of Bangladesh for the following reasons. First, we argue that modernization of Bangladesh society is to an extent contingent upon the ability to accumulate scientific knowledge and to apply that knowledge to enhance the quality of life for its people. What this entails is the careful application of scientific knowledge in solving the pressing problems which beset this impoverished country. While optimum utilization of scientific knowledge can solve or, at least, alleviate a number of problems, they cannot cure the fundamental problems of social inequality and injustice. Attacking these problems entail a major structural overhauling of Bangladesh society as well as necessary changes in the world system. Yet a strong case can be made on the important role of science, especially, in view of the dire poverty in this country. Proper use of science, that is scientific knowledge, in Bangladesh can make the needed difference between life and death for tens and thousands of people.

Secondly, Bangladesh is entering into the twenty-first century in the sense that the world, to which Bangladesh is an integral part, is entering into a new century based on sophisticated science and high technology. And it can be assumed that in the forseeable future the gap between countries like Bangladesh, in the periphery of the world system, on the one hand and the industrialized core countries on the other is going to widen not only in matters of economic development but also in the use of scientific knowledge and technology. This process is, however, not an historical inevitability. This gap can and must be minimized. We argue that the gap with regard to science can be minimized with less difficulty than, say, with regard to technology in view of the present global knowledge links and institutional networks.

Lastly, proper science planning and careful application of scientific knowledge will also preclude some of the adverse effects of unregulated and unplanned technological growth which often manifest through ecological disasters of various sort in many a Third World society. The very rudimentary level of development in Bangladesh with regard to science and technology can be turned into an advantageous situation The opportunity must be seized on time. And the time is now.

Our main concern in this paper is to highlight the importance of science planning, that is, we emphasize the need for careful and systematic decision making by the government with regard to promotion of scientific

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researches and the application of scientific knowledge in Bangladesh. The process of science planning, however, does not occur in a vacuum; the socio-cultural system under which it takes place must be reckoned with. How far the socio-cultural environment is receptive or unfavourable to science is the main issue that we must address ourselves to. In other words, what we are dealing with here is institutionalization of science, by which we mean, in a broad sense, the incorporation of science in the culture of Bangladesh. We suggest that, there are aspects of culture and society in Bangladesh which often impede the growth of science. In this sense, one may find a certain degree of similarity between Bangladesh and other peripheral countries. In this paper we will examine some of the problems of institutionalizing science in Bangladesh society by exploring the status of scientific thinking and the nature of the scientific community. Finally, we will recommend policies to promote science and a research agenda to explore the cultural and institutional barriers in the way of institutionalizing science in Bangladesh.

The relationship between science and social-structure is complex. At the risk of oversimplification the various existing theories of this relationship can be grouped as follows. First, there is one theory which suggests that, science—and, broadly knowledge—is determined by a given social-structure. Defining social-structure in its broadest sense as the political-economic basis of society, this view asserts that the level of scientific development in a society is contingent upon its material, i.e., economic advancement. This view is rooted in a Marxist epistemology. Secondly, there is another theory which emphasizes the role of scientific knowledge in the development of society. While the former view does not grant science any autonomy and makes it subservient to the socio-economic, or material conditions of society, the latter view grants science a great deal of autonomy. Both these views, however, present a locomotive view of society; in one, the material conditions or the economic forces are the engine of society, in the other, it is science, and broadly knowledge.

There is, however, a third thesis. Stated simply, this view suggests that the relationship between science and social-structure is dialectical. It is the social-structure, the broad politico-economic framework, which, to some extent creates and hosts science. At the same time, science in modern society plays an important part in recreating and reshaping the social-structure. We adhere to this view in this paper.

Since the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in Europe, the dialectical relationship between science and social structure has been clearly evident. The growth of scientific knowledge and its application opened new frontiers and brought about significant changes. Again, changed social circumstances provided the foil under which scientific knowledge could develop and could be utilized. Discovery of new energy sources, new means of communication and transportation, new measuring

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instruments, advances in medicine and agriculture enhanced the material progress in society. The contributions of science and techonology to the industrial revolution and the modernization of the western world is too well known to be recounted in any details here.

SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Societies, in the late twentieth century, are to a large extent dependent on systematic enlargement of scientific knowledge and its application for not only the advancement but also for the maintenance of the existing material progress. In a sense, modern societies are based on scientific knowledge. For the developing countries the need for the utilization of scientific knowledge is further accentuated because their problems are myriad and complex. This is, however, not to suggest that application of scientific knowledge is a cure-all. In the context of the western industrialized countries, the recent discussions of the role and place of science centre around the questions of limits of science and the adverse ecological effects of runaway technological growth. But this need not be construed as a repudiation of scientific norms and the role of scientific knowledge.

We hold that though science is not a panacea for solving all the problems which beset Bangladesh, it is, however, extremely important to recognize the role and importance of science in solving the pressing problems of Bangladesh. It is through systematic planning and careful application of scientific knowledge that Bangladesh can attain its stated national goal of self-sufficiency. We are suggesting that the application of scientific knowledge and a changed perception of science can make significant contribution in modernizing the Bangladesh society. Here we are using the word modernization in a restricted sense. Modernization is a term which eludes precise definition unless put in a specific context. In so far the present day Bangladesh is concerned modernization can be equated with effective solution of the myriad problems this society faces. Modernization in this sense means an improvement in the living conditions of its people. A working consensus can be formed on the point that Bangladesh is faced with a number of major problems : rapid population growth, shortage in food, housing, health-care, schools, to name the pressing ones. Few would disagree that these problems need to be solved or contained with whatever resources – both material and intellectual—available.

A number of plans and programmes are in place to tackle these problems. Nevertheless, an absence of realistic planning, goal-setting and a great deal of inefficiency in the implementation plague these plans and programmes. Modernization in the context of Bangladesh of the 1980s is a process which must address to scientific planning and ensure maximization of efficiency. The question of efficiency becomes more salient especially in view of the fact that there is an acute shortage of resources. With regard to an orga-

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nization, say an industrial organization, the word 'efficiency' implies optimality, maximization of production with efficient use of resources based on effective planning. Input-output analysis can be made to measure the level of efficiency or optimality. But when we suggest that a country is not being run efficiently or particular aspects of the state machinaries or development programmes are not running efficiently we face a giant empirical problem. We suggest that one way of evaluating the efficiency of an organization, say, an agency of the state, is to see if it depends on and utilizes available information and relevant scientific knowledge in setting its goals, priorities and in carrying out its objectives. This evaluating criterion is applicable, we will argue, for not only small-scale organizations but also for large organizations like governments or any agency (or department) of the government.

It would be, however, naive to imply that an efficient administration would take care of all the problems in Bangladesh. But we do suggest that even under the constraints of acute shortage of resources, unfavourable land-population ratio, calamitous natural environment and political uncertainities, an increase in the level of efficiency in every sector will register an improvement. But at the heart of these ideas of 'efficiency' 'planning' use of scientific knowledge, etc., lie the notion of science, more specifically the place of science and scientific thinking in society.

It is not a coincidence that countries regarded as developed, whether capitalist or socialist, are also advanced with regard to the development of sciences. Rapidly industrializing countries like South Korea, Brazil and, to some extent, India have also made significant investments in capital outlays and institutional infrastructures with regard to the development of science and technology. But this relationship is often overlooked, perhaps because it is too obvious to attract serious intellectual attention. We will suggest that there are two additional reasons for this neglect. First, research of this kind broadly falls under 'modernization' research. In the intellectual world, as in the worlds of dress or music, fashions play a certain role. Once it was fashionable to talk about modernization, nation-building and economic development. But in the last fifteen years or so, the modernization paradigm as an explanation of social change has been much discredited. The alternative paradigm of dependency which postulated that the underdevelopment of parts of the world is a result o their dependence on the developed (capitalist) world seemingly provided a more efficacious explanation. Its thesis that the same historical process which created development also accounts for why some countries remain under or un-developed made a lot of sense upto a point. This was specially popular with the Third World intellectuals who began to take into account the extra-national contingencies to understand the dynamics of their own societies. Significant strides were also made methodologically. All these were great. But yet there are issues which

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remain unexplained and sometimes even unaddressed in this paradigm. Why is it that the rate of development varies from one third world country to another while both these countries may be dependent? Why is it that dependent development is taking place in some countries whereas countries like Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Haiti languish in utter poverty?

While global macro studies of the politico-economic forces are useful they can not adequately deal with such micro-issues as the problems of planning, role of science and technology, demographic problems, etc. The emphasis on the exogenous factors, especially economic relationship with the international system, as in the dependency perspective, often creates a diversion for understanding factors internal to a given society.

Secondly, the notion of use of scientific knowledge also raises the question of technology transfer. Again in the last decade or so a lot has been written on the negative consequences of technology transfer. Although many of these arguments are quite convincing a wholesale repudiation of the idea of borrowing technology as well as scientific knowledge is unrealistic.

The recognition of the need for systematic planning and the utilization of science for achieving the objectives of national development has become a global phenomenon. And despite a number of serious constraints in the institutional arrangements of the present world, there are certain favourable conditions within which scientific knowledge can be transferred across the national borders The objectives of rational planning and the utilization of scientific knowledge can however, be achieved only if there is appropriate political will.

Meyer *et al* write :

> Although countries vary in terms of wealth and economic structure, all nations pursue common national economic development goals. Development strategies vary across countries, but every national elite understands that the development process requires rational planning and technically trained personnel. This understanding is reinforced by networks of international loans and aid and widespread state-directed national planning, all of which help perpetuate the present world primacy of scientific knowdge and technical expertise.[1]

The production of scientific knowledge varies from country to country where poor countries are in the role of borrowers of scientific knowledge rather than its producers. In the matters related to application of scientific knowledge similar disparity and assymetrical relationship exists between the countries of the world.

A huge reservoir of accumulated scientific knowledge, the result of centuries of work, is available in the rich countries to be drawn by the poor countries, at least, theoretically. In reality there are several problems in the

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free flow of scientific knowldge. While one part of these problems lies in the tendency of many industrialized countries towards monopolizing scientific knowledge, the other part can be accounted for by the institutional and cultural obstacles in the recipient countries. In this paper we take up this latter problem with special reference to the circumstances in Bangladesh.

PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE IN BANGLADESH

In order for science to take root in a society a number of preconditions, such as economic, political, and cultural infrastructures, are necessary. These infrastructures are historically formed. But since countries like Bangladesh, because of their distinct historical experiences, have failed to foster the growth of a body of scientific knowledge autonomously, careful adoption—not transfer—of scientific knowledge is probably the only way to overcome the predicaments of history. But adoption of scientfic knowledge in a piece-meal fashion will not go a long way in aiding the modernization efforts in Bangladesh ; what is needed is a reorientation of the indigenous culture so as to facilitate the adoption, sustenance and growth of science in Bangladesh. What this entails is, the institutionalization of science in Bangladesh.

Below we will examine some of the obstacles in the institutionalization of science in Bangladesh. But before we proceed any further let us deal with the question : What does institutionalization of science mean ?

According to Muhammad Shahidullah :

> The institutionalization of modern science and technology in non-Western societies is a process of endogenizing those norms, institutions, and modalities of organizations that have greater theoretical validity and empirical relevance for contributions to sustained production and use of scientific knowledge. It is a process largely technical in nature. But it is a sociological process as well.
> The institutionalization of modern science is not just an increase in scientific institutes and an expansion in scientific infrastructures. It is also a process of evolving endogenous "cultural valuation" for science in development, politics, profession, art, literature, and the general organization of social, economic, and cultural orders of modernity.[2]

Institutionalization of science does not simply mean promotion of science education and establishment of research institutions—of course both of these are necessary but they are not sufficient conditions for institutionalization ; it means that the cultural ethos of a society become transformed so as to accomodate the values and norms of science. According to Ben-David, institutionalization involves the following :

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1 The acceptance in a society of a certain activity as an important social function valued for its own sake ;
2 the existence of norms that regulate conduct in the given field of activity in a manner consistent with the realization of its aims and autonomy from other activities ; and finally,
3 some adaptation of social norms of the given society.[3]

The pre-conditions for the institutionalization of science, according to Ben-David, are the recognition of empirical research as a method of inquiry, and the autonomy of science from other ways of knowing. Also important is the development of a set of norms which would govern the professional behaviour of the scientists. In introducing these preconditions in the peripheral countries, we argue that governments can play a crucial role. But the success of the governmental efforts with regard to the development of science in a society, in our opinion, is dependent on the role of the intellectual elites. The institutionalization of science is thus contingent upon the emergence of a community of intellectuals who are oriented towards scientific methods of inquiry and thinking. The formation of scientific culture, a set of norms that govern the activity of this exclusive group also infringes on the larger society and contributes to the transformation of the encompassing culture.

This leads us to ask : What is the nature and status of scientific thinking in Bangladesh ? Science is, in its broadest sense, a consciousness, a state of mind. As Einstein once observed :

> Science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of the human mind, with its freely invented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the wide-world of sense impressions. The only justification for our mental structures is whether and in what way our theories form such a link.[4]

Apart from theories and laws, science is also a point of view, a distinctive mode of looking at both nature and society. A systematic and methodical way of looking at phenomena, science generates its own ground rules, criteria for validity and seeks to generate universally acceptable and useable knowledge. But it must be stressed that it is not the only point of view in a society. The intellectual life of a society is permeated by several thought processes and points of view. The issue is not the exclusion of one for the other but to create a situation where each of these points of view gets recognition on its own merits and these various traditions recognize each others contributions to the enrichment of the cultural life.

One of the features of science development in the west has been the emergence of a community of scientists and a set of ethos and norms

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which govern their activity. In course of time, as the internal social organization of the scientific community became more integrated, the scientists were set apart from, a) the mainstream society and b) other group of intellectuals. This is the process which C.P. Snow depicted in his analysis of the intellectual life of the western world, mainly in Great Britain. About a quarter century ago, Snow was alarmed by the split in the intellectual life of western society into two polar types. At one pole, he observed :

> We have the literary intellectuals, who incidentally while no one was looking took to referring to themselves as "intellectuals" as though there were no others...at the other scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension...sometimes hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding [prevailed]. They have a curious distorted image of each other.[5]

Such a polarization was damaging according to Snow, who wrote, 'The polarisation is sheer loss to us all. To us as people, and to our society. It is at the same time a practical and intellectual and creative loss...'[6] While Snow was lamenting over the gulf between the two cultures, in Bangladesh the problem seems to be the absence of the scientific culture which, at least, existed as an autonomous culture in Snow's England.

The only culture that exists in Bangladesh among the intellectuals is broad-based, liberal-intellectual culture, which is passionate, involved and lacks the detachment and objectivity of a scientific culture. What is, then, scientific culture ? Snow's definition of scientific culture still seems to be valid and worth quoting. According to him :

> The scientific culture really is a culture, not only in an intellectual but also in an anthropological sense. That is, its members need not, and of course often do not, always completely understand each other ; biologists more often than not will have a pretty hazy idea of contemporary physics ; but there are common attitudes, common standards and patterns of behaviour, common approaches and assumptions.[7]

In Bangladesh, it can be said without much hesitation that such a scientific culture is almost absent. Scientists in Bangladesh are bound by particularistic orientations. There is hardly any dialogue between or across disciplinary boundaries. The development of scientific consciousness and more specifically a scientific community steeped in universalistic orientations is almost non-existent in Bangladesh. A host of social, economic, political, and cultural factors in Bangladesh impede this growth.

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If we judge the growth of knowledge production by looking at the publication of books, research monographs and articles, we will find that the bulk of the published materials centre on literature, followed by social sciences. Most of the knowledge thus produced can be classified as intellectual rather than instrumental following the classification of Max Scheler. Max Scheler has classified three types of knowledge : instrumental knowledge (*herrschaftswissen*), intellectual knowledge (*bildungswissen*), and spiritual knowledge (*erlosungswissen*). Elaborating this classification Machlup provides his own which includes : 1 practical knowledge, 2 intellectual knowledge, 3 small-talk and pastime knowledge, 4 spiritual knowledge, and 5 unwanted knowledge.[8]

In Bangladesh there is a cultural bias for spiritual or religious knowledge, In the rural society of Bangladesh a person well-versed in religious tracts is considered as knowledgeable. In the academic setting the emphasis is given on either intellectual knowledge, or trivial knowledge. In the schools and colleges, a great deal of stress is given on rote learning, The high school curricula makes religious education and education of literature—both English and Bengali—compulsory while science subjects are optional. One can get a high school diploma without taking any chemistry, physics or biology courses. This is made possible by a policy of introducing specializations in science, humanities, and commerce from grade nine at high school. It is only a minority of students who choose science and only they get to study the science subjects. The majority of the students choose either humanities or commerce.

There is a great deal of neglect with regard to practical knowledge or instrumental knowledge in the curricula which does not include any courses on agricultural science. This is unfortunate in a country which is predominantly agricultural and rural.

Being a literary intellectual assure a great deal of prestige in society. It is not easy to determine why educated Bangladeshis are so much ennamoured of literature ? (This can be a separate inquiry in itself). How much of it is due to the heritage of a traditional Bengali culture, rich in folk literature, and how much of it is the fruit of British liberal education is difficult to assess. But this passion for literature among Bangladeshis is fascinating. And this is not a problem unless this passion is nurtured at the cost of science. The daily newspapers in Bangladesh carry, at least, a weekly literary supplement while their coverage of news of science and research is minimal. Most of the magazines—weekly/monthly —also devote the lion's share of space to literature. There is very little emphasis on the promotion of scientific knowledge and scientific thinking. Spiritual or religious knowledge is respected both within and outside the academic setting.

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The intellectual elite in Bangladesh can be divided into three groups: 1) the liberal intellectuals, 2) the Marxist intellectuals, and 3) the religiously-inclined or the fundamentalist intellectuals. These groups, diverse as they are in their attitudes and orientations on almost everything, share a common indifference to modern science. This is not to suggest that there are no scientists in Bangladesh. Indeed, there are individual scholars who are deeply concerned with the promotion of science. A number of Bangladeshi scientists, both at home and abroad, have earned a professional reputation. And a civil servant has led a one-man crusade in promoting vernacular science education for which he has earned international recognition. But what is absent in Bangladesh is a scientific community. The scientific community as a self-regulated, integrated community is yet to appear. In Bangladesh, in short, the scientific norms are yet to be developed.

One of the major reasons for the ambivalence of the Bangladesh intellectual elite to science bears on the question of ideology. In a certain sense, any discussion of science in the peripheral countries must deal with the problem of ideology, and such issues as the relationship between ideology and science, and especially the issue of ideology of science. In drawing the distinction between science and ideology, Clifford Geertz wrote :

> Science names the structure of situations in such a way that attitude towards them is one of disinterestedness. Its style is restrained, spare, resolutely analytic : by shunning the semantic devices that most effectively formulate moral sentiment, it seeks to maximize intellectual clarity. But ideology names the structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained towards them is one of commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberately suggestive : by objectifying moral sentiment through the same devices that science shuns, it seeks to motivate action.[9]

This reflects an earlier understanding of science which saw it as dispassionate, non-involved, and neutral. The earlier conception of science is also evident in the observation of Frances Yates :

> The basic difference between the attitude of the magician to the world and the attitude of the scientist to the world is that the former wants to draw the world into himself, whilst the scientist does just the opposite, he externizes and impersonalizes the world.[10]

The earlier generation of writers had a positivistic understanding of science. There are, at least, two major problems with the positivistic and deterministic images of science insofar as the acceptance of science in the peripheral societies is concerned. First, the positivistic image of science situates it in the position of control and domination vis-a-vis

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other systems of thought. This problem is raised not only in the context of the western developed societies but it also has implication for the Third World societies. Both the literary and the religiously inclined intellectuals fear that many of the traditional systems of thought and local knowledge will face extinction in the face of science. Two, the positivistic image of science fails to distinguish between science and technology. This lack of distinction has important implications. A number of writers have forcefully argued against technology transfer and have pointed out its adverse effects on the recipient countries.

In Bangladesh both the Marxist and the liberal intellectual elites share these views and perceive, it may be added, rightly, that wholesale technology transfer is not to the interest of Bangladesh. The arguments levelled against technology transfer are also shared by these intellectuals in Bangladesh and they become suspicious of the political and economic dependence of not only technology but also of science.

The Marxist intellectual elites in Bangladesh view science as an aspect of bourgeois culture, ready to be thrust on the countries in the periphery of the capitalist world including Bangladesh. Their fear is in large part rooted in the positivistic conception of science. The postivistic view of science, however, has undergone considerable changes in recent times. A number of recent writers view science in less deterministic terms. The popularity of various uncertainity principles of science is itself an indication of the changed perception. Science is a product of history and of processes which occurred in time and in place and involved human actors. These actors were not only scientists but also social beings who lived, in the context of the wider societies, beyond the community of scientists. In this sense science is a social activity like other social activities.

The positivistic and absolutist concepts of science have in recent years given way to a less deterministic and relativistic concept. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers argue that traditional science in the Age of the Machine tended to emphasize stability, order, uniformity, and equilibrium. This concept of science which they call 'Newtonianism' 'pictured a world in which every event was determined by initial conditions, that were, at least in principle, determinable with precision. It was a world in which chance played no part, in which all the pieces came together like cogs in cosmic machines.'[11]

Toffler adds that 'what makes the Prigoginian paradigm interesting is that it shifts attention to those aspects of reality that characterize today's' accelerated social change : disorder, instability, diversity, disequilibrium, non linear relationships (in which small inputs can trigger massive consequences), and temporality—a heightened sensitivity to the flows of

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time.'[12] Ilya Prigogine, whose ideas have influenced the Brussels School, eloquently represents the new concept of science.

One of the problems of the earlier conceptualization was to view science as a homogenous activity which was held to be in conflict with ideology or other systems of thought in society. Ravetz has argued that three distinct varieties of science have arisen historically having association with specific interest groups :

> 1 "Pure academic science : " Here science is totally inward-looking, its only offerings to the outside world are general contributions to knowledge and culture, unpredictable technological applications and the example of its endeavour.
> 2 "Ideologically engaged science :" which is considered a bearer of truth and reason, standing against dogma, superstition and oppression, and a weapon in the struggle against a variety of material and spiritual ills. In this sense science becomes a powerful and legitimate and tends to replace former ideologies.
> 3 "Useful Science :" where "the results and methods of science are applied directly to technical and practical problems; and those external tasks provide stimuli, goals and partial justification for scientific work."[13]

But the distinction between pure academic science and the useful science, as we will show below, is not very tenable and should not be pressed too far. What is interesting in the above classification is the recognition of the ideological aspect of science which makes the distinction between science and ideology redundant. In this respect Feyerabend's idea that science is one ideology among many makes a lot of sense.[14]

Nevertheless, Feyerabend's suggestion that science should be separated from state is not applicable to the peripheral countries like Bangladesh. His view represents the liberal view of science which 'sees science as munificiently showering its gifts on mankind when allowed freedom for its own spiritual aims but collapsing into barren torpor if required to serve the needs of society.'[15]

This liberal view in science also elaborated in the writings of J.R. Baker and Michael Polanyi, among others, emerged in response to the view of J.D. Bernal in the 1930s and 1940s. Bernal advocated for a comprehensive reorganization of science to be brought about by both the scientists as well as through government's planning. In Bernal's view such planning would be compatible with freedom of scientific research. For him, 'Science is a gift that demands to be used to the full for the material and cultural benefit of humanity, and...if science is not so used it will itself be the first to suffer.'[16]

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With specific reference to the peripheral societies the image and role of science as suggested by Bernal is most relevant.

What is to be Done ?

In the light of the preceding discussion we come to pose the question : How to modify the existing cultural values so as to make science and scientific values more easily acceptable ? The very idea of changing cultural ethos ostensibly by governmental planning smacks of totalitarianism. But we would argue that the gradual promotion of science education, enhancing research facilities, recognizing the role of science and scientific planning in the development of Bangladesh society will snowball into creating a scientific culture which would undermine the forces which are anti-scientific. But the process will be gradual and the changes will be incremental In order to pave the way for the institutionalization of science in Bangladesh through appropriate science planning the following suggestions may be considered.

First, recognizing that there are literally thousands of opportunities for results beneficial to countries like Bangladesh by research in the physical and biological sciences and the technology based on them, steps should be taken to promote science education at various levels of education and upgrading research facilities.

Emphasis should be given to both production and dessimination of scientific knowledge. Emphasis must be given both to basic research and applied research. The general idea behind the distinction between basic and applied research is that basic research creates basic knowledge, on which practical applicable knowledge may rest but which itself is too general, too broad or too deep, to have direct applications; whereas applied research creates directly applicable knowledge. But in the real world the distinction between basic and applied research often get blurred. Taking that in view the National Science Foundation of the United States has formulated the following definition :

> Research is a systematic, intensive study directed towards fuller knowledge of the subject studied. Research may be either basic or applied. Basic research is directed towards increase of knowledge; it is research where the primary aim of the investigator is a fuller understanding of the subject under study rather than a practical application thereof. Applied research is directed towards practical applications of knowledge.[17]

A good starting point may be a survey of the existing situation. To plan promotion of science, to ensure that science can be used to derive maximum amount of good to the majority of people, we need to know as

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much as possible about the existing status of science, the condition of the scientific institutions, research activities, and of the scientific personnel.

Not only are we in need of knowing the growth of various scientific disciplines, institutions and scientific thinking in Bangladesh, we also need to study the organization of scientific institutions, their decision-making mechanisms, the relationship between science and politics, the motivations, the reward structure of the scientists and the mechanism of implementing scientific knowledge to development activities. The following policies may also be considered as primary steps :

1 Strengthening and upgrading the existing research institutions.
2 Steps are in order to recruit the best available talents for conducting scientific researches. Steps may be taken to attract the Bangladeshi scientists working abroad by creating advanced research facilities in Bangladesh and by providing other incentives.
3 Establishing contact between research scientists and practical problems of development. The research activities must deal with specific developmental problems and the researchers must be assured that their contributions will be properly utilized.
4 Since Bangladesh does not have the capability of conducting scientific researches on all the aspects of development, it is important to promote inter-institutional cooperation within the country and between the countries. Cooperation between the research organizations in Bangladesh and other Third World countries on the one hand and between Bangladesh and western developed countries can be extended. This will build a network of cooperating institutions with active interchange for training, problem-findings, problem-solving and application of research results to practical action. Steps must be taken to promote regional cooperation among scientists and the research institutions.

The following tentative agenda of broad research areas can be suggested, although specific research projects are to be drawn by a team of scientists and the specialists in the field.

1 Resource Surveys :
There is an urgent need in Bangladesh for surveys and studies of its physical and biological resources – its rocks, minerals, soils, subsoil water, rainfall, river flows, fisheries and forests. Most of the data on these are either outdated or incomplete. This information is necessary to base not only development activities but also further researches. In Bangladesh there is no shortage of data, but their reliability is questionable. Steps must be taken to standardize and upgrade data collections.

2 Local Source of Energy :

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Overall economic development of Bangladesh and more specially, rural development is inconceivable without tapping alternative, locally available sources of energy, such as, biogas, and electricity generated by mini-hydraulic projects. Researches in the area of alternative energy sources, conservation, and energy management are needed.

3 Agriculture :

Although in recent years important steps have been taken to direct attention to agricultural research, there is still room for further development. There is a need for cooperation and coordination among the research institutions involved with agricultural research within Bangladesh and between countries in this region.

4 Public Health and Clean Water :

Researches must be undertaken to ensure the quality of drinking water and to find out alternative and local means of water purification.

The area of public health, and health care is neglected in Bangladesh. Studies are in order in the area of epidemiology preventive medicine and indigenous treatments.

5 Food and Nutrition :

Although the establishment of the Institute of Nutritional Sciences is a good beginning, there is still a lot to be done in terms of research in food science and nutrition. There is a colossal ignorance with regard to nutrition in Bangladesh. Local knowledge, especially if it is compatible with scientific findings, should be evaluated and made known to the people. Researches should also be done to validate specific traditional knowledge scientifically.

6 Housing :

Researches must be undertaken to design low-cost housing, flood resistant housing in the coastal areas, etc.

7 Demography :

A number of research organizations are involved in demographic researches but these researches need to be coordinated. In this regard there is room for both regional and international co-operation.

8 Environment :

There is an urgent need for conducting researches on the impact of population on urban growth, industrialization and on the environment. Both short-term and long-term impacts should be studied. In this regard the importance of forestry, reforestation and its impact on climate must be underlined.

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The starting point, however, rests on the political will of the government to undertake the necessary steps in promoting scientific research and science education.

HABIBUL HAQUE KHONDKER*

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* Dr. Khondker is Lecturer Sociology, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ETHNIC POLITICS IN PUNJAB

A Review Article

IN recent years, ethnic political groups based on religion, race, tribe and other cultural markers have acquired greater salience and 'politicised ethnicity' has virtually become a global phenomenon. The problem has long been recognised in socialist countries under the rubric of 'nationality' or 'national question.' The scholars in these countries, however, view the problem through a different conceptual scheme.

The study under review* is based on a Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Delhi University. It deals with one important ethnic political party, the Shiromani Akali Dal. The party in its long history of nearly six and a half decades spearheaded a number of *morchas* (agitations), and a few of the important ones (with a longer life span) may rightly be designated as movements.

Dr. Narang's major concern in the study is to examine the Akali-led 'powerful ascriptive' movement for the demand of a Punjabi-speaking state. The author, in addition, traces the developments that led to the more recent 'Dharam Yudh' *morcha*. This militant agitation, unfortunately, has landed the state into the most serious political turmoil that it has faced ever since partition.

As the author wants to study the 'ascriptive' movements in the context of the nation-building process, he presents (in the introductory chapter) a brief overview of certain Western models of nation-building. On the lines of the criticism of the models by Rajni Kothari and other scholars, he opines that loyalties based on language, religion, region, etc., need not pose a challenge to the process of nation-building. It is also argued that these deterministic models ignore 'the primacy of politics' in the nation-building process. (p. 4)

In order to explain the phenomena of the Akali-led protests and movements, the author has not charted out a clear cut theoretical landscape. The author's theoretical position can be gauged from his cryptic observation that he wishes to examine the Akali Movement (and politics) from beyond the purely religio-political standpoint. It seems, he wishes to take account of the material interests and power urges of the classes and groups who have supported and opposed the Akali Dal's agitation. (pp. 6-7) The incorporation of this line of analysis into an explicit theoretical framework would have added to the worth of this painstaking study.

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* A. S. Narang : *Storm over the Sutlej : The Akali Politics* (Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983), x, 261 p., Rs. 120.

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In Chapter 2, an overview of the changes in Punjab's socio-economic structure from the colonial times to the post-independence period is presented. As to the spread of the Sikh faith, it is pointed out that in view of its egalitarian ethos, it became popular 'with the tillers of land and manual workers', that is, the sections of the society who 'had long been denied opportunities for upward mobility.' (p. 13) The greater incorporation of certain social groups and classes as against others into the Sikh faith, affected the structure of Sikh society. With the concentration of the Sikhs in the Punjabi-speaking region on the Indian side after partition, this facet of the society got reflected in the social demography of the state. In the Punjabi-speaking region—which forms the present Punjab state the older pre-partition rural-urban divide, coupled with the occupational divide, re-emerged and coincided roughly with the non-scheduled caste Hindu and Sikh communities.

The study also examines the impact of the Green Revolution on the agrarian class structure in Punjab since the mid 1960s. In view of its dislocating effects, it has exacerbated social tensions between the landowning Sikh peasantry and the landless agricultural labourers belonging to the scheduled castes. This has involved another unattached group into the vortex of thenic tension through electoral politics. The Sikh peasantry since the late 1960s has increasingly been drawn towards the peasant-dominated Akali Dal, while a large majority of the scheduled caste voters have gone in favour of the Congress. The winning Congress coalition of the Hindu middle clasess, scheduled castes and a small section of the Sikh peasantry after the 1980 Assembly Elections was unable to withstand the powerful ethnic movement which gathered disparate sections of the Sikh society with diverse motives and divergent class interests.

The difficulties of the Punjab Congress in the post-independence period could largely be traced back to its support base, and its ideological image conditioned by its support structure in the colonial period. Chapter 3 of this study traces the development of communal consciousness among the three religious communities and political developments in colonial Punjab.

Punjab, under the colonial regime, witnessed a higher degree of commercialisation of agriculture as compared with other parts of the country (Fox 1984, pp. 466-67). In the first half a century after the British annexation of Punjab, Hindus belonging to the merchant castes, with a sprinkling of the Sikhs, occupied a predominant position in trade, professions and administration. The Muslims and the Sikhs, in western and central Punjab, being predominantly landowners, lagged far behind the Hindu mercantile classes entrenched in the urban monetarised sector. The incorporation of the Punjab economy as an 'agrarian appendix of the British metropolis' led to the indebtedness of the peasantry—the Hindu moneylender being viewed as an oppressor by the peasantry. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the class conflict between the

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peasantry and the finance capitalist and competitive middle class conflict for government jobs went hand in hand with the religious revivalist movements among the three competing communities. The author rightly points out that 'a combination of religious, and more significantly, material fears led to the communal antagonism' between the communities. (p. 40)

Around the turn of the century, the Hindu urban middle classes in the province got attracted towards the Indian National Congress which the colonial regime viewed with serious misgivings. In order to checkmate this vocal section, the Provincial Government tried to cultivate the landed interests through the passage of the Punjab Land Alienation Act 1900 and other policy measures which mainly benefited the Muslim and Sikh landed interests and the Hindu landowners of eastern Punjab. This period also saw the coming into being of Chief Khalsa Diwan, an apex body of the local branches of Singh Sabhas. Till 1919, the Chief Khalsa Diwan, a loyalist body, was the only forum which espoused political claims on behalf of the Sikh community.

The Gurdwara Reform Movement of the 1920s, after a protracted struggle (1920-25), put the two newly formed Sikh bodies, Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Akali Dal, on firm footing. These two organisations laid the institutional and ideological framework of the future Sikh politics. The movement gave rise to new middle class leadership which eclipsed the landed loyalist leadership of the Chief Khalsa Diwan, and helped in politicising the peasantry. Further, this new leadership cooperated with the Congress and this cooperation (with some strains at intervals) continued till 1939. The cooperation between the two parties received a setback, firstly, in view of the ambivalent attitude of the Congress to the 1932 Communal Award which accorded statutory majority to the majority Muslim community in the province, and secondly, the fears of the Akali leaders that the Congress may not protect their community interests on the issue of the demand for Pakistan by the Muslim League. The cooperation between the two parties, however, was again revived after the 1946 provincial elections. As to the relationship between the two parties, the author concludes that the attitude of the Akali leaders 'was based on the adoration of two political deities – Sikh nationalism and Indian nationalism.' (p. 73) It seems to this reviewer that there were conflicting pulls within the Akali Dal : one pro-Congress faction wanted to extend continued cooperation to the Congress, and there was another group whose support was contingent on the protection of Sikh interests. There were also Sikhs in other political formations, especially the secular Marxists, who looked beyond the horizon of the community interests.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with the political developments in the post-independence period that culminated in the formation of a Punjabi-speaking state in late 1966.

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The Congress-Akali Coalition Government that assumed power in the post-independent Punjab represented a coalition of urban Hindu middle classes and rural Sikh peasantry in the Punjabi-speaking region, which more or less coincides with the present day Punjab state.

The partition of the erstwhile Punjab had a differential impact on the two religious communities and the classes and groups within each community. The important section of the urban Sikh middle class, represented by the refugee Sikhs, suffered most as a result of partition. They not only faced competition from the well-entrenched Hindu middle classes in trade and professions, but also feared the erosion of their distinct cultural identity in Hindu-dominated urban locales. This urban middle class, being denied power in the secular political arena, still wielded considerable power in the higher echelons of the two major Sikh bodies, Akali Dal and Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. Through these forums the urban leaders (with rural support) zealously guarded the interests of the whole community. Given the social base of the top Akali leadership in the 1950s, they naturally showed an 'alienated attitude towards the Congress regime' which was not shared by the Sikh peasantry. (p. 82)

The vocal advocacy of their demands by the Akali leaders led to a panicky reaction among the Hindu leadership. The dominant middle class Hindu leaders, by denying their mother tongue, and through manifesting their strong misgivings about the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state provided justification to the Akali leaders that their just demands were being ignored by the majority community—a self-fulfilling prophesy.

As to the genesis of the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state, the author corroborates the views of (Joyce Pettigrew 1978, p. 158) that the movement 'was partially rooted in the concrete situation' of the 'older' urban Sikh middle class whose economic and social situation worsened as a result of partition. (p 108)

Given the ideology of the Akali Dal and the communal stereotypes of the Hindu and Sikh middle classes, the secular and democratic 'Punjabi Suba' demand for linguistic reorganisation of the state, was put forth in religio-political idioms. Elaborating the views of certain Akali ideologues, the author writes : 'Sikhs...are not to be seen, merely as a group of individuals with distinctive traits, but as an indivisible social and political community with historic "theo-political status," whose loyalties to any secular state are qualified and contingent upon the state's adherence to truth and morality.. (p. 121).' As the demand for the 'Punjabi Suba' was strongly advocated by the Akali Dal and supported only by minor leftist parties, it was summarily rejected by the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) on the plea that it 'lacks general support of the people.' The Akali Dal President characterised the Report of the

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SRC on Punjab as a 'decree of Sikh annihilation.' The Punjabi Suba agitation of the Dal was followed by negotiated settlement between the Akali Dal and the Central Government in the form of a Regional Formula, which again led to the merger of the Akali Dal and the ruling Congress in 1956.

The Regional Formula, however, proved to be a shortlived compromise. In 1960, Master Tara Singh after his victory as SGPC President, announced his plans for the launching of the Punjabi Suba Agitation in April 1960. The failure of the Punjabi Suba Agitation of 1960-61 led to the split in the Akali Dal after the 1962 General Elections. The author throws light on the support structure of the majority Dal led by Sant Fateh Singh and the minority wing of veteran Akali leader Master Tara Singh.

The Suba Agitation was revived in 1965 by the dominant Akali Dal of Sant Fateh Singh. The acceptance of the demand by the Central Government is explained in terms of the political crisis and the failure of the Central Government to cope with the mounting economic crisis during this period. (p. 171) Paul Brass, however, explains the acceptance of the demand in terms of certain rules of the game underlying centre-state relations. (Brass 1975, pp 363-65). It seems obvious in retrospect that the political context within which 'rules of the game' operate has increasingly assumed greater salience.

After the linguistic reorganisation of the state, the Sant Akali Dal on the eve of the 1967 General Elections followed a moderate posture on Sikh demands, while the Master Akali Dal wanted a 'Sikh Homeland' within the Indian Union. After the 1967 General Elections, the Sant Akali Dal in association with the two Communist parties, Jana Sangh and the Republican Party formed a United Front Government led by Gurnam Singh. The period 1967-71 witnessed four Akali-led coalition governments (including one minority government led by Lachhman Singh Gill, leader of an Akali splinter group).

The important highlight of this period was the reunion of the two Akali Dals in 1968 after the death of Master Tara Singh. This strengchened the rightist lobby of committed ideologues in the party. The post-1968 period was also marked by a rightward swing in the policies of the Akali Dal. This short spell of power by the Dal was marked by 'a big influx of farmers along with rich transport operators and affluent building contraetors into the Akali Dal.' (p. 185) In the economic sphere the Akali Government favoured a pro-farmer and pro-rural policies. These policies continued during the 1977-79 Akali-Janata Coalition Government. The post-1967 period in the Akali politics, for a time, marked a shift 'from socio-religious to socio-economic issues.' (p. 204)

In the chapter on "Autonomy, Khalistan and Akali Dal," the author traces the Akali autonomy demand to the early 1950s. The demand, however, was taken up in September 1968 after the merger of the two Akali

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Dals when the Dal passed a mildly worded and vague resolution to the effect that 'the Constitution of India should be on a correct federal basis, and the states should have greater autonomy....'

In the period from 1967 to 1980, the mainstream Akali leadership, with a few exceptions, adopted a moderate posture on the state autonomy issue. In view of their experience of leading the coalition governments during the periods 1967-71 and 1977-79, Akalis generally felt bad about the Central interference in the working of the state government in matters of executing developmental projects for lack of adequate funds. At the political level, they alleged 'interference in the very continuance of the Akali Ministry.'

During the same period, there were at work certain Akali leaders and party ideologues who were intensely concerned with protecting the distinct cultural identity of the Sikhs and their glorious traditions. They were also able to indoctrinate through their speeches and prolific writings a group of young men from the urban and rural middle class backgrounds. It is this committed cadre, enjoying the tacit support of certain social forces, that provided a nucleus for the subsequent demand for Khalistan. Some of the patrons of this group earlier had close relations with the Master Tara Singh Akali Dal, which in December 1966 demanded a 'self-determined status' for the Sikhs.

In elaborating the contributory factors for the demand of Khalistan, the author refers to : the naive fears of the Sikhs that because of Delhi's yoke the state economy is heading for stagnation ; Hindu Press' plea to Hindus to declare Hindi as their mother tongue in the 1981 Census ; escalation of some extremist demands by certain Akali leaders to subserve their factional ends; and finally propping up of the Dal Khalsa by the Congress leaders because of the compulsions of electoral politics. (pp. 223-231)

As to the social base of the militant movement, the author provides barely impressionistic information. He writes : '...the Nihangs, Sants and *jathedars* have lapped up the slogan of "Sikhs are a nation" or Khalistan, in order to maintain their octopus-like hold on the Sikh masses....By appealing to the religious sentiments of the Sikh masses and their glorious past, they hope to meet the growing challenge of the educated segments of the community.' (pp. 223-24). To this reviewer this portrayal of the social base of the militant movement seems to be superficial. A deeper analysis would perhaps show that the much maligned poor 'Nihangs, Sants and Jathedars' are being used as cannon fodder by certain social forces who have provided financial support and organisational and ideological underpinnings to this movement. This line of analysis would unravel the role of 'respectable' Hindu and Sikh middle classes in creating the present situation of crisis.

In the treatment of a subject of this nature, it is extremely difficult to avoid partisanship. To this reviewer, Narang fortunately is nearer to the

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other pole. The major lacuna of this informative study is that it lacks a coherent theoretical perspective. One finds a juxtaposition of diverse perspectives— ranging from that of Pettigrew, Brass, to the Marxist one. The result is fuzziness in analysis.

M. S. DHAMI*

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* Dr. Dhami is Reader Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SAMUEL S. KIM : China, the United Nations and World Order. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1979, xviii, p. 581 p.

BOOK under review can be easily considered an excellent work on the Chinese communist diplomacy and role in the United Nations between 1971 and 1976. The first part of the book describes the traditional Chinese and the Maoist images of the world order. The second part (comprising 350 pages) constitutes the analytical core of the book. And the third part is a brief summary.

Depending on UN records and interviews with the United Nations bureaucrats and diplomats, the author has drawn some sober conclusions which deserve attention from the critics as well as the admirers of China.

When the People's Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people, it was feared in the West that the communists would disrupt the functioning of the United Nations. This fear has been proved unwarranted. According to the author, the Chinese diplomacy in the United Nations has come to be regarded as honest, straightforward and credible. After examining the voting behaviour of the Chinese in various bodies of the United Nations, he has found that the Chinese have very often resorted to the practice of 'non-participation' in voting. They have neither objected to consensual voting nor requested for a recorded vote during the period examined. The non-participation in voting has been transformed into an art which signifies both passive opposition and passive cooperation. It also represents a method of expanding the scope of flexibility in a multitateral diplomacy.

The Chinese have participated in the consultative processes in the United Nations in a very passive way, with 'modesty' and 'caution' and without assumig a posture of leadership. They have joined the Asian Group while opting to remain out of the Group of 77. They have declined to accept the Chairmanship of all agencies except the Security Council. The only body in which they have been especially active is the Committee of 24 which is supposed to concern itself with the colonial situations.

According to the author, China does support the Third World in the United Nations. China's support however takes the form of a 'partisan spectator who cheers, moralizes and votes when necessary' rather than of an active player in the game of global politics. Its championship of equal rights for all states provides an enormous morale-boosting against the super-power domination of various agencies. Its refusal to join behind-the-scene consultations among the Big Five is not without significance. In its consultations with the Third World countries, the position taken on various issues is the same as the position taken publicly. This behaviour

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has tended to give credence to its claim that it would never become a super-power. Despite the modest role it plays, it commends respect.

The author has not failed to point out that China has often taken a rigid stand in the United Nations--for example on the question of disarmament. It has assumed a conservative posture towards NATO—a Gaullist rather than a Marxist posture. At the same time it cannot be overlooked that China alone has taken the pledge to the no-first-use (of nuclear weapons) principle. While its competition with the Soviet Union has compelled the latter to curry favour with the Third World countries in the Security Council, the Third World 'consultative pressure' has sometimes compelled China to take compromising postures.

China still does not participate in some UN agencies. The author has given enough evidence to say that it would play a more positive role in the United Nations in future.

Marathawada University, B.E. SHINDE
Aurangabad

KALIM BAHADUR, D.R. GOYAL, C. P. BHAMBHRI AND V.D. CHOPRA: Inside Afghanistan. Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, 147 p., Rs. 70.

BETTER late than never. Such a book should have come out much earlier. It seeks to spell out in perspective the historical inevitability and the logic of the Afghan Revolution of April 1978, which received a shot in the arm by the assumption of leadership of the Party and the Revolutionary Council by Babrak Karmal in December 1979.

Indian scholarship cannot escape the charge that they have neglected their Afghan brethren for so long and so thoroughly, that crucial events in this land which at one time formed part of the great Aryavarta fail to create but mild ripples on their mental surface. We seem to have forgotten that a princess of Gandhara was in times of yore the Queen Empress of India; and then Kanishka and then Akbar held sway over Afghanistan. The Maharaja of Jaipur was at one time the Governor of Kabul. The bonds snapped due to the quirks of history, but does it mean that we should forget our brethren, particularly in their hour of need? So these essays are welcome. They should be read by all sympathisers of Afghanistan and more importantly by those who stand befuddled and befooled by Western propaganda.

As Chopra says in his Introduction, the natural boundary of Afghanistan, according to geographical location, is in the north, the Oxus River; in the south, Baluchistan; in the east, Sind River; in the west,

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Khorasan. In the beginning of the last century, Afghanistan lost many of its border territories to predatory neighbours. Imperialist Britain imposed three wars on Afghanistan during 1838 and 1919 with varying fortunes. The role of King Amanullah to modernise Afghanistan is current history, and the manner in which his downfall was brought about by imperial stooges and feudal vested interests needs to be recalled for the sake of better appreciation of the events in this troubled but resurgent state.

The travails of Afghanistan deepened when USA tried to drag it into its various military alliances and pacts. Afghanistan was the missing link in the SEATO and CENTO, and therefore with the collaboration of Iran and Pakistan, USA sought to pressurise it in many ways. First came the agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and America's Morrison Knudson Company in 1946 for building roads and irrigation systems in Helmand Valley. This work had to be finished by 1949, but the project was deliberately delayed so as to oblige Afghanistan to seek further aid from USA. In the early fifties, American technical experts started directly supervising various projects and when in April 1955, the Afghan Consulate was attacked in Peshawar, which was the main centre from where the foreign trade of Afghanistan was transacted, matters began to fall in shape. But Afghanistan stuck to its policy of non-alignment. It may be noted here that in common with other third world countries, national liberation and democratic forces were being generated in Afghanistan too during this period. They demanded basic socio-economic reforms, democratic rights, constitutional government and abolition of the rule of feudal aristocracy, conservative mullahs and foreign monopolists. Kabul University became the centre of the *avant garde* movements.

As Kalim Bahadur records, some advance was made in the economic field during Mohammad Daud's first regime (1953-1963), but soon political advance was halted. After Daud was removed, a new Constitution was promulgated by King Zahir Shah in 1964. It granted limited rights to the people and an election was held the following year. This opportunity was availed of by the scattered progressive groups to forge unity and organise a Revolutionary Party. Thus came into existence the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which held its first foundation Congress on I January 1965. A Central Committee of 7 full members, including Taraki as General Secretary and Karmal as Secretary was formed.

The PDPA programme declared the building of socialism in Afghanistan as its final goal. It laid down that this would be achieved through the overthrow of the feudal-bureaucratic rule and by ensuring genuine national freedom and social progress. Its immediate objective was the establishment of people's sovereignty, based on the unity of workers, peasants and all national and patriotic forces including the patriotic bourgeosie.

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In the elections that followed Karmal, Nur and Feizan were elected to the Parliament on the PDPA ticket. Interestingly, Taraki and Amin lost the election.

In 1966, having felt the need for a party newspaper for consolidation and further education of the people, the PDPA started the Khalq. In 1967, however, the PDPA split as Taraki and Amin did not approve of the political line of educating the people through organising popular struggles and exposing the feudal and monarchical system. They believed in overthrowing the monarchy through a military *coup* and, therefore, wanted to concentrate on work among the armed forces. Two other factions also appeared, one was the adherent of Maoism, the other was Setem-i-Milli led by Badakhshi, one of the founder members of the Central Committee, who was later executed on the orders of Amin.

In 1973, the Monarchy was overthrown by the King's cousin, General Mohammad Daud. The Communists, particularly those who were in the Army supported Daud. The Daud regime, however, was slow in undertaking the promised reforms. Eventually, Daud began to act according to his class character of a tribal sirdar. He appointed his friends, sons of his friends, psychophants to important positions in the administration. In the external sphere, he exhibited a tilt to the West and the Shah of Iran.

This alienated the progressive elements and the armed forces from Daud, who it appears was under considerable pressure from the CIA as well as Pakistan at this stage. Daud was initially a vociferous advocate of Pakhtunistan, but soon felt obliged to succumb to imperial tactics after the abortive *coup* of July 1975. He agreed to a tripartite arrangement of 'non-conflicting coexistence' with Iran and Pakistan. The dispute about the sharing of waters between Iran and Afghanistan was settled and it was expected that Daud would accept the Durand Line. The idea of an Asian Common Market was mooted and a proposal to build a railway line between Kabul and Tehran *via* Kandhar and Herat was also discussed. However, the most serious development that came to pass was that SAVAK, Shah of Iran's secret police, took over the main instruments of Afghan economy, trade, banking, finance and even administration. About this time, King Zahir Shah paid a visit to Kabul *via* Iran, and it was on the cards that the former Crown Prince Wali Khan would be made a sort of constitutional President, with Daud remaining the Prime Minister and effective Head of the State. Thus ground was being prepared for a military alliance between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran with USA remaining on the sidelines.

It was at this juncture that the Daud apple-cart was upset by the rising of the Afghan people on 27 April 1978. With the declaration of Nur Mohammad Taraki as the first President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on 9 May 1978, this Revolution brought in its wake the end of a long period of succession of tyrants and autocrats and ushered in a

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new era, calling for the participation of popular masses in the implemenattion of political and socio-democratic transformation of Afghan society. Unlike past political upheavals, it was not a mere replacement of one feudal clique by another. Those who now assumed power did not belong to any ruling dynasty or any powerful tribal hierarchy. Power now passed from the representatives of the exploiting classes to the representatives of the exploited and toiling masses.

The essential elements of the programme of the new Government included the end of feudal relationship of production, development of public sector, land reforms, democratic solution of national problems based on the *Jirga* system, emancipation of women, elimination of imperial hegemony, liquidation of illiteracy, promotion of progressive national culture of all nationalities inhabiting the country.

It may be appreciated that the Revolution was not imported from outside. It was the natural outcome of a steadily aggravating political, economic and social crisis,

After the Saur Revolution, as it came to be called, Taraki was elected the President and Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Babrak Karmal was the Vice-President of the Council and also the first Deputy Prime Minister.

One of the most important tasks which the DRA Government undertook was the initiation of land and water reforms. In the industrial field, public sector was separated from the private capitalist system. Usurious credit arrangements between the rural poor and the money-lenders were eliminated and a popular campaign was launched to eradicate illiteracy. A democratic restructuring of the socio-politico-economic life was under way, but soon fissures appeared in the party phalanx which were both the cause and result of deviations, slips and errors. Consequently, the pace of progress was slowed down. In turn, this gave a boost to counter-revolutionary forces to intensify their struggle against the DRA.

According to Kalim Bahadur, a major responsibility for these errors lay with Taraki and Amin, who had in the meanwhile wormed his way into the corridors of power. They purged hundreds of party workers and executed many of them. The harsh measures which they introduced to implement the socio-economic reforms drove large numbers of urban middle classes as well as the urban and rural poor to seek refuge in Pakistan and swell the ranks of the earlier refugees who belonged mainly to the ruling landlord class or were the hangers-on of the monarchical'regime. Many of these credulous refugees were lured by the United States and Pak intelligence agencies and by the right wing Afghan emigre organisations, which were operating from Pak territory, into guerilla groups for carrying on armed insurgency against the revolutionary regime in Kabul. The sectarian policies of Amin against Afghan religious sentiments and institutions provided grist to the

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mill of US-Pak conspiracy against DRA. Thus by December 1979, the threat from outside and insurgency within had assumed a serious magnitude which endangered the very survival of DRA; and the kaleidoscopic events of that fateful month have to be examined in this background.

Relying on the evidence of Shah Mohammed Dost, the DRA Minister of External Affairs, Kalim Bahadur comes to the conclusion that Soviet military assistance was sought by Taraki under the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation which Afghanistan had signed with USSR on 5 December 1978; and that Amin was executed on 26 December 1979, by the decree of the Central Committee of the PDPA, following the verdict of the Revolutionary Tribunal against him. Kalim Bahadur categorically rejects the theory that Karmal returned to Kabul along with Soviet troops on the ground that Karmal was an activist of long standing who had extensive contacts in the city, and therefore, it was possible for him to live clandestinely in the city without being caught by Amin's police until the right moment came.

At any rate, viewed in the perspective of the Western power game over the last two centuries, the kettle has no right to call the pot black. It is for the inhabitants of this geo-political region to pause and ponder how long they shall allow themselves to be the cats-paw in this imperial game, for nature abhors a vacuum, and if the local authority is weak, powerful neighbours shall show their predatory claws unashamedly. It is here that the responsibility of the rulers of South Asian nations is so clear that it can be overlooked only at great peril. This is exactly what happened in Afghanistan in December 1979 when Babrak Karmal took over the leadership of the Party and the Revolutionary Council.

A large number of members of PDPA who were disgusted with the policies of Amin accepted Karmal's leadership, which marks the second phase of the Saur Revolution. The new regime set out to undo the damage done by the Amin Government. Thousands of prisoners unjustly incarcerated by Amin were released; the Government undertook to protect the democratic rights of all classes; it guaranteed reverence to Islam and the religious community, national customs and traditions; it sought to rectify the errors and excesses committed by the Amin regime in carrying out economic and social reforms; most importantly, the *Jirgah* (popular assembly) system was revived with a qualitatively new content, as it was realized that the revolution could not be defended against the onslaughts of reactionary forces abetted by Imperialism, without a strong mass base.

With the passage of time, the Karmal Government has found itself to be in a position to introduce yet another dose of democratic reforms by replacing the hereditary chieftains and feudal lords by duly elected local state organs. A very major step in this direction was the formation of the National Fatherland Front in 1981. The Front includes all the mass

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organisations and leading personalities of Afghanistan. In the words of Karmal, it is a continuation and development of popular *jirgas*. It has played a very important role in stabilizing the revolution.

It is significant to note here that the *Loya Jirgah* of Afghanistan, representing all the tribes, provinces and classes in the country, which met for three days from 23 to 25 April 1985, called upon the people of Afghanistan, especially the 'brave border tribes, who safeguarded throughout history its independence against external aggression, to rise as a monolithic whole and defend its borders from reactionary, imperialist, interventionist aggressors, highway robbers, murderers and bandits exported from abroad.' The *Loya Jirgah* made an appeal to those who had been 'deceived' by the enemy to act against the interests of the Afghan people, to realize as early as possible that this exercise was not only futile but against their own interests and the interests of the Afghan people. They should, therefore, lay down arms and resume a noble and peaceful life. The *Jirgah* appealed to those Afghans who were leading the life of vagabonds in foreign countries, to those who had become 'slaves' of the enemy, contrary to their own wishes and were victims of atrocities by the leaders of the counter-revolution, to return to their motherland by availing themselves of the General Amnesty Decree of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Amongst the forces that make up the threat of counter-revolution, Chopra enumerates the feudal khans, big landlords who held poor peasants and their families in bondage, their henchmen, some of them constituting the legal apparatus, extremely reactionary wing of the clergy, fascist fanatics, members of the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood, gangsters, and of course, many innocent persons belonging to the nomadic tribes living not far from the border with Pakistan, who used to go across during the winter with their flocks of sheep and returned in summer. However, the Afghan Revolution is trying to create a brave new world and is in the vanguard of an anti-feudal, anti-imperialist upsurge in Asia. That is why it has earned the wrath of Western Imperialism and its feudal allies in this region.

As will be seen, these essays not only seek to peep into and tear the veil of cofusion created by interested propaganda about Afganistan, but also guide the thinking of Indian intelligentsia and statesmen, for we too have similar problems and are enmeshed in a similar maze. For ease of understanding, it would have added to the value of the book if it had carried a chronology of events, spanning the last two centuries, accompanied by a few maps marking the pendulum of political ups and downs of the brave Afghan people.

G. B. K. HOOJA

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SURENDRA CHOPRA (*Ed.*) : Sino-Indian Relations. Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1985, viii, 196 p., Rs. 70.

THE anthology edited by Professor Surendra Chopra is a product of a seminar held under the auspices of the Guru Nanak Dev University in March 1983. It seeks to 'provide a fresh look' on the different constraints in the way of normalisation of Sino-Indian relationship. Keeping this objective in view, the various contributors to the volume have sought to examine the entire parameters of the relations between India and China in relatively less emotional terms. Admittedly, their efforts have been made easier by the span of time (over more than two decades) since the two countries fought a border conflict in 1962.

The twelve papers comprising the volume, study the question of Sino-Indian relationship from different vantage points. Making use of his expertise in the field, Professor Mehra gives a lively analytical overview of the border question in his paper : "India's Imperialist Legacy and Chinese Frontier Gains : The Western Sector." Dealing with a related subject, Dr. Sharma submits in his paper, the "Role of Consent in the India-China Border Dispute" that 'China in its conduct has always consistently accepted the boundary as claimed by India.' (p, 47) However, hindsight tends to suggest that in many ways, the complex Sino-India boundary question seems to have been left unclarified. Later events would indicate that the Chinese were waiting for an appropriate time to raise the issue.

The third paper of the anthology is by Dr. Suri who highlights the contrasting negotiating styles of China and India. The author contends that Shri Nehru was impelled by domestic pressures to turn against China. In his view the Indian negotiating style was not only legalistic but also theoretical. The reviewer gets the impression from his paper that India lacked pragmatism in dealing with China. Dr. Suri has come out with a rather oversimplistic generalisation in his treatment of a complex issue.

In the following paper, Dr. Budhraj deals with an important facet of Sino-India relationship—"Moscow and the Sino-Indian Relationship." From the outset the Soviet Union was concerned about the developments on the Sino-Indian border. But after an initial ambivalence, it later voiced full support to India on its border issue with China. Indeed there is a great deal of truth in Budhraj's observation that in the light of closer relationship between Pakistan, China and USA, the Soviet Union attached considerable attention to its Indian connection.

The next paper by Col. Surinder Singh is a brief treatment of the Chinese motives in their conflict with India. In this context he also deals with the impact of this war on India. The author contends that this conflict did much to give a jolt to India's political and military thinking.

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While the author's contention is well taken, it is by now an over-repeated theme.

In his paper on "Atomic Hegemony and the Third World Autonomy," Dr. Pathak takes an overoptimistic view of the likelihood of Sino-Indian nuclear cooperation. His projection is based on China's favourable comments on the Non-alignment Meeting in Delhi in March 1983.

Dr. Brar's essay is an exercise on the prospects of normalisation in Sino-Indian relationship. Spelling out the ideological dimension of the problems, he submits that reconciliation between India and China has started, though it will take another generation to regain the warmth of the pre-1962 era. It would appear that there is a gap between the basic assumptions and the conclusion of his paper.

Dr. Chopra deals with the treatment of Prisoners of War (POW) following the Sino-Indian border conflict in the northern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. In his first paper, the author highlights the Chinese violations of a number of provisions of the Geneva Convention I and III against the Indian POWs. In the second essay, he examines the 'explosive' Sino-India boundary question with reference to the northern sector. In this context, he highlights the Sino-Pak collusion against India.

Dr. Kaur's paper focuses on the 'divergent Sino-Indian perspectives and their approach' to the Afghanistan crisis. She concludes that China is not serious about normalisation of relations with India. The last essay of the anthology by Prof. Balbir Singh studies the international roles of China and India in the context of the Third World.

The anthology under review is thematically well organised. The format as well as the basic theme of the volume have been cogently spelt out by the editor in his brief introductory note. Most of the papers in the anthology are interesting and at times come out with fresh ideas and insights about the state of the Sino-Indian relationship. Admittedly, contentions of some of these papers are fairly well known by now. Nevertheless, they do jointly present an analytical reference frame for handling the complex task of achieving the goal of a mutually beneficial Sino-Indian relationship. But then this is not an easy task ; the matter has been complicated not only by the legal, political and military constraints but also by national psychological hang-ups.

Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi

SHIVAJI GANGULY

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ANURAG GANGAL : New International Economic Order : A Gandhian Perspective. Chanakya Publications, Delhi, 1985, viii, 160 p., Rs. 100.

INTERNATIONAL Economic Order has been the subject of concern among the academics. Consequently a number of volumes have come out focusing on the diverse aspects of the subject. Addition of one more volume perhaps would not have merited the attention of the reviewer but for the fact it makes an endeavour to break fresh ground by looking at the problem from the Gandhian perspective, thereby, making it an important reading for both the students of international economic relations and Gandhian studies. How far the study has successfully contributed in the evolution of Gandhian methodology is a matter of judgement, but the mere fact that it is an effort in that direction deserves appreciation. It is true that Gandhi did not provide a very comprehensive methodology to interpret the global events, therefore it would be unfair and unscientific to look for approval or disapproval of an event purely in terms of his writings. What is needed is to appreciate the underlying logic and spirit behind it. Unfortunately most of the Gandhian scholars neglected this aspect making Gandhi obsolete and irrelevent. The volume under review, defines the prevailing format and has tried to interpret the demand for a new International Economic Order from a Gandhian value premise stressing the primacy of decentralisation and democratisation of both the domestic and global order.

The first section of the study traces the evolution of the prevailing global economic order from the days of the Bretton Woods Agreement and infers that its collapse was 'logical conclusion of inherent incompatibility between its institutions and the post-second world war environment and development throughout the world.' In other words, the study finds that inefficiency and inadequacy of the Bretton Woods order lies in its failure to take cognizance of the emerging global reality and responding to it accordingly. This conservative profile of the world order is explained in terms of the inherent contradiction of the world economy which was based on a power hierarchy underwritten by the strength of one economic power. With the decline in the strength of that economic power and the emergence of new centres of economic strength it was inevitable that old institution felt the stress and strain.

In the second section, the study has tried to enlarge the scope of debate by bringing in the issue of development and modernisation. Questioning the 'catching up' premise of the NIEO demand, the study introduces the Gandhian development model as an alternative to the development crisis faced by the developing world. Dispelling the popular notion of Gandhi being anti-industry, it drives home the point successfully that Gandhi's reservation was against the inappropriate nature of industry and technology. Appropriate industry does not mean an outdated industry. On the contrary it

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underlines the need for correspondence between the base and superstructure. Gandhi was against that industry and technology which leads to the growth of monopolies and creates the poles of prosperity in midst of poverty. By linking the issue of development with the NIEO debate, the study has exposed the fragile nature of its demand package. It raises doubt about the ability of this demand package to resolve the development problems of the Third World even if it is achieved.

Recognising the need to change the world order as it has been impinging on the development process of the Third World adversly through trade-aid linkage, the study emphasises the need for a parrallel change in the domestic order also. The global economy can be changed only if there is strength among the developing countries to withstand the pressure of the dominant powers. This strength cannot be achieved by a fragmented economy. While, on the one hand a developing country will have to look inward for self-reliance, on the other hand, it has to forge links with the co-developing countries within the framework of collective self-reliance. It is only when the developing world would be able to generate a self-generating development process that the global order can be changed from its dependent-dominant nature to enter the dependent world order. However a self-reliant order is based on assumption of peoples participation and decentralisation of the economic power. Gandhian perspective, however is silent on the operationalisation of this transition. Perhaps we would get an answer to our curiosity in the subsequent work of the author.

Centre for West Asian Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

GIRIJESH PANT

V. R. PANCHAMUKHI : Capital Formation and Output in the Third World. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, xvi, 174 p., Rs. 100/$20.

THE author (presently Director, Research and Information Systems for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries) is well-known in academic and governmental circles for his econometric studies. The book under review carries a Foreword by Dr. Sukhomoy Chakravarty; this concludes with a statement that, 'His statistical analysis as well as interpretation need to be widely discussed as the policy-makers need to work out their development strategies on a firmer understanding of the historical experience of the last twenty years.'

The subject matter of the book, the relationship between capital formation and output, has indeed been of great relevance to developing countries.

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Panchamukhi has subjected this to extensive statistical analysis for India during 1960-80, avoiding some of the obvious pitfalls, especially the problems of lags, of disaggregation, and of short cycles. In the treatment of lags, his application of Almon's statistical procedures is stated by Chakravarty as new in its application to India—they have been used side by side with other functional forms in providing precise information about the lag structure of investment. The novelty is in putting the results from Almon's techniques along with the other method to crystalise the ideas underlying the relationship of investment with output. An attempt has also been made to make international comparisons for select developing and developed countries. The bulk of the monograph consists of the econometric work, in 37 tables, on pages 62-165, following the narrative portion.

Capital output ratio is generally regarded as the key parameter in planning models, reflecting the nature of technology and efficiency in resource use. But the empirical and conceptual basis of the relations between capital and output is often stretched too far, drawing inferences which are unwarranted - mainly because of ignoring the various structural elements implied in the relationship A significant breakdown analysed in the work is the separate behaviour of the private and public sector investments and the inter-sectoral relationship between these two broad sectors. It is recognized that these two sectors may not be strictly comparable in view of differences in output structures, investment objectives, etc. Also, a large part of the public sector is essentially meant to provide services, while the private sector is a user, which makes comparisons more difficult.

In Chapter 2, on concepts and methodology—the major concepts have been formulated, especially average and marginal capital output ratios. The structure of lags, gross and net values and decomposition of changes in capital-output ratios. The last named is important and has been recognized so even earlier. Panchamukhi has stated that one of the popular uses to which the analysis of capital-output ratios is put is to draw inferences about the efficiency of resource use. But these could be derived only when components of the changes in those ratios are properly identified. (p. 13)

This is followed with Chapter 3 on "Data: Sources and Limitations." The author has used data on gross and net domestic product, both in the aggregate as also by sectors of origin, and both in current and constant prices ; and also similarly for gross and net capital formation. The major source has been the National Income Account Statistics (of CSO) recognising the cost of these being highly aggregative in regard to the sectoral classification. Then come Chapters 4 and 5 on aggregate and sector analysis and the decomposition of incremental capital output ratios in Chapter 6, and a few international comparisons in Chapter 7 for twelve developing and six developed countries. These chapters serve to highlight the findings of the quite terse econometric analysis and need

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therefore to be considered by the specialist readers in conjunction with the 37 tables.

We may turn to some of the conclusions and qualifications which the author seeks to establish. On the conceptual side, the study questions the wisdom of using the capital-output ratio with or without given gestation-lag, or drawing inferences about efficiency in resource use. Also the changes in the capital-output ratio should be decomposed into the effects of the sectoral composition of the output and changes in the sectoral capital-output ratios. It has been argued that the mere analysis of the growth rate of investment or output may not be adequate for obtaining an insight into the structural characteristics of our economy—it is necessary to consider the year to year fluctuation and the instability of behaviour in regard to capital formation and output. During the 1960's and the 1970's changes in the aggregate capital-output ratio in India have been found to be more due to shifts in the sectoral composition of output and investment in the case of the private sector, whereas they are due to sectoral capital-output ratios in the public sector. The asymmetry in response of the private and public sectors to investment and output activities, is revealed, and this is stated to be a possible factor for imbalances in the economy and failures to achieve plan targets. For international comparisons, it is seen that the estimates of capital-output ratios are sensitive to the period of the gestation-lag assured, and there is no definite pattern of behaviour of the capital-output ratios over time in the case of developing countries.

The work is to be welcomed as an important contribution. We have earlier quoted from the Foreword how the analysis and interpretation need to be widely discussed by policymakers. In some form or the other, however, the relationships between capital formation and output have been current coin for some years, though a broad-spectrum, sophisticated econometric analysis including an extended application of Almon's method is noteworthy. The present effort will perphaps deter facile application of the concept. The author has drawn attention to the highly aggregative nature of the sectoral data he has been compelled to use and also of the relatively unsatisfactory method of deriving the data for the private sector. Such difficulties are often unsurmountable and if they qualify to some unknown degree the findings, this is unavoidable. The generation of an informed awareness of the complex web of factors relating capital formation to output is itself a serviee. The findings of the substitution between consumption and investment, and of the international comparisons remain tentative and the reviewer is generally chary of the latter, in view of the constraints posed by data and differences in the economies in perhaps most of the constituent elements which influence.

Bombay

ARUN K. BANERJI

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INDIA

R.N. KAUL : Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah : A Political Phoenix. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1985, viii, 120 p., Rs. 80.

M.K. TENG : State Government and Politics—Jammu and Kashmir. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1985, viii, 167 p., Rs. 75.

KAUL'S book is a biography of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. Professor R.N. Kaul, a Professor of English Literature and himself a freedom fighter, is quite competent to reflect on the life and times of Sheikh Abdullah.

Kaul traces the tolerance of Kashmiris and their cosmopolitan and secular outlook of life. For centuries, Kashmir has provided a synthesis of various faiths, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. The tradition in Kashmir is, therefore, representative of the true composite culture of India.

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was a modern saint and builder of Kashmir. He had a vision and mind that saw ahead of his times. Religion to him was non-violence and love of all mankind. In spite of the vicissitude of life, he remained a true patriot, a savant, and a torchlight for all Indians who believe in the great composite culture of India.

The world is moving towards interdependence and common living. Cultures are integrating towards oneness of mankind. The synthesis in Kashmir tradition has always provided a beacon light to many, for, it represents the tradition of India, of tolerance and love.

The book traces the beginning of Sheikh Abdullah's political career, his humble origin from his village Soura, his association with anti-colonial movements, his comradeship with other national leaders like Gandhiji, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad and others. Indeed he carried the message of renaissance in India to Kashmir. Other chapters in the book include the developments during 1947 and accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the Delhi Agreement, departure of Sheikh Saheb for a while from the political helm of affairs, his years in wilderness, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and Sheikh's return to power as Chief Minister.

As Mrs. Indira Gandhi paid tribute on the death of Sheikh Abdullah, she said, 'Sheikh Abdullah was a tall Indian, and the tallest of Kashmiris.' This is a fitting tribute to this great son of India for whom the unity and secularism of this great country were dear at heart. He made it his life's mission to achieve these goals. I am sure Indians today remember him very much and continue to imbibe his gospel of peace, non-violence and love of all religions. He belongs to the rich heritage of India. Kashmir has always produced great people in history. Lalded, and Zain-ul-Abadin (Budshah) are some examples. Sheikh Abdullah was a modern Budshah.

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Let us, therefore, carry forward his message for building a strong and secular India.

Addressing the All Jammu and Kashmir State People's Convention in Srinagar in October 1968, which was chaired by Sheikh Saheb, Prof. Jayalal Kaul, the doyen among modern Kashmiri scholars said, Sheikh Saheb has suffered much both from his friends and foes, but he was too big a man to let hate or ill-will impair his vision. This sums up his greatness indeed.

The book is a welcome addition in memory of Sheikh Sahib and should be of much interest to general readers and students of history. Arnold Toy been, the historian, says history is made by great men who work for harmony of mankind. Sheikh Sahib falls in this category. Today there is a great mood in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere to work for economic development, cleaning of environments and harmony of all. This is what Sheikh Sahib would have liked everyone to follow.

In contrast, Teng's study analyses the constitutional aspects of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. He also traces the political developments leading to the adoption of the present constitutional system in this State. The author is professor of political science in Kashmir University. As such, he has provided an excellent analysis.

The book has chapters on Constituent Assembly of India, the basic structure representing relations of States to the Center, the Constituent Units of State Government, and various constitutional amendments and laws applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, it is among the few books which sketch the applicable laws from Central Government to Jammu and Kashmir State in view of the special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. It also provides a commentary on the administrative functioning of State Government.

This book is a contribution to the study of constitutional laws that apply to Jammu and Kashmir. It will be useful to lawyers, administrators, and general readers. The author has attempted study of a somewhat difficult subject and justified his work in good measure. To the student of political science and constitutional laws, it is necessary to know these aspects for day to day administrative procedures. The book has historical interest as well in so far as it traces various landmarks in the constitutional developments of this State under the Constitution of India

New Delhi. S. BHATT

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K.L. TUTEJA : Sikh Politics (1920-40). Vishal Publications, Kurukshetra, 1984, xv, 254 p., Rs. 80.

THE last couple of years have witnessed a mushroom growth of qualitative literature on Sikhs and Sikh religion. Dr. K.L. Tuteja's book ranks considerably high in portraying the so far unscanned aspects of the role of Sikhs during the heyday of India's freedom struggle. The author has meticulously endeavoured to juxtapose various contemporary developments which took place at the beginning of the twentieth century.

His penetrating analysis begins with the historical assessment of the loyalty politics of the Sikhs and the circumstances leading to their disenchantment with the then British authorities in India. As the onset of the 1920s inaugurated the confrontationist politics under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, the Sikhs who had and are in the front ranks in defending the country, also wholeheartedly plunged themselves into the national freedom struggle. It was during this period that the Sikh leadership addressed itself to reforming the gurdwaras as well as provide a new fillip to the freedom struggle.

The author has chronicled very dilligently every minute detail about the struggle launched by the Akali Dal and the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SPGC). It was during the Gurdwara Reform Movement that the Sikhs developed a passion for politics. Though the Gurdwara Reform Movement was religious in nature its anti-British stance provided it the hue of a political movement. Thus religion had become politics and *vice-versa*.

The Sikhs were the second largest minority in the undivided Punjab. During the initial phase of the Gurdwara Reform Movement, the Sikhs could enlist the support of the Hindus. The author contends that the Hindus developed cold feet when the separatist intentions of the Sikhs became apparent. But both Hindus and Sikhs had at least one thing in common—their fear of living under the Muslim domination, so both joined hands. The author has aptly concluded that 'it was an alliance of expediency and not the meeting of hearts.'

The book provides an in-depth assessment of the participation of the Sikhs in the national movement and also unfolds the predicament of the Akalis when the latter's loyalty was torn between national and community interests. It also traces the traumas and turmoils in the political life of the Sikhs and examines how politics in a plural society was effected by the plural loyalties.

The author points out how the attitude of the Sikhs towards the British underwent many a sea-change leading to a clear shift in their outlook. He also examines the Sikh-Hindu, Sikh-Muslim relations as also the Akali-Congress relationship.

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The author has made optimum use of primary sources which add to the academic credence of the book. It is a commendable effort on the part of the author whose contribution has bridged a gap on one of the crucial phases of Sikh history. Despite being a research work, the book is free from the jargons ; and its lucid style is appealing to both serious scholars as well as lay readers.

New Delhi. MADAN LAL

D.K. PALIT : Sentinals of the North East : The Assam Rifles. Palit and Palit, New Delhi, 1984, 344 p., Rs. 150.

SENTINALS of the North East is a fascinating account of the traditions and achievements of the defenders of our northeastern frontier areas, now known as the Assam Rifles. In the course of recounting these, the author has provided the reader with a short historical outline of the region and its people. Assam and Eastern India generally have been integral parts of Ancient India as much as other regions of Bharat. The area was justly famous as *Pragjyotisha* and its capital *Pragjyotishpura*, present day Guwahati, equally famous in the *Mahabharata* period under King Bhagadatta an ally of the *Kauravas*. The region also known as *Kamrup*, has down the ages, continued to be an organic constituent of India. However, in the middle ages, the fertile Assam Valley attracted intruders from across neighbouring Burma and adjoining areas of what is now China.

Over the years all have been assimilated in the complex fabric that is India.

The Mughals repeatedly tried to extend their sway across the Brahmaputra but the fiercely independent people of *Kamrup* repulsed the attacks every time. When the British arrived and started expanding their activities in this country, the Eastern region too succumbed. The so-called tribal areas were isolated from Assam and the separate identity of individual sub-regions emphasised. It was in this historical context that the Cachar Levy, a purely border police force, the forerunners of the Assam Rifles of today, was raised in 1834-35. The role assigned to this gallant but numerically small force by the British rulers of India was to guard the eastern borders of Assam extending south from Nowgong on the Brahmaputra to Silchar. Under this arrangement, the defence of India's border with Burma was assigned to regular army troops who were to be assisted by Bengal's armed police. At the time the Cachar Levy was raised, Nagaland and other parts of Eastern India retained their indepen-

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dence. So did Burma. Shortly after the Levy was raised, the British began penetrating into Naga territory and the process of subduing the frontier people was begun. In keeping with this policy, more para military forces were raised, whose principal task continued to be to watch the frontiers.

The history of the Assam Rifles, how, where and when they were first raised, their operational record, how the force steadily expanded and why and how the officers and men of the forces were utilised as part of regular forces during the First and Second World War, is in fact in broad outline, the history of the Assam and Eastern India generally and of its gallant people. This history has been admirably presented by the author. The work, as the author has mentioned, was based on the force's history spanning almost a century up to 1920 by a British officer, Col Shakespear, and a subsequent elaborate draft by a diligent Indian Officer, Major Brahma Singh. Another Indian Officer, Colonel Commissariat, with long experience with the force and intimate knowledge of the region, had provided valuable source material. The credit for putting these together, supplementing them with material obtained by personal discussions with British officers who had served with the force earlier and bringing out an interesting and valuable history of the force goes to General Palit. As noted by the then Governor of Assam, B.K. Nehru in his Foreword, the author has 'produced a most comprehensive and detailed history of the Regiment bringing the story up-to-date.'

The book ought to be compulsory reading not only for officers and men of the Assam Rifles but also for all officers of our Army, para military forces and administrators serving in the region. In the larger context, it would be of equal value to our academicians and other students of national affairs.

R. RAMA RAO

Birla Institute of Scientific Research,
New Delhi.

DAVID SMITH : Ratnakara's *Haravijaya*—An Introduction to the Sanskrit Court Epic. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1985, vii, 322p., Rs. 200.

SANSKRIT court epic—known as *Mahakavya*—is a precious contribution made by classical Indian poets to world literature. Composed on a grand scale, with a refined ornate style, this branch of Sanskrit literature has received mixed responses depending on different tastes and attitudes of the readers and critics of poems. However, as the literary appreciation of the court epic had to adjust with the scholarly analysis of the

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Sanskrit poetics, the *Mahakavya* seems to remain unexplored in terms of their natural expressions. Besides, apart from being pieces of art, the court epics also reflect various aspects and problems of their ages. However, this reflection is often hindered by the formalistic approach of the poeticians. The book under review aims to provide a comparative perspective of the Sanskrit court epic through its 'free' and sympathetic appreciation. Methodologically, using *Haravijaya* as a basis of his study the author has not only analysed the structure and poetic embellishments of the Sanskrit court epics but has also highlighted their historical, sociological, religious and philosophical dimensions.

Haravijaya (the victory of Shiva) is the largest Sanskrit court epic written by a Kashmiri poet Ratnakara in the ninth century A.D. Its theme is the destruction of the demon Andhaka by Shiva. The book is structured around eleven chapters. The first chapter traces the history of court epics; the second chapter describes the attitude of Sanskrit poetic to *Mahakavya*. The third chapter deals with the role of court in the development of a court epic. In many ways, a court epic fulfilled the idological necessity of a court society and accordingly became beneficial for the king, the poet and the audience. Chapter four presents Ratnakara's own view of his work. The structure of the poem is analysed in chapter five. Chapter six explains the speeches made by *Ganas*, the goblin follower of Shiva.

Chapter seven considers the women in the poem. Chapter eight examines the iconographical and religious significance of the gods and goddesses. The author, in an unconventional way, highlights the 'neutrality' of gods in a court epic. In view of this the structure of a *Mahakavaya* derives its 'decorativeness' from the gods who are 'referred to neutrally.' However, there are places where the verses describe the transcendence of gods that does not call for embellishments. The author of this publication seems to have over-stretched the significance of 'decorativeness' in his analysis of gods in the *Haravijaya*. The symbols and figures of speech used by the poet are examined in two subsequent chapters. In the final chapter, the author's impression of *Haravijaya* are presented.

The basic purpose of the book is 'to gain friends for the *Haravijaya* as a whole.' The author submits that the appreciation of Sanskrit court epic depends on the understanding of its totality. He has considered *Haravijaya* as a typical court epic. However, in the process of showing its parallels in form and substance with other court epics, the author has established the interrelationship of Sanskrit court epics, and thereby offer a generalization of the *Mahakavyas*. To some extent the author has been successful in introducing an informal approach to court epics. However, he has considerably utilized the formalistic principles himself and his evaluation of *Mahakavya* is yet to free itself from the strictures of formality.

The author has given a very exhaustive bibliography. The English translations of the Sanskrit verses are well done but to a Sanskrit scholar they

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appear rather as broad thematic presentations.

The book is a good addition to the ever growing field of the history of Sanskrit literature. Its methodological format is likely to prompt many serious scholars to undertake research on various detailed aspects of Sanskrit court epics. Above all, one is grateful to the author for his keen interest in a rich but neglected branch of Indian literature.

Buddhist Studies Department
Delhi University, Delhi.

SWATI GANGULY

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By **Ashok Jambhekar**

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences).

BHAGWAN, Vishnoo and Vidya BHUSHAN, *World Constitutions*. Sterling. New Delhi, 1984, vi, 727 p, Rs. 29. Paper

Textbook includes constitutions of Great Britain, the United States of America, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia, the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

BHARGAVA, Motilal *Architects of Indian Freedom Struggle*. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1981, 268 p., Illus.

The story of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 presented in the shape of biographical sketches. While describing their character, it highlights their glorious deeds and heroism. Based on rare source material in the form of memoirs, letters and documents.

BOSE, Sudhir Kumar *N.D. Basu's The Motor Vehicles Act*. Edn. 6th. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1984, viii, 870 p., Rs. 110.

First edition published in 1939, contains all the up-to-date amendments, enacted by both Parliament and the State Legislatures.

CHOUDHARI, K.K. *Maharashtra and Indian Freedom Struggle*. (Maharashtra State Silver Jubilee Publication). Director General of Information and Public Relations, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1985 146 p., Illus., n.p., Paper.

Narrates historical role of Maharashtra, in the struggle for freedom beginning from 1857. It presents personalities of Maharashtra and the historic events that took birth in the state. Based on official records and documents.

DAS GUPTA, Jyotirindra *Authority, Priority and Human Development*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981, viii, 118 p., Rs. 55.

Poverty is the bane of poor countries. Inspite of three decades of development, economic development has not succeeded in transforming sub-human survival into a human level of existence in most of these countries. The book addresses itself to this human challenge of development. Political problems of poverty alleviation through internally generated efforts in poor countries are mainly focused in this study. The three aspects examined in it are : the changing perspectives, problems of formulating strategies of action for realizing revised perspectives and how these strategies are actually translated into planned action by political authorities, i.e. by a structure that is broader than formal government. The author has limited his discussion to rural development. Empirical material has been derived from documentary and field interview sources in India, the Philippines and Kenya. Indian experience with regard to developmental action is compared with selected Asian and Afrian cases.

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DE RIENCOURT, Amaury *The Soul of India*. Sterling, New Delhi, 1986. xv, 416 p. Rs. 190.

This is the revised edition (first published in 1961) which brings history of India up to the year 1984. The book is divided into four parts. The first part discusse Harappa and Mohenjodaro Civilizations and the birth and evolution of Indian culture. History of contacts between alien civilizations which brought India into contact with the Middle East and Southeast Asia, then China and the Arab, Persian and Turkish realms is discussed in the second part. Third part dwells on convulsions of India under the onslaught of the West in the last two centuries. Decline of colonial power in India, rise of Congress, freedom struggle, economic problems and revival, growth of Indian Communism and rule of Smt. Indira Gandhi are discussed in in the last chapter. The author, a philosopher of history, has not based his research on recorded facts alone but has taken into account thoughts, emotions and ideas of the human beings who have made history.

DHARMADASANI, M. D. *Antarrashtriya Rajneeti* : *Saiddhantic Adhyayan*. Shalimar Publishing House, Varanasi, 1986, 285 p., Rs. 30, Paper.

Text book in Hindi for the graduate and post graduate students according to the new syllabus,

GOYLE, L.C. *Supreme Court Guide to Words and Phrases*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1986, 143 p., Rs. 48.

The guide covers period from 1950 to 1985 ; references to articles in the Indian Constitution, legislations and cases with citations are provided to facilitate location of meanings.

HARIDASAN, V. *Dr. John Matthai 1886-1959* : *A Biography*. Sunil, Cranganore, 1986, xi, 192 p., Rs. 100.

First full biography highlights — Dr. Matthai's career and his contributions as Chairman of the Tariff Board, Minister of Railways and Transport, Finance Minister, author of the Bombay Plan and Chairman of the Taxation Enquiry Committee. It also contains his opinions in brief on contemporary politics and politicians, particulary Pt. Nehru, Sardar Patel, Rajagopalachari, C.D. Deshmukh, M.A. Jinnah. His writings on economics are also introduced briefly. A commemorative volume released on the occasion of Dr. John Matthai's Birth Centenary Celebrations on 10th January 1986 at Dr. John Matthai Centre, Trichur.

JAGANATHAN *Indian Freedom Movement, Vol. I.* Poet India Publications Pudukkottai, 1985, 180 p., Rs. 13, Paper.

Dramatic literary history upto the formation of Indian National Congress in historical sequence is presented in this volume.

KANDA, Mohan (*Ed.*), *The Tinctured Canvas* : *Concept-Practice and Strategies in Rural Development*. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, viii, 155 p., Rs. 30.

Collection of theme papers, articles, addresses and group recommendations of the seminar organised in July 1978 by Chetana in collaboration with National Institute of Rural Development. Focusses attention on concept of rural development and approach to it, social and economic aspects of rural development, generation and development of relevant technology and the role of voluntary agencies in rural development.

KARAN SINGH *Sadar-i-Riyasat* : *An Autobiography, Vol.* 2 : *1953-1967*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985, xi, 168 p., Rs. 100.

This volume brings the author's life upto 1967 when he became Union Cabinet Minister for Tourism and Civil Aviation at the age of thirty-six. The first volume under the title *Heir Apparent* is already acclaimed as a significant work of contemporary history. The period covered in this volume witnessed many important events,

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viz., Chinese aggression in 1962, India-Pakistan War in 1965, death of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru and Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri rise to power of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, imprisonment of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and the disappearance of the holy relic from the Hazratbal Mosque—an account of which is presented in the volume by the author who is a well-known scholar, philosopher and politician, even beyond the borders of India. He also discusses his inner development and his relationship with his spiritual mentor-the great seer, Sri Krishnaprem.

MARLA, Sarma *Bonded Labour In India : National Survey on The Incidence of Bonded Labour Final Report, January 1981*. Biblia Impex Private Ltd., New Delhi, 1981, xvi, 227 p., Rs. 85.

Findings of survey of agricultural bonded labourers conducted in the states, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. It identifies the magnitude and the extent of the problem on the rural scene and reveals the factual background of the phenomenon which is continuously growing. The report says that the rural political elite of our country is directly responsible for eliminating this social evil and the sincere implementation of the Bonded Labour (System) Abolition Act can only stop violation of human rights of the bonded labourers.

MUKHERJEE, Sakti and Indrani MUKHERJEE, *International Relations*. World Press, Calcutta, 1986, x, 250 p., Rs. 35, Paper.

The book describes the theories of international relations and highlights new trends in international relations such as changes in the forms and techniques of diplomacy, nuclear deterrence and *detente*, strategies of neo-colonialism, and factor inhibiting North-South dialogue. It also describes various regional systems ands foreign policies of major powers and India's relations with them. Serves as a reliable text book.

RAMAMURTHY, K and Govind Narain SRIVASTAVA, *NAM Today*. Indian Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, New Delhi, 1985. ix. 128 p., Rs. 100.

Traces history and activities of Non-aligned Movement. It presents important decisions and resolutions adopted at the Seventh Summit Meeting. Contribution of Mrs, Indira Gandhi to the Movement and Rajiv Gandhi's policy towards it are also discussed.

SHARMA, Piare Lal *Immortality Assassinated: A Tale of Tributes, Tributes and Tributes to our Late Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi*. ISSD Publication, 1985, x. 193 p., Rs. 120.

Collection of tributes paid by India's Parliament, world leaders, leaders of the opposition parties, industrialists, traders, common man, institutions and associations and the Press. It also contains a brief life sketch of Mrs Gandhi, selective quotable quotes and a description of her last rites.

SINGH, Ashok Kumar *Disarmanent and World Peace*. Prakash Book Depot, Bareilly 1985, iii, 138 p., Rs. 45.

The study examines historically the need of disarmament and the efforts made towards achieving it for the progress of mankind. It discusses the role of the United Nations and Super Powers and their reaction to disarmament proposals. The author has also discussed in separate chapters the Indian viewpoint regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and economic and social aspects of disarmament

UPADHYAYA, Anjoo S. *Self-determination in World Politics : Emergence of Bangladesh*. Lokbharati Prakashan, Allahabad, 1984, xii, 140 p., Rs. 110.

Research study presents historical and analytical account of the development and nature of the right of self-determination as a concept and principle. It further discusses its place in the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations Charter

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(Article 1 Para 2) and in the chapter on "International Economic and Social Co-operation" (Article 55), and its interpretation and translation into practice. The author has studied the case of Bangladesh with a view to inquiring whether Bangladesh was entitled, under the existing international norms, to the right of self-determination. It has analysed attitude of India towards this problem and role played by it in the complicated situation and the responses of the international community towards this issue.

VAHIDUDDIN, S. *Muslim Thought in a Changing World* (Khuda Bakhsh Annual Lectures Series, 10). Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1983, iv, 41 p., n. p.

VERMA, D.C. *The Unfinished Revolution : A Treatise on Democratic Decentralization.* National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, x, 227 p., Rs. 75.

The book is on democratic decentralization. The author who is an administrator and academician strongly argues in its favour. He discusses that the Westminster model of constitution has not been useful to bring about reform and meet the challenges of socio-economic development. He suggests that the present parliamentary system which is dominated by the elitist classes should be transformed into the People's Democracy. The author dwells on the problem of creating balance in distribution of powers between the Centre and the States and between the States and statutory bodies at the grass-roots. He has worked out blue-prints of a decentralized polity based on the Gandhian philosophy of grass-roots Democracy.

ZAKIR HUSSAIN *Communal Harmony and the Future of India : The Study of the Role and Thought of Nation Builders for India's Unity 1857-1985.* Prakash Book Depot, Bareilly, 1985, xi, 296 p., Rs. 125.

Based on documents, the study in history of India presents contributions of political leaders and social reformers to the preservation of national unity. The author has dedicated this book, and rightly so, to Mahatma Gandhi and Indira Gandhi who were the apostles of communal harmony, unity and integrity of India. A chapter entitled *Another Sacrifice* underlines her struggle against fanaticism, narrowness and communalism in all their forms. It makes a case that the prominent Hindu and Muslim leaders, belonging to different organisations and ideologies, carried similar views and thoughts regarding unity of India. The author in its concluding part forcefully argues that India has always been harmoniously united and organically integrated.

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

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UNITED NATIONS' ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA : CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS

By SHANTI SADIQ ALI*

The principle of the elimination of racism and racial discrimination, of which **apartheid** *is an institutionalised form, has become one of the cornerstones of the international community's concerns. As the community's watchdog, the United Nations has accorded a high priority to this principle. Article 56 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that 'all members pledge themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55', which includes 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.' Equally, the concern of the international community has been evident in the progressive evolution of the General Assembly's recommendations, resolutions and decisions, of the relevant international instruments, of its policy of sanctions, albeit by no means satisfactory, and the prominence this principle receives in various UN organs and activitives, in particular the programmes undertaken under the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.*

However, the supportive role of the United Nations in the struggle being waged against **apartheid** *within South Africa and Namibia, highly commendable though it is, has unfortunately been considerably weakened by the lack of consensus in dealing with systematic violations of international norms by the Pretoria regime for the maintenance of* **apartheid**, *as well as over the strategies to be adopted to resist this unjust and oppressive system. In the specific context of the present structure of the United Nations, particularly the powers given to the Security Council, these divergencies are found to be major constraints as they have the inevitable impact of impeding enforcement measures. As a consequence today, the continuing gulf between international law and reality threatens the very credibility of the world organisation especially as far as its human rights policies with regard to South Africa are concerned.*

The struggle within the United Nations system against **apartheid**, *inevitably slow moving, nonetheless continues as can be seen from the evolution of measures taken. It will also be seen that the world body, undeterred by persistent disagreements over principle, its interpretation and enforcement, continues to explore possible options in shaping policies to be able to deal*

*Mrs. Sadiq Ali is currently Rapporteur of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

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more effectively with the scourge of **apartheid** *and thereby strengthen the ethical foundations of the international community and a civilised system of peaceful coexistence. The situation, therefore, though highly complicated, is not entirely hopeless. On the contrary there is room for optimism that meaningful consequences will emerge from these efforts of the United Nations to eliminate* **apartheid** *as well as to bring about a qualitative change in and protection of a whole range of human rights.*

APARTHEID : A COLONIAL SITUATION

At the outset it must be stated that over the years the case of South Africa has come to be treated by the United Nations General Assembly, where the international community is optimally represented, as one pertaining to a *de facto* colonial situation, with the whites, who where granted self-rule in 1910, falling in the category of occupants. Here as in territories under colonial rule, it is pointed out, life is increasingly organised to serve the interests of the occupier and society is "penetrated" and administered by the latter. This view has been reinforced since 1969 when the analogy between *apartheid*, 'based on the ruthless demand of human inequality', and colonialism was made implicit in the Lusaka Manifesto on the Liberation of Southern Africa, even though the authors recognised South Africa as a member of the United Nations.[1] The Manifesto, adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations. Even earlier the concept of self-determination had been given substance when the United Nations Charter accepted that due recognition should be given to the promotion of 'fundamental human rights for all men and women, irrespective of race, colour or creed in all nations and in all international relations with one another.'[2] By extension it thus becomes clear that the primary norm safeguarding the people's right to self determination (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960) becomes applicable to South Africa. In this case it is the inalienable right of the South African people, including Africans, who constitute over 70 per cent of the population, to freely determine their own political and social status which the United Nations regards as the most fundamental of human rights, and it is no coincidence that this principle is to be found as the first article of both the major international covenants of 1966.

The international community insists, moreover, that *apartheid* is a violation of these rights not because different policies are pursued for different sections of the population, but because the policies pursued with regard to the black majority are defined and implemented by the white minority and are not based on the desires expressed and promoted by all these groups on the basis of equality. By the same logic the victims of *apartheid*, as other peoples under alien domination, are entitled to contribute to their

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own emancipation and their national liberation movements have therefore been granted observer status as "authentic representative of their peoples" within the United Nations. The international community, it can thus be seen, has recognised *de facto* and *de jure* those who are combating this particularly intolerable system of oppression. Finally the policy of *Bantustans*, entities which are totally dependent on Pretoria in every respect, and intended to perpetuate the racist character, cannot be reconciled with the right of self-determination as they are designed to deprive the African majority of their inalienable rights and to destroy the territorial integrity of the country which the Declaration on Decolonisation insists shall be respected. The "*bantustanisation*" of Namibia further illustrates the colonial character of *apartheid*.

It is true the Western Powers, particularly the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, who exercise the power of veto in the Security Council, have been reluctant to support the otherwise broad consensus achieved in the United Nations on the question of self determination for the African majority in an undivided South Africa.[3] Their stand however exposes them to a glaring contradiction, ironically, on the very struggle for democracy itself, to which they claim to be committed, and which is epitomized in the African demand of "one man, one vote" in an integrated South Africa, but with the ultimate aim 'to replace the present form of state with a radically and fundamentally different form of state.'[4] Secondly, by repudiating universal franchise and supporting instead South Africa's concept of *Bantustan* in a fragmented South Africa, or as Botha, the President, has recently redefined it as a "plural society" (racially, ethnically, culturally, etc.), composed of a variety of "constituencies" of different "minorities;"[5] the Western accommodationist approach appears to be based on the assumption that racial reconciliation between blacks and whites is not possible, while conveniently disregarding the known ethnic differences between *Afrikaner* and English-speaking whites. Whatever the reasons, this kind of approach is diametrically opposed to the principle of non-differentiation enshrined in the United Nations Charter, in the Declaration on Decolonisation (Resolution 2671 (XXV)) and the UN Declaration on All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the General Assembly in 1965.[6] In supporting the White Minority Government of South Africa the Western countries are, moreover, also rejecting their own liberal concept of the "state" which does not simply mean the government and its organs, but encompasses 'that organised community of people who constitute the state' and that of "sovereignty" in the contemporary world which belongs to the people, including the black majority in South Africa. As has been argued, 'as long as the principle of self-determination is violated, there can be no domestic law that gives constitutional rights to the people concerned — if such a law existed the right to self-determination would not be violated.' This right belongs to the

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people because, 'they, the people concerned, are entitled to pursue their economic, social and cultural development.'[7] Clearly, according to the universal interpretation it is the people who are to enjoy sovereignty, not the state organisation. The western position is therefore untenable in terms of international law, as well as morally and ethically. The international community, on its part, rightly considers their policy self-contradictory and thinks they should readjust it. Of some significance and satisfaction is the fact that, unwilling to defy international public opinion beyond a point, no western government has so far formally recognised any of the four "independent" *Bantustans*. The near unanimity in the General Assembly Resolution rejecting the 'acceptance of Independence' by the Transkei *Bantustan* on 26 October 1976 was evident in the impressive majority of 134 votes to none, with the United States alone abstaining.

SELF DETERMINATION : AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Secondly, the General Assembly has underlined that the realization of the right to self-determination in South Africa is not a matter to be dealt with exclusively at the national level but one in which the international community has acquired a positive role and responsibility. This was highlighted in Resolution 2105 (XX) of 1965 which reaffirmed 'the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self determination and independence,' while at the same time inviting all states 'to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial territories.' By 1970, Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted by consensus, went a step further specifying that the peoples 'in their actions against and resistance to (sic)' suppression of their right to self determination 'are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.' Clearly the international community was being called upon to play a supportive and more active role in all colonial situations, including South Africa's policy and practice of *apartheid*, condemned as "a crime against humanity" and where the right of self determination has been violated. As a result, a number of voluntary funds for multilateral assistance to victims of racial discrimination in Southern Africa have been established within the United Nations system, including the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Trust Fund for Publicity Against *Apartheid*, the United Nations Fund for Namibia and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. Here the interational community has recognised the historical facts that few liberation struggles can achieve independence without external support and assistance; the United States of America itself having achieved its own by seeking aid from the French King Louis XV, a monarch known for his autocratic style of functioning.

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LEGITIMACY OF ARMED STRUGGLE

In still another step, the General Assembly Resolutions 2621 (XXV) and 1708 (XXV) 1970 accepted the view of resistance to oppression to include armed struggle, and proclaimed the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movements by all available and appropriate means, including armed struggle. It is not without significance that this action coincided with the fusion of interest of the NATO Powers and South Africa now being extended to the military field, thus laying bare the true character of South African sub-imperialism.[8] The international community was also convinced by now that the opponents of *apartheid* had exhausted all possibility of action by non-violent means — such as the defiance and anti pass campaigns, the school boycott, the increased demand for higher wages — and which had been their professed policy until the Sharpeville massacre where men and women who were peacefully demonstrating were brutally massacred. Nor could the black majority be expected to succeed as the American Civil Rights Movement had done because the latter could appeal to the Constitution and the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Government gave suport to equal rights and desegregation. In South Africa, on the other hand, the constitutional framework and white minority laws, framed exclusively by whites, were based, and continue to be based, on segregation. The non-white majority has thus had to fight under laws which are considered valid under the *apartheid* constitution and all domestic remedies are therefore virtually blocked while brutal repression and indiscriminate killings have continued. For all these reasons '*Apartheid*,' as the UN Secretary General observed, has become a policy which inherently and inevitably leads to violence. It is the end of a self-destroying policy . . . for as long as it is practised, for that long it will be resisted.'[9] In the final analysis the examples of physical violence used by the racist regime being so great, armed resistance was accepted as an act of 'counter-violence.'

Viewed against these harsh realities, the Western insistence to place limitations on resistance and opposition to *apartheid* by expecting its opponents to eschew all forms of violence, when the racist regime and its agents have left little choice of means, has become unacceptable. The liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress of South Africa, feels compelled to keep its options open. Here it may not be out of place to point out that the revolutionary process building up in South Africa is not very dissimilar to the great convulsions of the French Revolution with its demands for the principles of liberty and equality nor to the American War of Independence which was also an expression of a right of resistance. Both the French and Amercian Declarations serve to illustrate their continuing relevance to the South African situation. The American Declaration of Independence, for instance, eloquently states :

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> We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organising its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and Happiness . . But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such a Government, and to provide new guards for their future security.[10]

The French Declaration of 1793 is even more explicit for, Article 35 states: 'When the Government violates the rights of the people, rebellion is for the people and each section of the people, the holiest of rights and the most indispensable of duties.' Rebellion, to France was 'a holy and indefeasible right which is superior to the law.' It proudly proclaimed '...it was through rebellion that we broke our chains in 1789; and it was by such means that tyranny was overthrown in 1792.' People are thus called upon to rebel as a measure of protection; a right that cannot be denied to the oppressed people of South Africa.

In more recent times the United States itself has by no means regarded non-violence as a fetish. In Southern Africa, the Reagan Administration has repealed the Clark Amendment and is now providing overt military aid to UNITA rebels who in reality are not freedom fighters but are carrying out the objectives of South Africa in Angola. Among the measures taken, it is worth mentioning that one Bill provides $ 27 million in US military assistance to the insurgent forces of Jonas Savimbi; another, a similar amount of non-military assistance; the third to prohibit new investment, embargo trade and prohibit loans to Angola.[11] However, as far as South Africa is concerned, the Reagan Administration is reluctant to support similar action. On the contrary, it has provided the racist military and police with aid banned by previous administrations, flagrantly violating the United Nations' arms embargo. Among large sections of the international community these actions understandably have created the impression that the United States Government has different principles for white and black-ruled states. This not only discredits its role, as the leader of the western world, but reveals the glaring contradictions in its own stated policy of peaceful change in the case of white-ruled South Africa. The same contradiction was evident, till recently, in the Western support

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to Pretoria's insistence on making the release of Nelson Mandela conditional on his renunciation of "violence" which, it has been rightly argued in the General Assembly, would be forcing the African National Congress to accept the legitimacy of the entire *apartheid* machinery.

POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE

It is against this scenario and the obstacles presented by the role of South Africa's major western allies that the options available to the United Nations to dismantle *apartheid* by peaceful means need to be considered.

In its efforts to bring about a peaceful change in the legal order of *apartheid* South Africa and influence the behaviour of its white minority rulers, the United Nations, led by the General Assembly, in essence has relied on the application of pressure by various means. It has also conferred legitimacy on the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) to facilitate the process of dialogue and negotiations with the African majority for the restoration of their inalienable rights and full equality. Of late the European Economic Community (EEC) has accorded *de facto* recognition to the ANC implying that it is the true representative of the South African peoples with whom real negotiations must be held,[12] and President Reagan has done the same by explicitly calling for the South African Government to negotiate with black leaders, including Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned leader of the ANC. All these actions thus, have brought about a situation in which the Pretoria racist regime will have to accept the outlawed ANC in any negotiations on majority rule.

Primacy of Sanctions

Furthermore, the General Assembly has insisted, more stridently so after the emergence of the African Group at the United Nations in 1960, that it was not enough to universally condemn the system of *apartheid* but that severe condemnation must have legal and political backing if it is to be anything more than a statement of principle: 'The complete antithesis between the norms of general international law and the system of *apartheid* must lead to action, and this incompatibility must incur sanctions.' The primacy accorded to sanctions as a strategy for peaceful change by the United Nations has achieved some results in isolating South Africa in the political and diplomatic field by excluding it from the World Health Organization, UNESCO and other UN technical and scientific bodies, by rejecting the credentials of its delegation to the General Assembly (Resolution 2863 XXVI, 1974)[13] and by declaring the racist regime illegitimate (Resolution 3411 GXXX, 1975). The politico-psychological elements in these measures are obvious. However, in other respects its record

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on the question of sanctions has been disappointing. The embargo on petroleum products and arms, notwithstanding economic and military assistance, documented in great depth by the UN Special Committee Against *Apartheid*, has shown a steady growth enabling South Africa, in the latter case, to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons. More recently, the Reagan Administration was pressurised by an overwhelming vote in the United States House of Representatives and Republican-controlled Senate to order limited economic sanctions against South Africa on the declaration of a state of emergency in a desperate effort to meet the wave of unrest which has swept the country since 1984. But these, it is recognised, are full of loopholes and regarded more as a codification of existing regulations. They were not designed to put economic pressure on South Africa but as George Shultz, Secretary of State, described, they were intended to 'send a single message on behalf of all Americans.'[14] The response of the EEC member states has been much weaker than the US decision because of the British attitude; the latter has argued that it has a much greater economic and general involvement in South Africa than other members of the Community.[15] Although this reflects a modification, howsoever mild, in the Western stand from their outright opposition to sanctions on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations—a status not enjoyed by the rebel minority regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)—it has not proved effective.

The Western Powers continue to argue about the harmful effects of sanctions, the impact of which, it is pointed out, will be felt entirely by the black community, including the estimated 1.5 million workers from neighbouring Southern African states. In reply, however, it has been shown as far as the latter states are concerned, that the effect of sanctions would involve a relatively marginal additional cost to those already borne by them as a result of South Africa's policy of military and economic destabilisation. The Secretariat of the nine Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) states in a submission to the OAU Summit Conference in 1985, which shows that their own economic development depends on the ending of *apartheid*, puts these costs at more than $ 10,000 m. since 1980, the year of Zimbabwe's independence. That includes 'about $ 2,000 m. in lost economic growth resulting from the knock-on effects of direct and indirect South African action.'[16] The progressive marginalization of the majority of blacks in South Africa as a result of *bantustanisation* has already been amply documented by the Special Committee Against *Apartheid* and several western scholars.[17] It is also recognised that the presence of foreign investors, particularly the role of the Transnational Corporations, has morally and economically encouraged Pretoria's repressive policies and continues to contribute to the exploitation of African labour. Moreover, rather than humanizing the

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apartheid regime, as the Reagan Administration claimed while aggressively launching its policy of "constructive engagement", developments within South Africa and Pretoria's policies in the region reveal that in reality it is the Western Powers who are having to work in subordination to South Africa's aims of "reforming" not eliminating *apartheid* at home and establishing its hegemony in Southern Africa. In the latter case, in both Angola and Zimbabwe,[18] South Africa was able to effectively undermine western policies and the West can still not point to any tangible success in either Angola or Namibia.

However, the General Assembly can do no more than recommend that the Security Council should implement the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter and impose mandatory economic sanctions.[19] As mentioned earlier, the Security Council, inspite of its guarded approach, has on a few occasions heeded the recommendations of the General Assembly as in the case of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo imposed on South Africa in place of the voluntary ones recommended in 1963, 1964 and 1970. This was significantly after liberation movements had demonstrated their capacity to seize power in Southern Africa and nationalist forces within South Africa had begun resorting to increasing militant action. It was the first time that mandatory sanctions had been imposed on a member state and the Western Powers had supported the unanimous decision in determining that 'the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related material constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.' It is true these measures have been marked by undue caution and followed by gross violations ; at the same time they underline the need to keep up and intensify the momentum for mandatory comprehensive sanctions at this turning point in the struggle against *apartheid*.

Role of NGOs

Here the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which have been active in the campaign against racism and instrumental in exposing large-scale violations of human rights in colonialism, racism and apartheid, needs to be maximised. They need to be asked to redouble their efforts to produce evidence and documents that will help increase public awareness and mould public opinion particularly among the people in Western countries, as they did with regard to political prisoners in Southern Africa (1976) and the world-wide campaign for effective sanctions against South Africa (1980). The importance of this strategy of mobilising public opinion in the Western countries needs hardly to be underlined, the precedent of Vietnam being still fresh. The restrictive measures adopted by the United States and the EEC member

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states against the Pretoria Government in 1985, it needs to be reiterated, were also to a large degree a response to domestic pressure, particularly in the United States where a nation-wide campaign for divestments was undertaken. The built in checks and balances in the American system, where Congress can act as a brake on administration policy, furthermore needs to be exploited fully.

Anti-Apartheid Convention

Another interesting possibility perhaps may be found in the International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of *Apartheid*[19] which, according to some international jurists, has provisions to deal with Transnational Corporations and banks collaborating with the *apartheid* regime. Attention, for instance, is drawn to Article 1 (2) of the Convention which includes organizations, institutions and individuals among those liable to commit the crime of *apartheid*, and Article 111, pursuant to which criminal responsibility also covers those who 'directly incite or abet in the commission of the crime of *apartheid*' and which, it is stated, could apply to TNCs operating in South Africa. Under Article IV (b) moreover, the Convention authorises states/parties to adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to prosecute and bring to trial those who committed the crime of *apartheid* 'whether or not such persons reside in the state in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that state or of some other state or are stateless persons.'[20] While progress towards the creation of an International Penal Tribunal, also provided for in the Convention (Article V), has understandably been slow, the above provisions, the view is held among these international jurists, can still have far-reaching consequences as any state party to this Convention may put on trial before a competent national court and punish persons guilty of the crime of *apartheid*. 'No special facts of criminal act are required for this over and above the norms of international law', it is asserted.[21] The Commission on Human Rights has already received a list of 3,708 transnational corporations, banks and international consortia based in 33 states and 227 TNCs which collaborate with South Africa in the military and nuclear fields. It would therefore be logical, the view is held, to include such corporations which breach the arms embargo against South Africa on the list of *apartheid* criminals, just as during World War II the list of major war criminals contained not only individuals but also organisations and corporations. Taking the above precedent, it is further argued that 'in the case of *apartheid* crimes the main emphasis of criminal responsibility of organizations and other organizations, whose participation in the *apartheid* crime is established, may be expropriated in favour of the people or be made liable to pay compensation.'[22] The practical significance of this argument is underlined

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in the fact that 'with the liquidation of the *apartheid* regime the main criminal, the *apartheid* regime, itself disappears', and it will therefore be of great importance '...that a free and independent South Africa is entitled to claim compensation also from the collaborators and organizations and that there exist assets out of which such claims can be satisfied.'[23] A not unrelated development is that the United Nations Council for Namibia, in its capacity as the legal administering authority for the territory until independence, is already examining the feasibility of implementing United Nation Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia by instituting legal proceedings in the courts of some Western and other countries where corporations or individuals have been engaged in economic activities in Namibia and it is now being urged to consider the promulgation of additional decrees and other legislation and to implement them effectively. Thus one of the most promising areas for action by the world community may well be in connection with TNCs.

In conclusion it is clear that the pace and direction of peaceful change within South Africa, under the auspices of the United Nations, can only be brought about by the active cooperation of Pretoria's allies, who control the implementation of enforcement measures in the Security Council. The United Nations experience has however shown that this cooperation has invariably been a response to militant action by nationalist forces challenging the *apartheid* system in combination with sustained pressures by the vast majority in the General Assembly. This strategy needs to be continued with vigour.

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1 The Lusaka Manifesto, while recognising the Republic of South Africa as 'an independent sovereign state and a member of the United Nations', reiterated that it could not compromise on the question of South Africa's *apartheid* policy 'based on the ruthless demand of human inequality' and that 'the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Republic of South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa.' For full text of the statement see *Africa Contemporary Record 1969-70* (London), pp. C41-45.

2 Article 1, Paras 2 and 5.

3 Illustrative of the Western view was *The Guardian* (London) Editorial commenting on President Botha's speech to the Natal National Party Congress on 15 August 1985 when he stated, 'one man, one vote' is non negotiable. The Editorial observed: 'The rejection of one man, one vote is neither new nor an insoluble obstacle to a settlement and could be solved by voluntary partition or involuntary fragmentation.' The United States moreover, by abstaining on the General Assembly Resolution (31/64 (XXXII) rejecting the "acceptance of independence" by Transkei expressed its support for the policy pursued by South Africa.

4 Stated by Justice Rumpff in 1961 during the treason trial of African National Congress (ANC) leaders.

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5 Inerviewed on British TV by Brian Walden, President Botha said, 'We are a country of multi-cultural societies. Everyone of these multi-cultural societies has certain rights — cultural rights, language rights, a way of life that should be protected. In South Africa you do not have a white minority as against a black majority. That is quite a wrong way of looking at things, In South Africa we have a country of different minorities — a white minority and black minorities,' *Financial Mail* (London), 31 May 1985.

6 The Declaration states : 'Any doctrine of differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous and there is no justification for racial discrimination in theory or in practice anywhere.'

7 See Asbjorn Eide *et al*, in "The Right to Oppose Violation of Human Rights : Basis, Conditions and Limitations," in *Violation of Human Rights — Possible Rights of Recourse and Forms of Resistance*, UNESCO, Paris, 1984.

8 See Report of UN Special Committee Against *Apartheid* A/8722 and Add. 1. This Permanent Committee, established in 1962, is responsible for keeping developments in the various aspects of the policy of *apartheid* under review and for reporting on the matter from time to time.

9 Secretary General of the UN in his Opening Address to the Organizaton for African Unity Summit Conference in Port Louis, Mauritius, 2 July 1976.

10 Para 2.

11 Mathew F. McHugh, "Angola and American Interests," *Africa Report* (New York), January-February 1986, p. 9.

12 Jacques Poos, the EEC Chairman and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg met members of the ANC on 10 September 1985 before the EEC meeting to discuss the state of emergency in South Africa. In their statement the EEC Foreign Ministers also called for, among other things, the immediate and unconditional release from jail of Nelson Mandela and other political persons with whom, it said, South Africa must negotiate. This has been followed by other meetings in Lusaka with the ANC.

13 The rejection of the credentials of the South African delegation and the interpretation given by the President of the General Assembly resulted in the exclusion of the South African delegation from the Assembly's debates. Since that time, South Africa, though still a member of the United Nations, has recalled its Permanent Representative and suspended payment of its budgetary contribution. In the United Nations context, suspension is considered a more flexible sanction than expulsion as it preserves the means of action it can apply to a state remaining a member of the organisation.

14 The limited economic sanctions ordered by President Reagan on 9 September 1985 included a ban on new US loans ; new commercial investments in South African business ; imports of *Krugerrand* gold coins ; computer sales and sales of nuclear fuel, equipment and technology. The loophole was obvious in the proviso that all loans were to be banned except those for projects clearly beneficial to all races.

15 At the meeting of the 10 full members of the EEC, alongwith Portugal and Spain, to consider action against South Africa after the declaration of a state of emergency on 10 September 1985, the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Malcolm Rifikind, placed a general reservation on all the restrictive measures proposed by the other nine full members which reportedly would have put a Community-wide embargo on oil exports, military and para military equipment and an end to official support for all cultural and scientific exchanges. These were endorsed by Britain on 25 September. However, even though Britain has accepted the UN arms embargo it is the only European country to continue to have a South African military representation in London. *Financial Times*, 10 and 11 September 1985.

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16 *Africa Economic Digest* (London), 17 Augnst 1985. See also "Report on the Adverse Consequences for the Enjoyment of Human Rights of Political, Military, Economic and other Forms of Assistance Given to the Colonial and Racist Regimes of Southern Africa." Prepared by A.M. Khalifa, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, United Nations, New York 1970.

17 See for instance, Barbara Rogers, *Divide and Rule : South Africa's Bantustans* (London, 1980) ; Randolph Vigne, *The Transkei : South Africa's Tragedy* (London 1969).

18 For instance, contrary to the UN Security Council decision, South Africa sustained the rebel regime in Rhodesia with arms as well as money. In doing so it made a peaceful resolution of the dispute impossible.

19 Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to call on all UN members to cease diplomatic and trade relations with any country which threatens international peace, and in extreme cases can also call for the use of force.

20 The Convention is based on the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.

21 For scope of this Convention see B. Graefrath, "Apartheid : an International Crime," *Information Bulletin*, GDR Committee for Human Rights, No.1/74, p. 3 and UN Doc.E/CN. 4/1366. See also Report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts, *Violation of Human Rights in Southern Africa*, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1984/6.

22 B. Graefrath, "Problems and Responsibility of Reparation for the Crime of Apartheid," *Information Bulletin*, GDR Committee for Human Rights, No. 3/1981 pp. 28-35.

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AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS IN GUJARAT

By JAYANTI K. PATEL*

Indian settlements in Africa are a well-known fact. Studies have been made about their presence and problems. Similarly, there are some African settlements in India. Their presence was first noted by T.H. Esquire as far back as 1926.[1] *However, so far their presence was noted as a novelty or only in Census Reports. Recently some studies about their social and economic activity have been published. There are some African settlements in Gujarat as Gujarat has had a long tradition of trade with the eastern coast of Africa. The total population of these Africans in Gujarat is nearly five thousand; 3000 of them stay in Saurashtra.*[2] *In the Junagadh District of Saurashtra a small hamlet Jambur, ensconced on the fringe of the Gir Forest between the rivers Saraswati and Karkari, is inhabited entirely (population 500) by Africans.*[3] *Other than this the Africans are settled in mixed areas of Broach, Kutch and Ahmedabad district in Gujarat.*

The coming of Africans to Gujarat is shrouded in legends, which may have some historical truth. Also some postulates may be formed on the basis of their religion and social customs. Most significant fact is that Africans in Gujarat are popularly known as *Sidis*, though, sometimes the world *Habasi* is also used. Now, the word *Sidi* is close to the Arabic word *Saiyad*,[4] which would relate their coming with the Arab invaders. The word *Habasi* is related with *Abyssina-Habsinia* which suggests their direct relationship with the African east coast, from where they came with Gujarati traders returning from Africa. A benevolet merchant of Sagra village in Kodinar—near the present Jambur village—is believed to have brought some *Sidis* with him. Some say that the *Sidis* were brought to India as slaves at the end of the seventeenth century.

At that time, there was a convention in the noble families to keep the *Sidis*, brought from Abyssinia and other East African countries, as personal attendents because employment of servants having no local social roots served to provide political security.[5]

ORIGIN OF SETTLEMENTS

One legend asserts that the *Sidis* of Jambur village came with the invading forces of Mahamad Gazni, though some historians question this invasion altogether. It is pointed out that they were the drum-beaters

*Dr. Patel is Professor Political Science at the University School of Social Sciences, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.

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and the mausoleum of their forefathers is known as Baba Nagarchi's Dargah.* Another legend claims that they were the followers of Baba Ghor, who came to India from Kano in Nigeria *via* Abyssinia and Mecca. In the beginning they settled in Rajpipla near Broach and Cambay. Baba Ghor, a merchant, was accompanied by six brothers and three sisters; their names are also famous. He developed the agate trade (a type of precious stone known as *akik* which is freely available around this area). Though the agate trade is as old as the 1st Century BC, Baba Ghor was an expert in carving and making many varieties out of this stone, hence a type of agate beads is known as "Baba Ghori" bead and, a maroon agate-cornelian stone—is known by his sister's name "Mai-Mariam."[7] 'It is also claimed that Baba Ghor was the elder brother of the Nagarsha Pir of Jambur (who had ten brothers and four sisters). Some Writers also attribute the coming of the *Sidis* with the Portuguese.

Looking at their language, it is found that the *Sidis* residing in and around Jambur are known as *Shimali* (Swahili : they seem to have come from North East Africa); they speak pure Gujarati. *Sidis* of other areas in Saurashtra are known as *Tais* and their dialect is an admixture of Gujarati and Hindi, while Africans of Div, known as Swahilis use many words of the Swahili language.[8]

All the *Sidis* of Gujarat follow the Muslim religion. However, there are shades of difference in their customs and three distinct groups are found among them-particularly in Saurashtra.

One group of *Sidis* residing in Saurashtra is considered a scheduled tribe and are given special amenities reserved for such tribes A second group residing in the Div area, known as *Kafaras*, have maintained some of their original characteristics and language. They hardly intermarry with other *Sidis*. The third group consists of the royal *Sidis*. They are the survivors of the *Sidi* State of Jafarabad established by a commander of a fleet of the *Sidi* Chief of Janjira (established during the times of Shivaji). The Jafrabad *Sidis* consider other Africans as inferior to them. There was also a *Sidi* principality in the State of Radhanpur in North Gujarat, one in Sachin near Surat, and even Ahmedabad had a *Sidi* ruler for a short period. They maintain relationships with other, better Muslim, families only.[9]

From this evidence it could be safely concluded that some *Sidis* came as house servants, some came with the invading Muslim Arabs and were in the employ of Nawabs and Sultans and some may have come with the invading armies (Muslim or Portuguese) as mendicants or merchants and settled in Gujarat. This process might have been spread over between the 14th to 17th centuries.

* In the Gujarati language *Nagara* is a drum

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A WELL INTEGRATED COMMUNITY

During this period the Africans have undergone a process of integration; they have accepted many social customs and codes. As Muslims and Hindus in Saurashtra were socially integrated, the *Sidis*, even while following the Muslim religion, practised many Hindu customs. They also followed the practices of *Shrimant* known as *Khole Bharvo*, offering of coconut on many occasions. *mundan* ceremony of a male child, along with circumcision as per Muslim code; and customs of *Pithi*, *Mandap*, *Mameru*, etc., during the marriage ceremony. They have also accepted clan names like Parmar, Makwana, Darbar Shah, etc.[10] 'Some of them have accepted Hindu Gods as their clan Gods.' In the pamphlet published by a journal of the *Sidis* on 3 November 1979, a resolution is quoted which asserts, that the *Sidis* living in Saurashtra and Broach district, who consider Baba Ghor their pir have 'customs and manners different from the other Muslims,' and 'no one except a *Sidi* should be included in the administration of the tomb of Baba Ghor.'[11] Their integration is clear from the terms they use to denote kinship patterns like *Dikro*, *Pikri*, *Gharwali*, *Fua*, *Mama*, *Kaka*, *Bhanej*, *Masar*, *Sadhu*, *Vevai* and so forth.[12] *Sidis* have also evolved a community panchyat to regulate social behaviour. The *Sidi* Panchayat of Jamnagar seems to be well organized as it is administered by some educated people.[13] There is also a Gondal Youth Organization, Bhavnagar Negro Welfare Board, which published *Sidi Samachar Patrika*. In this journal news about the *Sidi* community, new social rules and regulations, information about marriages, death, transfer, educational achievement, etc., is published.

Over the years many *Sidis* have moved into towns and accepted modern ways and living styles. They are hardly different from other Gujaratis except in their ethnogaphic characteristics. To recapture the real vision of *Sidi* life, a visit to village Jambur is necessary. It is a small hamlet of 86 houesholds. Its name suggests that it was established as the hamlet of the royal hunters, as the hunting squad is known as *Jamoor/Jamoori*. They live in mud houses with roofs made of grass or country tiles, their dress is similar to that of other Gujarati villagers. They are engaged in agriculture, forestry. fishing and transport activity. They grow groundnuts. cotton, fodder and other coarse grains. Economically they are poor, their average income per household was Rs. 1639.45 (per capita Rs. 301.27 in 1961), majority of them were in the Rs. 1201 to Rs. 2500 income group.[14] According to Naik and Pandya their average income per household was Rs. 3308 in 1981, and their indebtedness has also increased.

The Jambur *Sidis* follow the Muslim religion; their most revered pirs are Baba Ghor, Nagarchi Baba, Sidi Makbut, Sidi Pyara, Sidi Mmulu, Dariyapir and Mai Parsan (sister of Baba Ghor). Everyday

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in the evening people gather to pay their homage to the pir; an incense stick is burnt and *prasad* distributed, a lamp is lighted and bugles and drums played. At the time of *urs* and every Thursday, the *Sidis* perform their Dhamal dance. It is interesting to note that the songs have Gujarati words. A troupe of 8 to 10 persons dressed in animal skins and printed bodies, wearing headwear of peacok feathers (or other birds), with the rhythm *Madido* (big drum) and *dhamal* (small drum) as well as other musical instruments (e.g. *Shelani, Mai Mishra, Sir Mukta-kassota, Nafir, Mugarman*, etc.) perform this sacred traditional dance. They also observe *Namaz, Id, Mohurrum* and other Muslim festivals and are keen to visit Mecca. Their educational standard is low, even in urban areas9 7.6 per cent females are illiterate and in the rural areas 88 per cent males are illiterate. The percentage of those who had passed the Senior Secondary School is only 1.2 per cent and only one female is there in that group.[15]

From various studies and surveys it seems that the *Sidis* have been integrated in Gujarat life and they maintain hardly any original customs except the *dhamal* dance. Their ethnic features also make them distinctive. In Saurashtra they are considered as scheduled tribes people and given usual facilities, but their economic and educational standards are very low. They have accepted the civilized ways of life. They have also spread all over Gujarat and we find them in most towns and some villages. However they live in closed groups and have preserved their physical characteristics by usually marrying within their own group.

The integration or participation of Africans in the Indian society can be assessed on three different planes —socio-cultural, economic and political.

Complete Socio-Cultural Integration

In the *socio-cultural* sphere the Gujarati language has become their mother tongue, (with some differences like special type of sentences or excessive and frequent use of abuses and foul language both by men and women). They have accepted entirely the customs of the Saurashtra region which comprises an admixture of Hindu and Muslim practices. However, their handshake is of a special type; they rotate their palm and bring the thumb in such a position that the thumbs pressing against each other are in standing position. In *education* they are backward; hardly a dozen of them have reached upto the matriculation level. However in Bhavnagar they are more advanced and the community can boast of four doctors and one graduate. But Bhavnagar is an exception. In Jambur they have started a residential school (*Ashramshala*) since 1974; 144 students (inclding 24 girls) are studying there at present. Ethnically they have maintained their negroid features as tney marry within the group.

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Marriage between *Sidis* and non-*Sidi's* are not accepted; however the *Sidi* Nawab families of Jaffrabad and Surat have marriage relations with other Muslim famiies.

Agricultural Farming Main Occupation

In the *economic* sphere of activity Jambur *Sidis* are largely agricultural farmers, wood-cutters and some have their own land. Some farmers grow cash crops like groundnut but their overall economic position is low. It is alleged that most of them spend their earnings in gambling or playing numbers (*warlimatka*) but they keep away from alcoholic drinks. In Talala town *Sidis* have tried their hand at some other employments like hawking, small trade, drivers, etc., while in Bhavnagar they are employed in the railways and some of them have even clerical jobs The Ratanpur *Sidis* work mostly on agates. Further, as they are included in the Scheduled Tribes, the *Sidis* particularly in the Talala area, look upto governmental help for everything. The effort to start cooperatives has failed so far. Some *Sidis* have their own cattle and are desirous of joining in milk-producers cooperatives, which are largely organized by the non-*Sidis*.

In the rural areas, one can see a powerful and sturdy *Sidi* carrying a huge tree-trunk on his shoulders; even female Sidis carry a 100 kg. head load of wood without any hesitation for a long distance. They are prepared to work at back-breaking jobs. No doubt they are good eaters but their food is simple. It seems that their ignorance, habit of spending on cimema or gambling, as well as absence of proper guidance regarding saving and, low education has kept them poor. They do not think or plan about the future with an eye on development. They prefer to enjoy the fruits of their labour by participating in readily available entertainment, which they enrich with instantly made couplets and vibrating dances. No doubt their living standards have improved but in comparison with their neighbours they are still far behind.

Involvement in Politics Marginal

The Sidis' involvement in *politics* is very marginal. In the Talala area, where they are largely concentrated, their impact on politics is not considerable. They side with the ruling group, as they consider that the rulers will help them. Jambur has a joint panchyat with Madhapur. Jambur *Sidis* have four members in this panchyat. They are actually selected by the *Jamat-elders* of the community. They are elected without any opposition, no one is prepared to file his nomination without the permission of the *Jamat*. There are *Sidi* members in the Taluka Panchayat (Bilalbhai Raju, who is also the President of the cooperative), Bhavnagar

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Sidis are active in political parties and participate in labour unions. *Sidis* have their own youth organisations like *Ratanpur Yuvak Mandal* and *Vadva Sidi Yuvak Mandal* (Husanbhai A. Miyava, Bhavnagar). Abdulbhai A. Nakwa's *Sidi Rastrya Yuvak Mandal's* activity is widespread and members of other communities also practicipate in it. Nakwa is an active member of the Janata Party and is the Organisational Secretary at district level. Bilalbhai Abdullahbhai is the Assistant Chairman in the Loco Branch Bhavnagar, of the Western Railway Employees Union. while Abdulrahman Alarakhabhai is Secretary in the workshop branch of the Mazdoor Sangh. It seems that the Bhavnagar community had the advantage of good leadership of Abdulbin Mubarak, who started the *Sidi Samachar Patrika* (between 1976-1977) with Husenbhai Lobi and others. They are organized; they try to participate in the activities of other communities and strive to improve their status.

From these observations it could be concluded that *Sidis* have accepted the language and the customs of their area but their participation in the economy is peripheral while their political participation is marginal. But for all purposes they have become Indians.

INDIAN POLICY

It seems that the policy towards these African groups can have two dimensions.

1. Considering them as an internal social group, induct them in the mainstream of the Indian social milieu. As such, they have no different language or religion and their social customs are largely Indian. Hence, on their part they have tried to merge with the mainstream. Some of them have their own farms and are active in transport or other professions. However, they have distinct racial features and they are not socially accepted. In Saurashtra they are categorized as Scheduled Tribes and given the relevant advantages. But in other parts of Gujarat they do not get this advantage. Even otherwise in Saurashtra and Gujarat their education level is low and their overall economic position weak. It is required that they should be provided more facilities for education: the present *Ashramshala* at Jambur should be developed to provide higher education and basic training type courses which would make them self-reliant.

This group and their leaders have been organizing cooperatives but they fail without proper guidance and help. It is necessary to link their efforts wiih the Sarvodaya unit in this area, which could provide tnem proper guidence. It is possible that their linking with the Sarvodaya Movement will bring about a change in their attitude towards saving and thrift, and sensible use of resourees may improve their position.

The Indian Government has prepared two Census Reports, one on "*The Sidis*" and the other on "Jambur Village" giving a wealth of

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information on the socio-economic and cultural life of these people. Some video tapes of their dance and music are also prepared. These could be displayed in national programmes and widely publicized.

2. Another dimension is related with the projection of this group in developing our relations with African people. Publicity of this group's existence, well being and promotion of their cultural activity could help us in establishing a bridge with the African people. Very few know that India also has an African population and they are comfortably accommodated in the national life. Further this group may be allowed to develop exchange of visits to and from Africa. Thus, establishing people to people contact between the Indian and African people could open a new vista of socio-cultural understauding and strengthen the ties between the two.

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4 It is interesting to note that the world famous mosque of Ahmedabad, having a traceried window, is known as the mosque of Sidi Saiyad. According to the *Oxford Dictionary, Sidi* is equivalent to *Saiyed* a title of honour and respect similar to that of prince.

5 T.B. Naik and G.P. Pandya, n.2, p 7. Also, Vimal Shah, *Gujaratna Adivasio*, (Ahmedabad), observes that *Sidis* were brought by Britishers for the akik industry. M.C. Borer, *A Short History of the People of Africa*, (1962), p. 102, believes that the Portuguese brought them to India. Ramlal Parikh in *Gujarat ek Parichaya* (Ahmedabad, 1961), p. 160, says that they were purchased by the Nawab of Junagadh from the Portuguese.

Laxmikant Shrikant in *Congress Patrika* (Ahmedabad), September 1965, says that, Indian traders while returning from Africa brought them

See also D K. Kawa, *Jamburna Siddio-Ek Adhyayan*. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, School of Social Sciences, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad 1967.

6 'The Rajpipla Mines came to be known as the Baba Ghori Hills and his sisters' names became brand names for certain varieties of agate goods.' M.J. Mehta, *Agate Industry of Cambay in Mediaeval Times* (Mimeo), Ahmedabad. The village where Baba Ghor settled is also known as Ratanpur (the town of Gems).

7 *Census of India 1961* n. 3, p. 6

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APPENDIX-I

DISTRIBUTION OF *SIDI* POPULATION IN GUJARAT

District	*Taluka*	*Rural*	*Urban*	*Total*
Ahmedabad	Ahmedabad City	—	150	150
Amerili	Rajula	104	—	104
	Kodinar	84	17	101
Jamanagar	Jamnagar	23	345	368
	Kalyanpur	99	—	99
Junagadh	Junagadh	8	90	88
	Talala	2014	533	2547
	Veraval	100	53	133
	Una	163	7	170
Rajkot	Rajkot	—	96	96
	Gondal	—	206	206
Bhavnagar	Bhavnagar City	—	150	150*
Broach	Ratanpur	100	—	100*

Source : T.B. Naik and G.P. Pandya, *The Sidis of Gujarat : A Socio-Economic Study and Development Plan*, Mimeo, Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad.

*Approximate population based on field observation.

Note : Princely States of *Sidi* Nawab : Sachin, Jafrabad.
In Ahmedabad, *Sidi* Zulfikarshah ruled as Sultan for a short period.

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RATIONALISING INDIA-AFRICA ECONOMIC RELATIONS : THE ROLE OF PRODUCTION COOPERATION

By R. R. RAMCHANDANI*

A group of Indian parliamentarians, cutting across party lines, organised on 24-25 July 1986 a two-day national seminar on "Parliamentarians Action for Removal of **Apartheid.**" *The seminar constituted yet another milestone in underscoring India's unflinching commitment to stand firmly united with the African countries in their fight against the pernicious system of* **apartheid** *and the removal of the remaining remnants of colonialism that still persist in parts of Southern Africa. It is because of India's principled stand and considerable sacrifice in this respect, and the unwavering appreciation of that stand by the African leadership, that ever since their independence India and African countries have forged the most cordial and constructive political ties. Apart from sharing common ideals of the Non-aligned Movement, they have often expressed common concern on crucial world issues such as peace moves and nuclear disarmament, security and development issues, "South-South" cooperation and the establishment of the New International Economic Order. But, despite close political understanding, their economic relations have yet to develop sufficient depth to register a sustained forward thrust to record a lasting impact on the global production structure. India's trade with African states, for instance, has shown an uneven pattern for the last two decades and a half, and depicted a falling trend in recent years.*

THE major thrust of this article is to critically examine the *modus operandi* of India-Africa economic relations in the 1960's and the 1970's to see whether some dent has been made on the earlier colonial framework, and whether the recent trading trends constituted a forewarning of an uneasy pattern of economic relationship in the years to come. The crux of the problem is to identify a crucial rationalising element to place Indo-African economic relations on a firmer foundation. It is in this context that the role of "production cooperation" as a major agent of growth-promoting sustained economic relations at an inter-regional level, with a view to developing an autonomous capacity at the Third World level is signified.

It is true that we cannot ignore diversities in African economies, in terms of the conflicting ideological orientations of some countries, variation in their resource availability and factor endowment, limitation

* Dr. Ramchandani is Professor and Head of the Centre of East African Studies, University of Bombay, Bombay.

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of their national market size, national income and technological capabilities, etc. Such factors certainly remind us of the specificities of individual African economies and highlight the significance of bilateral dealings. All the same, we would attempt to identify a plausible plank providing a sustainable bridgehead for promoting such relations at both the bilateral as well as at the inter-regional levels. Moreover, as a mutually beneficial exercise, the pattern of such relations has to be free from the earlier colonial underpinnings traceable to warped patterns of colonial development.

In an India-Africa trade related study,[1] it has been shown that if India and the African countries were to highlight the function of trade expansion among themselves in the context of "South-South" Cooperation, it was time for them to look beyond trade and explore a much wider economic and technical cooperation frame of reference. Moreover, so far such relations were largely conducted on a bilateral, country to country basis. But a new dimension has been added to this situation in recent years with the formation of intra-regional African groupings such as the Economic Community of 16 West African States (ECOWAS), Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of 18 Eastern and Southern African states, and the relatively better coordinated Southern African Development Coordination Conference of nine Southern African States.[2] The development strategy for Africa as outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action, unanimously adopted by the African Heads of States at Lagos in April 1980, also adds further weight to intra-regional and inter-regional elements in promoting "collective self-reliance."[3]

INDIA-AFRICA TRADING TRENDS

Table I relates to India's trade with Africa from 1960-61 to 1983-84. The table reveals that although India's trade with Africa in this period never rose beyond 10 per cent, it was still relatively better placed in the 1960's when its exports to African countries rose from around Rs. 50 crores, i.e. 7.7 per cent in 1960-61, to around Rs. 139 crores, i.e. 9 per cent of its total world exports in 1970-71. In the same period its imports from African countries also rose from around Rs. 73 crores, i.e. 6.8 per cent, to around Rs. 170 crores, i.e. 10.44 per cent of India's total imports of around Rs. 1,600 crores. Throughout the 1960's, the balance of trade was in favour of Africa as a whole.

In the following decade—the 1970's—although India's exports to African countries rose in value terms by more than 300 per cent, and imports from Africa also rose by more than 50 per cent, yet in percentage terms there was some decline. India's exports to Africa in this period, declined by some 33 per cent, from 9 per cent to 6.5 per cent ; and its imports by around 80 per cent, from 10.5 per cent to a meagre 2.13 per cent. However, the balance of trade now distinctly moved in favour of India.

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By 1983-84 India's trade with Africa further declined. Its exports dropped by another 45 per cent and imports by 20 per cent. The balance of trade also by then tilted slightly in favour of Africa by some Rs. 50 crores.

TABLE I

India's Trade with Africa (Balance of Trade)

(*Value in Rs. crores*)

Year	*Exports*			*Imports*			*Balance of Trade*	
	World	*Africa*	%	*World*	*Africa*	%	*World*	*Africa*
1960-61	633.91	49.01	7.73	1070.15	72.82	6.80	— 436.24	— 23.81
1970-71	1524.39	139.16	9.06	1625.17	169.82	10.44	— 100.78	— 31.65
1975-76	3941.61	269.98	6.84	5264.77	112.86	2.14	—1323.16	+156.18
1980-81	6708.84	435.15	6.48	12434.58	265.39	2.13	—5725.74	+169.77
1981-82	7796.18	473.93	6.07	13588.71	418.12	3.07	—5792.53	+ 55.81
1982-83	8907.75	409.73	4.59	14355.76	197.30	1.37	—5448.01	+212.43
1983-84	9865.30	371.04	3.76	15762.95	421.76	2.67	—5897.65	— 50.72

Source : DGCIS, Calcutta, *Monthiy Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India*, various issues from 1960-61 to 1981-82. 2; Ministry of Commerce, *Annual Report 1984-85*, Government of India, New Delhi.

However, the decline in India's trade with Africa need not unduly cause us great concern. There are reasons which explain the position. Some of the reasons are reassuring that an alternative rationale is evolving. We will, however, do well to watch the working of the emerging pattern and identify relevant measures to reinforce its broad parameters. Let us account for the drop in the first instance. Firstly, this period was noted for a steady decline in the global trade in the wake of world wide recession; and the global crisis has deeper implications particularly for those countries which are tightly linked to global pulls and pressures. Most of the African countries were dangerously exposed being critically dependent on the global developmental archetype. Following the world recession in the 1970's, when the developed market economies slumped from an annual growth rate of 4.9 per cent between 1960-73 to 2.8 per cent growth rate between 1973-1979, the growth rate in African economies collapsed to negative (—) 0.1 per cent by 1983.[4] In 1980, Africa's global export index was placed 38 points lower than in 1973, confirming a sizeable slowdown in its world trade, not only in terms of value but also in volume.

Apart from a substantial fall in the their export earnings, the terms of trade of African countries, with 1975 as the base year, stagnated and then deteriorated by 10 points between 1970 and 1981 declining from 117 to 107 points.[5] In turn, the severe loss felt on account of this was hardly compensated by annual aid receipts and financial flows in this period. The

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steep decline in export prices of primary products, the mainstay of several African countries, was simply devastating in its impact. Meanwhile, Africa's debt burden also increased enormously and almost one-quarter, and in some cases one-half of the export earnings, went by way of debt-servicing. The deteriorating economic situation was further aggravated by devastating and widespread Sahelian drought followed by severe famine in several parts of Africa. This situation further pressed African economies into a state of "dependence."

Under the circumstances, the question arises whether recovery in Western industrialised economies will automatically pull them (African countries) out from the deep waters they have sunk into. For instance, in 1983, when Western economies slightly recovered and showed a growth rate of 2.6 per cent, the growth rate of non-oil developing African countries was only 0.4 per cent,[6] and further preliminary data suggests that in 1984 developed economies grew at the rate of around 5 per cent. But according to an updated version of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF), *World Economic Outlook 1985*, the African economies registered a growth rate of only one per cent in 1983-84 as a result of weak import growth, acute shortage of essential imports, prolonged drought in several countries and difficulties encountered in implementing domestic economic policy reforms.[7]

EMERGING INDIA-AFRICA TRADE PATTERNS

Growing Complementarities

However, it appears that the traditional economic order has lost its edge to pull out the African economies from the present crisis situation. On the other hand, unless alternative production complementarities among developing countries becomes operative the African economies would be cornered indeed. Unlike the Indian position, the slow-down in Africa's external trade was in no way compensated by any significant increase in the internal domestic trade or intra-African trade. But certain production complementarities between the Third World countries such as India on the one hand and several African countries on the other have certainly developed.

Throughout the 1970's, India largely escaped the worst aspects of the world crisis. Its independent stance on the issue of a self-reliant development strategy and lesser dependence on the international trading system have enabled it to acquire certain industrial and technological capabilities, so much so that it is no more entirely inconceivable that countries like India are now in a relatively better position to providing an alternative viable alliance system. This has been quite evident from the shift in the pattern of commodity composition in Indo-African trade during the 1970's.

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It is found that non-traditional industrial products, mainly engineering goods and chemical and allied products, accounted for much larger percentage of Indian exports to African countries in the 1970's. Table II clarifies this position.

TABLE II

Commodity Composition of India's Exports to Africa.

(in Rs. million)

Commodity	*1970-71*	*1974-75*	*1977-78*	*1978-79*	*1980-81*
Major Non-Traditional Items					
1 Engineering Goods of which	345	506	1246	1553	1725
a) Machinery, non-electric,	120	90	110	1230	440
b) Machinery, electric,	40	140	NA	NA	220
c) Transport equipment (incl. road vehicles).	140	190	750	NA	980
2 Iron and Steel	30	50	120	100	80
3 Chemicals and Allied Products	40	60	120	140	210
4 Metal Manufactures	20	80	200	260	250
Major Traditional Items					
1 Spices	20	20	20	40	60
2 Tea	160	180	310	510	710
3 Cotton manufactures excl. yarn thread and clothing	180	130	440	120	510
4 Cotton Yarn and Thread	40	30	40	20	160
5 Clothing incl. Readymade Garments	10	20	20	NA	NA
6 Jute Manufactures	410	440	270	Neg.	Neg.

Sources : 1 DGCIS, Calcutta, *Monthly Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India*, 1970-71 to 1980-81.
2 Engineering Export Promotion Council, *Handbook of Export Statistics 1984*. Engineering Export Promotion Council, Calcutta, 1984.
3 Chemical and Allied Products Exports Promotion Council, *Export Statistics*, 1964-65 to 1980-81, CAPEPC, Calcutta, 1984.
4 Cotton Textile Export Promotion Council, *Exports of Cotton Textiles to African Markets*, 1983.

Notes : Neg.—Negligible.
NA—Not Available.

It will be seen that the major export products in recent years have mainly been non-traditional items, like engineering goods, chemical and allied products, machinery and transport equipment and plastic products. Exports of engineering goods, for instance, jumped up from Rs. 345

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million in 1970-71 to Rs. 1,725 million; and according to the Engineering Export Promotion Council Report for the year 1983, the figure has further risen to around Rs. 1,900 million by 1981-82 -- an impressive six-fold rise. They now accounted for 40 per cent of India's total exports to Africa. More importantly. there has been a significant increase in the export of capital goods. In this category, products like transport equipment, including road vehicles which recorded a five-fold rise, rose from Rs. 140 million in 1970-71 to Rs. 900 million in 1980-81. Exports of chemical and allied products also recorded a five-fold increase, while metal manufactures jumped up from a meagre Rs 20 million in 1970-71 to as much as Rs. 250 million in 1980-81. Iron and steel exports also rose from Rs. 30 million to around Rs. 80 million.

In the same period, traditional exports gradually declined in importance. Their increase has been at best moderate, and in some cases they declined sharply indeed. For instance, exports of jute manufactures declined from around Rs. 400 million in 1970-71 to Rs. 110 million in 1976-77 and by 1980-81 export of jute manufactures were negligible. Cotton manufactures, among the traditional items of exports, have however moderately risen from Rs. 180 million in 1970-71 to around Rs. 500 million in 1980-81. There was also a significant rise in exports of tea—from Rs. 160 million to Rs. 710 million—more than a four-fold rise.

On the whole, it will be seen that while in 1970-71 major traditional exports accounted for around Rs. 820 million and non-traditional exports were placed around Rs. 730 million, the pattern was significantly modified by 1980-81, when exports of traditional items was placed at Rs. 1440 million and non-traditional products accounted for Rs. 3,900 million. Thus, in value terms, whereas exports of non-traditional products recorded a five-fold increase, the traditional products rose by just 75 per cent. The non-traditional exports now accounted for around 72 per cent of India's total exports to Africa, as against 48 per cent a decade earlier.

From the above account of India's trade with Africa, it is observed that despite a substantial decline in India's exports to Africa from around 9 per cent of its total exports in 1970 to about 3.6 per cent in 1983-84, India's exports of value-added manufactures now constituted a more significant element of its exports to Africa, be it light engineering products, capital goods, chemical and allied products, metal manufactures or iron and steel. And this appears only a beginning. The pattern does not yet reflect full potential of the emerging production complementarities.

As regards India's imports from African countries the following table—Table III—lists major commodities/products imported by India from some African countries for the last two decades.

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TABLE III

India's Imports of Major Commodities from Africa

(Value in Rs. million)

Products	*Countries*	*1970-71*	*1980-81*
Fruits and Vegetables.	Kenya	39.90	—
Cashew nuts.	Tanzania	143.50	—
	Madagascar	1.40	—
Vegetables—fresh and chilled.	Kenya	—	21.80
Non-ferrous base metal, copper waste scrap, waste scrap nickel and alloys.	Kenya	—	4.10
	Tanzania	—	0.50
Other mineral phosphates.	Senegal	4.50	49.30
	Morocco	30.70	197.06
Vegetable textile fibre.	Kenya	7.17	1.30
	Tanzania	6.52	2.30
Crude vegetable materials, gum and other resins.	Kenya	1.04	1.71
	Tanzania	2.55	3.60
	Sudan	7.50	11.87
	Morocco	—	0.74
Raw cotton.	Sudan	201.70	0.66
	Kenya	27.63	—
	Tanzania	0.65	—
	Uganda	77.11	—
	Morocco	42.40	—
Dyeing and tanning materials.	Kenya	19 30	28.26
	Tanzania	2.10	13.19
	Morocco	—	99.40
Phosphoric acid, pearls, precious, semi-precious stones, worked or unworked diamonds, rough unsorted.	Kenya	—	2.03
	Tanzania	—	126.18
	Ghana	—	125.70
	Congo	114.32	—
	Sierra Leone	3.40	2.21
	Ivory Coast	0.85	21.72
Non-ferrous metal.	Zamiba	3876.80	124.48
Copper wire.		62.30	312.96
Zinc.		9.18	668.60
Electrotype copper base.	Tanzania	—	21.00
	Mauritius	—	0 38

Source : DGCIS, Calcutta, *Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India*, Vol. II for the years 1970-71 and 1980-81.

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It is found that major products imported from African countries constitute either basic raw materials or intermediate inputs for India's manufacturing industry. The significance of trade expansion between India and Africa is appreciated in this perspective. The trade expansion among them is, therefore, not to be considered as an isolated exercise in trade diversion or merely an attempt to reduce the critical dependence of African countries on the industrialised market economies. It is equally aimed at creating more trade among themselves. Therefore, the slow-down in India's trade with Africa during the 1970's need not cause us undue concern as long as the trading pattern is reflective of growing production complementarities in the two regions. What is called for is to galvanise a genuine growth agent that linked the production structures in India and African countries in a "collective self-reliance" framework.

In a recent study,[8] the UNCTAD Secretariat has underlined technological issues and policy options for developing countries covering the capital goods sector. It shows that apart from India, China, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Mexico and South Korea, hardly any other developing country has paid much attention to this sector which as a result has been relegated in most cases to a minor place. As such, whereas in the developed countries, capital goods industries have played a leading role in the industrialization process, accounting for 10-35 per cent of the manufactures, in the developing countries they account for only 10-15 per cent of the total manufactures.

The study therefore advocates strengthening indigenous technological capacity to design, adapt and produce capital goods effectively. In this respect India, according to this study, has done better than almost all other developing countries. 'Examination of the equipment and skill profiles of these firms (Indian firms) shows that Korean (South Korean), and to some extent Indian firms do in fact have modern equipment of a more recent design than that which is generally in use in industrialized countries. At the same time, especially in the case of Indian firms, they can count on an adequate staff for their technical needs.'[9] The account thus firmly reveals some aspects of differential growth among the LDC's and the emerging production complementarities among the countries like India and several developing countries in Africa.

Dynamics of Global and Internal Pulls

By the end of the second development decade of the 1970's, the dynamics of global and internal pulls and pressures indicated a notable trend which took its cue from global recessionary pressures. The Western industrial countries, suffering under such pressures, stiffened their protectionist measures which in turn resulted in growing market rigidities, declining soft aid prospects and mounting debt burdens. The consequental

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hardship of developing countries had made them a little wiser. They now appreciated the significance of South-South cooperation as an alternative economic alliance system with a clearer perception. The emerging trading pattern between India and several African countries, by way of greater trading in manufactures in the 1970's, was a meaningful trend in that direction. The growing production complementarities provided them now firmer binding material to set in motion an autonomous mechanism on a collective basis.

The trend was highlighted by a relatively vibrant Indian economy which has meanwhile acquired significant production and technological capabilities in certain sectors despite the global slow-down of trade and the world-wide recession. The relevant technology, trading in manufactures and pattern of industrial development in India, therefore, offered greater opportunity of trade expansion between India and the African countries.

It may be mentioned, that generally speaking African countries have been quite eager to diversify their trading patterns and to create more trade among themselves. By and large, they have been dissatisfied with the development strategies followed during the "development decades" of the 1960's and 1970's. By the middle of the 1970's, most of them regarded such strategies as out of tune with the African aspirations for a "self-reliant" and a "self-sustained" development model. It was, therefore, considered imperative that they sought greater intra-regional economic cooperation among themselves and greater economic linkages with other developing countries. The principle of collective self-reliance among developing countries, as advocated under E and TCDC systems approach, now made greater sense to the African leadership. The "Lagos Plan of Action", referred to earlier, is a collective African expression of this dominant inclination. The "Plan" underscored that it was 'specially necessary to find ways of restricting or neutralising the present dominating influence in Africa of the developed countries' industrial and commercial power.'[10] The document expresses utter dissatisfaction with the Third General Conference of the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO), particularly with the negative attitude of the developed countries towards efforts being made by African member-states of accelerated industrialization in the region. This attitude, in the words of the Action Plan document, '*inter-alia*, underlines the necessity for individual and collective self-reliance.'[11] It further stressed the need for promoting side by side with other developing countries recognition of their right to development; the need for fruitful cooperation between member states on the one hand and between member states and other developing regions on the other, and the urgent need to implement a plan for the collective industrialization of Africa based on the concept of collective self-reliance.[12]

Again, in the matter of transfer of technology, "The Lagos Plan" emphasises the urgency of the development of "appropriate technologies."

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Several African countries acknowledged the relevance of the Indian experience to their developmental requirements in this context. Furthermore, besides emerging production complementarities, India has by the end of the 1970s, as explained elsewhere, become the biggest supplier of technical and professional manpower the world over, whose competence has certainly been of greater relevance to developing countries going through development of the kind with which India has been familiar since independence.[13]

Throughout the 1970's therefore, India-Africa economic and technical cooperation covered much wider ground than mere trading. It was extended to several spheres—be it joint ventures, small scale industry, investment flows, project exports, railways and air-fields construction, consultancy services as also supply of intermediate and high level manpower. Maybe India's economic commitment in terms of investments and collaborative arrangements, was comparatively small. But then it was just a beginning. It is here that we could locate "production cooperation" as the rationalising factor to lift India-Africa economic linkages from the warped colonial patterns and to place them in a mutually accommodating cooperative frame.

ROLE OF PRODUCTION COOPERATION

The concept of "production cooperation" is traceable to the socialist milieu of Eastern Europe. The concept, however, contains all the ingredients to provide a sound frame of reference for intra and/or inter-regional economic and technical cooperation among developing countries. In essence, the process aims at promoting cooperation among a given group of countries in any, or all, such production areas that offer scope for joint-manufacturing, sharing of investments and other inputs such as manpower, etc., joint marketing and sharing of output and even conversion deals, i.e. retaining part of production as payment for processing production on behalf of another country. The arrangement, however, calls for a supra-national body to sort out differences. The COMECON countries have a built-in provision in this regard. Even the European Economic Community (EEC) provides such a mechanism.

However, since the basic aspect of production cooperation involves the principle of sharing production complementarities to the mutual advantage of the participating countries, the institutional cooperative frame in the India-Africa context could be located, to begin with, in the joint economic commissions, and/or by setting up joint business councils, etc. Although, such arrangements would generally represent bilateral aspects of relationship, we could surely think in terms of setting-up mutually acceptable inter-regional bodies. For instance, the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference's (SADCC) success in attrac-

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ting external support was underlined by two major agreements signed just before the Fifth Consultative Conference of SADCC held in Harare (Zimbabwe) at the end of January 1986. Under the first, SADCC became the first grouping of the Asia, Carribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries, linked to the Lome III Trade-in-Aid pact with the EEC, to enter into a formal region to region agreement with the EEC. The second was a joint declaration of expanded economic and cultural cooperation between SADCC and the Nordic group of countries, which have pioneered the idea of a special regional trade partnership with SADCC. Maybe, this is yet another aspect of North-South vertical relationship. The question arises, whether or not such innovative South-South inter-regional partnerships could not be devised to collectively overcome attitudes of helplessness associated with the dependency syndrome inherited as a colonial legacy. The choice regarding areas of cooperation would, of course, depend on the mutuality of interests and priority schedules as perceived by the participating countries.

Maybe, the identification of specific product areas would require separate in-depth feasibility studies. Given below are several broad areas which will interest both the African countries as well as India.

Product Areas

1 *Food Security and Agro-based Industry* is one such product area. Time and again, Africa has been prone to famines and other problems relating to agricultural production. In recent years some African countries have witnessed record starvation deaths, while hundreds of thousands have been rendered homeless. By 1981 it was estimated that there were over 5 million refugees in Africa, concentrated mostly in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.[14] Maybe the widespread disastrous drought in the 1970's and the early 1980's, leading 'to the worst food crisis of the century,'[15] is largely responsible for the catastrophic proportion of the damage done. Even otherwise, in the best of climatic conditions, food production in Africa has not kept pace with the growing population.

TABLE IV

Agricultural and Food Production (Rate of Annual Growth)

	1961-70	*1970-80*	*1981-82*	*1982-83*	*1983-84*
Agricultural Production	2.8	1.8	3.0	—2.8	3.3
Per-capita Agricultural Production	0.2	—1.1	0.0	—5.7	0.2
Total Food Production	2.7	2.0	3.2	—3.1	3.4
Per capita Food Production	0.0	—0.9	0.1	—5.9	0.4

Source : UNCTAD, *Handbook of International Trade and Development 1985, Supplement*, pp. 446-447.

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From Table IV we find that during the 1960s agricultural output increased at an annual rate of 2.8 per cent, while the food production grew at a slightly lower rate of 2.7 per cent. The rate of agricultural production thus was just the same as the rate of population growth. During the 1970s, agricultural production suffered a severe setback and the rate of growth declined at 1.8 per cent. In per capita terms, while agricultural production declined at the rate of (—) 1.1 per annum; the per capita food production declined at only a slightly lower rate of (—) 0.9 per cent. The position was worst in the year 1982-83, when the annual rate of growth of agricultural production was (—) 2.8 per cent and that of food production (—) 3.1 per cent. As a result the per capita agricultural production showed a negative rate of growth of (—) 5.7 per cent and per capita food production showed a negative rate of growth of (—) 5.9 per cent. The position somewhat improved in the year 1983-84 because of relatively more balanced rains and it was indeed after many years that the rate of agricultural production was marginally higher than the rate of population growth. Thus, while the Second UN Development Decade set a target growth rate of 4 per cent in agricultural production for Africa, that could never be achieved. Only two countries Ivory Coast and Rwanda could make it, while Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria returned a rate of growth between 3.5 and 4 per cent.[16]

A country like India has, on the other hand, largely attained self-sufficiency in food production and in the process gained substantial experience in agriculture-related technologies. It could certainly share its experiences, relevant technologies and other inputs like fertilisers, farm implements, etc., with the African countries. India is also in a position to offer training to African agriculturists and help the African countries in setting up agriculture-related research institutes, and may be even universities. There is also a rich potential for joint ventures in this field. It offers a built-in scope for conversion deals and buy-back arrangements. Several crops could be identified for this purpose—food crops like maize, wheat and rice ; oil seeds like groundnuts and soyabeans ; and cash crops like coffee, cotton, tobacco, tea and sugarcane are some of these. Likewise, a number of agro-based processing industries like sugar, cashew processing, vegetable oil industry and tobacco curing, constitute an area for promoting joint-ventures which, given the policy support measures, could become pathfinders to forging a lasting and an invaluable mutually beneficial Indo-African cooperative framework. However, only a little has been attempted so far in this direction. In fact, neither the "relevant" Indian technologies, nor for that matter techniques of production, have been identified and classified in an attempt to relate the same to specific agricultural needs of an African country, or an African region.

Undoubtedly, this could be one of the lead areas in building up a cooperative frame. For instance, in several African countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Malawi, Botswana, Mauritius, Rwanda and Burundi, arable land

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is limited. Here the need is to raise productivity by the use of high-yielding seeds and fertilisers and thereby promoting intensive farming. Similarly, in countries like Ivory Coast, Zaire, Central African Republic, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, where the production can be raised by claiming uncultivated land, India could think in terms of estabilishing joint-farms with joint-marketing and where necessary work on the basis of buy-back arrangements. The production of groundnuts in Nigeria, cashew in Tanzania, cotton in Uganda and the Sudan, palm-oil in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria and even pulses in some African countries like Kenya and Zambia could be significantly increased through joint-ventures in farming. This field also offers large scope for joint-marketing arrangements in products such as coffee (with Ethiopia), tea (with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) and copper (with Zambia and Zimbabwe). There is also a great scope for establishing agro-based industries around products like rubber (Liberia), tobacco (Malawi), sugar (Mauritius and Uganda), palm oil (Nigeria), cocoa (Ghana), etc.

2 *The Small Scale Industry* is another area in which India has taken rapid strides since independence. This sector constitutes a vitally important area in a developing country seeking to establish a self-sustained development pattern. It also promotes local enterprise, local skill development, and encourages the use of local raw materials and equipment ; further it helps by way of wider dispersal of national income in an effort to reducing regional imbalances. In a poor country where unemployment is widespread and where most entrepreneurs are persons with modest means who can make only small investments, the acquisition of sophisticated technology is generally out of the reach of local enterprise. Small industry becomes a *sine-qua-non* for promoting industrial development in such a situation. At the same time the small industry provides a support structure to the large scale industrial sector through the provision of sub-contracting and ancillarisation arrangements. In the African environment, small industrial units are further ideal to help the process of a "self-reliance" strategy and indignisation of African economies without necessarily disturbing productivity schedules.

In brief, the rural and small industry in Africa has a vital role in the matter of promoting structural transformation. It may be remembered that development processes, such as these, have a wider carry over effect to help with evolving an autonomous capacity to sustain a "self-reliant" strategy. This is irrespective of the question of a preference for a "socialist" or a "capitalist" path of development. The African economies in general, and sub-Saharan economies in particular, are one form in which spatial inequalities may occur. Therefore, internal consistency and complementarity between different sections of industrial development assume special significance in the African countries.

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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa did not sufficiently provide for linkages to the domestic resource base, locally available raw materials and internal transport and communication systems. To this day industrial development in most of the African countries and regions continues to be high-cost export-import oriented, rather than inexpensive inward-looking arrangements based on local demand and local needs. Such a structure, as has been pointed out elsewhere, 'has a tendency to consolidate the development of urban enclaves, import-oriented consumer markets and export-oriented maintenance equipment for large scale industries. This has to be paid for in export-oriented raw materials. Instead of providing a bridgehead, it has a tendency to snap rural-urban industrial linkages.'[17]

Moreover, because of the disjointed industrial structure the non-participatory administration, services and commercial establishment further helped to reinforce the market for consumer goods, on the one hand, and the export of raw materials, on the other. 'The colonial system encouraged the development of a low level of administrative and commercial strata which occupied more people than the manufacturing sector.'[18] David Phillips in his study of Tanzania writes, 'One of the characteristics of an ex-colonial economy such as Tanzania is the relatively high proportion of "unproductive" service in the wage earning sector compared with manufacture.'[19] This was true of not only Tanzania, but most of the sub-Saharan countries.

Throughout the 1960s, it is believed, there was a relative decline of small labour-intensive enterprises in the sub-Saharan countries and a consequent increase in the overall capital intensity of production. It must, therefore, be stressed that in the conditions of sub-Saharan Africa the development of rural and small industry could substantially help in the redistribution of industry and in increasing the employment potential in the manufacturing sector by encouraging labour-intensive manufacturing activity. Above all, it has a great potential to restore symmetry in the overall capital-intensity of production.

Not surprisingly, the rural and small industry is an area in which several African countries have found Indian production techniques and adaptation of factor inputs—middle-level engineering, artisan skills and several variants of technologies produced in the process of industrialisation—of great relevance to their requirements. Countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have in recent years increasingly turned to India to have joint-ventures such as industrial estates, common facility centres and services and in the establishment of national institutions for providing investment capital, technology transfer mechanisms, production-cum-training centres and the related infrastructural development.

The National Small Industries Corporation of India has often, during the last decade, shared its experience and expertise with other developing

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countries particularly in Africa. For instance, a number of African national bodies pertaining to small and rural industry have directly or indirectly drawn inspiration and support from the National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) in their organisational set up. Mention may be made of organisations such as the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO), Mauritius ; Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO), Tanzania ; Small Enterprises and Development Organisation (SEDO), Zimbabwe ; Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO), Zambia ; Office pur la dev. Industries (ODIO), Morocco ; Kenya Industrial Estate, (KIE) and the Appropriate Technology Advisory Committee (ATAC) Kenya.

The NSIC, according to its Chairman, also provides the following services to developing countries in the field of turnkey projects—'detailed project report preparation and taking up industrial surveys, deputation of study teams, supply of appropriate plant and machinery, installation, testing and commissioning of the plant at site, training of engineers and technicians of the client in India at the site and technical assistance for production and maintenance of plant.'[20]

India has further sought a dynamic programme of cooperation with the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Information gathered by the author shows that since 1970 India has pledged, more or less on regular basis, some funds for industrial and other related projects of the ECA mostly concerning small industry development in African countries. The following table relates to such projects.

TABLE V

ECA Projects Funded by India

Year		Projects	Amount Pledged
1979	(a)	Consultancy and training services for procurement and supply of management in Africa.	US $ 201,534
	(b)	Assistance to African countries in the development of technologies relevant to problems and needs of the rural population.	US $ 160,000
	(c)	Assistance to African governments in developing and promoting simpler decentralised systems of building materials production, construction services and requisite entrepreneurship.	US $ 220,800
	(d)	Asistance to the Regional Centre for services in surveying and mapping, Nairobi	US $ 20,000
1983	(a)	ARCEDEM	US $ 300,000
	(b)	Engineering Industry development programmes.	US $ 350,000
	(c)	Development demonstration and rural replication of rural industries.	US $ 250,000
1985	(a)	Project for small scale industries.	US $ 400,000

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The total amount pledged is relatively small, but what is important is that it breaks fresh ground in institutional linkages and in evolving a methodology of support structures for fuller utilisation of production complementarities to the mutual advantage of African countries and India.

OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION

Besides industry and argiculture, other areas which are likely to interest the African countries in this respect are :

(*i*) *Manpower Training*

India has a large reservoir of trained technical manpower whose supply price is found to be lower than the supply price of similarly placed manpower obtained from Western industrialised countries. As such, among other things, a collaboration venture involving staff development in India and inplant training of African manpower would generally be welcomed by African countries.

(*ii*) *Construction and Related Infrastructural Prospecting*

In the civil construction industry and related infrastructural project prospecting, India has completed a number of turnkey projects in several West Asian countries and has by now acquired a rich experience. In fact, some Indian public sector undertakings such as the Rail India Technical and Engineering Services (RITES), Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (I) Ltd. (MECON) have undertaken several infrastructural-related development activities in a number of African countries and have shown their competitive worth and international class.

(*iii*) *Mineral and Hydro-electric Prospecting*

Africa is a continent of vast mineral and hydro-electric resources. India-based technology for prospecting and exploration in these areas may be found to be more relevant and cheaper. India may also offer a good market for many of the African minerals.

(*iv*) *Consultancy Services*

Consultants often play a very important intermediary role in the matter of identifying sound projects. They further undertake comprehensive feasibility studies and set the ball rolling. They even explore finding avenues—internal as well as external, This is yet another promising area for promoting joint ventures and other modes of production cooperation.

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Since, basically the central issue is one of complementing and supplementing the resource base and factor inputs like capital, manpower and enterprise on a collective basis, production cooperation in the form of promoting joint industrial ventures could become, over time, a major instrument of change provided the connected well equipped institutional technologies, both officially supported, and non-officially initiated, are either available or instituted with adequate wherewithal.

(r) *Export Processing Zones*

If some African countries desired to set up export processing zones for promoting their exports, India could also share its experience in this regard either on a consultancy basis, or on joint-ventures basis.

JOINT VENTURES—TRENDS AND CRITERIA

It may be mentioned that industrialisation in the past has largely been a function of multinationals in the African countries. This is mainly for the fact that the African countries lacked not only capital resources but also technical knowhow and highly skilled manpower. To avoid their total sell-out to the multinationals, they have often sought joint ventures with other developing countries such as India. Joint ventures of this kind have essentially been a post-war phenomenon; one of the several methods adopted by developing nation states to narrow the material and technological gap between the industrially advanced and the newly independent developing countries. Since India, even though a developing country, had by the early 1960s demonstrated its technological capabilities in certain areas by achieving a comparatively higher degree of industrialisation and sophistication in industrial production, a number of African countries welcomed joint industrial ventures with it to lessen their almost exclusive dependence on the Western economies. By 1964 broad contours of India's policy guidelines in this regard were clear. An industrialist's goodwill mission to some African countries in 1964 recommended that, 'we must actively participate in setting up joint industrial ventures (in Africa) in as large a measure as possible.'[21]

Since then Indian joint ventures abroad have made impressive advances. The total number of ventures has steadily risen from 19 in 1970 to 134 in 1982 and the product coverage in African countries, under this mode of production, has also widened over time as can be seen from Table VI concerning the regional country-wise position of Indian joint ventures in Africa showing product-coverage and equity participation, etc., as of 1985.

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TABLE VI

Indian Joint Ventures in Africa (as on September 1985)

Country	*No.*	*In Production* Indian Equity (*in Rs. '000*)	*No.*	*Under Implementation* Indian Equity (*in Rs. '000*)	*Total* Indian Equity (*in Rs. '000*)	*Area Covered*
a) *PTA**						
Botswana	1	500	—	—	500	Packaging material.
Kenya	8	96,937	3	7,818	104,755	Textiles, pulp and paper, pharmaceuticals, auto ancillaries, iron foundry, electric wire, machine tools, sulphuric acid, insurance business.
Mauritus	2	1,197	2	5,124	6,321	Garments, power driven pumps, hotels, etc.
Zambia	—	—	1	15.000	15,000	Infant foods.
Seychelles	—	—	1	13,450	13,450	Hotels.
Uganda	1	2,807	—	—	2,807	Jute goods.
b) *ECOWAS***						
Nigeria	12	1,15,483	9	52,540	1,68,023	Engineering goods, transmission line towers, diesel sets for drilling machine tools, pharmaceuticals, cement, soft drinks, consultancy, etc.
Liberia	—	—	1	6,800	6,800	Glass products.
Senegal	1	1,69,600	—	—	1,69,600	Fertilizers and phosphoric acid.
c) *North Africa*						
Egypt	—	—	2	980	980	Blending and packaging of tea.

* PTA stands for Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African countries.

** ECOWAS stands for Economic Community of West African States.

Sources : Veena Upadhaya, "Indian Joint Ventures In Africa;" and J. C. Srivastava, "Indian Trade and Joint Ventures With Africa." The above two papers were presented at the International Seminar on India-Africa Relations: Issues and policy Options, University of Bombay, Bombay, 3-5, February 1986.

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It is found that the Indo-African joint ventures now cover not only diverse fields such as engineering and chemical products, textiles and pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, machinery and machine tools, civil construction, etc., but also a wider range of products under these broad heads such as paper, auto ancillaries, electric wires, cement and soft drinks, etc. The Indian ventures have also tapped the services sector such as hotels, banking, life insurance and consultancy services. India's competence in consultancy service is now well recognised in Asian and African countries and the Government of India has set up a "Project Cell" in the Ministry of Commerce to monitor consultancy projects.

The growth of Indian joint-ventures is mainly attributed to the following three relevant factors : (i) Improving production complementarities among India and several developing countries in Asia and Africa; (ii) Diversification of industrial production and the achievement of relatively higher industrial capabilities in India; and above all (iii) the adaptation of a positive flexible approach by the Government of India in order to encourage this mode of cooperation among developing countries.

Among the African countries, Nigeria has understandably drawn greater attention. Its petroleum wealth has in the recent past made such investment economically more attractive. As it is, Nigeria accounted for 23 out of a total of 44 joint ventures, followed by Kenya with 11 and Mauritius with 4 ventures. The other African countries have barely one venture each. The product-coverage in Africa is of course quite wide as indicated earlier. It may further be mentioned that some Indian concerns—both public sector undertakings, like HMT, NSIC, RITES, LIC and Indian banks, and private companies such as Birla Bros., Raymonds, Sarabhais, Kirloskars, and scores of small Indian business houses—have given a good account of themselves. They have demonstrated that some of them could implement even high-value projects on turnkey basis, e.g., the railway projects in Nigeria and Algeria, airport and power projects in Libya, industrial estates in Tanzania and Kenya, etc.

The total Indian actual equity participation in the ventures has steadily increased from around Rs. 155.6 million as in March 1982, to Rs. 488 million by early 1985. Yet compared to the enormous potential the process has just scratched the surface. However, the Indo-African ventures have shown a stagnant tendency in recent years. The problem is that most of the African countries are passing through critical times amounting to economic crisis. Their financial position is extremely tight. By 1985, their foreign debts had accumulated to a staggering figure around $ 175 billion. All the same, while the resource constraint is certainly a cause for concern, and it has no doubt had a halting impact on Indian joint-ventures, as it has had on Indo-Africa trade, the growing production complementarities, we believe, are bound to assert their presence as

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the African economies recover from the present "limbo". Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for further intensification of our efforts to set up more collaborative projects and further strengthen the sources of funding within the South. Undoubtedly, as the global economic recovery gains momentum, the African countries will certainly attract greater international finance as they posess a very rich reservoir of mineral and agricultural products as can be seen from the following Table VII.

TABLE VII

Africa's Share of World Agriculture and Mineral Production

Sub-Saharan Africa's Share of World Agricultural Production		*Africa's Share of World Mineral Production 1977*	
Coffee	—23.8	Gold	—74.5
Cocoa	—59.8	Diamond	—70.9
Tea	— 9.5	Cobalt	—56.2
Sugar	— 3.5	Chrome Ore	—43.8
Citrus Fruits	— 2.0	Manganese Ore	—36.5
Rice	— 1.5	Uranium	—30.2
Wheat	— 0.3	Crude Phosphate	—25.8
Palm Oil	—26.9	Copper	—19.4
Cotton	— 4.3	Bauxite	—14.9
Sisal	—42.8	Crude Petroleum	—10.2
Rubber	— 4.8	Iron Ore	— 8.0
Tobacco	— 4.7		
Tropical Hardwood logs	—17.1		

Source : (a) Shamsher Singh, "Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa", World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 608, Washington-D.C., The World Bank, 1983, pp. 52—152.

(b) *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Africa*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 280.

It is clear that Africa indeed contributes substantially to the world production of commercial crops such as coffee, cocoa, sisal, palm products, tea, etc.. and among the minerals, it is very rich in gold, diamonds, cobalt, uranium, copper ; nor is it a poor producer of crude petroleum and iron ore.

But the question arises, to what extent the funding is done from Africa, from Asia and from the other third world quarters so that the growing production complementarities among them have fuller interplay and that they are not unduly constrained for want of adequate funding when the funding is mainly left to world fora like the IMF, International Development Agency (IDA), International Bank for Reconstruction

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and Development (IBRD), EEC or for that matter the other countries of the North, which are primarily conditioned by their own limitations and their own commitments.

The funding from the Northern sources is generally tied and attached in a variety of ways with a tendency to consolidate rather than loosen the traditional economic linkages with a built-in North-South axis. Let us take the case of ACP countries and the Lome Convention. There are 39 African countries which are members of the Africa, Carribean and Pacific group having an agreement with the European Economic Community for special trade and financing agreements. For the period 1980-85, the EEC, under the provisions of the Lome II Convention, raised the financial resources for the ACP countries to some US $ 5.6 billion unit of account, or US $ 7 billion approximately. This was besides the aid of US $ 27 million to West African countries.

But the problem concerning India's participation in project financing from such funds is that normally India would not qualify for bidding for tenders floated for ACP projects, financed from the European Development Funds, unless the interested Indian firms are registered in one or the other ACP country, or the participation is sought in the form of sub-contracts ; or when a particular project is co-financed by EEC and some other source of financing. It is, therefore, obvious that if India were to benefit from prjoect prospecting flowing from such funding, it will have to negotiate some kind of exemption from the restrictive clauses. Simultaneously, Indian firms would do well to attempt to convince the ACP countries and the EEC of the several advantages in permitting them (Indian firms) to participate in ACP tenders in general. The EEC has been recently pushing the idea of a trilateral arrangement between the EEC, the Arab-OPEC group and the African States for drawing upon the finances of the EEC along with the Arab Development Funds for the projects in the African countries (both regional and inter-regional). By 1980 there were already 19 projects co-financed by the EEC and the Arab Development Funds.

It would, therefore, be worthwhile to explore a triangular arrangement in which India could also participate, and the framework be oriented towards expansion of project cooperation among developing countries through pooling of skills, capital and technology. In this connection, third country participation from among the countries of the North is not in contradiction to cultivating South-South linkages, although that would largely depend upon the nature of a project as well as the motivation of an advanced country. At the same time, India could utilise good relations established with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries for setting up collaborative enterprises in the socialist oriented

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African countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

As regards the appraisal of joint-ventures, what is important is to view them in the light of their potential 'to creating opportunities and a base for export of capital goods, know-how and services.'[22] and external cooperation among developing countries in the context of promoting South-South linkages. Their role is, therefore, to be assessed not merely on the basis of quick returns, but on considerations such as creation of more trade and/or creating an opportunity for a wider variety of exchange of goods and services.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The role of government and its policy perspectives, therefore, assu mes central place in promoting various channels of "production cooperation." The task is much too wide to be left to private enterprise alone for it is motivated by only financial and profit considerations. The principle of collective self-reliance, on the other hand, aims at breaking new ground. Under such an arrangement certain ventures, and project prospecting that required a longer gestation period, had also to be accomodated when such projects were to tap the resource base of the host country. In another case, an elaborate arrangement may be warranted by entering into an agreement for a conversion deal, or a project undertaken on a buy back basis. For instance, some ventures in Africa in agricultural products, such as pulses and oilseed, etc., could be organised to raise the tempo of agricultural development of a host country, and simultaneously the home country could obtain an assured source of supply of these products. In the words of Abid Hussain, the former Commerce Secretary of the Government of India, 'Time has come when approach to our venturing overseas has to be given a new dimension. Even the nature and form of equity participation has to be reviewed in the context of the changed situation abroad, requirements of the host country and the efforts made by our competitors.'[23]

The most important aspect of Indo-African cooperative framework would, therefore, be a well regulated action programme in the matter of joint project financing, the area in which the countries of the North have been well entrenched and enjoy a distinct advantage.

Western Thrust in Project Financing in Africa

It may also be recalled, in this connection, that ever since the first sight of their economic recovery the Western countries have been active again to push up their sales in developing countries. They have devised innumerable forms of soft loans and outright aid packages to this end.

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Be it the Americans, the British, the Japanese, the Danes or the Swedes, or be it the French, perhaps the most aggressive of the Western powers in the African countries (mainly in French-speaking Africa), all appear to be in the race to beat the others to the second place. Ingenious methods, and even controversial forms like "mixed credit" that combined export credits with outright aid, and long-term credits extending upto as far as 20 years and more are being devised to do business in developing countries.

The developing countries, particularly those in Africa, which are passing through a critical period and cannot muster substantial development funds internally, are under pressure to award project contracts to those countries which can do supplementary financing. This aspect of project financing, therefore, has to be examined in some depth if the African countries and India would like to avail of the full advantage of the growing complementarities among themselves. A number of steps would be necessary. The least that they could do is to take urgent steps with regard to improving and providing, in the first instance, adequate information services concerning project prospecting etc.

At present there is a wide information gap in several African countries, particularly in French-speaking African countries, relating to the capability of Indian industry and its level of technical competence—in terms of sophistication of Indian equipment, competence of Indian merchants in maintaining delivery schedules, relevance of Indian technology and manpower with reference to specific projects, etc. Nor again, is there adequate flow of information to the Indian industry regarding the projects being conceived in the African countries and their funding sources. Even the information regarding the foreign competitors in the field and their operation methods are often found to be either out of date, or highly wanting in the matter of detail, etc. This area will require urgent attention. For, inspite of growing complementarities and policy framework to support ECDC, unless there is an adequate institutional framework pertaining to the information services, India and the African countries may not be able to fully exploit the available opportunities in this area. Instead, the African countries may find themselves cheated by missing a relatively cheaper source of project implementation, the source that also falls in line with the "Lagos Plan" strategy.

INDIAN INITIATIVES

Some steps have recently been taken by India to overcome the handicaps such as these and meet with the exigencies of the resource crunch. India has become a member of African Development Bank which was set up in August 1963 under the aegis of the UN Economic Commission for Africa and that of African Development Fund established by the Bank in 1972,

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with its share of contribution amounting to 2.5 million Bank Unit of Account, i.e., Rs. 27.05 million (payments made by 1985 were Rs. 16.2 million) and 27.65 million Fund Unit of Account, i.e. Rs. 286.43 million (payment made by 1985 was Rs. 203.73 million), respectively. This enables India to participate in the projects financed from the above sources. Similarly, India is exploring matters relating to sub-contracting in respect of projects funded from the European Development Fund (EDF), as also contracting in the case of projects financed through the European Investment Bank for which international tendering is allowed. Besides, a number of European contractors have already shown interest to associate Indian firms in African projects on sub-contracting basis, as they find such an association economically relevant, involving relatively lower costs.

India is further pursuing the interested Indian business houses to register with the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for their participation in BADEA funded projects in Africa. During the 1970s, the Bank had advanced loans amounting to some US $ 400 million to more than 50 projects and has become a vital link in the chain of Arab aid to non-Arab Africa, which is already reported to have totalled around US $ 3 billion by 1982. Added to this, if we include aid from the same sources to Arab Africa, the total Arab aid to Africa is reported to be of the order of US $ 9 billion over the period of 1975-82.[24] These are certainly sound steps in this direction, but this would mean only cutting a tip of the iceberg. Much more will have to be done if the joint ventures and project-prospecting in the African countries have to perform a lead economic role not only in further strengthening India-Africa economic relations, but becoming a major operational strategy to internalise the engine of growth within the southern hemisphere, by creating a lasting arrangement for a continuing expansion of trade among themselves. This is, therefore, the time to think of promoting project-prospecting, joint-ventures, or rather the whole question of "production cooperation" with the African countries as a distinct proposition.

The whole question is one of redesigning the contours of international division of labour in favour of larger South-South interaction than what is obtained under the traditional order rooted in the colonial pattern of development. Hence, Indo-African joint-ventures and project-prospecting, etc., will have to be encouraged and promoted in a special way even though, from a short term point of view, it may not always be a positive-sum-game and may be, to begin with, it produces negative results in regard to certain areas and certain measures. But, once we are convinced about the potentialities of growing production complementarities we may as well provide supporting funding structures, since the financial resource crunch has been a major lacuna in this field indeed.

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India being itself a developing country cannot in any way provide, on its own, large funds at the present stage of its development. It will be legitimate as such to avail of every opportunity of obtaining funds on a selective bilateral or trilateral basis as mentioned above. But it is also time to consider a proposition to establish a separate "Africa" wing in organisations such as Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank), Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation (ECGC), Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO), Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). Their major function would be to promote and monitor India's trading and other forms of "production cooperation" with the African countries in the matter of development funding and other related matters.

Regarding the question of underwriting risks involved in promoting such projects, organisations like ECGC should be more considerate to African countries. This author believes that their case has to be differentiated from other developing countries. In an unpublished paper on "Export Credit Insurance for African Countries—Some Major Issues and Policy Alternatives," the General Manager ECGC, N.M. Chordia refers to the rising claims on ECGC relating to the corporation's underwriting business concerning African countries. He writes : 'The magnitude of our involvement in Africa can be gauged from the fact that of Rs. 988 million paid by us so far towards claims on account of country risks, as much as Rs. 970 million related to African countries; the claims worth millions of rupees are expected to materalise in the next few years. In this context, the continuation of liberal underwriting policy becomes inconsistent with the corporation's objective of working on "no profit, no loss" basis even on a long-term basis.'[25] The above explanation does not appear to be adequate. Rather, we have to think in terms of some innovative methods—such as counter guarantee arrangements in a given host country, etc., or even be prepared to write off such losses as aid to the host country and earn goodwill in return.

Since the whole exercise is conducted in accordance with the principle of collective self-reliance, such "aid" provision will contribute towards laying the foundation of the ECGC system by linking, for mutual benefit, the African countries and India. By a collective endeavour on these lines, they could together utilise their large markets and vast unexploited natural resources. Some African countries are too small but most of them have now formed groups, like ECOWAS, SADCC, PTA, IOC (Indian Ocean Commission), etc. As groups, they could avail of the advantages linked with large markets and enjoy economies of scale accruing from large-scale operating industries. As mentioned earlier, were India and a given African group to act in unison, there would now be greater scope for setting up large Indo-African joint ventures that require large markets to make such projects viable.

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To sum up, the organisations like IIFT and ITC have done some work in identifying products for joint-ventures in Africa, country-wise. We have, however, underlined that our enquiry aims at a systems approach for building, over time, a cooperative framework which would collectively secure for the two regions—India and the African countries—a more favourable position in the global capital accumulation process. We have highlighted, in this connection, the role of emerging production complementarities but, more importantly, we have identified the sector-wise and sub-sector wise areas wherein the application of complemental factor inputs like capital, relevant technology, manpower and management skills will have a much wider impact in terms of obtaining, over time, a durable and lasting basis of economic and technical cooperation between the African countries and India. The core functioning of "production co-operation"—be it by way of project prospecting, joint-ventures or any other related activity—should therefore, be related to such sectors and such areas.

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SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA : SOME ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

By ANIRUDHA GUPTA*

Two diametrically opposite views have been advanced on the subject of sanctions against South Africa. One supports sanctions on the ground that, 1. sanctions will facilitate the end of apartheid *and 2. timely imposition of sanctions can avoid an all-out racial blood-bath in Southern Africa. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has been the foremost advocate of this argument. In his address at the Harare Summit of the Non-aligned Movement, 2-6 September 1986, he reiterated that 'sanctions could yet bring a relatively peaceful transition to racial equality and majority rule. Else, unprecedented violence would mow down a multitude of the finest flowers of South Africa.'[1] Opposing this view others argue that, 1. sanctions are immoral; 2. they will hurt South Africa's blacks more than the whites and 3. that at any rate sanctions are impracticable. The champion of this "no-sanction-business" is Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who observed towards the close of the Commonwealth Meeting that sanctions would only harm the blacks and frontline states and so she would not like to be accused of causing 'greater hardship to the people of South Africa.'[2] Mrs Thatcher also warned that imposition of sanctions would hurt the British economy as well as render some 250,000 British workers jobless. In addition to giving a new angle to the sanction debate, she obviously picked up this theme to impress the British voters.*

SUCCESS OF PRO-SANCTIONS CAMP

A review of the relative strength of these two opposing camps shows that the pro-sanctions camp has won hands-down. Support for sanctions has spread far and beyond the range of African and non-aligned countries. At its June meeting in Paris, the European Community decided that 'in the next three months, the Community will enter into consultation with the other industrialized countries on further measures which might be needed, covering in particular a ban on new investments, the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa.'[3] The Community agreed to stall action till September on the British plea that Pretoria be given one more chance to negotiate reforms. This resulted in British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe's fruitless visit to South Africa in late August 1986, described by Lord Fenner Brockway as "a colossal humiliation."[4]

* Dr. Gupta is Professor African Studies and Dean at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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At the Commonwealth Meeting held in London between 3 and 6 August, Mrs Thatcher's stand came under attack from the other six members.[5] On the eve of his departure for London, Australia's Prime Minister, Bob Hawke asserted that "peremptory dismissal" of Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission would intensify pressure in Europe for effective measures against Pretoria.[6] The Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, was more forthright and called for a Commonwealth initiative on sanctions. As a result, despite British reservations, the Commonwealth Mini Summit agreed to initiate a package of economic actions against South Africa. These included a ban on all new bank loans to the South African public and private sectors; a ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel, and withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa, except for their own nationals or third countries to whom they rendered consular service.[7]

Notwithstanding its dissenting stand, the British Government agreed to impose limited sanctions on a voluntary basis, i.e., a ban on new investment, a moratorium on the promotion of tourism to South Africa and acceptance of any EEC decision to ban imports from South Africa.[8]

NAM'S Economic Measures

Backed by such impressive steps in favour of sanctions, the Eighth Summit of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) at Harare, held in September 1986, unanimously adopted a charter of economic measures against South Africa.[9] The range of sanctions was extended to cover vital sectors of the South Africnn economy and, for the first time, NAM agreed to work out a plan of action to support the Frontline States because of their total dependence on South Africa for supply routes, transport and energy.[10]

American Senate Calls for Limited Sanctions

It may take some time for the Harare decisions to mature and to be translated into action. But in the meanwhile other dramatic developments have taken place; in mid-September the American Senate passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution calling for selective sanctions, which in effect endorsed the stand originally taken by the House of Representatives. The Senate-sponsored measures offered a package of "targeted" sanctions including a ban on fresh US investment in South Africa; stoppage of coal, steel, uranium and textile imports from South Africa, and a ban on South African planes from landing in America.[11]

With such a measure of support in both Houses of the Congress, it is more than likely that the United States' Administration would either accept the Congressional initiative or formulate its own proposals to punish South Africa.[12]

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IMPLICATIONS OF SANCTIONS

The debate over sanctions thus seems to have shifted its focus : it is no longer the desirability of sanctions that is in dispute; what is still to be ascertained is whether or not sanctions will carry out fundamental changes in South Africa and Namibia without incurring large scale violence. Any answer to the question will depend on many imponderables *viz.*, Would sanctions divide or unite the White electorate in South Africa ? Would a sizeable section of the Whites begin to exert pressure on Botha's Nationalist Government and force it to abandon *apartheid* ? On the other hand, would sanctions help South Africa's Black majority to fight *apartheid* on more determined lines or would they succumb to collective demoralization ?

A Complement to Armed Struggle

These are the imponderables on which no firm opinion can be hazarded. But there are certain related issues that must nevertheless be emphasized. First, we must make our minds clear about the objectives of sanctions. If sanctions are expected to supplant the foundation of racist power in South Africa, then we might as well treat them as a lost case. For sanctions are meant to supplement and not to replace the armed struggle the Africans are waging against the racist regime in Pretoria. In the long run, no amount of outside intervention (short of armed intervention) can break the back of *apartheid*; the end of racist power in South Africa must ultimately depend an the strength of the anti-apartheid struggle *inside* South Africa. The purpose of sanctions, therefore, can only be, 'to assist the black majority in their struggle.'[13]

To determine the immediate impact of sanctions, it is necessary that we point out the specificities in the South African situation. The first specific is that sanctions are aimed against a "House" that is already divided.[14] South Africa is neither Fascist Italy of the pre-war period, nor is it Israel where any external threat tends to unite the Jewish population on a war-footing. In the context of South Africa, sanctions can only widen the divide between Blacks and Whites; pressed by economic hardship the White minority may become more insular and resentful of external pressure, just as in the wake of sanctions the Blacks may feel more confident about the world's active involvement in their struggle.

Economic Repercussions

In the immediate future, the Blacks may face greater economic hardship, unemployment and even dispersal from the cities. But a wholesale destabilization of the Black population may also lead to spontaneous violence which the regime would like to avoid, particularly in view of its

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strained resources to maintain law and order in the country. For the sake of its own survival, the regime would prefer to contain African unrest even as sanctions begin to bite the country's economy.

In two other aspects, sanctions may hit the racist government. First is the paradox of a relatively advanced industrialized society which faces an acute shortage of skilled labour precisely because of its racist policies. The rate of South Africa's industrial-manufacturing growth demands a continuous supply of high level technicians, engineers, craftsmen, etc., which the White community alone cannot supply. This need also cannot be met by the new immigrants who are mostly non-skilled Whites.[15] The problem will become more acute as a larger number of White professionals and technicians leave the country thereby making the economy more dependent on skilled labour available among the Blacks. Over the past 5-6 years, Black Africans have increasingly filled the technical, middle management and professional positions. The enormous growth of Black education has on the other hand facilitated the emergence of a middle occupational group of Blacks who know that the South African Administration cannot dispense with their services simply because it cannot expect a continuous flow of White immigrants.[16]

Paradoxically, education 'has become a focus of protest and militant mobilization.'[17] It is from among the educated Africans that leaders have sprung up to lead the urban Blacks against *Afrikaner* racism. In a recent poll of Black opinion in South Africa 90 per cent urban Blacks were found to be totally opposed to emergency and an overwhelming majority in support of sanctions.[18] In the final phase of assault against *apartheid*, therefore, this class of educated Africans can be expected to play a vanguard role in mobilizing the Blacks against repression and economic dislocation.[19]

At this point we may turn to examine the peculiarities of the South African economy. In some ways South Africa has shown rapid advance in its industrial-manufacturing sector. The share of manufacturing today stands at 24.2 per cent GNP as against mining which is 14.2 per cent and agriculture only 6 per cent.[20] But this does not mean that manufacturing in South Africa has become self-generating in terms of either capital accumulation or industrial output. Leaving aside the state-run heavy industries (coal, iron and steel) manufacturing in the private sector has remained limited to light-industries, food processing and consumer goods. The peculiarity of such a development has been that by keeping the heavy industries under state control, South Africa aims at raising enough revenue from mining, foreign capital and trade to sustain and expand its manufacturing capacity.[21] The role of the state has been that of generating surplus capital by way of 1) inviting foreign investors in the mining and manufacturing sector, 2) raising revenue from profits and dividends as well as 3) determining the priority sectors for foreign investment. The semi-colonial

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character of the South African economy is, therefore, obvious. What the state really wants is to achieve a stage of rapid industrialization so as to become at some point, independent of external apparatuses. In this sense, South Africa is actually using the profits generated by the mining industry to build the base of state capitalism.[22] But the expansion of manufacturing industries notwithstanding, South Africa still remains heavily dependent on import of intermediate and capital goods, whereas its own exports classified as manufactured are highly processed agricultural and mineral products.

Herein lies the significance of the linkage between foreign capital and the *Afrikaner* path of capitalist development. The linkage itself mirrors the vulnerability of South Africa on two counts. Notwithstanding rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector, it is mining that accounts for the surplus capital as also 60 per cent share of the country's export earnings. Further, this 60 per cent share depends overwhelmingly on the export of gold and diamonds. The role of gold in the South African economy is overwhelming. It raises on an average 40-50 per cent of South Africa's export earnings; meets 50 per cent of total South African imports; fetches a high price in the world market so as to keep the country's balance of trade even and meet major commitments under external debt. The crucial role of this single commodity can be measured by the fact that any fall in gold production and prices can slice down the country's GNP which during most of the 1970s showed a phenomenal growth of 8 per cent per annum.[23] The relative importance of gold among other items of export can be seen from the table below.[24]

TABLE 1

Exports (million Rand)	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*
Gold	6,002.4	9,774.8	9,790.8
Others (food, minerals, chemicals, machinery etc.)	8,808.7	10,140.6	8,338.6

Dependence on foreign trade runs parallel to South Africa's need for foreign investment. Specially crititical has been the role of foreign banks which have mobilized international credits for the *apartheid* regime during its most critical phase.[25] For South Africa such inflow of capital is a must in order to expand its manufacturing sector, pay for capital imports, and secure long-term planning to its priority sectors. Any cut in the flow of foreign loan or larger fluctuation of commodity prices in the world market can grievously affect the economy.

To a great extent the behaviour of foreign banks depends on their independent assessment of the regime's capabilities to ensure safe return on

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their investments in the country. This assessment does not necessarily follow the lead given by official agencies nor does it endorse western stock-taking of the South African situation based on mainly non-economic lines. Accordingly, whenever there is an outbreak of violence or industrial unrest, foreign capital tends to flow out of South Africa, while it may flow back if confidence in the capabilities of the regime to control urban Blacks returns.

APPRAISAL

A review of the period 1959-84 thus shows an interesting pattern. a) Between 1959-64 there was a net outflow of capital because of political unrest resulting in the Sharpeville killings of March 1960. b) The period 1964-76 witnessed, on the other hand, inflow of loans and investments as the regime stabilized itself and even extended military support across the borders to the Portuguese troops and Ian Smith's breakaway government in Rhodesia. c) In 1976, Portuguese rule collapsed and in the wake of an intermittent civil war in Angola, South Africa's largest black township of Soweto erupted into violence. For 3-4 years, a sharp fall-off in private investment forced the authorities to impose an import surcharge to protect the balance of payments. d) By 1980, however, the situation changed. With the enunciation of the Reagan doctrine of "constructive engagement", the volume of US bank lending increased by 700 per cent.[26] This flow of direct foreign investment stabilized South Africa's balance of payments position, with revenues standing at Rs. 4,746 million in February 1983.[27]

The inter-linkage of economics with politics is also illustrated by the fact that foreign bankers fight shy of longer involvement in South Africa unless they are assured by their own governments about the Republic's political future. By its policy of "constructive engagement" USA gave implicit approval of South Africa's military aggression on the Frontline States, while the short-term results of such military adventures helped boost President Botha's image of a strongly entrenched leader in power. What really neither the United States' nor South African rulers had anticipated was the sudden explosion of Black anger all over the country. Instead of dying out under the attack of brute force (as had the revolt of school children in 1976), Black opposition to the regime showed an altogether new mood of defiance. People came out in the streets and attacked security pickets; Blacks organized spontaneous demonstrations, while mining and factory workers staged strikes on an unprecedented scale. The revolt took new form ; a larger number of Blacks embraced jail in defiance of the Emergency Laws.[28] In June 1986, after a brief spell, when a second state of emergency was imposed to crush the Black revolt, African trade unions organized a day's nation-wide strike which was unheard of in South African history. Simultaneously, the Blacks began boycotting retail shops

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owned by Europeans; the multi-racial United Democratic Front (UDF) continued political agitation in defiance of police terror, while the Church mobilized followings in both cities and rural areas to defy *apartheid* in larger numbers under the charismatic leadership of Bishop Tutu.[29]

The cycle of political disturbances created panic among foreign bankers. In July 1985, the Chase Manhatten Bank (US) which had been a major banker of South Africa, declared it would freeze unused credit lines and withdraw short-term credits as they matured. Other major US banks decided to follow the example and reduce their short-term South African loans, estimated at $ 2 billion, primarily to the private sector. Following this, Barclay's Bank of London announced that it would make no further loans to South Africa until political difficulties were resolved.[30]

This forced South Africa to declare a moratorium on the repayment of principals on its foreign debt. But failure to defuse tension and the imposition of emergency only helped to reinforce the impression that the South African crisis was destined to be a long-running one. As a result foreign banks refused Pretoria's request for rescheduling its external debt of $ 22 billion.[31] Despite South African attempts to raise emergency loans foreign banks remained cagey. Above all they argued more pointedly than before that the political climate in South Africa must return to normalcy before any steps to meet the South African request were considered.

The dominant role of external capital on the South African economy is thus clear. Indeed, whatever the language of defiance Pretoria uses against the rest of the world, it nevertheless has to take account of this sensitivity. Above all it must take steps to ensure the flow of money, technology and capital goods to run and administer *apartheid*. By its very nature this has become a costly affair since the high standard of living to which the Whites are used must at any rate be maintained or else *apartheid* would lose its own justification.

It is here that we can see how the spread of Black unrest will affect South Africa's external supporters. If Black opposition makes the machine of *apartheid* inoperative foreign capital will decide to move out. As two authors jointly argue : 'Western capital can only support South Africa so long as Black opposition is below the threshold of sustained violence. Continuous disturbances of the type now under way will therefore cut South Africa off from most of the external sources that have bolstered the White regime.'[32]

Against this background, the campaign for sanctions gains added significance. External pressure on President Botha's Government may perhaps cause new alignments among the Europeans : the manufacturing and trading community would rather like to bring about liberalizing reforms with emphasis on cooperation with the African National Congress (ANC) leaders. It is noteworthy that Gavin Rally, head of the giant

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Anglo-American Mining Corporation led in 1985 a team of White South Africans to Zambia for talks with ANC President Oliver Tambo. Rally's call for release of Nelson Mandela was welcomed by other leading businessmen, including heads of the biggest Sugar Corporation, the main retail chain stores and the Southern Africa division of the large oil company.[33] Within the Nationalist Party, new fissures may occur with some joining the extreme right-wing groups led by Dr. Treurnicht, while some others may stray further to join the UDF and press for reforms. In the meanwhile, sanctions will erode external proppings of the regime and, as a sequence, political resistance of the Blacks will acquire a critical dimension.

But this still does not mean that sanctions will avoid bloodshed or secure a peaceful change of rulers in Pretoria. From all accounts it appears that Botha's Government has embarked on a course of collision both with its external and domestic "enemies." Botha has declared that he would not bend under external pressures : 'We have the faith and inherent ability to ensure our future. South Africa will not crawl before any one.'

The system of *apartheid* has faced the problem of survival right from its inception ; but its position was never as critical as it has now become. With no alternative in hand, the National Party adopted only one method which in *Afrikaans* is called *Kragdadighsid*, forcefulness. This means, brutal suppression of Blacks by police terror, attack by hired mercenaries and inciting inter-tribal war, and clubbing the neighbouring states with bombings and raids to force them into submission. On both counts it depends heavily on the fighting capacity of its security and armed forces. Since the middle of the 1970s the Republic's defence budget rose steeply to 700 million Rand and by 1976 it doubled. In 1981-82 it rose 40 per cent to almost 2.5 million Rand and in 1982-83 it totalled more than 3 billion Rand. In addition to being a police-state, South Africa turned itself into a well-oiled war machine.

Not only has the spending on the military budget increased manifold, the role of the military too has become all-powerful in running the system. In the words of an observer, militarization in South Africa has become 'an all—embracing social activity involving major institutional shifts within and between the public and private sectors of society, new dimensions in state power, and new psychologies in the proces of interaction between state and society.'[34]

In case therefore, sanctions fail to persuade Botha's Government to start negotiating with the Black organizations, especially the ANC, then they are bound to push the *Afr ikaner laager* to the other extreme of total confrontation with Africa and the world. Indeed a military take over with the support of right-wing civilians and the bureaucracy cannot be ruled out.

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Alternatively, 'The future could conceivably see a continuation or acceleration of what some analysts graphically describe as the "creeping *coup*" in current South African politics - a growing but gradual and low-key penetration of the military into key public decision-making bodies and into the social institution and collective psychologies of the White body politic.'[35] Such a turn would certainly involve South Africa into larger armed conflict with its neighbours and the Black majority at home. The South African armed forces have already tasted blood and they would not hesitate to carry out their wholesale carnage of the population both within and outside its borders.

Also, one cannot dismiss reports about South Africa's nuclear capability. As yet neither the Africans nor the non-aligned nations have achieved a nuclear deterrence to South Africa's nuclear threat. Perhaps the need for such a deterrence may not arise ; but even as one presses forward with sanctions and pledges economic aid to the Frontline countries, possibilities of a military confrontation with the beleagured citadel of White Power cannot be discounted altogether.

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ISSUES, CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF POVERTY IN NIGERIA

By NAJEEM ADE-LAWAL*

Administrators usually prefer to think of themselves as "men of action." Perhaps they are. But one thing is certain, namely, that every decision arrived at by such men of public affairs is informed by their own "theories" of the phenomenon – to which the policies and measures deriving from it are addressed. And this is so even when the administrators fail to make explicit the theoretical basis of their decisions. It is so even when they themselves are not fully and consciously aware of the theories that they are using. Furthermore, any policy decision is only as good as the theory which informed its formulations; and wrong theories of a problem can produce only wrong "diagnosis" of it and wrong decisions as to how to deal with it. This is true whether the particular problem in question is lung cancer or mass poverty.[1]

The most serious social problem undermining progress in the world today is poverty. It has emerged as an important social issue in many developed and developing countries. Yet, it is difficult to say that an end of the war against poverty is in sight. Rowntree and Lavers argued, that the policies of the welfare state—full employment, provision for emergencies and so on—had almost entirely eradicated "primary poverty" in Britain where the war on poverty has gone on longest.[2] *It is also true to say that the basic structure of economic and social relations which generates poverty as a by-product of its normal functioning has remained largely unscathed in the prolonged campaign.*

This paper will assume three considerations contrary to conventional notions, that (1) a particular power configuration in the past provided the social setting of the current poverty structure; (2) the present structure of power determines the nature and effectiveness of poverty policies; and (3) that successful elimination depends on the future of power constellations in the country.

WHAT IS "POVERTY"?

Perhaps the only consensus among scholars on the definition and measurement of "poverty" is that the phenomenon is very difficult and very elusive to define and measure. As Zweig points out, 'It is easier to speak of poverty than to define it.'[3] This has often led many scholars to proceed with analysis without identifying the problem, hiding under the

*Dr. Lawal is at the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos Nigeria.

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guise that we all know what "poverty" is or who the "poor" are. However, for the measurement of poverty, Zweig used three standards, *viz*: personal or individual standards, social standards and scientific standards. Malthus and Richards recognized the problem in determining the "standard of life" line for their population analysis. This raises the question of determining the absolute minimum for human survival. The possible answer for this could be found in the medical nutritional standards similar to Zweig's scientific standard of poverty. However, according to Dandekar and Rath, if an individual is not able to have a diet which has an adequate intake of calories, he, according to them is below the poverty line.[4] Galbraith, also considers poverty in part to be a physical matter. According to him those afflicted have such limited and insufficient food, such poor clothing, such crowded, cold and dirty shelters that life is painful as well as comparatively brief.[5]

The evolution of thinking may be better understood by the use of a simple typology divided into three distinct categories:

1) the subjective approach;
2) the statistical, sometimes called relative approach; and
3) the subsistence or poverty line approach, sometimes called the absolute approach.

The subjective approach has often been adopted by the less quantitative disciplines. The central argument seems to be that poor persons are mostly responsible for their own condition since an individual's location in the society's hierachy of income and wealth is presumed to be determined, above all, by his motivations, aptitudes and abilities. No one would wish to deny the possible relevance of individual attributes to the question of where man ends up in the society's status hierachy, only that individual attributes normally operate only within a structure of possibilities and within limits which are set and defined by forces very well beyond the individual. In every society, such forces are determined by the prevailing system of property, class relations and power.

The statistical approach to the definition of poverty consists of two methods. While some scholars use the arithmetic mean to determine the poverty line and regard as poor anyone who earns less than average income of total population, others classify the total population into income classes and regard as poor anyone in the lower third, fifth or tenth class of the income distribution. Here the poverty line is explicitly accepted as subject to dynamic changes and hence poverty becomes not a physical or physiological situation as such, but as simple statistical ordering. On this plane, poverty cannot be an absolute state, since society is itself always changing and generating new products, new processes, new states and new horizon of wants.

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The main objection to this approach is that it perpetuates poverty, in that regardless of the absolute income of an individual poverty will persist and remain with us for so long as inequality persists, since some proportion of the population must fall below the statistical mean or the lowest third, fifth or tenth as the case may be.

Another problem, though not peculiar to this approach, especially for developing and predominantly agricultural countries like Nigeria, is the difficulty of determining peoples' incomes for classification purposes. The majority of Nigerians are not in wage employment but are either self employed or employed in the formal sector and it is difficult to estimate their incomes.[6] For the above reasons, this approach offers no visible solution to poverty.

The subsistence or poverty line identifies some basic needs of man and the minimum amount of money required to procure goods and services to satisfy the need. A classic case in Nigerian experience is the Morgan Commission which sets the national minimum wage currently being operated at N 125 in the formal sector. Once the "line" has been established, then poverty is a simple specification of scoring a value less than the prescribed norm. This approach may also be said to be relative because the question of what constitutes subsistence or where to draw the line arises. Who determines the subsistence level? On what basis? Basic needs differ from one individual to another and from one society to another. They also vary with time. The definition can therefore only be relative and limited to specific places and time. As Marshall noted early in the century, 'the basic needs of people are largely culturally determined, and since there is no universal culture, there can be no universal definition of subsistence or the poverty line.'[7] Furthermore, if we wish to determine food requirement in terms of calorie needs, nutritionists would be quick to point out that people's tastes differ and that there are more than one way of satisfying the calorie need of individuals.

Let me here enter some final reservations concerning the various theories of inequality/and or poverty which have been mentioned and discussed above. The first reservation is that they have all been formulated within the framework of the particular ideological predilections and moral preferences of the proponents. At least, each of them is founded on a number of unstated meta-theories concerning what constitutes tolerable inequality in society, what level of deprivations amounts to poverty, how far should society go in subordinating the interests and aspirations of the individual to its own, how far should government interfere with the free play of market forces in order to ensure greater distributive equity and to minimize the extent of poverty in society, and so on It is here, suffice to say, that it is difficult to come across value-free theories of poverty.

The other reservation is that the various theories reviewed are not comprehensive and tailored to fit all cases to such an extent as to absolve

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us from the responsibility to study and get to understand the phenomenon of poverty, together with its various cultural and other implications as these are manifested in the society.

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT POVERTY STRUCTURE

The genesis of Nigeria's poverty reveals that the problem is not a tautological question of "a country is poor because it is poor" or due to some fatalistic "vicious circle of poverty."[8] The fundamental issues involve the structure of relations of production in the country.

The implication of the analysis so far are :

1) Poverty is man made;
2) Poverty is not an original state of mankind but a historical moment in the development of man's productive activity and accumulation, and
3) The phenomenon of poverty is a consequence of man's alienation from the means of production and the products of his labour by his fellow men, leading to inability to procure basic needs as defined at any historical era.

The emphasis has been placed on insufficiency of basic needs arising from man's social relations of production and not from an inability to conquer nature. It also involves a disparity in power positions which enables the dominant group to expropriate surplus products from the other members of the society.

Poverty in Pre-colonial Nigeria

There has been a juxtaposition of three modes of production in pre-colonial Nigeria: communal, slave and feudal in that order of historical development. To what extent did poverty exist with these three modes of production or historical stages? According to Onimode, the early communal mode of production was characterized by the lineage, clan or tribe as the unit of social organization and the family as the unit of social production. 'At this time, the peoples of Nigeria consisted mainly of pastoralists in the North and hunters/agriculturalists in the middle and southern belts of the country. The basic means of production in this case are land and labour, generally owned jointly by all the social groups.'[9] Under such communal ownership of the means of production, 'the relations of production arising from these productive forces were cooperative rather than antagonistic.'[10] It meant then that 'mutual help, cooperative production and obligation to the group governed production

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relations.'[11] At this time also whatever divisions in labour input that occurred were based purely on sex and age.[12] They were mutual and complementary.

> Among the pastoral peoples, able-bodied men herded the animals, women and old men engaged in possible cultivation, while women reared the children and cooked. Among the agriculturalists, men cleared the land, cultivated crops, prepared cloth from the bark of trees and fashioned implements for farming and hunting, while women and old men reared the children and prepared food. These masculine functions were often divided among age groups.

It must also be noted that during this pre-colonial communal mode of production,

> social and political distinctions and divisions were on a generational basis. Basically, the social structure was egalitarian. Material distinctions between families were of little significance. Power was exercised by a Council of Elders and, where chiefs existed, they were not initially hereditary, but were elected and removed democratically.[13]

The gerentocratic principle that conferred power and status on elders was devoid of antagonistic class relations. Indeed there were no classes and class struggles. That is to say, there was no poverty and no poor people.

This point is being emphasized in order to correct the erroneous impression that the direct struggle between man and nature in which some people are ill-equipped to tackle many problems of their environment is poverty. It becomes poverty, or what is specifically known as "underdevelopment," if such inadequacy is consequent on structural relationships with other groups as occurred between the industrialized nations and the Third World.[14] Inadequacy *per se* is not poverty especially which afflicts everyone in society. Poverty arises when there is enough or even surplus to go round but the surplus is expropriated by some people thereby creating inadequacy among some others.

The point about "surplus" is important because it properly locates poverty within a historical context. It links poverty with social inequality and shows how the poor are by-products of historical developments in the forces of production.

The emergence of the slave and feudal modes of production illustrates the views expressed above. As Anikpo noted:

> At different points in time and in different ways (conquests, cultural assimilation, surplus expropriation, etc.), various Nigerian communities developed monarchical feudal institutions in which hereditary

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posts and titles created dominant and aristocratic noblement; in reality or symbolically the prerogative of the King as the accredited symbol and representative of the people. Sharing the privileges of land ownership were subordinate chiefs appointed by the King to physically represent him in the peripheral district's of the "empire." By virtue of their being deprived of land other citizens became tenants who must produce enough food to support themselves and their landlords.[14]

What happened was that as the lineages enlarged in population and the need for more land to grow crops and graze cattle increased, conflicts and wars over land between neighbouring communities set in. People who were captured during these wars were compelled by their captors to engage in production for others and on land that did not belong to them, while the conquerors organized further military exploits and captured territory and its inhabitants. In this way, the worthwhile communal formations were transformed into "military democracies"[15] organized around slave labour. Onimode also notes that in many other places and at different times 'this transition also led to the introduction of feudal features such as bondage, dispersal of authority, emergence of a military class and forms of state.'[16] These features created a dominant ruling class with hereditary chieftancy of kinship positions. Although some features of the communal society such as the communal land tenure system persisted, its predominantly egalitarian character was replaced with a hierachical structure that thrived on inequality and antagonistic relations. In practice, the community owned land and individuals held parts of it in trust. But the King or Chief, in principle owned the entire territory over which his authority spanned. While his domestic slaves worked for him directly in the vast hectare of land he physically controlled, members of the community paid tributes to him in recognition of his symbolic ownership of the entire territory. These were the free peasants, and the process by which they were drawn into this assymetrical exchange relationship with powerful monarchs and manipulators of state authority is referred to as *peasantisation*.

Poverty in Colonial and Post-Colonial Nigeria

The colonial encounter extensively altered the norms, values and social structure of the Nigerian traditional society. Starting with a gradual "monetisation of the traditional economies," it incorporated Nigeria into the orbit of the world capitalist system and matured into imperialist exploitation of Nigeria's economic resources.[17] European commercial activity in colonial Nigeria gave rise to the development of infrastructural facilities like rail lines, roads, inland waterways for the evacuation of cash crops and mineral deposits gathered at different points all over the

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country. These communication networks facilitated migrations of both Europeans and Nigerians to different sections of the country.

Initially, new urban settlements of migrants engaged in economic activities in industrial enterprises developed in areas with mineral deposits and at seaports. The expansion of trade and commerce further gave rise to industrialised urban settlements in areas of administrative and commercial convenience. It is necessary to remark that these new urban cities differed significantly from the more traditional cities in a feudal social formation. They became heterogenous in character, sustained their activities on an industrial capitalist mode of production, and thrived on a political power base provided by European military and technological superiority.

The presence in the urban areas of the power brokers drew all attention to the cities. Capital intensive projects were sited in them. Extra-structural facilities, including markets, were developed and exotic social values and practices flourished. It became fashionable for people to move from the neglected rural sectors to the new urban cities.

Why and how they moved are the subject of numerous researches which are not within the scope of this analysis. Suffice it to say that in the new colonial formation, some of the rural cultivators and peasants had been incorporated into a new class of wage earners in the new industrial establishments and the colonial administrative bureaucracy, whereas in the pre-colonial economic system, the social relations of production had created a dominant and exploitative class of land and slave owners as against an oppressed class of peasants and slaves. The colonial and post-colonial systems created a similar dichotomy of an exploitative European and Nigerian class of capitalists as against an indigenous proletariat. By the end of the colonial period, an indigenous *petit bourgeois* group had emerged mainly through the acquisition of colonial educational skills. It is this *petit-bourgeois* group, 'who for reasons of self-interest led the struggle against colonialism'[18] with the aid of the proletarian working class. When Nigeria became independent in 1960, this *petit-bourgeois* group acquired the same class position as the Europeans they displaced. Like the colonizers too, they wielded tremendous economic and political power. The irony however is that while they sought and annihilated colonialism, they later began to manipulate their power in ways that sustained colonial poverty through proletarianization. Since then, Britain has continued to support and nurture the *petit bourgeois* group in a framework of neo-colonialism in order to protect its vast economic and financial empire in Nigeria. This neo-colonial policy of maintaining *status quo* has produced an alliance of interest and mutual collaboration between the foreign and demostic capitalist. It is no longer a unilateral matter, since the domestic *bourgeosie* act largely as intermediaries between the foreign capitalists and the national population in this neo-colonial pillage.

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This is what has produced the policies which generate and perpetuate mass poverty in Nigeria. As Nkrumah noted, the causal factors in the crisis of contemporary poverty in Nigeria originated in foreign capitalist domination and exploitation and the domestic capitalist class structure they created and the neo-colonial alliance of interests forged between the foreign and domestic capitalist for the continued domination and exploitation of the rest of the country.[19]

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELIMINATION OF POVERTY

Having established that it is the neo-colonial collusion between foreign and domestic capitalists, which is based on a common purpose of exploitation and the domination of the rest of the country as the primary cause of mass poverty in Nigeria, it becomes obvious that the country has been polarized between the rich and poor, along neo-colonial capitalist lines. In this class stratification are members of the upper class and their subordinates in the middle class who constitute the privileged classes. They represent a small upper layer of Nigerian society; below them are the working class. They represent the poor in Nigeria. They are under-privileged with little or no education and barely any access to property or land. They have the poorest housing, diet and social security in the country. Their main source of income is the sale of their labour power or the meagre produce of their tiny plots.

The question one should ask here is, What kind of remedy shall we apply to clear the problem? Attempts will be made here to demonstrate that given the class base of the poverty problem, the so called anti-poverty programmes are either crippled from inception or hypocritical.

Writers have pointed to "income redistribution." The problem here is that the neo-colonial structure, property ownership and economic power tends to produce a pattern of income distribution that generates or perpetuates mass poverty and powerlessness among the masses. This means that programmes of income redistribution in Nigeria, such as progressive taxation, social security and the like, will not go far towards eliminating poverty. Their bankruptcy lies in their failure and, or refusal, to tackle the basic institution of private property together with the class dominance it generates.

The second observation is that in Nigeria, economic programmes are typically inspired and elaborated by the elite classes without mass participation. According to Onimode, in a capitalist society, the fundamental exploitative relations between the elite classes and the poor masses guarantee that economic programmes will inevitably consolidate the predominant economic and political power of the rich dominant classes and the exploitative interests of the imperialist collaborators.[20] Even when such

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programmes and policies are publicly declared to be in the interest of the poor, the main beneficiaries are the elite classes. This may be by design or default. Examples of such programmes that increase or perpetuate poverty in Nigeria include agricultural reforms and indigenisation programmes (in which agricultural credits go to the rich) which legitimizes capitalism among the domestic *bourgeoisie*; the so called poverty stricken people are not involved either in planning or implementation of the programmes. As a result, the programme of income/property redistribution in favour of the masses is negated.

Thirdly, as I have mentioned before, the various development plans have elaborated the concept of mixed-economy which is dominated by imperialists and the domestic *bourgeoisie*, while the middle class plays an uncomfortable second fiddle in the setting. Again the elite classes and their imperialist collaborators formulate and execute without the poor masses.

Thus, taken collectively, the economic programmes for the elimination of poverty in Nigeria are caught in the power implication of the very social forces that generate mass poverty.

REMARKS AND CONCLUSION

Mass poverty is not a question of "poverty begets poverty." It is a historical moment in the development of productive forces and involves a system of social inequalities arising from the social relations of production.

The masses remain powerless because they are powerless. This situation has strengthened the dominance of the elite classes with respect to the economic, political state and other categories of power. Given the above factors, the poor could not generate potentials for political unrest in the country. And unfortunately, economic programmes that the elite classes elaborated to eliminate poverty in Nigeria are typically biased in favour of the privileged classes.

The general conclusion thus emerges that while measures intended to boost overall national economic growth continued to be devised and implemented, it now seems very necessary that the war on poverty in Nigeria be pursued vigorously at the level of other crucial structural factors which systematically determine the distribution of power and of the national products. As the experience of many of the advanced capitalist countries suggests, less developed countries, and Nigeria particularly, in their anti-poverty campaign will have no choice but to adopt policies and measures which go very well beyond those normally associated with welfare capitalism.

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20 B. Onimode, n. 9.

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BURKINA-MALI WAR : IS NIGERIA STILL A REGIONAL POWER

By SEGUN JOHNSON*

Suddenly Burkina Faso and Mali were at war. 'Burkina was the aggressor! No, it was Mali.!' And the attack and counter-attack continued. For the man on the street, Nigeria moved in barely four days after the war had started and that is good enough. For a student of West African states' foreign policy, that was a late move for Nigeria, more so when the hopes of Nigeria's moves were dropped. For whatever the cause, Nigeria was expected to get the grasp of any crisis erupting in West Africa regardless of the countries involved—Francophones or Anglophones. Why? Authorities in the seventies had seen Nigeria in the subregion of West Africa as its "regional power." John Ostheimer, in 1973, wrote that '...Nigeria is now obviously the "giant of Africa" in a new sense...Nigeria... (is) the dominant power in the West Africa Region.'[1] Colin Legum in the same year wrote :

> *Nigeria is Africa's most important country—in size of population and in resources—as well as in trained people. Properly developed and with a properly functioning political system it could provide decisive leadership for the entire continent strong enough to consolidate a powerful organization embracing Anglophone and Francophone African States; militarily and economically strong enough to play a leading role in challenging the minority white regimes in Portuguese and Southern Africa and to provide more muscle for the OAU; and influential enough to strengthen the whole of Africa's relationships within the international community.*[2]

In the same vein, an American paper in 1977 summed it up thus : 'As the biggest, richest and most influential black African State, Nigeria has an evident capacity to reduce the prospect of great power involvement in an African quarrel and and an evident self interest in doing so.'[3]

But Nigeria did not react immediately to the Burkina-Mali crisis when it came into the open. Could it be that the impetus had gone or the ability had been reduced by internal problems? Attempts will be made to answer these important questions. For now, it is desirable to look at the remote and immediate causes of the border clash between the two warring states.

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* Mr. Johnson is Lecturer Political Science in the Faculty of Law and Humanities, Lagos State University, Ojo, Nigeria.

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GENESIS OF CONFLICT

UPPER VOLTA, now known as Burkina Faso was first created by the French colonialists in 1919 out of their exploits in West Africa. However, for reasons of administrative unviability the French divided the country into three parts in 1933, giving a part to Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger to administer. After the Second World War, France redrew the map of Upper Volta and recreated the country adjusting its boundaries in the north eastern area near a village called Ouadalan. By this act, France laid the basis of a dispute between the two states. This aspect had been detected as far back as 1960[4] when a joint commission was asked to look into the issue of possible border disputes between the two states. Suffice it to say that between 1960 and 1974, the commission held ten meetings without resolving the issue.

When in December 1974, Mali and Upper Volta had a border clash, observers called it the "war of the waterhole,"[5] for water supplies are very important to landlocked and sahelian states like Mali and Upper Volta. Other reasons adduced for this war were the unquantified deposits of manganese, titanium, cement limestone, oil and natural gas that were believed to be in the region and what had been described as "Malian jealousy"[6] over many of its nomads that fled the country to neighbouring countries especially Upper Volta, due to alleged maltreatment by the Malian Authorities. But the Malian official reaction was that the people of Ouadalan were essentially of the Malian tribe and argued that the French-drawn border inherited by the two countries did not reflect the true position of things on the ground. On the part of Upper Volta, officials claimed that the Organization for African Unity's Charter implored all African States to accept the colonial frontiers inherited at independence. This had always been the strongest point of Upper Volta and it was this point that broke the meeting of Presidents Mousa Traore of Mali and Sogoule Lamizana of Upper Volta on 4 Deeember 1974.

A historical appraisal shows that Ouadalan was from time immemorial a province of the Fulani Emirate of Liptako. However, in the 19th Century, it was invaded by the *Tuaregs* from the Timbuktu area of Mali. It was then that the name Ouadalan was given to the place after the blue tents used by the *Tuaregs* at their encampment outside Timbuktu. The French in their wisdom, drew the map of the area and gave Ouadalan to Upper Volta. During the 1974 War, the OAU quickly moved in and set up a commission of good offices in Lome which comprised the Presidents of Togo, Niger, Mali and Upper Volta to find an immediate and lasting solution to the dispute. An immediate solution was found but not a lasting one. Both warring parties agreed to a ceasefire but President Lamizana called for French arbitration and promised to abide by the ruling of their former colonial master.[7] The OAU Commission of Good Offices however

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turned down President Lamizana's request. It is noteworthy that apart from the Presidents of the two warring countries, the other two mediators were Francophone leaders. The successful temporary settlement was made at a time a Nigerian Head of State was the Chairman of the Organzation for African Unity.

Eventually, it was resolved that the two countries should submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.[8] Apart from this, Mali and Upper Volta agreed to set up a joint commission for co-operation with a view to promoting bilateral relations between them.[9] With all these, one would have thought all was well.

BURKINA-MALI WAR 1985

While the world was celebrating the 1985 Christmas, Malian soldiers were in their tanks crossing the 160 kilometers out of the common 1,000 kilometer border with Burkina Faso, killing and maiming as they moved. This time Mali claimed that Burkina Faso was the aggressor, for early in December 1985, Burkinabe officials escorted by armed military officials carried out a census in the region up to the Agacher strip. The version from Burkina Faso expectedly differerd; according to them, the fight was as a result of an "international plot"[10] to topple the left wing regime of Burkina leader Thomas Sankara and that the allegation that the war was foug ht for the control of minerals in the Agacher strip was'a smokescreen to hide the true designs of Bamako and several other capitals.'[11] Thus, ten years after the first war between the two states, the issue had moved from pure economic reason to political. This view was also supported by the French state-owned Development Research Institute (ORSTOM) in its explanation that the mineral wealth of the strip had been grossly exaggerated and that with the prevailing economic conditions of the two states, it was not advisable to exploit the large reserves of manganese deposits, bearing in mind the distance from the sea and the transport route.[12] Hence one sees reason with Thomas Sankara, moreso when the International Court of Justice was expected to give a ruling in June 1986. One may perhaps digress and look at the activities of Sankara since he assumed power.

Repercussions of Sankara's Ties with Libya

On coming to power, Sankara denounced all vestiges of neo-colonialism. He jailed many former leaders and ordered dissolution of some political institutions including the National Assembly. He associated with Gaddafi and initiated closer bilateral relations between the two countries. He was the only leader in French-speaking West Africa to refuse to attend the 1985 Franco-African Summit which he described as a French device for further new-colonialism. Suffice it to say that Sankara and other non-leftist

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governments of Ivory Coast—Mali in particular—and other West African States in general, had been viewing each other with scepticism. Moreso, when Sankara associated with Libya, which was occupying three out of the five riverain member states' territory, they were afraid to admit it openly for the fear of either reprisals from Libya or the lack of heavy military equipment to meet the Libyan forces.

Even though both Libya and Mali belong to the not-too-functioning association called "the Riverain Group," relations between them were not cordial because of differences in ideologies. Little wonder then, that the French appeal to Mali and Burkina Faso was promptly rebuked by Radio Tripoli warning France 'to refrain from intervening in African affairs'[13] and that the conflict was taking place because of its past colonial policy. Burkina Faso pre-empted Mali by accusing it of orchestrating an international press campaign against it and making allegations that Ouagadougou was receiving arms from Libya 'in order to frighten (Mali's) imperialist masters and obtain more arms' aid.[14] The Burkinabe Government also claimed that Mali had been assisted by an unnamed imperialist power in launching the attack on the country and that 'it is no longer a question of territorial claim but a direct open war between forces of reaction and revolution, between retrogression and the progressive Burkinabe Government.'[15] In its reaction, Mali denied the allegations and Radio Bamako described the Government of Burkina Faso as being led by 'thoughtless and misguided people.'[16]

Perhaps what should be of more concern to the two states is the weak state of their economies ; Mali and Burkina Faso are among the ten poorest states of the world. Mali with a population of 5.6 million and a land area of about 1.2 million square kilometres (land-locked) is about four times the size of Burkina Faso with a population of 5.9 million and a land area of 274,000 square kilometeres (also land-locked). At this juncture, it would be very pertinent to assess the role of Nigeria in the settlement of the dispute.

Nigeria Edged Out of Mediation Diplomacy

Though the war broke out on Christmas day 1985, hostilities had started earlier on 12 December. The Nigerian Foreign Minister did not get to Bamako and Ouagadougou until four days after the war had started. Meanwhile, Foreign Ministers of other neighbouring countries namely Libya, Algeria, and a representative of the PLO leader had already been there. Also, all the Ministers of the Non-Aggression and Defence Agency (ANAD) had been summoned at Abidjan to consider the issue. Even when Bolaji Akinyemi, the Nigerian Foreign Minister did go to Bamako and Ougadougou, he was really on his way to London and Washington selling out the economic recovery measures of his country's national budget for

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1986. On top of it, he had to team up with this counterparts from Libya to mediate between the two warring states.

Unaware of his country's diminishing power among the Francophone states in West Africa vis-a-vis the North African states, Akinyemi announced in Lagos that Mali and Burkina Faso had agreed to a joint Nigeria-Libya peaee package that called for an 'immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.'[17] He further claimed that a military observer team comprising Libya, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and the representatives of the Organization for African Unity would be stationed in the disputed area. He opined that Nigeria would contribute troops to the Military Observer Team only if the warring countries requested for them.[18]

Apparently unknown to him, Mali had refused to accept the Nigeria-Libya negotiation. Instead, Mali accepted and signed the peace accord as presented by the ANAD and the Republic of Benin[19] ministerial meeting in Abidjan.[20] Mali as well as all other ANAD members, except Burkina Faso, rejected the presence of Libya in the Military Observer Team as proposed by the Nigeria-Libya Peace Accord. Instead, a 16-man Observer Force drawn from the seven countries of ANAD and the Republic of Benin left Ivory Coast on the 31 December 1985 to police the disputed border.[21] Although Nigeria, and Akinyemi in particular for his "shuttle diplomacy,"[22] were commended for a job well done, the truth is that the cessation of hostilities was primarily due to the efforts of ANAD, which in effect means that it was an all Francophone affair. Both Nigeria and Libya, and indeed the North African countries, were subtly eliminated in the settlement of the accord. Not even the left-wing Government of Sankara could resist what he could have termed another form of neo-colonialism. Thus, Nigeria, a supposedly regional power in West Africa was edged out of a straight diplomatic game it had performed ten years ago when Yakubu Gowon was the Chairman of the Organization for African Unity. This will be examined in detail later in this paper. For now, one might look at what Mali or Burkina Faso had lost in terms of geo-political ordination, ideological choice and military equipment.

In a solidarity rally held after the war, Sankara announced the release of two Malian prisoners held during the war and displayed two Malian tanks and three other military vehicles as their spoils of war. He however said that he had learned much from the conflict, including proof that Burkina Faso was underarmed. Indeed Sankara did learn a lot, for he reversed some of his earlier decisions; he announced the reduction in the sentences of more than 80 political and common law prisoners and commuted jail sentences passed on ex-President, Saye Zerbo, former National Assembly President, Gerard Kango Ouedraogo and ex-Public Works Minister, Mohamoudou Ouedraogo to house arrest; former Posts and Telecommunications Minister, Paul Ismael Ouedrago, jailed for seven years in 1983 was

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pardoned while ex-Labour and Civil Service Minister, Jean Bado and former Air Force Chief, Christophe Klevasseur were freed from house arrest. These must have been done as a result of pressure from fellow Francophone states with whom Burkina Faso had greater ties than its northern neighbouring state of Libya. Burkina Faso, no doubt, suffered geo-political subordination from West Afriean Francophone States. Sankara could not even disagree with the rest that Libya should not be removed from the observer's team. This shows how strong the Francophones could be in West Africa under the leadership of Ivory Coast.

NIGERIA'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS REGIONAL DOMINANCE

Although Burkina Faso displayed some "trophies" of Malian tanks, it suffered more in terms of casualties, as Sankara even admitted openly that his country was underarmed. In a bid to boost his morale at home and justify his government's left wing position, Sankara announced during the solidarity rally that his social revolution was 'one of the greatest and noblest on earth.'[23] It would dawn on Libya now that no matter the extent of selling an ideology to a West African Francophone state, the historical, lingual and tribal ties would eventually prevail during the time of crisis. The example of the self-styled Lennist-Marxist State of the Republic of Benin, which is still very close to France, is worth mentioning. Guinea that voted "no" in the 1958 Referendum and got out of the Franc Zone had gone back to that zone and even begged for French aid before the death of Sekou Toure.

On its part, Mali was "victorious" not in the 5-day war but in subduing the uncompromising Burkina Faso leaders who had been described as "thoughtless" and "misguided." One would not count the displayed Malian tanks that were captured, as a serious loss as one expects the victor and the vanquished in a war to lose certain equipment. Even then, Sankara did not tell his people of the casualties on his side. Nonetheless, one would expect that Mali should have an easy fight over Burkina Faso considering its military balance. At this point, one may look at the concept of regional power, appraise the assertion that Nigeria had been a regional power in West Africa and then analyse its role in the Mali-Burkina Faso War vis-a-vis its regional dominance.

Definition of Regional Power Concept

For the purpose of this study, Herbertson's explanation of a region shall be used; that is, a region is a division of the world into several units on the basis of a number of principles mainly meant for analytical purpose.[24] Hence West Africa is taken as a region.[25] The next problem is to find out what power is and what determines power.

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Perhaps the most general and usual definition of the concept, of power, is given by Harold Laswell; he says :

> Power is participation in the making of decisions; A has power over H with respect to the values K if A participates in the making of decisions affecting the K policies of H.[26]

In the same vein, K. J. Holsti defined power as 'the general capacity of a state to control the behaviour of others.'[27]

He further explains this by exemplifying the influences A must have on B before B can do X to suit A. Influence, he says, is an aspect of power which is just a means of achieving a purpose on a rational basis. There is also the necessity of being in possession of capability which has been defined as 'any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement to persuade, reward, threaten or punish.'[28] Capabilities are, in essence, available materials, sufficient and powerful enough to influence another state to suit the possessing state. For instance, the possession of oil wealth by Nigeria is a capability which can be used—and it is being used to an appreciable extent—to influence the decisions of other West African states to suit it. Being influenced and trying to influence is said to involve a relationship which over a time might be called a process. Power can be measured (even though to a limited extent) if it is related to others. This idea is acceptable to Hans Morgenthau who, from the psychological point of view described political power as a 'relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.'[29] The state that possesses the greater political power has control over some actions of the less powerful state(s). The more powerful state may expect benefits, or be interested in the men and institutions of the less powerful ones. In distinguishing between power and influence, Morgenthau notes that the ability to influence does not mean ability to exercise power, for the less powerful states might influence but not necessarily exercise power. For example, the Republic of Benin can influence Nigeria in some of its decisions because Benin is a border country but it is highly doubtful whether it can exercise power over Nigeria. Whereas, Nigeria is capable of exercising power over the Republic of Benin.

Another way to understand the concept of power is the sensitivity-vulnerability spectrum. Country A might be sensitive to country B's actions. Dahomey in 1969 allowed the International Red Cross plane to land at its airport. Nigeria was very sensitive because it (Nigeria) was at that time in the midst of a civil war. As one goes to the right of the spectrum, so the sensitivity of a state goes higher until it gets to vulnerability where alternatives are hardly got by the affected state ; or where the costs of alternatives are astronomically high. An example is the effect of

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change in oil price by OPEC between 1973 and 1980. America was sensitive to it but Japan was vulnerable as it had no domestic supply of oil. However, the OECD countries quickly rallied round Japan thereby making OPEC's action to move from vulnerability to sensitivity.

In essence, sensitivity-vulnerability spectrum is used to denote a state of affairs when one state has to pay a transnational cost as a result of a country's action. If there is no alternative, then the affected state becomes vulnerable. Thus a vulnerable state will be forced to change some of its policies in the face of an imposed liability cost by external sources. It should be noted that all states can be sensitive. For instance, West African Francophone States were sensitive to Sankara's left-wing government but Burkina Faso was vulnerable to the collective action of the Francophone states and this forced Sankara to change some of his policies.

From the aforementioned, one can conveniently say that a regional power would be a state that is influential on most of the issues or on very vital issues among other sorrounding states. Or better put, "regional power" is that state with dominant power in a region. It may not be highly industrialized but must be dominant in terms of political structure, economic development, military aid and natural resources in that region. The interests of a regional power permeates through the economy, politics and social development of its region.

Another interest for the regional power would be the assertion of its personality position for the region in dealing with the rest of the world. For example, USA would endeavour to settle disputes among the states in the Organisation of American States (OAS) than allow any other external power to move in. From this, it emanates that a regional power tends to keep other powers away from exercising any influence within their regions. Suffice it to add, that a regional power must have dominant elements of power in its region.[30]

Potentialities for Dominance

Nigeria is the fourth largest state in size in West Africa after Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. Its population surpasses that of all the other West African States put together.[31] Like eleven others in the region, it is a coastal state with the longest coastline. It is only in Nigeria that oil is found in large quantity in the sub-region while Ivory Coast, Liberia and Mauritania have large Iron Ore deposits. In the present day rating, oil has higher value than Iron Ore. In 1972, the Liberian President, William R. Tolbert, along with some West African Heads of State. asked the Nigerian Government to grant them oil at concessionary prices thereby placing Nigeria on a favourable platform to influence other states' decisions.[32]

An important element of power is the gross national product (GFP). Nigeria's GNP is greater than all the other West African GNP's put to-

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gether.[33] As regards expenditure on defence, Nigeria spent about US $ 2.4 billion between 1976 and 1977. The summation of other West African States budget on defence does not equal that of Nigeria.[34]

These comparisons go a long way to show the potentialities of dominance of Nigeria in West Africa. But as earlier noted, it is not just the possession of capabilities that enables a State to be a regional power but the ability to influence other states. It is very necessary to confirm whether Nigeria had ever influenced states in West Africa before. It is noteworthy that regional powers use various methods in influencing neighbouring states : diplomacy, persuassion, aid, threat and the actual use of physical force. The last method is rarely used.

Influence with West African States

One of the ways Nigeria uses to influence the policies of West African States is by having a high level of interaction with them at all levels, Presidential, Ministerial, educational and the like. This has been very noticeable after the civil war. The Balewa regime faced with the arduous and complex task of initial nation-building problems coupled with lack of sufficient funds, did not have a high level of interaction with other West African States, especially if compared with Gowon's regime. Furthermore, the Francophone/Anglophone dichotomy was very pronounced. Also, the ideological conflict between Nkrumah of Ghana and Nigeria's Balewa drew both countries apart and in fact made then antagonistic to a point of seriously damaging relations.[35] However, immediately after the civil war, Nigeria having woken from the propaganda slumber started to increase its level of interactions with other countries particularly neighbouring states. According to the Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation,

> ...in one major respect, the present
> policy differs from the one before the
> war ; it is much more dynamic...
> General Yakubu Gowon not only sincerely
> believes in a policy of having strong
> relations with other West African countries
> but also spares no effort in translating
> them to reality.[36]

This trend has continued even after Gowon. Apart from sending delegates to other West African States, the level of ambassadorial representation is high. One can now make a tour d'horizon of possible influence Nigeria had over the West African States.

Nigeria influenced all the West African States, except Ivory Coast, in not recognising Biafra during the civil war. The support Nigeria got from

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the neighbouring states boosted its morale. However, it should be noted that some West African States accepted Nigeria's reasons for the war with some reservations. Notable was Ghana and probably Benin ; they allowed Red Cross planes to land in Cotonou and to take off to Biafra.[37] On the other hand, Senegal, Niger and Togo gave unflinching support to the Federal Military Government. In fact, President Senghor considered it suicidal for any country to support the secession as 'Nigeria is the greatest African country.'[38] Nigeria unthinkably criticised Paris for supporting Biafra and Togo handed over a sum of £ N 7 million to Lome.[39]

For mediation, Nigeria was not only made a member of the 21 Member Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of OAU, it was a Nigerian that became its first Chairman.[40] Nigeria was also a member of the OAU body that successfully handled the dispute between Guinea and Senegal[41].

Nigeria played the role of a mediator when Dahomey and Niger were at loggerheads over the Lete Island situated in the River Niger.[42] Also, Nigeria pacified Togo and Benin Republic over border clashes. In all the disputes that Nigeria played the role of a mediator, it ably and effectively pacified the two warring factions. Although Nigeria had worked along with other nations, its views were highly respected within the groups.

The formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 went a long way to boost the ego of Nigeria in West Africa. This was because there had been three other unsuccessful attempts to form an economic union in West Africa.[43] Nigeria's subscription of 32 per cent of the ECOWAS Fund gives Nigeria a leverage in the running of the community. It is noteworthy that the formation of ECOWAS marked a major breakdown of the language barrier between the Francophone and Anglophone West African States ; and unsurprisingly, the formation has not been very easy. The Francophone States during the preliminary meetings formed a bloc led by Mauritania. Niger refused to hold a meeting scheduled in Niamey in 1974 because the new government of Kountche said that the country was not capable of financing it; the meeting was to consider the draft of the treaty—thus a crucial one. Mali was advised to host the meeting but refused too, hence the future of ECOWAS looked bleak. Liberia however, on October 7, 1974 saved the situation by holding the conference and thereafter the treaty was signed against all odds by all West African States in May 1975.[44] France even set up the CEAO to stop the formation of ECOWAS.[45]

The role Senegal played before the formation of the ECOWAS should not go unmentioned. President Senghor was in favour of a West African Economic Community that would stretch from Nouakchott to Kinshasha—thereby ECOWAS would never have been born because of its impracticability. However, President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast came to the rescue when he announced at the CEAO Conference

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in Dakar that CEAO was only a stepping stone to ECOWAS. More surprising was the presence of Boigny himself at the signing of the ECOWAS Treaty which he described as a sign of goodwill and improvement in Nigerian-Ivorian relations.[46] The Ivorian Government also saw the benefits that may accrue to it from such an economic community; cheap oil for Abidjan, access to the rest of the Nigerian market and the subsequent development of its infant industries. A more important fact underlying Ivory Coast's support for ECOWAS was the Senghor/Houphouet-Boigny immemorial rivalry which allowed either of the two personalities to step in where the other slipped.[47] For instance, while Ivory Coast backed Biafra, Senegal was one of the staunchest supporters of Nigeria.

Even though Nigeria professes among others things the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African State...non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries,[48] it still enjoys the privilege of influencing the decisions of these African States. Major decisions to be taken by West African States are usually communicated with Nigerian Ambassadors or High Commissioners in the host country or through a delegation, as was sent to Lagos by Ghana in 1978, when within 24 hours of change of government, two sepparate delegations had been sent to Lagos. The Benin Republic informed the Nigerian Government before calling the Russians to reorganise its Army in 1977.[49]

APPRAISAL

On three occasions Benin had invited Nigeria to have defence pacts with it but was turned down until 1979. On two instances Nigeria had offered the use of its troops to other West African States : Guinea in 1970 and Chad in the same year. In summation, there is little doubt that Nigeria had a lot of influence on West African States before now. The big question is whether Nigeria has lost or is losing its grip on the regional states or the elements of power are diminishing as can be revealed in the daily dwindling of oil price ?

In 1985, the Babangida Government could not even hold a meeting between Ghana, Togo and Benin successfully, the first two countries could not agree over the agenda. It was a diplomatic failure. These diplomatic failures coupled with the depreciation of the Nigerian economy between 1979 and 1984 might have eroded the dominance or perhaps tilted the leadership of power in West Africa against Nigeria. The latest war between Mali and Burkina Faso which Nigeria could not effectively participate in bringing to a logical conclusion looks very ridiculous against its claim to be the giant of Africa.

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One important thing to note in the formulation and execution of Nigerian foreign policy is the leadership factor. For, the Head of State's posture is paramount ; he directs and leads the country's foreign policy. Nigerian foreign policy of the 1960's was weak, ineffective and nearly purposeless due to Balewa's weak leadership and later the civil war. After the civil war, Gowon made useful incursions and headed the OAU as well as the setting up of the ECOWAS. Murtala Mohammed made a great impact during his short period and since then the dynamism in Nigerian foreign policy declined. The Babangida regime, in order to prop up the image of Nigeria, made a Professor of International Relations and a former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs the Minister in charge of External Affairs.

There is no doubt that the dwindling economy, high rate of inflation, internal political wranglings, fraudulence at its peak and political instability, all culminate into dissipating the energy of Nigeria from effective monitoring, planning and execution of a dynamic foreign policy. The Nigerian Foreign Minister was more preocupied to sell his country's 1986 economic recovery budget than in settling a dispute between neighbouring states. One should also add that the Francophone "togetherness" is still very much alive. It is very obvious from the Mali-Burkina Faso War that the Francophone states wanted to make it a family affair. While other states' foreign ministers were shuttling between Bamako and Ouagadougou, looking for a solution to the crisis, those of other Francophone States (ANAD members plus Francophone Benin) were in Abidjan settling it their own way. The ministers even said that they could go on with the meeting if their counterparts in Mali and and Burkina Faso were not present.[50] This shows how close the Francophone states are and how close they may want it to be. On this crisis, Ivory Coast acted as the leader of the States in West Africa for it was in its capital that a settlement was reached without its leaders moving out of the country. This is one of the qualities of a regional leader.

Perhaps it is Nigeria's association with Libya, in its bid to settle the crisis, that really reduced its regional leadership charisma, for the presence of Libya was nauseating to the Francophone leaders. Even then Nigeria should have known that from experience and avoided a situation that would lead to a deadlock. Even though Libya might be favoured by Burkinabe officials, Nigeria could have gone either alone or through OAU as it turned out that Burkina Faso did not resist the dropping of Libya from the Observer Force Team. If Mali could refuse the presence of Libya, Burkina Faso should have been able to resist the rejection of Libya.

But Francophone ties prevailed. What was saddening was the unawareness of Nigeria's Professor Bolaji Akinyemi of Mali's rejection of the

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Nigeria-Libya Accord proposal. For he would not have come to Nigeria announcing the acceptance of the still-born accord. Or if Mali accepted in his presence, and later announced its disapproval, it could only mean that greater forces hard prevailed on its leaders and that jeopardises the assertion that Nigeria is a regional power in West Africa. For a regional power's reaction to such an action must be vulnerable or at least very sensitive if meted out. So far, no reaction has come from Nigeria. Probably it is satisfied with the ceasefire arranged by ANAD. If so, it butresses the point that leaders matter a lot in the direction and velocity at which Nigerian foreign policy is made.

All said, Nigeria cannot be said to have lost all or even many of its determinants of power that made it the likeable regional power in the mid-seventies, for its geographical, population and oil ratios with other West African States remain unchanged. It is true that oil price has gone down considerably and the economy is in a bad shape due to malpractices and ineffective planning; the gross national product continues to be the largest in the subregion. Its military defence has not been equalled by the total of all others, and diplomatic consultations have not been relented. What floored Nigeria was lack of tactic and the leadership concentration on domestic matters with a resulting neglect in foreign affairs. Nigeria could not even be at the ANAD meeting as an observer like Benin. If Mali resented the presence of Libya, why did it not invite Nigeria as was done to Benin. If Nigeria wae genuinely interested in the settlement of that affair, it could have requested to send representatives as part of the observer team to the area. Or was France present at the ANAD meeting in a faceless way ?

If France was controlling the affairs of ANAD, which was not impossible, then one might understand the obstacles Nigeria might have faced if it had appeared at the ANAD's meeting in Abidjan. One should not rule out this possibility as the French Foreign Minister said, 'Paris was working towards a solution to the hostilities.'[51] France and Nigeria normally view each other with scepticism. Nigeria had gone into bilateral trade relations with all the West African Francophone States in order to reduce the French influence on them. Thus, one will not be surprised if France had not been present at all the meetings. Perhaps it was the Libyan's reply of "shut up" to the French statement above that warranted the total rejection and abhorence of the Libyan presence.

No matter the truth, Nigeria, if it wants to lead in West Africa even with all its resources, must have a dynamic and responsive leadership in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Its tactics have to be flexible for it is not facing the Francophones alone, but also France in disguise. One can still presume that the Nigerian role in the Mali-Burkina Faso War was a slip in diplomatic handling rather than the loss of grip on the leadership of West Africa.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH : FROM NASSAU TO LONDON

IN many ways, South Africa is the last bastion of the forces of colonialism. What happens in South Africa will determine the outcome of the final struggle for decolonisation the world over. Admittedly, in the age of revolution in communieations, conflicts can no longer be geographically contained. For one thing, the continuing struggle for racial equality and human rights involves the entire international community and for another, like peace, freedom is indivisible.

As a trans-continental forum the Commonwealth has worked steadily towards the amelioration of the process of self-rule in Africa through peaceful transition. But unfortunately, this trans-continental forum's record in South Africa has been rather dismal. It has failed to play its expected role. True, the majority of the Commonwealth members essentially belonging to Asia, Africa and the Caribbeans have persistently demanded the dismantling of the *apartheid* regime for the eventual transition to a political system based on majority rule. But their efforts have not met any success. The United Kingdom has been always hesitant to support any concrete steps—political/economic—against South Africa to mend its racist policy.

In terms of rhetoric, all the Commonwealth members tend to agree that the issue of *apartheid* is contrary to the norms of international society. But then, there are members who do not endorse the majority opinion of this forum which calls for more effective/corrective steps against the racist Pretoria regime. In this process the Commonwealth failed to give an effective lead to the on-going global struggle against racism.

The issue of severing contacts with South Africa is not particularly a Commonwealth but a global issue. However, there is a near-complete Commonwealth accord on this issue. Commonwealth accepts that individual rights comprise, political as well as economic and social rights. Human rights have as much to do with freedom from starvation as with freedom from oppression.

I

The Commonwealth comprises people of many faiths, languages, races, and cultures. These peoples are linked through shared traditions and the belief that their interests are best served by partnership. A Commonwealth Secretariat was set up in 1965; it conducts many joint activities. Commonwealth membership includes 26 Republics, 18 Monarchies and 5 countries headed by national monarchies.

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Meeting every two years, Commonwealth members wrestle with live intra-forum and international issues, such as nuclear disarmament, a new international economic order and colonialism (with particular reference to South Africa and Namibia), among many others. During the last two decades, this forum has been again and again confronted with the task of combating the *apartheid* regime in South Africa through the instrumentality of mandatory sanctions unitedly imposed by all Commonwealth members. As a transcontinental organisation the Commonwealth brings together former British colonial countries at all levels of development. It comprises different political systems, but all its members acknowledge the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth, as it exists today, largely evolved out of the old British colonial connection. Irrespective of different political systems, the members share more or less common principles of freedom, democracy and multiracialism; they practice similar patterns of law, administration and education. Admittedly, the members speak many languages, but they can easily communicate through the English language.

The structural evolution of the Commonwealth has been followed in its wake by the growth of consultation and cooperation to meet the needs of its member countries. Commonwealth Heads of Government — Prime Ministers and Presidents — meet biennially to discuss matters of importance to them in particular and the international community in general. The Commonwealth Secretariat administers programmes of cooperation.

The contemporary Commonwealth is an outcome of decolonization; it holds self-determination as a central principle. For many years, it has been seeking to help in extending political freedoms to all the people of South Africa. In 1961, South Africa was forced to leave the Commonwealth because of its racist policies. Even though at times rather halting, the Commonwealth has been playing a prominent role in the campaign against *apartheid*. In particular, international arms embargo against the Pretoria regime and its ouster from sporting events came through Commonwealth's 1977 Gleneagles Agreement.

At Nassau (Bahamas) in 1985, Commonwealth leaders decided to put further pressure on the Pretoria regime to change its *apartheid* policy. The Nassau Summit appointed a group of eminent persons from the Commonwealth countries to initiate a political dialogue in South Africa with a view to dismantling the system of *apartheid*. It was designed to establish a popular government.

The Commonwealth Summit at Nassau followed the usual agenda of the previous summits. However, this summit made a special effort to dismantle the system of *apartheid* in Africa. This summit opened on 16 October 1985 at Nassau with a powerful plea from the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to his fellow Commonwealth leaders that they should demand comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the racist Pretoria

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regime. The Indian Prime Minister's strong plea for decisive action against South Africa indicated the deep concern of most Commonwealth leaders on the need to dismantle the structure of racism in South Africa.

The Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who has been the Chairman of the group of Southern African Frontline States, sought for a united Commonwealth stand on the issue of sanctions against South Africa. The Zambian Prime Minister had discussions with Rajiv Gandhi. It was submitted that mandatory sanctions against South Africa could no longer be deffered. In this context reference was also made to the continuing bondage of Namibia. Indeed, in many ways, Namibia's independence has been blocked by some vested Western States. In this context, particular reference may be made to the stand taken by the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, whoh as been pursuing a policy different from the rest of the Commonwealth members on the issue of South Africa.

II

Since the beginning of this year a Group of Seven Eminent Persons from seven Commonwealth countries of five continents made great efforts—as per the accord reached at the Nassau Commonwealth Summit in 1985—to bring about peaceful change in South Africa. The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was entrusted with the task of initiating a process of peaceful change for dismantling the structure of *apartheid* and thereby pave the way towards the establishment of a democratic system based on racial harmony. The seven eminent persons were : General Olusegun Obasanjo (former Head of the Federal Government of Nigeria), his name was proposed by the President of Zambia and the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe; Sardar Swaran Singh (held several important cabinet portfolios in the Indian Government), his name was proposed by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi; Malcolm Fraser (Ex-Prime Minister Australia); Reverend Edward Scott (Primate of the Anglican Church, Canada), the Prime Minister of Canada proposed his name. Anthony Barber (Chairman, the Standard Chartered Bank, UK); the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher proposed his name; Nita Barrow (Chairman, World Council of Churchs), Nita Barrow's name was proposed by the Prime Minister of Bahamas; and John Malecelar (Ex-Foreign Minister, Tanzania), his name was proposed by President Kaunda of Zambia and the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.

The Eminent Persons Group worked against a background of mounting turmoil within South Africa and increased calls for sanctions by the international community. With effect from January 1986 the EPG Mission was given six months time to produce a report regarding their assigned task. In addition to formal meetings in London, the EPG travelled extensively in South Africa in particular, and the Frontline States of Southern Africa

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in general. The Group had access to leaders not only in the government but also in the political, religious and community organizations. More importantly, they were able to meet people from all walks of life. The members of the Group were able to visit townships in South Africa not normally open to the public. They even visited Nelson Mandela — the South African Black leader—in prison three times. In pursuance of their assigned task the members of the Group, both individually as well as jointly, took part in a series of consultations in Nigeria and Tanzania, the United States and Europe. As individuals they had occasional meetings with Commonwealth Heads of Government and Ministers. The Eminent Persons Group had a unique experience; they produced a report that offers a searching look at South Africa and suggests how a catastrophe could be averted to the benefit of the peoples in South Africa and the world. In many ways, the EPG Mission was symbolic of the concern of the international community at large.

The message is clear—*apartheid* must end ! *Apartheid* must end—preferably through peaceful means, but if necessary through a bloody struggle.

The Report indicates the extent to which the racist Pretoria regime is opposed to any form of basic change within South Africa. However, the Report does mention as well that there are some whites who are willing to build a multiracial society in South Africa through a peaceful process. Another important aspect of the Report is that it gives a call for action to the international community against the South African White regime. This action envisages economic measures or what are commonly known as sanctions by the major economic powers—having trading relations—against South Africa. The Pretoria regime is dependent on them for financial sustenance.

At Nassau the Commonwealth countries perceived sanctions as part of a programme of action. The Nassau Summit agreed that, if in their opinion, adequate progress had not been made towards the goal of the Accord within six months the members would consider the adoption of further measures against South Africa Hence the task of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa was to initiate the process of change in South Africa and at the same time to monitor the progress. However it would appear from the Report that no progress has been made towards the dismantling of the *apartheid* system. The Group submitted, the absence of real economic pressure on the Pretoria regime was actually halting the process of change. In the final analysis it would appear that the people of South Africa have been eagerly looking for world solidarity and support.

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III

Speaking before more than 40 Heads of State and Government at the Nassau Conference, Prime Minister Gandhi had said, "Let not the Commonwealth be charged with cowardice in action and bravery in words." Rajiv Gandhi's strong words were indicative of India's deep concern about the need for taking decisive action against *apartheid.*

Among other leaders, the Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was actively involved in talks aimed at producing a unified Commonwealth stand on the issue of sanctions. He also conferred with Rajiv Gandhi. In this context, Rajiv Gandhi said, "How much longer will we wait for persuasion to work? The Pretoria regime is imperious to reason. Champions of human rights collude with racism." He said, comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South could not be deferred. He also mentioned how powerful vested interests were opposed to the independence of Namibia. Rajiv Gandhi said: "We speak of peace, but can there be peace without the elimination of racism?" For, the ruling elique of Pretoria is waging a war against the people of South Africa.

Following the conclusion of the Nassau Summit a seven page accord was released representing in a sense a partial victory for Mrs. Thatcher who, throughout the first five days of the Commonwealth summit had strongly opposed the idea of economic sanctions. Nevertheless, she agreed that as part of an immediate package of measures against Pretoria, each member of the Commonwealth should be ready to take what unilateral action was possible to preclude the import of South African *krug-gerrand* gold coins.

As noted above, the Summit decided to establish a committee of eminent Commonwealth figures to promote a dialogue between South Africa's White rulers and Black nationalist leaders. In case there was no progress, Commonwealth states agreed upon the action to consider a number of measures, including a ban on a new investment and the import of agricultural products and a ban on government contracts with South African companies.

The British Prime Minister stressed on a section of the accord that called on South Africa to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, "a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government."

The Canadian Prime Minister felt that the measures conceived by the summit would "send a clear signal to Pretoria" that it must move faster to end the racial *apartheid* system.

Significantly, the British Prime Minister had made it clear that Britain still opposed economic sanctions and that Britain would not be among those who would adopt voluntary economic measures if Pretoria failed to take action on *apartheid* within the six month deadline.

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Be that as it may, the Nassau Accord, according to the President of Zambia, the Prime Ministers of India, Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Britain and Zimbabwe, would develop the mechanism by which a political dialogue in South Africa could be started.

The Accord listed a package of common action already adopted by number of countries. The list included measures such as a ban on government-to-government loan and the sale of computer equipment to the security forces. The remaining measures were : an end to government funding for South African-related trade fairs, a ban on new sales of nuclear goods and technology, a ban on the sale and export of oil, an embargo on military cooperation and discouragement of cultural and scientific changes, except where they contributed towards the ending of *apartheid.*

It is however interesting that the Summit Accord used the term "measures" instead of "sanctions" ; apparently it was an attempt to placate Mrs. Thatcher who preferred the first term.

With a view to avert confrontation with UK on sanctions, there were behind-the-scene moves to hammer out a compromise through the idea of "graduated sanctions." However, it did not find favour with the executive session.

Speaking to newsmen, the Indian Prime Minister made it clear that while the overwhelming majority of the Commonwealth leaders favoured strong action against South Africa, they were not in favour of confrontation. The issue, he said was to be resolved through discussion. He however, expressed his anxiety over any delay in applying sanctions since the plight of the Black population deserved immediate attention.

Interestingly, the Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal in his report did not find it feasible at that stage to have an economic boycott of South Africa and instead called for making recalcitrant South Africa to see reason through pressure of public opinion. There were indications that Ramphal's options might ultimately be accepted.

His options included withdrawal of investments, a freeze on future investments, a ban on bank loans and end to the import of *krugerrand,* curbs on South African advertising and termination of flights to South Africa.

In keeping with its tradition of functioning by consensus, the Commonwealth Summit at Nassau was able to overcome its sharp differences over sanctions against the racist Pretoria regime. It adopted a declaration embodying a compromise between the British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher's total opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa and the equally strong insistence by the Third World members of the Commonwealth on effective measures to force the South African rulers to dismantle the *apartheid* system. The measures comprised a ban on new governmental loans to South Africa, to a denial to it of any sales that

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might strengthen its police, military and nuclear organisation. However, the measures recommended by the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government were nothing new. The measures were in line with the stand taken by the United Nations.

In some ways, the EPG was set up as a result of a deadlock on the question of mandatory sanctions. Going by the record of the Pretoria regime, it was an optimistic view to assume that the EPG was going to achieve the desired results. It was quite unlikely that the EPG would receive meaningful response from the Pretoria regime. But then, what had encouraged the intransigence of the South African White minority regime has been the unhelpful attitude of some of the Commonwealth countries. Even though the White minority regime had expressed its willingness to receive the EPG, hindsight suggests it was no more than a publicity stunt.

At Nassau, the following additional measures were suggested :

i) A ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sector. ii) A ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and iii) the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for nationals of third countries to whom they render consular services.

The EPG Mission looked for support beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. It therefore immediately embarked on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, its emphasis being on those countries that presently sustained a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

However, the British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declared that it will :

i) Put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa.

ii) Put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

iii) Accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.

In its collective commitment to effective action, the Mission requested the Secretary General, with assistance from the members of the respective Governments, to coordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

The EPG renewed the call the Commonwealth made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a non-fragmented South Africa.

Meeting in London at a time of heightened strain within the association, members took the opportunity to renew their own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which

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had guided it over the years, towards fulfilment of their common purposes, namely the dismantling of *apartheid* and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.

IV

Meanwhile, efforts were being made in other forums to resolve the *apartheid* question. At the UN sponsored conference on South Africa (Paris) in June 1986, an African move to send a Commonwealth delegation to London to persuade the British Government to change its stand on mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria regime failed. Nigeria and Zimbabwe were the main supporters of the move. Some differences had emerged. There were some non-aligned countries who did not favour bringing into the Conference the East-West struggle.

Meeting in late June this year, the EEC agreed to send Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary on a solo mission or what was described as 'Mission Impossible'—to South Africa. The British Foreign Secretary was to take with him an EEC call for the realease of Nelson Mandela and other political persons. The EEC decided to consider selected sanctions if this mission failed.

In some ways, the British Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher was able to avert immediate EEC sanctions against South Africa.

Since then matters have gone from bad to worse. India decided to pull out of the 13th Commonwealth Games which began in Edinburgh on 24 July following UK's continued opposition to economic sanctions against the racist South Africa regime. In the Indian Parliament, members cutting across party lines, welcomed the government decision. The decision was an expression of India's solidarity with the people of South Africa and with the Frontline states.

Before that India had tried to explore every possible way to salvage the Games. But it soon became clear that the UK was not immediately prepared to implement even the minimum measures, which all the Commonwealth countries had agreed to at the Nassau Summit.

The issue of sanctions against South Africa and the Commonwealth Games had become so inextricably linked that India was left with no other choice but to announce to boycott the Games.

India never had any link—trade/diplomatic—with South Africa. Even in sports it forfeited a chance to win the Davis Cup when it refused to allow its team to play against South Africa.

Thus, India is at the forefront to fight and pursue a concerted policy to force the racist-regime to give up these policies.

The boycott has a legitimate purpose. The Indian people have consistently condemned the theory and practice of *apartheid* and have backed this position by refusing to have any truck with the racist Pretoria regime. India

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is giving full support to the growing international demand for economic sanctions as the only alternative to continued and greater bloodshed in South Africa.

Throughout, India has been in close touch with the Frontline African States. It watched with good deal of expectations the outcome at the NAM meeting at Harare to take collective decision against South Africa. Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi spoke to Kenneth Kaunda and Prime Minister Mugabe.

By the time the Games got underway, of the 49 Commonwealth Games nations, 32 countries besides India had announced that they would not be sending their teams to Edinburgh.

The boycott of the Games started around 9 July when Nigeria and Ghana pulled out; soon they were followed by other countries.

The move against the racist Pretoria regime was no longer keeping confined to the Third World Commonwealth member countries. For instance, even the Church of England leaders gave a strong call for economic sanctions against South Africa, a country where two million of their fellow Anglicans reside. The call followed a three hour debate at the regular summer session of the General Synod, a policy-making body of Bishops, clergy and laity. The Synod rejected an amendment condemning all acts of violence in South Africa, whether inspired by Blacks or Whites.

Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, spiritual head of the Church and leader of the world's 70 million Anglicans urged adoption of the resolution calling for economic sanctions.

The resolution from the Church's Board for Social Responsibility said the British Government should deploy "effective economic sanctions" to help bring a democratic South Africa.

V

At the London Mini-Commonwealth Summit the leaders of the seven countries, India, Canada Zimbabwe, Zambia, Australia, Bahamas and UK attending, favoured coordinated moves—along with the US and Japan — for sanctions against South Africa. This was reportedly agreed at an informal lunch given by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 3 August 1986. The Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal was present at this lunch. A week earlier, British Prime Minister Thatcher got a broad mandate from her cabinet to work out a strategy for coordinating action on sanctions against Pretoria in consultation with other leaders from the Commonwealth, EEC and the United States.

Prior to this, the Zambian President Kaunda had said that since Britain was reluctant to impose sanctions which the other six Commonweath countries were in favour, a three member group consisting of India, Australia and Canada canvassed imposition of sanctions against South Africa.

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In any event, the Summit started in the afternoon of 3 August 1986. The Conference Chairman submitted that adequate progress had not been made in South Africa towards the elimination of the *apartheid* system. It was also submitted that the Pretoria regime was not genuinely interested in ending *apartheid*. The Conference reviewed the EPG Report and heard the British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe's account of his visit to Southern Africa.

There were obvious differences in the approaches of Britain and the six Commonwealth countries regarding the Question of Sanctions. Even though the British Prime Minister tried to underplay the significance of the points raised in the EPG Report on South Africa, the British Foreign Secretary had to admit that no quantum jump had been achieved in the political situation in South Africa since the Nassau Summit of October 1986. Ultimately the British Prime Minister had to agree that time was running out in South Africa.

Considering the obstinacy of the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, it was inconceiveable that the mini-Commonwealth Summit in London would have been able to sort out the South Africa problem. At no point the British Prime Minister Thatcher agreed to the idea of mandatory sanctions against the South African racist regime. Even the boycott of the Commonwealth Games by more than half the members did not have any effect on the British Government. The White Hall was not even bothered about the rebuff that British Foreign Secretary Howe and the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) — led by Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal—received in Pretoria. In fact, the Commonwealth leaders in a certain sense showed their statesmanship in accomodating the British dissenting note in the communique relating to sanctions.

The only concession that the Thatcher Government made was that "it will put a voluntary ban on new investments in South Africa and on the promotion of tourism to that country." But then it was just a symbolic policy stance to moderate domestic opposition to the British Government policy towards South Africa,

The Nassau Accord was not fully implemented by the British Government. What is more, even the London mini-Summit hardly made any attempt to temper the hardened British postures against the stand taken by the six Commonwealth members. While the communique reiterated the Nassau Accord regarding sanctions against the racist Pretoria regime; it was uncertain as to the effectiveness of such measures without the concurrence of the USA, UK and other Western Powers and Japan. Additionally, there have been trading links (even if sometime limited) between South Africa and some of the Commonwealth countries. Hence, unless moral considerations clearly outweigh their respective national interests it is unlikely that sufficient pressures can be brought against South Africa.

In the London mini-Summit British Prime Minister Thatcher did give

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up her inflexible stand against the imposition of economic measures on the brutal *apartheid* system in South Africa. But then, the British shift was only marginal in contrast to the stand taken by the majority of the Commonwealth countries who wanted to go much beyond the eight-point economic measures conceived in the Nassau Communique of 1985. Besides, the British willingness to put a ban on the import of coal, iron and steel was contingent on collective action on the same basis by the EEC which was scheduled to meet this September, along with the USA and Japan. Taking this into consideration the London mini-Summit marks only a small step forward in a long journey.

At one point during the London mini-Ssummit there was an apprehension that Zambia and Zimbawe might quit the Commonwealth as a protest against Britain's South Africa policy. But this was put to rest by the understanding reached at the London mini-Summit. The London mini-Summit made it clear that there will be progessively intensified pressure on the racist Pretoria regime to negotiate with the African majority to set free Nelson Mandela and to take concrete steps to dismantle the *apartheid* system.

Admittedly, it is difficult to forsee an early end of the *apartheid* regime. However, there are signs all round that the pressures are building up for a change in South Africa in particular, and Southern Africa in general. Already, US President Reagan is under strong pressures from the Congress to impose sanctions against the Pretoria regime. In fact, in recent months the US House of Representatives have become very active in this regard. It approved a bill calling for wide range of measures—including denial of visas to South African officials against Pretoria. The House of Representatives suggested a blanket embargo on the operation of 280 American multinational corporations in that country. A number of leading corporations have decided to leave South Africa.

In a statement released in late June this year, EEC leaders rejected adoption of immediate sanctions against South Africa. However, they called for the unconditional release of South African political prisoners and legalisation of banned anti-*apartheid* groups within three months. The statement also stipulated adoption of measures calling for ban on new investments in South Afrlca and an embargo on imports of South African coal, iron, gold, etc., into EEC member states.

South Africa on its part sought to counter the measures contemplated by the Commonwealth countries. In the announcement made on 5 August, South African Foreign Minister Botha said that international sanctions against South Africa could have catastrophic results for millions of Blacks inside and outside the country. Reacting to the sanctions announced by the Commonwelth mini-Summit, Botha stated that Pretoria would tighten economic controls on goods crossing South African territory from neigh-

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buoring Black states. This was because of Zimbabwe and Zambia's attitude, he said.

Then he went on to say that in future import lincences would be charged on all goo ds crossing South African territory and stricter border control measures would be introduced.

He further stated that "if South Africa could not circumvent economic sanctions we are prepared to accept a lowering of our standards of living." In particular, he pointed out the impact of the sanction measures on Zimbabwe and Zambia.

VI

More recently, a stormy call for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa and a plea to the USA and Britain to desist from "collaborating" with the racist Pretoria regime formed a part of the Political Draft Declaration for the Harare Non-aligned Summit.

It also expressed grave concern at the escalating nuclear arms race and the United States' intention to terminate its compliance with the Salt II Treaty. It urged the United States Government to reconsider its position. The declaration stated that a comprehensive test ban treaty was a matter of the highest priority for the non-aligned countries.

At Harare, the outgoing Chairman, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had declared in a Summit-eve statement focused on Southern Africa, that economic sanction against the racist Pretoria regime were absolutely essential and efforts must be made to convince all countries about their efficiency. Indeed there are welcome signs that people in some of the key western countries are taking a lead in this direction. Though the US Government has not fully committed itself regarding the imperative of economic sanctions against South Africa, the US Congress has given its support to this idea. South Africa cannot carry for long its *apartheid* system.

It is quite evident that the problem of racialism in South Africa cannot be sorted out merely through the instrumentality of the Commonwealth forum. While there is definite benefit in raising this issue in the various Commonwealth summits—as in the case of Nassau and London—it is unlikely that this could impel the racist Pretoria regime to dismantle a barbaric political, social and economic system. In the long run, the problem can be sorted out only through concerted and sustained pressures exerted by the international community against South Africa.

SHIVAJI GANGULY*

* Dr. Ganguly is Research Associate, Indian Concil of World Affairs, New Delhi.

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Annexure I

COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT RECORD ON SOUTH AFRICA

Nassau, 21 October 1985

The following is the text of the accord reached by the Commonwealth Summit on South Africa.

1. We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle *apartheid*, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore. At New Delhi we expressed the view that "only the eradication of *apartheid* and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in South Africa." We are united in the belief that reliance on the range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental changes we have sought over many years. The growing crisis and intensified repression in South Africa mean that *apartheid* must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end. We consider that the situation calls for urgent practical steps.

2. We, therefore, call on the authorities in Pretoria for the following steps to be taken in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency.

A. Declare that the system of *apartheid* will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.

B. Terminate the existing state of emergency.

C. Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all other imprisoned and detained for their opposition to *apartheid*.

D. Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.

E. Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

3. We have agreed on a number of measures which have as their rationale impressing on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling *apartheid* and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa. The latter in particular demands a process of dialogue involving the true representatives of the majority black population of South Africa. We believe that we must do all we can to assist that process, while recognising that the forms of political settlement in South Africa are for the people of that country—all the people of that country—all the people—to determine.

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4. To this end, we have decided to establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue. We are not unmindful of the difficulties such an effort will encounter, including the possibility of initial rejection by the South African authorities, but, we believe it to be our duty to leave nothing undone that might contribute to peaceful change in South Africa and avoid the dreadful prospect of violent conflict that looms over South Africa, threatening people of all races in the country, and the peace and stability of the entire Southern Africa region.

5. We are asking the President of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, Bahamas, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe to develop with the Secretary General the modalities of this effort to assist the process of political dialogue in South Africa. We would look to the Group of Eminent Persons to seek to facilitate the processes of dialogue referred to in paragraph 2 (above) and by all practicable means to advance the fulfilment of the objectives of this accord.

6. For our part, we have as an earnest of our opposition to *apartheid* reached accord on a programme of common action as follows :

I We declare the Commonwealth's support for the strictest enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 418 and 558 and commit ourselves to prosecute violators to the fullest extent of the law.

II We reaffirm the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977, which called upon Commonwealth members to take every practical step to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa.

III We agree upon, and commend to other governments, the adoption of the following further economic measures against South Africa, which have already been adopted by a number of member countries :

(a) A ban on all new government loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies ;

(b) A readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of *krugerrands*.

(c) No government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa.

(d) A ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces.

(e) A ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa.

(f) A ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa.

(g) A strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and para-military equipment from South Africa.

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(h) An embargo on all military cooperation with South Africa and
(i) Discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of *apartheid* or have no possible role in promoting it.

7. It is our hope that the process and measures we have agreed upon will help to bring about concrete progress towards the objectives stated above in six months. The Heads of Government mentioned in paragraph 5 above, will then meet to review the situation. If in their opinion adequate progress has not been made within this period, we agree to consider the adoption of further measures. Some of us would, in that event, consider the following steps among others :

(a) A ban on air links with South Africa ;
(b) A ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa ;
(c) A ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa ;
(d) The termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa ;
(e) The termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa ;
(f) A ban on all government procurement in South Africa ;
(g) A ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies ;
(h) A ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

8. Finally, we agree that should all of the above measures fail to produce the desired results within a reasonable period, further effective measures will have to be considered. Many of us have either taken or are prepared to take measures which go beyond those listed above, and each of us will pursue the objectives of this Accord in all the ways and through appropriate fora open to us. We believe, however, that in pursuing this programme jointly, we enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and peace and stability in the southern Africa region as a whole.

Source : *Indian Express*, 22 October 1985.

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Annexure II

COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP : FINDINGS

This Report, in reference to the five steps which the Nassar Accord called on South African authority to take urgently, mentioned :

1. *Declare that the system of* apartheid *will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.*

The Group examined the Pretoria regime's "programme of reform" and did not find any genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle *apartheid.*

2. *Terminate the exising state of emergency.*

Though the state of emergency was technically terminated, the substantive powers continued to remain broadly in force under ordinary laws.

3. *Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to* apartheid.

All political leaders including Nelson Mandela remained in prison.

4. *Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.*

The political freedom was being more rigorously curtailed. Political parties remained banned.

5. *Initiate in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.*

There was no prospect of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa. The cycle nf violence and counter-violence had spiralled.

In short, the basic objectives of Nassar Accord remained unfulfilled.

The Report in conclusion stated :

"We are convinced that the South African Government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against it."*

*Excerpts : *Mission to South Africa.* The Commonwealth Report. Findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa. Commonwealth Secretariat (London, 1986).

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Annexure III

TEXT OF MINI-SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

The following is the text of the Commonwealth Mini-Summit Communique.

"As agreed at Nassau last October, our meeting was held in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa. At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau. We reaffirmed, in particular the united belief we expressed in the Accord that '*apartheid* must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end.'

"At our request the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), General Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser, introduced the report of the EPG and answered the many questions we put to them. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who undertook a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also briefed us on the results of his mission.

"The report of the EPG Mission to South Africa, was the central document at our discussions. That unanimous Report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa. We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end *apartheid* and establish a non-racial and representative government in South Africa. We particularly commend the EPG's 'negotiating concept' and deeply regret its rejection by the South African government.

"At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa. It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring out concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing *apartheid* dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.

"As envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation. We are profoundly disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take 'in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency.' Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison. A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed, the ANC and other political parties are still banned. Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that at present there is no

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genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle *apartheid* and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative Government.' We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.

"We receive the Group's findings with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work, terminated its efforts for peaceful change. We continue to believe with the EPG that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end. It is clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security.

"It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.

"Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change. We acknowledge that the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.

"We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling *apartheid* and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.

"In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in Para 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures. But we have looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere. In deciding on the adoption of further measures, we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect rhey should be part of a wider programme of international action.

"The British Government's position is set out in Paragraph 12. The rest of us have agreed as follows :

"The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.

"We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation.

"All the measures listed in Paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord namely :

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a) A ban on air links with South Africa, b) A ban on new investment or re-investment of profits earned in South Africa, c) A ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa, d) The termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa, e) The termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa, f) A ban on all government procurement in South Africa, g) A ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and h) A ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and the following additional measures :

i) A ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sector, j) A ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and k) The withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services.

"While expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned in Paragraph 12 below.

"We feel however, that we must do more. We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

"The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will :

(i) Put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa.

(ii) Put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

(iii) Accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.

"As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action we have requested the Secretary General, with assistance from our governments, to coordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

"We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a non-fragmented South Africa. If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps which we called in Paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ready to review the situation and to rescind the measures we have adopted if appropriate, and to contribute in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.

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"On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even those further measures have not had the desired effect, still further effective measures will have to be considered. We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve. Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation or otherwise will activate that resolve.

"Regarding the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven governments will keep the situation under review with the view to advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full heads of government meeting, is desirable. We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously. We believe the Commonwealth must retain its capacity to help to advance the objectives of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.

"Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years. We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of *apartheid* and the establishment of a non-racial and trepresentative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency."

Source : *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 6 August 1986.

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BOOK REVIEWS

GROWTH AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION

A Review Article

THE two volumes—entitled *Wealth and Poverty* (Volume I) and *Dependence and Independence* (Volume II)—bring together some of Jagdish Bhagwati's* outstanding work in the field of development economics and international economic relations. They include the text of some public lectures, addressed as much to the layman as to the professional economist, as well as of articles, which have appeared over a large number of the world's most prestigious economic journals.

Some of the essays have been written jointly with others working in the same field, such as Padma Desai, Anne Krueger and T.N. Srinivasan. They range in date from the early 60's to the 80's and reflect the changing character of the issues, internal and external, confronting policy-makers in developing countries. Many of them deal specifically with the Indian scenario not only because India happens to be his homeland but also because he himself was, as he recalls, actively associated with Pitambar Pant in evolving a strategy for India's planned development. His later and more recent writings, particularly those included in Volume II, bear the imprint of his intense exposure to the intellectual environment of American Universities, though he maintains throughout his own originality of approach and analysis.

In many ways, Jagdish Bhagwati and I belong to different worlds. As an economist, I am a relic of the pre-econometric age, while Bhagwati is very much of a front-runner among the economists of today. Most of my working life, I have been an administrator, while Bhagwati has been an academic. It has been said that while an administrator is concerned with how a policy would work in practice, academics usually focus on the question whether it would work in theory. Despite these differences in our background, because of our common commitment to the cause of poverty-eradication, particularly in the Indian context, I find myself agreeing almost wholly with Jagdish Bhagwati's basic and objective approach and in a good measure with his policy prescriptions.

The objective of development, he emphasizes repeatedly, must clearly be the eliminatian of poverty. Growth he views as a means to the end. Thus, his basic approach is in complete harmony with the kind of consensus on

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*Jagdish Bhagwati : *Essays in Development Economics* : Volumes I and II (Oxford University Press, Delhi), 1985. Volume I, pp. 319, Rs 110/- and Volume II, 396 pp., Rs. 120/-.

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the subject which exists in most developing countries. He lends no support to the line of thinking, fairly common among western economists, which equates development with growth and argues that rapid growth will eventually lead to the elimination of poverty. However, the vital importance of growth in reducing and eventually eliminating poverty is an integral part of Bhagwati's reasoning—as it was in the speech of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when presenting the Budget of 1970-71, as she was then her own Finance Minister. At the same time, he emphasizes the importance of a direct attack on poverty and on measures to bring about a more equitable income distribution.

With regard to the techniques or methods of development, he stands for a blend of planning, particularly for key decisions, with a generous and judicious use of the market mechanism to stimulate growth and the pursuit, side by side, of policies which would directly help the poor, such as land reforms.

In consequence, he has not been too popular with rightist economists who plead for a free play of market forces and the price mechanism, without interference by the State. Reviewing one of his works on under-developed countries, Peter Bauer captioned his article as "Planning Without Prices." However, a lot of what he has to say would be unpopular with leftist economists as well, because he has "castigated the intellectual flabbiness that confuses and equates mindless controls with genuine socialism and, in the process, also hampers the very accumulation and growth process that could impact on poverty." He maintains that a judicious use of the market mechanism, particularly in the modern industrial sector, would be more helpful to the basic objective of poverty elimination than the regime of licensing and other controls which at best succeed in a measure of redistribution between the rich and the not-so-rich and bypass the poor.

His basic ideas are clearly spelt out in the thought-provoking essay on "Development Economics" with which Volume I begins. It is a brilliant review of the evolution of economic thought on the dynamics of the development process, bringing out the ways in which the understanding of the factors which either retard or accelerate the pace of economic growth, has been changing. After discussing the crucial role of investment and its pattern in initiating the process of development, Bhagwati turns to the vital question of the relationship between growth and poverty. Chiding those who "have turned belatedly to the question of poverty with an air of discovery" and allege that earlier "growth was regarded universally as an end in itself and that poverty was not in the picture", he recalls his days when working with Pitambar Pant in the early '60s; they were "looking at income distribution, functional and general, in different countries" with a view to "suggest policy measures to make a sustained impact on poverty." In the following essay on "Indian Economic Policy and Performance," being one of the Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lectures deli-

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vered in 1973 at the Osmania University, Hyderabad, he expresses his disappointment that "Indian economic performance, while a definite improvement over that in the pre-Independence period, is less than satisfactory, whether one takes the capitalist index of growth rates of income or the socialist indices of reduction of poverty and reduction of income inequality." In terms of growth, countries like South Korea and Brazil have done so much better than India, while in respect of poverty-elimination, China has a distinctly better record. The two reasons for the less than satisfactory achievements of Indian planning, he argues, are : the plethora of controls and regulations which have slowed down growth and the way in which adherence to socialistic slogans has in fact accentuated rather than reduced income disparities. He, therefore, puts forward a package of measures which would remove these weaknesses. The main ingredients of the strategy which he advocates are measures of liberalisation, on the one hand, which should be supplemented by steps directed towards poverty-elimination. These should include policies which would provide :

(a) direct public consumption to the poor ;
(b) programmes to enable the poor to have greater access to jobs and other income-generating activities ;
(c) radical institutional changes in the countryside including the introduction of a mixed economy in the agricultural sector; and
(d) an austerity programme for restraining the consumption of the richer classes.

The basic thrust in this chapter is radical rather than liberal. He does not subscribe to the "trickle-down" theory which holds that the benefits of prosperity to the upper income groups will gradually percolate down to the poorest and improve their living standards. Positive measures to alleviate and eliminate poverty have to be taken by the State. If in the industrial sector and foreign trade sector he urges liberalisation it is because, as he tries to demonstrate, the licensing regimes are not really promoting a more equal distribution of incomes and wealth. Instead, they are resulting in an inefficient use of resources mobilised through tough measures which hurt the lowest income groups, while they provide protection to the prosperous, perpetuate family empires of industrialists and give rise to a *rentier* class, thriving on permits of one kind or another. Side by side with his plea for liberalisation, he proposes other tough measures to curb the growth of monopoly power.

Even so—and this is particularly true of his next essay, captioned "Socialism and Indian Economic policy"—his rejection of socialist slogans and rhetoric is likely to bring upon him the wrath of many left-wing thinkers who live under the illusion that if redtape becomes wide enough, it would become the red flag of socialism.

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The wit which makes his style sparkle is more likely to irritate than amuse those who take themselves so seriously as never to appreciate a joke at their own expense. However, the essay does have the serious intent of trying to disentangle the strains of Fabian Gradualism and Soviet Communism in Indian socialist thinking. What he derides are the ways in which the socialist mantle shelters policies which, in the last analysis, hurt the poor and not benefit them. However, recognising the political appeal of Socialism, he makes the cynical observation that the "best thing for economists in this type of set-up would be to work out a number of such conspicuous acts of socialism which can be pulled out periodically to enable the government to maintain its socialist image but making sure that they are not economically expensive." He adds in the footnote that "this type of political economy could make a far greater contribution to the economic growth of a country in India's political predicament than any other single piece of economic research."

Over-all, from his first three essays, it is clear that in his approach to development economics, his heart is in the right place, where every human heart should be, to the left of the centre. His commentary on Indian planning and performance shows some impatience with what he considers to be the lack of progress, particularly in the sphere of poverty-alleviation. Perhaps, in this respect his judgement is a little too harsh because he depends so much on data compiled by research workers relying on statistics, which unlike the ones put out by China for example, under-estimate the progress made, because they do not take into account such things as the growth of the small-scale sector in the industrial economy or the rise in the per capita consumption of things like vegetable oils and sugar which reflect the increase in the income levels of the poor. He quotes, without drawing any lesson from it, Albert Hirschman's assertion that the failure to perceive progress may be the chief obstacle to progress. However, it must be satisfying to him that from the highest political levels in India, the removal of poverty began to be emphasised in the '70s and liberalisation of the economy has come to the forefront in the '80s.

Part II of Volume I deals with "Economic Structure : Regularities and Explanations." The seven essays included in it deal with issues which are of much greater interest to economists than the general reader and the language and presentation too, are much more technical in consequence, replete with graphs and equations. Their scope can best be surmised by looking at the captions of each of these essays :

1. Why does the Share of Manufacturing in GNP Rise with Development ?
2. Why are Services Cheaper in the Poor Countries ?
3. Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations.

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4. Human Capital and the Pattern of Foreign Trade : the Indian Case.
5. Capital Flight from LDCs : a Statistical Analysis.
6. A Statistical Analysis of Shifts in the Import Structure in LDCs.
7. LDC Exports : a Cross-sectional Analysis.

I do not propose to dwell on them at any length. However, on one or two issues, I feel compelled to offer a few comments. His explanation of the changing pattern of production as well as imports in developing countries is based primarily on the income elasticities of the demand for food, manufactured products and services in the consumption pattern of the people. As incomes rise, the demand for manufactures rises faster than the demand for food, and later, the demand for services begins to go up more rapidly than the demand for manufactures. But surely this is not an explanation of what happens but merely a re-statement in different words of what is seen to happen. The more important question is : Why there are differences in the income elasticities of demand for food, manufactures and services ?

To my mind, the explanation lies in the fact that the capacity to consume food per capita is limited. Once your your stomach is full and your palate satisfied, you have no reason to spend more on food. It then becomes natural for a larger proportion of the increase in income to be devoted to manufactured goods which can be used, possessed and displayed. The consumption demand for manufactures, therefore, keeps on rising, particularly as new products come in the market which stimulate the replacement of old ones. Indeed, a stage comes—this is more true of developed economies than the developing countries—when invention becomes the mother of necessity unlike the 19th century concept of necessity being the mother of invention. However, over time with growing affluence, the consumption of manufactures too approaches a saturation point. So, more consumption expenditure is directed towards services.

I have another reservation about the attempt to establish a correlation between the pattern of production and the income elasticity of demand for different types of goods and services. The attempt to do so presupposes that demand is the sole or the prime determinant of the nature and volume of goods and serviees produced in the country. But surely there are many other factors. Resources endowment is one. Singapore cannot be self-sufficient in food. Then there are constraints of resources. The demand may be there, but the capital or foreign exchange needed to produce the matching supply may be lacking. And then there are controls, both on investment and imports. There are also the competing claims on resources, e.g., for investment in heavy industry by the public sector or for providing health, education and other social services to the people or for supplying goods and services at subsidised prices to the low income groups. All these

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may come in the way of the income elasticity of demand influencing the qualitative composition of the stream of supply.

Despite these reservations, I must express my admiration at the way in which in these seven essays Bhagwati has attempted so successfully to throw light on the many complex trends in the economies of developing countries, by analysing the available data with rigorous economic logic and deep insights. With the help of regression equations he establishes that the size of the country is negatively correlated with the share of export in its national income and demystifies a great deal of the controversy around why certain countries seem to follow inward-looking policies and certain others adopt outward-looking policies.

In regard to services, as distinct from goods, which have become a major focus of attention in recent years, Bhagwati has shown, how technical changes, particularly in the information and communication industries, eventually result in a "disembodiment effect." When services, initially embodied in the person providing them and requiring his personal presence where the service is needed, get "disembodied", they can be provided by goods brought in the market.

Part III of Volume I is captioned "Class Structure, Poverty and Redistribution." The pull-up strategy of growth as discussed in Part I, has to be supplemented by other measures of direct benefit to the poor. It is to these that he turns in Part III. The first essay in this part examines the role of education in reducing income inequality, with particular reference to empirical evidence pertaining to India. After reviewing the major works in this area, as also the structural features of the Indian educational system Bhagwati proceeds to examine a hypothesis which runs as follows :

> For each class of education, the State (in capitalist LDCs) will subsidize the cost of education ; the benefits of these subsidies will accrue disproportionately less to the poorer groups at each level of education ; the higher the educational level being considered, the higher will be the average income-level of the groups to which the students belong ; and the rate of governmental subsidization to higher education will be greater than to primary education.

Testing this hypothesis with Indian data, he finds that the lowest income groups have not been able to have the same effective access to primary education as the higher income groups because for them : 1) the cost of primary education is higher ; 2) the benefit from primary education is lower ; 3) the private rate of return to them from such education is, therefore, lower ; and 4) the cost of capital against which such rate of return must be compared is higher than for higher income and cost groups.

As regards higher education, he again finds that its benefits accrue mainly to middle and upper income groups (which makes the subsidisation of

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higher education questionable) and he attacks the expansion of higher-degree institutions in India merely to enable students to compete for jobs which do not require the particular qualification in an objective sense. I myself have been pleading for a number of years for delinking most government jobs from degrees, particularly as the knowledge of the subjects studied by most of the degree holders is of no use or relevance to the candidates in the discharge of the duties which they have to perform, if they succeed in getting recruited.

In another essay dealing with the choice of technology, he point out that because of government's concern with the creation of employment, there has been emphasis on small scale units. But, unfortunately, in his examination of the Indian situation, he found "that in many of the cottage industries, labour-intensive techniques were so primitive and inefficient in relation to modern processes that they used more of both capital and labour to produce the same output." "What under-developed countries need," according to him, "are techniques which are labour-intensive in the sense that they subsitute labour for capital and which are also efficient in terms of productivity."

In the chapter on "Unemployment Models in Development Theory," Bhagwati provides an excellent review of major works accomplished by a large number of distinguished scholars, including Eckaus, Meade, Solow, Lewis and Harrish and Sabot. The problem of unemployment has been treated both as a "generalised phenomenon" for the economy and also as a "seetor specific phenomenon". Rural unemployment and urban unemployment have been subjected to separate treatment.

The first volume concludes with three essays which deal with the contribution made by three distinguished development economists of this century: W. Arthur Lewis, Raul Prebisch and Gunnar Myrdal. Each of them have contributed significantly to the problems of economic development; Lewis with his Caribbean background, Prebisch with his Latin American background, enriched by long years in the United Nations system and Myrdal by his study of South Asia, particularly India, in his celebrated *Asian Drama*. Quoting extensively from the classic work of Lewis, *The Principles of Planning* published in 1949, Bhagwati has enlivened the economic philosophy of Lewis and presented it in an extremely lucid style for a vast number of readers, particularly those engaged in economic policy-making in the developing world. Lewis is one of those distinguished economists who foresaw some of the practical difficulties of central planning arising out of functional problems and the inflexibility of centralised procedures.

The dangers inherent in the over-centralisation at the planning process are today widely recognised even in countries like the USSR and China. Not long ago, lamenting the excessive bureaucratisation of economic decision-making in Russia and need for reforms, Prime Minister Nikolairyzhkow noted :

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> To speak plainly, the insistent need for improving the system of control was in many ways underestimated until recently. The job was done slowly and half-heartedly. The bias for old, mainly administrative methods kept taking the upper hand, and acted as a brake on economic development. . . . The development of the system of economic norms is especially important if we want to improve the new method.

He continued, "out of all the dangers along this road, the biggest is red tape. Creating the appearance of work, taking cover behind hollow rhetoric and bureaucracy might hold back the improvement of the economic mechanism, dampen independence and initiative and erect barriers to innovation."

In the Indian experience too, the accent on economic reforms, since 1980, which has often been referred to as liberalisation of the economy, has been on minimizing discretionary bureaucratic controls and giving greater freedom to the managers of enterprises both in the public sector and in the private sector, to make their own decision within the broad framework of national policies and plan priorities.

The second volume bearing the title *Dependence And Interdepedence* deals with the New International Economic Order, for which the developing countries have been pleading, as well as issues in international economics, particularly from the point of view of the polices which developing countries should pursue in this sphere. The volume consists of four parts dealing respectively with (a) North-South issues ; (b) Development Strategy; Import Substitution versus Export Promotion ; (c) Foreign Assistance, and (d) International Migration and Investment. Many of the issues, particularly those dealing with India's external sector, were written about in the sixties. Even so, many of the issues raised by him are still very much alive.

Addressing himself to North-South issues, Bhagwati calls for a more realistic assessment of the international environment by the countries of the South. He reminds them that their voting strength in international bodies notwithstanding, their capacity to negotiate from strength is very limited. Even the faith in "commodity power" which had been aroused by the success of OPEC in raising oil prices, has now lost much of its force. He therefore, urges "that the southern interests be realistically defined and interests that do not concern us directly be dealt at arm's length . . . . The South should not attempt to resurrect the grandiose notions that have no bearing on the present crisis," even if they appear to be "attractive in certain circles and meritorious, perhaps, in the class-room."

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Instead of a confrontationist approach, he feels that a realisation on the part of both the North and the South about interdependence and mutual gains is needed for the development of the world economy. This is an approach with which I am in full agreement and to which I subscribed wholeheartedly as a Member of the Brandt Commission. The basic question which has to be faced is how the nation-states, both of the North and the South, can be made to realise how both sides stand to gain by policies of cooperation.

One of the things which stands out, if past experience is any guide, is that moral exhortations cut no ice. Countries pursue such policies as suit their own national interest regardless of their impact on other countries—except to the extent that the latter can retaliate in one way or another. In consequence, while the developed countries, despite sharp differences, do strive for an atmosphere of cooperation among themselves, they pay scant attention to the problems and difficulties of countries of the South. Developing countries are the worst victims of the revival of protectionism in the last 10 years or so. Much of the assistance and the "advice" that comes with it is motivated by national interests. Their approach to debt relief is conditioned by their concern for their banks. Aid is guided in a manner which would help their industries suffering from idle capacity. The interests of their investors again influence many of their polices and attitudes (I am leaving out foreign policy considerations emanating from east-west tensions). And finally, in the interests of employment and under pressure from trade unions, they take steps to keep out exports from developing countries.

Against this background, it seems to me that an integral part of the negotiating strategy of the developing countries must be to demonstrate to the workers in developed countries how helpful an increase in the purchasing power of developing countries can be in creating employment and expanding job opportunities in the industrialised world.

US exports of manufactures to major debtor developing countries fell by 40 per cent between 1980-81 and 1983-84. By the end of 1953, roughly 35 million people, i.e. about 10 per cent of the total labour force were looking for jobs in some of the most affluent nations of the world. As the Keynesian solution which led to nearly full employment in most of them for about a quarter of a century after the end of World War II no longer seemed to work and resulted instead in an accentuation of inflationary pressures and a worsening of balance of paymeuts, the developed industrialised countries reverted back to inward-looking policies and protectionist devices, as they had done in the '30s. The only difference between then and now is that while in the '30s, the industrialised countries were waging a trade war against each other, each carrying its colonial empire with itself, today the developed countries, as a group, are not insensitive to each other's problems and the real victims of their policies are the developing countries.

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To my mind, the Keynesian approach to fuller employment can still work if it is applied globally and not nationally. When Keynes propounded his General Theory, there were in the United Kingdom and other industrialised countries, a large number of people who could not afford to buy the things which they needed because they had no jobs and lived on a pitifully small dole, while industries had to cut back their production and lay off workers because they could not sell their product. It was to break this vicious circle in which unemployment led to more unemployment that Keynes urged that more jobs should be created through public works and aggregate demand increased by deficit financing so that more employment would create more demand and lead to more employment.

The reason why this recipe lost its efficiency by the '70s was that by then poverty had virtually disappeared in the more prosperous industrialised countries. Wages and salaries were high. Even the unemployed were so well looked after that they could live free from want. As I suggested earlier, a state of saturation had been reached so far as the physical needs of the people were concerned. More income did not induce people to buy more clothing or more automobiles or more television sets but to go in for costlier ones with some subtle differences and refinements. So, the attempt to stimulate aggregate *domestic* demand *a la* Keynes led to higher prices and not to higher employment. With rising prices, exports dwindled. Much of the additional payments began to be spent on imported goods because of their snob value or relative cheapness. The country's balance of payments deteriorated.

But the global economy still has all the potential and possibilities of using the Keynesian approach. There are hundreds of millions of human beings prepared to buy the goods which would be produced by the partially-idle factories and manpower in industrialised countries, if only they had the necessary purchasing power or foreign exchange. An increase in the volume of their exports or the inflow of resources for development, to the developing countries can provide fuller employment in industrialised countries without the risk of inflation or adverse repercussions on their balance of payments.

Turning now, somewhat briefly for reasons of space, to Parts II, III and IV of this volume, I must first of all pay a tribute to the brilliance of Bhagwati's analysis of the issues which developing countries have to face in their external economic relations. It was his original contributions to the theory of international trade that gave Bhagwati the place of eminence among contemporary economic thinkers, and it is not surprising that he has so many new and original things to say in this sphere.

At the same time, I cannot help expressing my reservations on some of the lines of reasoning he propounds. Thus, I doubt whether it is really sound to speak of import substitution *versus* export promotion in a country's development strategy as if they were alternatives and a choice had

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to be made between them. In general, any new line of production which is set up in a country will cater partly, if not wholly, to the domestic market and thus have an import substitution effect. It is only when the level of production begins to exceed the level of domestic consumption that export possibilities emerge. In island economies, such transformation may be pretty quick, almost simultaneously with the start of production because the domestic market for most products is very small. In a continental economy, the transition may take much longer.

Having said this, I would go along with Bhagwati's basic point that over-emphasis on import substitution in dealing with the foreign exchange problem distorts priorities and results in a low-income high-cost economy. What is needed is a proper balance between import substitution and export promotion which, for most countries, would entail some retracing of steps. Import liberalisation can help in this task but, as he warns, "import liberalisation is unsuccessful when it results in greater domestic competition, but is eminently successful when it involves greater access to non-competitive imports."

However, it does seem to me that in his attempt to find some single simple device which will set things right, he goes a little too far when he suggests the auctioning of foreign exchange as perhaps the most efficient method of allocating it between rival claims. The High Commissioner in India of an African country told me, how his country was pressurised into the auctioning of foreign exchange with the result that no one used the foreign exchange to import food which the country needed most, and most imports were of goods which could be smuggled at an enormous profit to neighbouring countries where their import was banned.

Similarly, I think, he over-emphasizes the role of devaluation in solving a developing country's foreign exchange difficulties. While I am not one of those who are shocked at the thought that the Rupee's purchasing power for foreign goods should be lowered even while they accept with a shrug of the shoulders a steady decline in the domestic purchasing power of the rupee, I do maintain that for devaluation to benefit an economy, the conditions have to be particularly propitious. The crucial question to face is whether the country's exports are languishing because prices are too high or because supplies are limited. Account has also to be taken of the impact on export prices of the increase in the cost of imported inputs as well as of the increased burden, in local currency terms, of outstanding debts expressed in foreign currencies, which may well have a crippling impact on development. It is worth remembering, as Bhagwati himself points out, that while South Korea is often looked upon as a star performer in export promotion, "close inspection of South Korean policies indicates that the kind of detailed and chaotic interventions which we have found in other countries are abundantly present in Korea's case as well : numerous QRs, high tariffs and physical targetting of exports and

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imports." The real trouble in many countries, including India, is that the administrative machinery provides tariff protection against imports only too generously while export subsidisation is resisted, because of the different revenue implications of either course.

Part III examines the role and impact of foreign assistance in a commendably clear manner. It examines the cost of aid not only to the donor but also to the recipient. Pointing out with care the kind of situations in which aid can lead to the immiserization of the recipient and the enrichment of the donor, he goes on to discuss specifically the impact of aid in the form of food and other agricultural surpluses though he refrains from an empirical evaluation of PL 480 programmes of the United States.

Finally, in Part IV, he examines international migration including the problem of brain-drain, on which he has done some original pioneering work. The concluding essay of the Volume argues that it is simply not true to assert that if free trade exists initially in goods, the subsequent introduction of free capital mobility must also be beneficial to all agents.

Over all, these two volumes provide a rich feast for the intellect to all those who are interested in problems relating to and arising out of the poverty of nations. While Bhagwati has dealt with them within the framework of rigorous economic logic, he has not been unmindful of the importance of political and social factors. Indeed, far from decrying, as many economists do, political interference in the working of the economy, he recognises its role and contribution pointing out that even before Keynes had evolved his General Theory relating to unemployment, the political leadership in some countries had begun to deploy deficit financing as an instrument of employment generation. Reading the two volumes becomes particularly fascinating because of the flashes of wit and humour which one comes across with such frequency.

New Delhi. L.K. JHA*

* Mr. Jha. is Chairman Administrative Economic Reforms Commission New Delhi.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE DIMENSIONS

JUDITH A. GILLESPIE and DINA A. ZINNES (*Eds.*) : Missing Elements in Political Inquiry : Logic and Levels of Analysis. Sage Publications, Beverley Hills, 1982, 264 p., $24.

THE volume under review arose out of a conference titled "New Dimensions in Political Science : How do we know what we know?" held in Bloomington, Indiana, in March 1981 and is dedicated to the memory of Professor John Gillespie by his friends "wishing to continue a tradition, a scholarship and fellowship to which John devoted his personal and professional lives." Anyone who is acquainted with John Gillespie's writings knows about his widespread theoretical and methodological concerns as a political scientist. His interests not only included the application of various macro-micro approaches to the study of political phenomena, but he constantly endeavoured to find out the weaknesses in the available methods and techniques and to improve them. He was deeply interested in cumulation and synthesis of knowledge and in theory construction in political science theories that would go beyond the American context and be more widely applicable. The present volume, as the following paragraphs will try to show, indeed makes an attempt to further the goals of political science research to which Professor John Gillespie was committed.

The volume consists of eight chapters equally divided among the following four parts : Coherence and Precision in Formal Models. Structure and Interaction in Dynamic Models, Aggregation and Sequence in Linkage Models and finally, Cumulation and Synthesis in Integrative Models. Each part is well supported by an introduction and a concluding synthesis all of which are extremely lucidly written in non-technical language.

In 1953 in his book, *The Political System*, David Easton very clearly and forthrightly expressed his anguish over the state of the then existing political science discipline and called for new conceptualization of politics for opening up new horizons in research and theory construction. Since then, some notable advances have been made primarily as a result of contributions by Gabriel Almond, Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch and David Easton himself among others. Models and frameworks developed by these political scientists have been responsible for many new strides in political science research, especially of the empirical variety during the last three decades. Yet, standing in the mid-1980s, it is hard for anyone to claim that we have achieved any reliable explanatory and predictive substantive theory in political science. Much of the theoretical contributions of the scholars mentioned above, despite being critically important, remain at the heuristic level. Explanatory and predictive theory in political science is still a far

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cry. When in the face of this Judith Gillespie, one of the editors of the present volume, writes in the Introduction, "Our basic problem is an inquiry problem, one of developing ways of thinking that will allow us to provide new insights into political problems and one of levels of analysis," (p. 12) she deserves attention.

Even a casual reading of the book will suggest that it has a sort of a bias in fovour of formalization. The first four chapters of the book, authored by Boynton, Salert, Brito and Intriligator, and Zinnes *et al.* respectively, argue for and demonstrate the applicability of formal mathematical languages to the clarification of conceptual and empirical issues. Indeed, Judith Gillespie in her introductory essay lays great emphasis on formalization. Formalization, according to her, provides a language for looking at problems; helps us to specify relationships between ideas; enables us to relate statements to one another, and allows us to make un-anticipated deductions. She finds coherence and precision as missing elements in a great deal of political inquiry. Boynton and Salert, in the first two chapters, demonstrate how formalization can help us deal with these missing elements.

Boynton in his contribution reminds us of the inadequacy of empirical research in the absence of its being properly connected with a perspective and he argues that through structures one can bridge perspectives with descriptions and that formal language plays a crucial role in this process for these structures are "already developed 'empty' structures that are available for our use." (p. 59) "Formal language is a tool for working with structures." Boynton very competently details out the role of formal languages in the study of political phenomena and the new insights that one can get from the use of such languages and models in political science.

Barbara Salert, on the other hand, examines the relationship between models that are utilized in political science and the phenomena that are studied. Salert tries to give specificity to the rather vague concept of "threshold" used to denote a sudden and dramatic change in some phenomenon occurring in response to small changes. Through an examination of individual decision thresholds resulting in collective outcome thresholds and the link between the two, with the help of formal languages, she shows how such languages can render greater specificity or clarity to an otherwise vague though a widely used concept.

While through formalization one can achieve coherence and specification or precisian, Brito and Intriligator, and Zinnes *et al.*, in their chapters illustrating dynamic models, show how formal languages can also deal with questions of change in relationships among individuals and groups, and also with temporal change.

One of the most interesting essays in the book is the chapter by James Rosenau in Part III (dealing with linkage models). Directing

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himself to the issue of the most meaningful unit of analysis in cross-national research, Rosenau deals with the question of comprehending the meaning of citizenship in an era of mounting international interdependence. Rosenau's chapter is important not only because methodologically it demonstrates how through a linkage approach one could examine the interactions between interrelationships of units of analysis at two different levels (the interactions between individual interrelationships and interrelationships among states, and possible causal linkages between the two) and achieve a better understanding of both, but also because it raises a number of pregnant substantive questions about the state as well as the individual in the present state of the international system. Implicit in his contribution is an attempt to work out the international implications of what in studies of domestic politics has been labelled as the "crisis of governability." Pointing out that despite some traces of discomfort, political science literature nearly universally assumes the political process to be taking place in a world of autonomous sovereign states, Rosenau urges, "...the changing structure of global politics and the advent of complex interdependence necessitates a new generation of conceptual tools—not as a substitute for our present analytic equipment, but as a supplement to it. Legitimacy, authority, support, complicance, loyalty and citizenship need to be recast in a new context, one that allows for the emerging bases of public affairs ...." (p. 164)

Betty Nesvold's paper in the same part of the book is in the tradition of theoretically informed cross-national analysis of quantitative cross-sectional data developed by such scholars as Rummel, Tanter, Feiraband and Feiraband and Ted Gurr over the past one and a half decades. Borrowing her model directly from Gurr and Lichback—"Forecasting Domestic Political Conflict" in Singer and Wallace (*Eds.*), *To Augur Well : Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*, Sage, 1979—she tests a hypothesis concerning domestic political conflicts, namely, "conflict breeds conflicts." To put it simply, she wants to examine the linkages between state-generated conflict (which she calls "coercion") and "conflict" generated by, I suppose (in the absence of specification by the author), individuals and private groups. Analyzing aggregate data across nations for a decade, she finds that for 50 per cent of her cases "conflict" tends to generate "coercion." (p. 192.)

But despite the insightfulness of Rosenau's chapter or the simplicity of Nesvold's application of a model, one would agree with Charles Herman's comment that both chapters suffer from a surprising lack of specification of the behaving units—Nesvold's more so than Rosenau's, I would say. Since both authors talk about cross-national comparison, non-specification of the sub-national units would leave one guessing whether one is indeed comparing the comparables.

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The final part of the book is designed to demonstrate models which can function as "integrative," helping to cumulate and synthesize knowledge generated by discrete political research and thereby lead us to the much desired road of theory construction. But the chapters in this part focus on, I would say, wrong areas of political research, namely, the American judicial process and the American constitutional system, to illustrate the promise of integration of political knowledge. Both the areas are so very *American* that even generalized findings, based on observations of their functioning, can hardly generate those "true generalizations" that Judith Gillespie expects integrative models to produce. (p. 28) As Samuel Krislov in his paper shows, despite a plethora of studies of the American judicial process, no "firmly based" knowledge is available. Indeed, the intervention of social science in this field, rather than providing common theoretical problems around which knowledge could be integrated, has "set scholars in wildly different directions." (pp.230-31) Similarly, it is not clear how Ostrom's discussion of the American constitutional system helps theory construction.

In sum then, the volume has something to say both with regard to theory construction and empirical research. Regarding the former, it argues that much greater attention has to be paid to coherence and precision as well as to cumulation of knowledge. Cumulation of knowledge requires much more sensitiveness to past research than has been shown so far by political scientists. On empirical research, the book suggests that greater care should be taken of the units of analysis as well as of the problem of aggregation-disaggregation across units at different levels. The need for approximating the complexity of real life brooks no laxity here. It is necessary, however, to point out that while the present volume has chosen to focus on these aspects of theory and empirical research labelling them as the "missing elements in political inquiry," these were not completely missing in past research. Nearly all theoretically conscious political scientists researching with empirical data in the decade of the 1970s had indeed recognized these as important issues. Joseph La Palombara's "Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics : An Anti-Scholastic View" in *The Methodology of Comparative Research* edited by Holt and Turner (1970) is just one example.

It must be mentioned before we conclude, that Judith Gillespie in her introductory essay has done a very good thing by emphasizing that graduate and undergraduate teaching in political science should be structured in such a way that concept and analytical thinking are encouraged among students. Indeed, only innovations in teaching can produce better political scientists in the future. Though one may disagree with Gillespie when she says(p. 31), that research should be chosen "with an eye towards the scope of the field" (for sometimes, innovative research can desirably challenge the

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existing scope and then, help to redefine it) or when she argues (p. 31) that political scientists should "first and foremost be theorizers" (for one may argue that given the poor performance of the discipline on theory during the last 2500 years so much emphasis on theory may be somewhat risky), the volume must be considered worth our serious attention.

Calcutta University, Calcutta.

RAKHAHARI CHATERJEE

EVERT VEDUNG : Political Reasoning. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1982, 232 p., $ 25.

EVERT VEDUNG in the present study discusses in an insightful and academic manner the basic rules scholars must observe if they are to analyse politics and political science in a critical and objective manner. This particular task is of great significance in specifying the nature and substance of politics and political science. It is true that a lot of semantic discussion is to be found in the extant literature in the field of political science, but unfortunately clarity, relevance and consistency seem to be lacking in these exercises.

Schematically the book is divided into eight meaningful chapters. It must be stated that the chapters are well-planned and well-written. Each chapter discusses a particular topic in an analytical fashion by taking into account all aspects of the problem. Thematically each chapter reinforces every other chapter by covering all the important aspects involved in political reasoning.

Chapter One is a clear-cut exposition of the alternative approaches to research on political messages. The author raises a number of questions like, What is the meaning of political message ? Is the message true or false ? and What is the purpose and impact of a message ?

In Chapter Two, Vedung comes to grips with the issue of constructing a language of analysis. He makes a precise attempt at defining a definition examining the meanings of words, their intentions and their extensions. He forcefully argues that a clear-cut definition, avoiding ambiguity and vagueness, converts poorly circumscribed topics into manageable research problems.

The Third Chapter is a critical essay on the nature and technique of interpretation. It must be mentioned that in social science correct interpretation may only be at best a point of view, and therefore it would be

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wise to aim at reasonable interpretations. This is an imperative necessity because political language in the modern world has become ambiguous, vague and stilted when used by different individuals ascribing diverse meanings and interpretations.

Chapters Four and Five examine the processes involved in the identification of pertinent messages and their relevance in a given situation. In this context Vedung discusses the fallacies of relevance like *argumentum adhominem* and *argumentum tu quoque*.

Chapters Six and Seven expound the standard of consistency and truth assessment. The author advances the viewpoint that messages should be free from internal contradictions, while truth assessment emphasises the use of techniques of verification, falsifications, confirmation, disconfirmation and other related concepts. Even the question of value judgements in political reasoning is examined with a view to clarify some of the problems in this ongoing debate. It may be pointed out that in respect of value judgements it is almost impossible to prove or disprove in a scientific way whether they are right or wrong and good or bad. However, it must be recognised that the standpoint of those scholars who avoid this whole issue of value judgements on the ground that they play a very insignificant role in political language is untenable and presumptious. Vedung examines all these questions in a scientific and objective manner.

On the whole, the study is a scholarly attempt to come to grips with a very abstract and philosophical concept like "political reasoning." Vedung's efforts must also be commended wholeheartedly since he goes into the entire matrix of the problem in a very competent and insightful manner. The discussion of difficult concepts is handled with great care by combining the virtues of academic objectivity and sound canons of scholarship. Thus, Vedung's work on political reasoning will be useful to scholars and professional academicians interested in the techniques, processes and nuances of political reasoning.

Department of Political Science.
University of Karnataka,
Dharwar.

V. T. PATIL

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.

BURNEY, Sayed Muzaffar Husain *All That I Have Found to Say*. Director, Public Relations Department, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, 1986, 270 p.

Collection of selected speeches of the Governor of Haryana, which bear upon his experience as an able administrator, his scholarship and deep knowledge of English and Urdu literature and his keen interest in fine arts. In these speeches he has dealt with international affairs, public administration, development education and culture and health and family welfare. This volume is in the series—"Governor Speaks"—which was started when the late B.N. Chakravarty was the Governor of Haryana.

CHAKRAVARTI, K.P. *Criminal Major Acts : Annotating Criminal Procedure Code 1973, Indian Penal Code 1860 and Indian Evidence Act 1872 Alongwith State Amendments with Table of Cases and Subject Index*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1985, 119 p., 953 p., Rs. 135.

Text includes authentic reproduction of government publications updated with amendments, and it incorporates in Cr. P.C., I.P.C. and the Evidence Act all the latest amendments introduced by the Criminal Law Amendment Acts (Acts 43 and 46 of 1983.)

CHAKRAVARTI, K.P. *Words and Phrases Under the Constitution : Interpretation*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1986, 42 p., 688 p., Rs. 110.

Interpretation is provided in the background of Drafting Committee Reports, the Reports of other committees and the debates of the Constituent Assembly.

DUBE, Leela *Seed and Earth : The Symbolism of Biological Reproduction and Gender-Based Relations of Production* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 30). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1986, 47 p. (Paper)

This paper enquires into homology between the sexual asymmetry in biological reproduction as conceived by the culture and expressed through the use of terms. *seed* and *earth* to symbolize differential contributions of the male and the female. It also studies the sexual asymmetry in relations of production expressed in the structural rules which govern ownership, control and use of productive resources and in the structure and functioning of domestic organization as such.

Economist (*Pseud*) *The Seventh Five Year Plan 1985-90 : Perspectives, Objectives, Strategy, Macrodimensions and Resources*. Good Companions, Baroda, 1986, 72 p, Rs. 16. (Paper)

It presents a broad outline of the policy projections contained in the first volume of the document of the Seventh Five Year Plan. It includes important tables and data relating to the projections of sectoral growth.

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HEGDE, Ramakrishna *Judiciary Today: Disturbing Trends and Suggestions for Reforms*. Government of Karnataka, Bangalore, 1986, 15 p. (Paper)

Address by the Chief Minister of Karnataka delivered on 27 June 1986, at the Bar Association of India Conference 1986, held at Bangalore.

INDIA. LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: (Constitutionai Safeguards and Role of Parliament)*. Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi, 1986, iv, 109 p., Rs. 20. (Paper)

Based on published documents, Reports of the Committee on Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the debates of the two houses of Parliament, the brochure describes constitutional economic and social measures taken for the amelioration of the conditions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

JAIN, R.K. *China and Japan 1949-1980*. (2nd edn.) Radiant, New Delhi, 1982, xxii, 339 p., Rs. 120.

Analyses the economic, political and strategic dimensions of Sino-Japanese relations. It is followed by related 87 documents which include bilateral treaties, agreements, joint communiques, interviews and statements of government dignatories, articles, commentaries and editorials in the Chinese Press. This second edition has six new chapters which deal with the significance and implications of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, The Senkaku Islands Dispute, economic relations in the seventies and cooperation in the development of energy resources especially coal and oil.

MADRAS INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES *The Match Industry in Sivakasi, Sattur: Towards Removal of Child Labour*. Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1985, v, 71 p., Tables, (Paper)

Study undertaken at the request of the Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation, Government of India. It considers the problems of child labour as a part of the complex socio-economic phenomenon peculiar to the Sivakasi area. It examines two aspects of the private costs incurred by the removal of child labour, one is the effect on total manufacturing costs or the possible increase in labour costs and the other is the loss of income to the child labour supplying households.

MIZORAM, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY *Fourth Mizoram Legislative Assembly Who's Who 1986*, Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Aizawal, 1986, xi, 67 p.

MUKHERJI, R. *The Peasant Question in India* (Bhoomaiah Kishta Goud Memorial Lecture, 1982). Subarnarekha, Calcutta, 1985, 44 p. (Paper)

Fourth lecture delivered under the auspices of the *Bhoomaiah Kishta Goud Memorial Committee*, Hyderabad. It dwells on the issue of land systems as existed since the Vedic Period and its consequent effect on the life of peasants. It says that the land reforms initiated did not improve the lot of peasants but further deteriorated their life and the land-holdings fragmented. Common ownership of land and collective production slowly and gradually through continuous, protracted class struggle and revolution is advocated as a solution to the age-old peasant question in India.

NARAYANAN. P. *Copyright Law* (Intellectual Property Law Series). Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1986, 26 p., 665 p., Rs. 212.

Deals with various aspects of the Law of Copyright citing case law from English as well as Indian decisions. It discusses the Copyright Act 1957 and its amendments of 1983 and 1984. Separate chapters are devoted to "Breach of Confidence" and "Industrial Designs" (based on the Designs Act 1911). The Appendix contains full texts of the UK Copyright Act 1956, the Berne and Universal Copyright Conven-

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tions, Designs Act 1911, the Design Rules and the Registered Designs Act 1949 (UK), and the extracts from the recommendations of the Whitford Committee (1977) on the Copyright Law in the UK.

PREM PRAKASH, *Mogha's The Indian Conveyancer (9th edn.)*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1984, xliii, 859 p., Rs. 115.

Handbook covers all aspects of conveyancing and includes a complete set of fully drafted precedents in major areas of it. The author, a retired judge of the Allahabad High Court, takes note of the numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court and High Courts in India relating to the subject.

RADHAKRISHNAN, P. *Nature and Extent of Education in Early 19th Century British india* (Caste Discriminations in Indigenous Indian Education 2), (Madras Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 63). Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986, ii, 187 p. (Paper)

The study is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the origin and significance of the institution of indigenous education and briefly discusses the Madras Educational Enquiries (1822-25) ordered by the Presidency Governor Thomas Munro, Bombay Educational Enquiries (1824-25) by Governor Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Bengal Educational Enquiries (1835-38) by Governor-General Lord Bentinck. Nature and extent of indigenous education in the early 19th Century British India is discussed in the second part. Rest of the study is devoted to examine in detail caste-differentiations in participation in the institution of indigenous education in the three presidencies. It is based on the data collected by the British administrators.

RADHAKRISHNAN, P. *Study of Early 19th Century Bombay Presidency* (Caste Discriminations in Indigenous Indian Education, 3) (Madras Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper, 64). Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986, 57 p. (Paper)

On the basis of data of the Bombay Presidency Educational Enquiries 1824-25 mainly of elementary schools and partly on domestic instruction and higher learning, the study analyses caste-differentiations in access to learning in the Bombay Presidency.

RAZA, Moonis (*Etc.*) *Tribal Literacy in India : The Regional Dimension* (National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration Occasional Paper, 9). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1985, 71 p., Tables, Maps (Paper)

Reviews the changing situation of literacy among the Scheduled Tribes of India as recorded by the succcssive censuses from 1961 to 1981. It identifies the broad regional framework of tribal literacy and compares performance of tribes with the non-tribal population in terms of their literacy attainment.

SAHA, A.N. *The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (3rd Edn.)*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1986, 56 p., 1428 p., Rs. 320.

Discusses the Code with the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976.

SAHA, A.N. *Mitra's Civil Reference (2nd Edn.)*. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1986, 7 p., 570 p., Rs. 125.

Volume contains case laws on various subjects including interpretation of statutes, administrative law, specific relief, etc., and provides reported decisions on important questions and exact state of law in civil matters of everyday uss. References to the cases are given from *All India Reporter* and other law reports.

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SHARMA, Ram Avtar (*Ed.*) *Indira Gandhi's Leadership*. Raj Prakashan, New Delhi, 1986, 216 p., Rs. 140.

Through the interviews of Mrs. Gandhi's colleagues at one time or the other and her contemporary opposition leaders, her successes and failures in regard to fulfilling aspirations of the people of the country are revealed. Replies to the questions are taken in their original form. Minor alterations are made in few cases to make interviewees' views clear. Among the leaders interviewed, the important ones are Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram, Chandrashekhar, George Fernandes L K. Advani and E.M.S. Namboodripad.

SUBRAMANIAN, K.S. *Violence Against the Scheduled Castes in India : Overview, Problems, Prospects* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 29). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. New Delhi, 1986, 99 p. (Paper)

The study discusses the factors responsible for violence. These factors are : protest by the Scheduled Castes against their deteriorating socio-economic conditions and resentful and defensive reaction to it by the land-holding caste Hindu elites, disapproval of even minimal development measures taken by the government for the welfare of the Scheduled Castes, collaboration of the Police Forces in putting down rural discontent and economic exploitation and social discrimination combined with political repression. The author's thesis is that the phenomenon of violence is not a law and order or administrative problem nor is it a species of caste violence but a socio-economic problem. He suggests comprehensive reappraisal of developmental policies *vis-a-vis* the Scheduled Castes.

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INDIA AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM : REALITIES AND PROSPECTS

By SANJAY CHATURVEDI*

India feels proud of its scientific as well as diplomatic achievements in regard to the Antarctica — the most forbidding terrain on our **terra firma,** *a significant 'natural laboratory' as well as an object of innovative political experiment in international control and cooperation. With as many as five successsful expeditions to this multi-faceted and multi-dimensional continent, a permanently manned scientific station* **Dakshin Gangotri** *and a coveted and enviable "consultative status" in the Antarctic Treaty System, India's presence on Antarctica is well established.*

The Indian entry into the elitist Antarctica Treaty System (hereafter cited as ATS) and its innermost circle has added a new dimension to the geopolitics of Antarctica. It has also highlighted and reiterated, in a significant way, India's resolve to have a meaningful and effective say in the management of Antarctica and its so far untapped resources. Demonstrating its scientific maturity and political farsightedness, India has started investing in Antarctica with an eye to future returns.

However, the entire issue of India-Antarctica interaction is not as it is often projected and portrayed by the press and elsewhere. Antarctica no doubt has just dawned in the realm of Indian consciousness and not many in the country possess much politico-geographic awareness about this frozen bottom of the earth where a subtle interaction between geography and politics has lately assumed significant dimensions and far reaching implications. And what we fail to grasp is the complexity of the geopolitical realities of the Antarctica and the political implications of India's presence as a consultative member within the ATS. We tend to isolate Indian interests and objectives from the general backdrop of the Antarctica political scenario and try to study them in isolation.

The present essay is born out of the necessity to critically examine the Indian goals in Antarctica, irrespective of whether they are scientific, economic or political in the light of the following assumptions. Firstly, India joined the Antarctic Treaty System at a 'critical' juncture and at a particular 'point' of the evolution of the Antarctic political field and hence cannot remain insensitive to or unaffected by its problems and complexities. Secondly, while examining the Indian interests and objectives in the Antarctic we should focus our attention on the 'role' that India decides to play on the

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* Mr. Chaturvedi is Senior Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Chandigarh.

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'geopolitical chessboard' within the ATS and moreover as a consultative member with rights and duties. And finally, the annual despatch of the scientific expeditions to Antarctica and the acquisition of the "consultative status" in the ATS should not be viewed as ends in themselves but to the contrary, as indispensable means to realise some crucial objectives or goals in the Antarctica. What lies before India in regard to the Antarctica issue is a difficult and changing path and a foreign policy dilemma.

It is in the light of these assumptions and against the backdrop of the Antarctica's geopolitical seenario, that the present essay purports to examine Indian interests, objectives and moves in regard to the Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty System.

I

THE ANTARCTICA GEOPOLITICAL SCENE

"Politicking" of Antarctica

The ice covered Antarctica continent is 5.5 million square miles in its immensity, and in fact, larger than India and China put together. It is the coldest (minimum temperature ever recorded being —86° Centigrade), the windiest (snow storms or blizzards raging up to a velocity of 200 nautical miles per hour), and the farthest of all the continents with the nearest land at Cape Horn being 600 miles away.[1]

The unique geographical profile of Antarctica and its normally uninhabitable and inhosfitable environment in its interaction with man and his highly developed political organizations, namely the nation-states, has generated an equally unique kind of geopolitics. Although the search for Antarctica started before the turn of the century,[2] we can say that as a political and legal problem it essentially belongs to the 20th Century. Inspite of exploratory expeditions[3] and the commercial enterprises[4] of the 19th Century, it was only during the last decade that great momentum was given to Antarctica. The real penetration into Antarctica, the development of various national interests and the origin and evolution of Antarctica geopolitics are undoubtedly a 20th Century phenomena. And what we take up in brief in the following pages is an analysis of the major characteristics of the geopolitical scene of the Antarctica in a historical perspective.

Claims and Counter Claims

The most complex crux and the greatest conflict potential of Antarctica politics lies in the disputed sovereignty status of the area.[5] By Letters Patent of 21 July 1908, Great Britain staked the first ever claim on the Falklands and later on extended it to the Antarctica Peninsula in 1917.[6] One of the motives was to control the rich, profitable whaling industry in

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the southern oceans, to save it from destruction and charge fees from those who were engaged in it.[7] As Philip W. Quigg points out, the motive was not entirely selfish but in closing the 'commons', Britain began a process of colonising the continent, that had troublesome consequences.[8] There were no official protests. In 1923, by an Order-in-Council, Britain formally claimed the Ross Ice Shelf and its surrounding coasts as a "British Settlement" and placed it under the administration of the Governor General of New Zealand.[9] Just ten years later, in February 1933, a British Order-in-Council carved out a third and the largest slice of the continent (2,470,000 square miles), placing it under Australian authority.[10] All the three territorial claims, each extending to the South Pole, embraced more than two-thirds of the Antarctica.

In anticipation of the claim on Australia's behalf, France in 1924 formally annexed Adelie Land, although no Frenchman had ever set foot on it. It consisted of a relatively small wedge sandwiched between the slices of the Australian territory.[11]

Norway had two major reasons for staking a claim in addition to its primacy as explorer of Queen Maud Land.[12] As a leading whaling nation, Norway was growing increasingly restless over being pushed out of the Antarctic coastal waters by the territoral claims of others.[13] But a more immediate and compelling motive was the increasing German activity in the southern region and the fact that in January 1939, with tensions high in Europe, a German expedition was planned for Antarctica. A pre-emptive declaration of sovereignty by Norway on the coastland of the Queen Maud Land was welcomed by the Allies.[14] To the present day the southern boundary of Norwegian claims is undefined.

With the advent of the Second World War, both Argentina and Chile became better aware of their geopolitical obligations to neigbouring Antarctica. Neither of the two, in fact, had been much involved in the Antarctic during the first four decades of the century,[15] and had shown no disposition towards exploration, claimstaking or research in Antarctica until the War, when other nations with Antarctic interests were otherwise engaged and the continent appeared to have some strategic importance.[16] Argentina sent expeditions to the Peninsula and the South Shetlands in 1942 and 1943. Chile, in November 1940, delimited a broad sector that it claimed had been national territory all along.[17] Argentina took the same position and much of the same territory. Hence, Chile and Argentina became, depending on one's view point, either the first claimants or the last.[18] In any event, their claims overlapped eatch other as well as the 1908 claim of Great Britain.

Although different grounds were advanced by the seven claimants in support of their respective claims (discovery, sector principle, geographical proximity, geological contiguity, inheritance of the historic rights from the Spanish), none of them fulfilled the requirement of effective occupation

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under International Law.[19] Which means that each claimant state tended to apply only those rules of International Law which were favourable to them, ignoring the others under the excuse that geographic conditions of Antarctica made it impossible for absolute compliance.[20]

The Antarctic claims scenario became still further complicated by the non-recognition of all the territorial claims by both the United States of America[21] and the late-comer USSR.[22] After a gap of nearly ninety years,[23] the first significant American activity was the private expedition of Admiral Byrd between 1928-1930 ; since then there has been no looking back for America in terms of its interests and activities. There were some private attempts, though vague ones, to claim some sectors of the Antarctica ; no official claim was put forward.[24] The United States, while making no claims on Antarctica, strongly refused to recognise the existing ones, but at the same time maintained all 'rights' in the area including the right to make claims in future. And many have doubted the validity or usefulness of such a stand.[25]

On the other hand, the Soviet Union entered the Antarctic political field after a gap of nearly 125 years in 1939, proclaiming its 'historic rights' in the region and refusing to accept any agreement in regard to the area without its participation.[26] And on the claims issue it took a stand identical to that of the United States.

Tense Rivalries

Demarcation and declaration of claims in the Antarctica by a handful of adventurous nations manifested, initially at any rate, a healthy rivalry in pursuit of knowledge, curiosity and explorations. The physical conditions of Antarctica never permitted these demarcations to cause immediate conflict. The smallness of the number of claimants also could not exhaust the huge spread of the continent (with 15 per cent of the continent still unclaimmed), a sizeable area of which remained uncharted and unexplored. But occasionally, the political temperature on Antarctica did rise.[27] The period between 1943 and 1952 was marked by a situation fraught with dangerous possibilities. In fact in 1952, shots were exchanged between the Argentinian Navy and some Britishers who were trying to establish a meteorological station at Hope Bay.[28] Both Argentina and Chile refused a British invitation to go to the International Court of Justice in 1947 and 1955 on the plea that no third party could judge this domestic issue.

Diplomatic and military tensions were rising rapidly in the 1950s and the competition had already driven these three claimants to maintain a "continuous occupation" of a number of bases with military and some scientific personel on and around the Antarctica Peninsula. Some believe that in the absence of political purpose, it is doubtful whether so much

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money and energy would have been budgeted for permanent meteorological observations and oceanographic investigations in the Antarctica.

II

ANTARCTICA AT THE UN

The Indian Initiative

Developments such as these caused the issue of the Antarctica to be brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1956. Ambassador Arthur S. Lall, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, requested (19 February 1956) that the question of Antarctica be included in the provisional agenda of the Assembly. India's explanatory memorandum stated in part :

> Antarctica, a region covering about six million square miles of territory has considerable strategic, climatic and geophysical significance for the world as a whole. With the development of rapid communications, the area might shortly come to have further practical sigificance to the welfare and progress of nations. The mineral wealth of the landmass is believed to be considerable and its coastal waters contain important food resources.[30]

India wanted to secure international agreement for the development of Antarctica's resources for peaceful purposes — and here one cannot help appreciating the wisdom and the farsightedness in the memorandum which referred to the possibility of growing conflicts over the natural resources of Antarctica. It suggested :

> The Government of India accordingly suggests that the General Assembly of the United Nations should call upon all the states to agree and affirm the peaceful utilisation for the general welfare and in particular to agree that the area shall not be used in any manner that would create or accentuate world tensions, or extend to this area the influence or effects of existing tensions.[31]

India however, did not press the issue largely because of opposition from Chile and Argentina and the lack of support from other quarters.[32] It finally withdrew the item.

In 1958, India again requested that the "Question of Antarctica" be inscribed on the agenda of the Thirteenth regular Session of the General Assembly.[33] An explanatory memorandum relating to this item reiterated the considerable strategic, climatic and geophysical significance of Antarctica to the world as a whole. A special interest was shown in the meteorological aspects and implications of Antarctica. What is significant is that the

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memorandum made it clear that the purposes underlined above could be achieved without the renunciation of any rights or claims which a nation may have in Antarctica or claims of sovereignty or other rights consistent with the United Nations Charter.[34] In view of the heavy agenda of the General Assembly for the 13th Session and the fact that a conference on Antarctica (excluding India) had been called at the instance of the United States, India deemed it proper to postpone the consideration of this question to the Fourteenth Session ; the item was then withdrawn from the session. However India continued to be convinced of the necessity of the discussion of the Antarctica by the UN, but at no stage indicated the kind of Untited Nations machinery it wanted to be set up.[35]

The Post War Scene and the International Geophysical Year

In 1957, "The International Council for Scientific Unions" (a federation of international scientific institutions) created "Comite Special de l'Annee Geophysique" (CSAGI) to work out the details of the International Geophysical Year, which declared Antarctica "a region of almost unparalleled interest."[36] The IGY extended over an 18 month period, from 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958, during which twelve nations (USA, USSR, Britain, Norway, France, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Japan and South Africa) operated 60 stations in the Antarctic region, out of which 48 were actually on the continent.[37] This "Commonwealth of Science" undertook scientific research programmes in eleven important fields, including geomagnetism, glaciology, cosmic rays, meteorology and oceanography.[38] The IGY experiment proved to be so successful that scientists were determined to continue their activities and after a series of meetings in this regard the ICSU established in 1958 a Scientific Committee for Antarctica Research (SCAR). The SCAR consisted of a delegate from each nation actively engaged in Antarctica research and representatives from the Scientific Union. It held its first meeting at the Hague in 1958 to discus post-IGY Antarctic research.[39]

A significant outcome of the IGY was that scientific activities had been institutionalised on a permanent basis thus ensuring participation of the scientific world in Antarctica affairs. Another important factor was that scientists belonging to all participant countries, whether claimant or not, were acting jointly. Their endeavours were being channelled by a non-governmental body and their actions were purely scientifically motivated. Keeping in mind the Antarctic sovereignty dispute and the cold war implications, the IGY was a remarkable success and did assist in generating the "political will" among the conflicting national positions to cooperate and avoid conflict. As Walter Sullivan has rightly remarked : "The IGY's construction of scientific bridges across political chasms coincided with a general growth of science's role in diplomacy, as well as in national policy

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making."[40] Though the political differences and the geopolitical considerations persisted, IGY did provide a stimulus for the Antarctica Treaty of 1961.

In fact, as early as 1948, the United States had initiated consultations with the seven claimant countries, proposing some sort of "internationalisation" of Antarctica which would help in solving the problem of conflicting claims.[41] But the claimants refused and it was obvious that no solution could be found without taking into consideration the position of the claimants. Thus it was necessary to devise a system that would not threaten what they considered to be their sovereign rights.[42]

Another reality to be faced was that of Soviet entry to the Antarctic scene with the official declaration of 8 June, 1985, informing: ". . . the Soviet Union cannot recognise as lawful any decision taken without its participation."[43] USSR's actual involvement was a matter of time and the IGY gave the opportunity. The Soviets, causing a general alarm had, all their bases in the Australian sector during the IGY and refused to pack up after its formal termination.[44] Who could stop the Soviets and on what grounds ?

A new and urgent reason, which completely changed the perspective of the Antarctic political solution and compelled a solution to the problem was "the entry of the giants" in the Antarctic. Large-scale participation of both USA and USSR changed the Antarctic situation radically. In the first place, it gave Antarctica a unitary outlook which now had to be considered geopolitically as a whole. Secondly, the Great Powers with vast resources at their disposal could, and did spread themselves out over the whole region, but as they recognised no sovereignty, there was no reason to stop them. And what if they asserted claims in future ? As they possessed far greater capabilities, they would in time be building up a very strong basis for challenging the existing claims and amassing impressive sets of precedent and bases for proclaiming their own. Such possibilities and apprehensions provoked great pre-occupation in the claimant nations in whose sectors the major powers had established themselves.[45]

It is significant to note that these events took place at the height of the cold war and although the Great Powers had a desire to extend themselves over the whole of the Antarctica, none could afford a confrontation. It was a characteristic phenomenon of the 1950s that more important than a desire to incorporate a given region into their own hegemony, was the wish to prevent the other power from doing so. In other words, the desire to avoid a confrontation, while at the same time guaranteeing and safeguarding one's own strategic position, lest it be diminished by strategic advantage of the other party, constituted another incentive for reaching an agreement on Antarctica. This was a foretaste of what has now become known as the "balance of prudence." We see in consequence

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that by 1958 Antarctica geopolitics had developed to a point that it compelled one and all, with direct interest in Antarctica, to find solutions to the problems and as a first step in this direction a series of rules applicable to all had to be provided.

It is significant to note that the preliminary negotiations lasted over a year and a half and took place during two different situations—initially, something like a 'spirit of Camp David' marked by co-existence, and later, the U-2 incident which reopened the old wounds overnight. Nevertheless, even the later incident did not hinder negotiations. The negotiations were accompanied by a desire to reach an agreement acceptable to all. In fact the negotiations had an element of urgency to lay down rules applicable to all. Such rules, it was remembered, should permit the activities necessary for the fulfilment of rational objectives. The challenge faced was to create a set of rules and laws out of a legal chaos, so to say. The twin principles of 'rule of unanimity' and 'lack of publicity' accelerated the pace of negotiations.[46]

III

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM

Essence and Principles

The Antarctic Treaty[47] was signed at Washington on 1 December 1959 by the representatives of USA, USSR, Japan, Belgium, South, Africa, UK, Argentina, Chile, Norway, France, Australia and New Zealand. With a Preamble and fourteen articles, it came into force on 23 June 1961, after due ratification by all the signatories.[48]

As we have observed so far, the Antarctic Treaty was the outcome of a series of confrontations provoked not only by conflicts and contradictions in legal positions and political outlook but also by problems arising out of the scientific activities on Antarctica. The region with which it deals is so inhospitable and different from the normal theatre of activities of mankind, that its unique geopolitical compulsions demand cooperation far greater than elsewhere. The Treaty therefore is a modest and limited attempt at an agreement that allows the co-existence of divergent national interests and positions. It does not solve as many situations or problems as it provides a means by which the signatories can live together. And in consequence, it is not a Treaty covering all aspects of the Antarctic reality but only some of them.

The essence of the Treaty lies in its Preamble which includes two major objectives :

(a) the peaceful use of Antarctica and
(b) scientific cooperation.[49]

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All the other provisions stem from these two cardinal principles and serve as working arrangements by which the Treaty is made applicable. We shall summarise only the more important ones.

With reference to the first principal objective set forth in the Preamble, we have Articles I, V and VII of the Treaty.[50] Article I prohibits any measure of military nature. It is not really a provision calling for demilitarisation, since Antarctica was never militarised, but one of non-militarisation. An exception to this article is contained in paragraph 2 of Article I. It permits the use of military personnel and equipment only for logistic support without which a scientific expedition to Antarctica would be extremely difficult. This article which refers to the prohibition of military activities is complimented by Article V, which prohibits any nuclear explosion or disposal of radioactive material in Antarctica.[51]

Finally, Article VII is important as it provides rights of inspection of all areas of Antarctica by nationals of the Consultative Parties.[52] This right to unhampered and unhindred inspection was included because of the apprehensions on the part of both the Super Powers, as well as the others, to prevent the region from falling into the hands of rivals and to guarantee all the parties that logistic activities performed by military personnel would not be a cover for military designs or enterprises. This Article has a final paragraph (No. 5), which establishes a system for the exchange of information regarding expeditions to and from stations in Antarctica.

The second important principle of the Treaty is cooperation in scientific investigations in Antarctica. Article II ensures that freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation will continue as applied during the IGY.[53] Article II recognises the importance of science and makes it one of the paramount objectives of the Treaty. Through its dispositions, the Treaty incorporated in legal binding norms the activities and objectives of the IGY (which interestingly was not an inter-governmental organisation). It was only through a legal international treaty that the political implications or spillovers of the IGY, such as using IGY activities to the staking of new claims or strengthening the old ones could be avoided and in consequence allow activities of a country in the claimed territory of another. As an immediate consequence of Article II, we have Article III which develops the principle of international scientific cooperation.[54]

The other Articles are on the ways and means to make the Treaty work in accordance with the two principles mentioned above. The first and foremost of these Articles is Article IV,[55] which has been considered one of the most successful ones of the whole Treaty, inasmuch as it tries to solve conflicts emanating from the different legal positions of the signatories regarding the issue of Antarctica sovereignty. It is said that this Article has "frozen" the claims of the parties or put them in "legal cold storage." In reality, what it does is to freeze the consequences of conflicting positions and that too only so long as the Treaty remains in force.

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The conflicting positions as such are left as they are. Every party maintains its original stand. What this Article does is to guarantee all the signatories that their stands or position will remain unhampered or undiminished by the Treaty.[56]

The use of the word "rights" along with the claims in Article IV, vividly suggests that it takes into account not only the position of the seven claimants, but also the one of the non-claimants, since each party maintains, "basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have either as a result of its activities or those of its nationals...or otherwise." No other formulation could be clearer and even acceptable to all concerned.[57]

The significant implication of such an arrangement—howsoever modest and limited it might appear—is that no claimant country renounces its rights and that the others likewise do not relinquish the basis upon which they could eventually stake claims.

Another principle contained in Article IV Paragraph 1(c), is that it allows states with divergent positions, especially in the South American quadrant, to cooperate in the region without having to safeguard constantly their respective rights.[58] And Paragraph 2 of Article IV further makes it clear that no claims or enlargement of the existing ones can be asserted while the Treaty is in force.[59] And it is precisely here that the "freezing" takes place, and consequently it is for the future and not for the past. This could be possible because the signatories have accepted the obligation that their activities would not generate new rights.

This is how the political problem that emerged during the IGY due to the scientific stations established by countries not recognising territorial claims in the sector of the claimant countries is solved.[60] This could reassure specially the less powerful claimant states apprehending that the more powerful ones could establish sites under the guise of science and then use them as the basis for a claim. After all, there was no guarantee that otherwise purely scientific matters could not be construed in future as a basis for proclamation of sovereignty.

Article VI defines the territorial limits of the Antarctic Treaty jurisdiction ; it says that the Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but without affecting the rights of any state with regard to the high seas in the area.[61]

The question remains as to what constitutes the "high seas" in the Treaty area.[62] Due to the different legal positions of the Treaty Powers, there does not and in fact cannot exist an exact delimitation of international waters since the claimant nations would claim their rights over the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone, whereas, these rights are not recognised by the non-claimants as well as those not members to the Treaty itself. As we shall analyse later, this problem has assumed alarming implications after the conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS).

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As regards the other Articles, Article VIII takes into consideration the problems of jurisdiction.[63] Here also, no agreement could be reached; it was decided—in the absence of any final solution—that the inspectors, scientific personnel and members of the station should be under the jurisdiction of the contracting parties.[64]

Article X[65] contains an undertaking to make appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the UN, to the end that nobody engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles and purposes of the Treaty.[66]

Article XI provides for procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute over interpretation or application of the Treaty.[67]

Interestingly, Article IX provides for an ad hoc, and far from being perfect, decision-making mechanism.[68] No permanent secretariat is being established and the Consultative Parties are supposed to hold meetings at regular intervals—and the agreement later arrived at is two years—to discuss and pass the recommendations. More interesting perhaps is the clause of Article IX that each party will have a "double veto" to undo a recommendation.[69]

Another significant—and now extremely controversial—provision of the Treaty is Paragraph 1 of Article XIII dealing with the admission of new members.[70] It makes the Treaty "open for accession by any state which is a member of the United Nations, or by any other state which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the contracting parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the Treaty."[71] And as it has been agreed to by all the signatories under Para 2 of Article IX of the Treaty, the new members desirous of acquiring the right to participate in the consultative meetings (with same rights and duties as for the original twelve) will have to prove their "substantial scientific research activity."[72] The word 'substantial' has come to mean despatch of a scientific expedition to Antarctica or setting up of a research base there.[73]

During the Antarctic Treaty negotiations in 1959, proposals with regard to the time period of the Treaty ranged from a fixed 10-years to an indefinite duration.[74] The final compromise was that no fixed termination date was set, but after 30 years any of the active parties could request that a conference be called "to review the operation of the Treaty." Articles XII, XIII and XIV of the Treaty deal with modifications, amendments, accessions, ratification and connected problems of the Treaty.[75]

There was, quite obviously, a mutual temptation on the part of all the original members to wait-and-see and to postpone consideration and consultation on difficult problems in the hope that they would not develop to a crisis-point before 1991. One such issue of Antarctica resource potential was deliberately shelved indefinitely on similar optimism. Though aware of the future resource promise of Antarctica, the signato-

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ries to the Treaty found it prudent as well as expedient to bypass the issue, for it was and still is linked to the sovereignty dispute over Antarctica.[76]

Problems and Constraints

Holding the reigns of control over decision-making, strictly adhering to the principle of unanimity and upholding the perceived functional requirements of secrecy and lack of publicity, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (hereafter cited as ATCPs) could successfully deal with the emerging problems, chiefly scientific in nature, throughout 1960.[77] Only four countries were admitted to the Treaty ; Poland (8 June 1961), Czechoslovakia (14 June 1962), Denmark (0 May 1965) and Netherlands (30 March 1967) with 'second class' status or ordinary membership, without access to decision making.[78]

The recommendations approved by the ATCPs in their periodic meetings were primarily on subjects, such as conservation of living resources in Antarctica, exchange of information, telecommunications, transportation, and historic monuments.[79] Since all of them were scientific and non-controversial in nature the ATS could deal with them effectively and successfully.

But somehow the 1970s had in store a series of new problems for the Antarctica Treaty System slowly and steadily posing a threat to its legitimacy and viability.[80] As a result of the transformed political and economic realities of the international system—constituting the "external environment" for the ATS—findings of geophysical and geological research on the continent, supported by much advanced science and technology and the intra-system developments, the Antarctic political field assumed complexity and intensity in the 1980s. And the ATS responded to the newly emerged problem areas, some of which were caused by Antarctic activities not covered by the Treaty, with urgency inspite of its inherent constraints.

One problem area, swinging the ATS into immediate action, arose out of the arrival of non-Treaty actors on and around the Antarctica. These "outsiders", so dubbed by the ATCPs, were the tourists and the fishing nations like South Korea and Taiwan engaged in their commercial enterprises in the marine-rich southern waters.[81] Whereas the tourist problem was simpler and manageable, the latter posed a more serious threat not only to the eco-system of Antarctica but to the perceived "role" of the ATCPs as the guardians of the Antarctic living resources. However, the 'outsiders' were not alone in the commercial exploitation of "krill" but were joined by the Treaty members—USSR, Japan and Poland.[82] The protein rich "krill" (*Euphausia superba*) not only happens to be the largest fishing stock in the world, with estimates of standing

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stocks ranging from 300 million to 6 billion metric tons, but at the same time the crucial nucleus of the Antarctic eco-system. The fear of over-exploitation of this species and its implications was further accentuated by the fact that as a result of the Law of the Sea Conference and application of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) concept, a large number of fishing nations were being pushed out of their traditional fishing grounds and now looked to the Southern oceans.[83] Before the extensive schools of "krill" could become the target of reckless and uncontrolled exploitation and the cause of irrevocable and irreperable damage to the Antarctic food-web and its fragile eco-system, the ATCPs thought of the need for establishing a regime.

Even before the dimensions of the first problem area could be properly grasped or grappled with, the oil crisis of 1973 hit both the ATCPs and the world community alike. It coincided with the discovery of a number of minerals on and off the Antarctica. The guessing of Antarctica resource potential based on the theory of Continental Drift or Gondwana Land hypothesis, was increasingly replaced during the 1970s by the growing evidence of oil and gas deposits in the Ross Sea sector of the Antarctica and some important minerals on the mainland (including iron, gold, copper, manganese, molybdenum, miobium, titanium, lead, zinc, tin, mica, graphite and many others),[84] As a result of the scientific findings of the US ship *Glomar Challenger* in the Ross Sea in 1973, very many expections were raised in terms of finding another "gulf" in the Antarctica Continental Shelf.[85] To make it still more fascinating, a part of the confidential report prepared by the National Security Council of United States leaked in 1974, indicated that the US Geological Survey estimated deposits of 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas on the continental shelves of west Antarction.[86]

The ATS Responds

Aware of the complexities and their likely unpleasant implications, the Antarctic Powers discussed the resources issue informally during the Sixth Consultative Meeting at Tokyo in 1970 and officially at the Wellington Meeting in 1972. It was decided that the item "Antarctica Resources—Effects of Mineral Exploration" be carefully studied and included in the agenda of the Eighth Consultative Meeting at Oslo in 1974.[87]

At Oslo, the ATCPs decided to take up the issue of Antarctica living resources first, also because some of the United Nations agencies (including FAO) had shown keen interest in this matter to the utter dislike of and opposition by the ATCPs.[88] They acknowledged the need for more "detailed studies of the biology, distribution, biomass and population dynamics and ecology of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (VIII-10). In London in 1977, the Consultative Parties called for a "definitive regime

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for the conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources" to be concluded before the end of 1978 (IX.2).[89]

After solving or bypassing the problems mainly concerned with the Antarctic sovereignty dispute and adopting a "bifocal approach" with calculated ambiguity in this regard, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was adopted at Canberra on 20 May, 1980.[90] The Convention adopted a unique "eco-system approach" laying down plans for the management of a fishery before the target-resource was in danger of exploitation.[91] It is significant to note that the "unsettled territorial status" of Antarctica as bypassed under the Antarctica Treaty was carried over to the Convention as well. This absurd situation has of late assumed serious implications after the UNCLOS.[92] The claimants might claim in future their respective EEZs off their Antarctic sectors (with Chile, Australia and New Zealand having already declared their rights) in the face of the non-claimants refusing to recognise the same.[93]

With a curious mixture of high expectations and apprehensions, the Treaty Powers began in the early 1970s to anticipate the day when mineral exploration and exploitation would begin in Antarctica. The expectation had increasingly to do with the possibility, howsoever remote, that the Antarctic might yield oil to lessen the crisis brought on by OPEC. And the sense of discomfort stemmed from the probability that the discovery of an increasing number of minerals would put the ATS under grave stresses, reopen the festering sore of territorial claims in the most explosive context and rouse the Third World to demand its share. There was also the question of the environmental implications of mineral exploration as each country also feared that others might get a headstart in exploration.

Because of the pre-occupation of the ATCPs with the Marine Living Resource Convention, the majority at the Oslo Meeting (1975) had favoured a moratorium on mineral exploration until the technical, environmental and political problems could be solved.[94] And while this policy of "voluntary restraint" was in force, the parties would attempt to negotiate a minerals regime.

However, the task of drafting the mineral regime, on the unanimous consensus of all the ATCPs, was not going to be so easy. It is interesting to note that throughout the 1970s, even preoccupied with the Marine Convention, the ATCPs had become more aggressive in pursuit of national interests more narrowly defined.[95] To cite just a few instances, Ambassador Keith Brenan, Australia's perennial representative at the consultative meetings, is reported to have remarked, "The Treaty did not freeze territorial claims; it merely put them on the back burner to keep warm."[96] Hence, in the Australian view, unilateral exploration and exploitation of resources by the claimant states are said to be entirely legal,

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subject only to voluntary and temporary restraints. Both Argentina and Chile seemed to be sharing this position. In brief, the claimants continued to be adamant and rigid in regard to their claims, and perhaps more vociferously so that the possible gains from Antarctica were getting nearer on the horizon.

The United States of America too has adhered to the "free non-discriminatory access."[97] As with science, Antarctica should be open to all and the spoils should go first and fastest to the nation(s) with the latest and most advanced technology. The USSR after having developed a stake in the Southern ocean fishery, and still far behind in mineral extraction technology vis-a-vis USA, held that the mineral exploitation should be postponed indefinitely with due consideration to the fragile environment of Antarctica.[98]

Nevertheless, by the time serious and formal discussions on the Antarctic Minerals Issue began in June/July 1981 in Buenos Aires, at the Eleventh Consultative Meeting—continued in 1982 in New Zealand—something approaching consensus had emerged on several points among ATCPs. And this change in the attitude was caused by a growing sense of urgency. Accommodation among the Consultative Parties was preferable to any conceivable alternative; if the ATCPs failed to act together before the conclusion of the Law of the Sea Convention, the Group of 77 under the banner of a New International Economic Order could and would cause all sorts of trouble.[99] The consensus, forced among the ATCPs by the various "problem areas" born out of the changed geopolitical realities on or about Antarctica, related to the following :[100]

1 A minerals regime must be drafted well before the technological capability to extract oil and other offshore resources (natural gas, as well manganese rich nodules at the ocean floor) is attained, otherwise the possibility of precipitous unilateral action might threaten both the environment and the Treaty.
2 The mineral-resource development must proceed by degrees and in stages, assuring at each step that the environment will not be seriously endangered by advancing to the next one.
3 Even though the extraction of hard minerals now seems distant as well as remote, the regime must cover this eventuality as well as the drilling for oil.
4 The claimant states should be entitled to derive some tangible benefits from any mineral extraction on their "territory" over and above what others may gain, although this special benefit might be disguised in a variety of ways.
5 Revenue sharing with the Third World is unavoidable.

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As the mineral regime talks proceeded entering the 1980s, they were hampered by various complex intra-system tensions. The ATCPs had all valid reasons to be nervous and even panicky when India stormed the Antarctica scene in the 1981-82 Summer of Antarctica.

IV

INDIA ENTERS THE ATS

The Indian decision to play an effective and meaningful role in the Antarctica Treaty System can be interpreted as a significant landmark in the history of Antarctica politics. The stimulus for this timely—though long over due—intervention by India in the affairs of Antarctica has come as much from the development on the Antarctic political scene evolved up to 1980s as it has from the perceived Indian stakes in the South Polar region and its Indian Ocean dimension. A critical examination of Indian goals in Antarctica indicates that they are not only interrelated but also mutually dependent on one another for their realisation.

Scientific Objectives

India's first-ever Indian Ocean-cum-Antarctica Expedition, led by S.Z. Quasim, after a 33 day voyage and covering a distance of 11,000 kilometers landed on the Antarctica on 9 Janurry 1982.[101] Said to be born in the fertile mind of the late Mrs. Indira Gandhi, meticulously planned in the corridors of power, shrouded in an unprecedented secrecy and launched in urgency, "Operation Gangotri" heralded the era of polar research in Indian Science.[102] The 21-member team of the first expedition carried out a number of oceanographic experiments enroute, conducted a preliminary survey of the Queen Maud Land, which is under Norwegian claim, and set up a base camp at 69 degrees 59 minutes South and 11 degrees 7 minutes east.[193]

Only months after the return of the first expedition "Operation Gangotri II" was underway.[194] This time it was to be a full scale assault with 22 members on board, ready to spend two months on the icy continent. It was reported that the USSR was willing to allow India the use of its runways and research sheds on polar ice, but the Indian Prime Minister is said to have refused and declared that India would do everything on its own.[105] After the success of the first expedition, feeders coming from other Third World countries—barring Pakistan—indicated that they would be willing and happy to provide all the financial and material assistance. Some African nations wanted India to counter South Africa's moves in Antarctica and thus were more than willing to provide assistance. Undoubtedly this was a prudent step, in addition to being a great moral booster, for dependence on any other country's sources or capabilities

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could have been self-defeating in the long run. As in 1981, the only country that was taken into confidence at an official level was Norway, because once again the *Polar Circle* (500-tonne polar vessel charted from a Norwegian firm, registered at Canada) was to be used.

Led by V.K. Raina of the Geological Survey of India, the Second Expedition (December 1982 to March 1983) worked out the logistics for setting up and serving a permanently-manned research station in the Antarctica, established a direct communication link between India and Antarctica through satellite and identified a suitable site for an airstrip and the best location for the permanent Indian station in Antarctica.[106]

Much larger in size (81 members) as well as scope, the Third Indian Expedition (December 1983 to March 1984) successfully constructed India's permanent station "Dakshin Gangotri" at Lat. 70° 05′ and Long. 12° 00′ E, in a record time of eight weeks.[107] The expedition, comprising two women scientists, left behind a team of 12 members at the newly-constructed manned station to winter over, and collected valuable scientfic data.

The Fourth and the Fifth Expeditions, launched in 1984-85 and 1985-86 respectively, have enlarged the basic infrastructure and the living and working facilities at "Dakshin Gangotri,"[108] thereby setting the stage for more ambitious and rewarding scientific programmes in the Antarctica. Significant scientific work was accomplished during the expeditions by Indian scientists.[109] Meteorological data obtained during the voyages and the data-recording cassette recovered from the unmanned meteorological station by the Second Expedition proved to be useful in designing the prefabricated building structures to withstand extreme weather conditions.[110] Various hydrometeorological studies have been conducted for understanding the dynamics of snow melting in the Antarctica. Geological studies have received special attention by Indian scientists ; rocksamp les were collected during the First Expedition around "Dakshin Gangotri," revealing striking similarity between Indian and Antarctica rocks. A high thorium/uranium ratio (30) was also found. Furthermore, sulphur mineralisation was observed in the western range of the Schirmacher Hill which is a 200m. thick band of rusty gneiss and is rich in base metal and graphite. An area of 4.5 sq. km. around "Dakshin Gangotri" was mapped by the Third Expedition.[111] Important experiments were carried out in marine biology in general, and on krill in particular, by the Third Expedition. The Indian contribution lay in conducting a series of geological investigations in a relatively unexplored sector of the Antarctica continent and the encircling Southern Ocean. So far the geological investigations were confined to the Antarctic austral summer. However, India plans to take up detailed investigations on the physiological adaptations of Antarctic flora and fauna during the most stressful, dark winter periods and further augment and diversify such experiments in future.[112]

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Antarctica is said to be a research haven for scientists, full of problems and challenges in regard to the unexplored and unsolved mysteries of the universe. However, there are some peculiarities or characteristics of Antarctica's scientific dimension that are of special interest to the Indian scientists. One such is the Antarctica-Indian Ocean link and interaction ; to quote S.Z. Quasim ;

> Unlike the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans which communicate with both the Arctic in the North and the Antarctic in the South, as these are in general terminology 'open oceans,' the Indian Ocean has its northern boundaries closed by landmass. Thus it only communicates with the Antarctic Ocean in the South from which it derives most of its fertility and energy—on which the economy of almost all the Indian Ocean countries is dependent.[113]

Antarctica is rightly said to be the key to global weather and can provide significant information regarding the monsoons on which the economy of India is so critically dependent. The White Continent is also an important location for observing the interaction of the magnetic field in conjunction with the charged particles from the Sun.[114] It also serves as a stable platform for carrying out observations, and being far away from the industrial areas remains an unpolluted datum point from which changes due to pollution can be monitored.[115] In the *Mesozoic Era*, the super-continent of Gondwana Land had a common landmass of India, Africa, Australia and Latin America. Later the continents drifted away and got separated by water masses.[116] Hence the studies on geological similarities between Queen Maud Land (perhaps that part of Antarctica once adjoined to India) and India can be of immense promise. Indian scientists from fields of meteorology, geo-magnetism, glaciology, upper atmosphere studies, environmental sciences, marine biology, geophysics and other branches have before them a "mine of knowledge" both in "pure" as well as "applied" realms of human scientific knowledge. Sharing a stake in Antarctica with the scientists from all over the globe, they also share in common the hope that Antarctica shall be used forever for peaceful and scientific purposes.

Economic Expectations

In a world exhausting its known resources with a mad abandon, the concern with the wherewithal necessary to sustain a future is turning into an all-consuming anxiety that often borders on panic. The great bulk of the globe—in the second half of the century—including the teeming millions of poor Indians, of course-impoverished and exploited for generations, is now trying to race into requisite economic development. The resources necessary for development, whether on the ocean-bed or locked under the Antarctic ice-cap or under its continental shelf, are as much the

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concern of this overwhelming part of the world as they are of the developed and the prosperous. The North-South divide—and Antarctica for that matter—is the latest of such issues which is getting to be far more serious than even ideological ones. Peace and survival of our planet may well be jeopardised by a total depletion and denial of basic or vital resources than perhaps by a thermonuclear war.[117]

As we have already noticed, Antarctica has a wealth of resources that could one day provide succour to the needy on the Earth. As a matter of fact, the commercial use of the Antarctic "krill" has already begun on a considerably large-scale, with at least half a dozen countries (including USSR, Japan, South Korea, Poland, Taiwan and West Germany) deriving significant material benefits out of it.[118] Even with the lowest estimates of an annual sustainable yield of 50 million tonnes to 100 million tonnes, the "krill" offers a handsone booty of a protein-rich food.[119] Other living resources like crabs, lobsters and a large variety of fish, including Antarctic cod, also hold a lot of promise.

To the undernourished protein-starved huge masses in India, about to enter the 2Ist Century with one billion population, Antarctica's marine resources would be most welcome as food and also for derivatives in pharmaceutical products. India has declared its intention to exploit "krill" from the Antarctica waters finding it commercially profitable. Though some preliminary geological research was carried out on "krill" by the Third Indian Expedition,[120] the Fourth Expedition launched a large-scale operation to study the possibilities of exploiting "krill" from the southern ocean and it is hoped that 200 tonnes of "krill" could be brought to India after processing it on ship by the expedition.[121] The "operation krill" received a considerable boost from the Fifth Indian Expedition.[122] India has also now acquired a fisheries and oceanographic research vessel *Sagar Sampada* for the exploitation of "krill" resources; it will soon join the increasing number of "krill-hunters" in the frozen Antarctica waters. Some experiments have already started in Cochin for processing "krill" (having 15 per cent protein roughly the same as in a beefsteak, shrimps and lobsters).[123] India would of course want to carry out its fishery programme by acceding to the Convention of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and its basic principles relating to regulation and conservation

It would be quite unrealistic to assume, given the geophysical, geological, economic and political considerations and constraints, that the mineral exploration and exploitation of the Antarctic lies somewhere in the near future or even before the next century.[124] However, no country with the size and requirements of India can afford to ignore the magnitude and implications of its future needs, say after a few decades from now. As and when the technological as well as political environment would make it feasible as well as profitable to exploit the onshore and offshore resources

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of the Antarctica, India would want a reasonable share in it. Of the minerals likely to be found on the frozen continent (for instance copper, manganese, zinc, gold, tin, uranium, oil and gas among others), many would be needed for the rapdly modernizing and industrial India.

Political Issues and Considerations

Hoping to find in Antarctica a resource-mine, the entire world community is casting covetous eyes on the continent and its surrounding oceans and devising appropriate strategies to fulfil its related requirements and ambitions. Technologies are being sought, alignments contemplated and plans being worked out to ensure that the due share in Antarctica wealth is not lost or usurped by default or through some clever machinations.

Quite obviously, India could not go to Antarctica the way it has gone to oceans and the space. On the Antarctica there is no legal or political vacuum; it has been governed by the Antarctica Treaty System for nearly a quarter of a century now. In order to realise its scientific as well as economic objectives in Antarctica, India had thus two policy options; one was to challenge the existing Antractica Treaty and the system derived therefrom and work for its replacement by some other form of a regime,[125] and the alternative was to join the Antarctica Treaty, enter the Consultative Group and play the game as per the rules of the Treaty as an "insider."

The first policy option was fraught with dangerous implications. A realistic and objective assessment of the Antarctic political reality must have impressed upon the Indian policy-makers that in the eventuality of the break-down of the ATS, the unsettled and explosive issue of Antarctica sovereignty would reassert itself resulting in international discord and confrontation. In such a situation, the two cardinal principles of the Antarctica Treaty, namely, "peace" and "international scientific cooperation" would be threatened and might be replaced for ever by militarisation and nuclearisation of the continent. With the lessons of the Falkland War in mind any attempt to challenge or replace the ATS must have been construed by India's policy-makers as self-defeating. And moreover India can attain its scientific and economic goals in Antarctica only so long as Antarctica remains peaceful and open to all.

Going in for the second policy option, India acceded to the Antarctica Treaty in August 1983 after the second expedition returned from Antarctica in March the same year.[126] Determined to acquire a place in the decision-making body with a "veto" right over the joint decisions of the ATS, it applied for "consultative status" under Article XIII of the Treaty, and was accorded the same in September 1983.[127] A remarkable diplomatic achievement indeed, but an achievement made possible by India's-scientists

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who could prove that they had carried out "substantial scientific activity" (under Article XIII of the Treaty) on Antarctica. Article IX, Para II stipulates that "consultative status" would be given to a country "during such time" it carries out the "substantial scientific activity." It is significant to note that whereas for Poland it took a number of years to make it,[128] India got the consultative status in a remarkably short time. The Indian entry could have been jeopardised had South Africa vetoed it. Fortunately for India and unfortunately for South Africa this did not happen. India, by joining the Treaty agreed to abide by the principle of the Treaty and all the recommendations so far passed, including of course, the ones relating to the mineral regime talks.

India's decision to join the ATS must have come as a blessing in disguise for the ATCPs for two major reasons. Firstly, what if India had decided to take up the matter of Antarctica to the United Nations in the wake of UNCLOS, supported by the majority of the Third World ? After all India was the first nation to raise the issue in the United Nations way back in 1956. To the utter relief of the ATCPs, India did not do so and was warmly embraced by them into the consultative circle. Secondly, the Indian decision to join the ATS would take the wind off the sails of those, or at least make their strategies less effective, who were working for the replacement of the present-day Treaty by some form of UN control.

India joined the ATS with two significant policy declarations—that it did not recognise the existing claims on Antarctica and would project and further the Third World views in the ATS, along with its own.[129]

India attended the 12th Consultative Meeting of the Antarctica Treaty members at Canberra (13-17 September 1983) as its 15th consultative member. For the first time in the history of the Treaty System, even the ordinary members were invited to participate, though as "observers." Speaking before this plenary session attended by all the twenty-eight Treaty members, S.Z. Quasim reiterated India's commitment to the principles of the Antarctic Treaty, the desire to "enhance its analytical capabilities" by exchanging scientific information with other members of the Treaty and the country's resolve to "project its own views as well as those of the non-aligned countries."[130]

The "Question of Antarctica" in the UN

The recent discussions in the United Nations on the "Question of Antarctica" have clearly shown that there is no definite Third World view on Antarctica.[131] At the same time, it would be fallacious to assume that all the non-aligned countries support the Indian perceptions and policies in regard to Antarctica. As a matter of fact, the Third World stands badly divided with India emphasising the promotion and protection of Third World interests within the Treaty framework, whereas Malaysia

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spearheads the offensive on the Antarctic Treaty System in the United Nations, supported by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Antigua, Barbuda, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Zambia.[132]

Malaysia, complaining that the present machinery for Antarctica has not kept pace with contemporary global realities, has criticised the Antarctic Treaty System for its exclusivity, its unaccountability and its secrecy. It has demanded that Antarctica, as the common heritage of mankind, requires a regime truly international in character and the exploration of Antarctica and its resources must be for the benefit of mankind.[133]

In reply to the Malaysian criticism, all the ATCPs, including India, have put up a common defence; the major counter-arguments are that the Treaty's membership is diverse in political, geographic, social and economic terms and this is supported by the accession of India and China to the Treaty recently. Moreover, the Treaty System is flexible and open to the aspirations and needs of mankind.[134]

The Indian stand on the extent and desirability of UN intervention in the functioning of the ATS is found in the Indian Government's reply to the UN Secretary General's "Study on the Question of Antarctica" published in November 1984.[135] It says in part :

> It is the consistent view of the Government of India that the Antarctica Treaty has established Antarctica as a region of unparalleled international cooperation in the interests of all mankind. It would be unrealistic and counter-productive to think of a new regime in the present situation. Any attempt to undermine the Antarctica Treaty System could lead to international discord and instability as well as the revival of conflicting territorial and other claims. If countries were to act outside a recognised legal framework, cooperative relations in the area might break down, seriously jeopardising the de-militarised status of the continent, hampering scientific investigation and adversely affecting the rational management of the resources of the region.[136]

The Indian view defends the Antarctic Treaty System in an indirect reference to its criticism by Malaysia and others by holding :

> The Antarctic System is not an exclusive body : it is an evolving institution whose structures and organisational framework are conceived in a flexible manner. These are based on optimally effective and feasible arrangements involving a special categorisation of countries which have conducted substantial scientific exploration in the area and which are able to contribute effectively to ongoing scientific, technological and other activities in the area. India does not believe that this framework is intended to exclude any country

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from its purview. . . . *India does however recognise that the Antarctica Treaty System needs to evolve further and take into account all legitimate concerns. India does not, however, believe that the existing system should be drastically altered or overturned.*[137]

(emphasis mine)

The Indian Dilemma

The 40th UN General Assembly Session, in November 1985, began discussions on Antarctica in the First Committee while it was considering the issue of South Africa in the Antarctic Treaty. Two of the Antarctica Treaty Consultative Parties, India and China, joined the African nations in voting overwhelmingly for the expulsion of South Africa from the Antarctic Treaty.[138] The voting held on 2 December 1985, indicated 81 for, none against and nine absentions; 35 delegations (among them 15 Consultative Parties) did not participate in voting. And as the Chairman of the New York Group of ATCPs later regretted, the tradition of consensus on Antarctica had been broken even within the ATS.[139] Though it would perhaps be too early to talk of the implications of this newly emerged problem for both the ATS and India's presence in it, what seems to be obvious is that the presence of the racist South Africa in the ATS would augment its criticism by more and more countries of Africa. This might assist in creating a better awareness among the African nations about what is happening within the ATS in regard to the Southern continent and its resources.

India's stand on South Africa is too well known to deserve any comment on it here. That India would push its demand for the expulsion of South Africa (supported by another ATCP China and the non-aligned countries) from the ATS, even up to a point of threatening the viability of the system, does not seem to be likely. For this could be self defeating and self contradictory for India's policy of not undermining the present-day ATS. However, the demand for South Africa's expulsion from ATS is likely to grow and assume more force in future. And the way India is going to deal with this complex issue remains a matter of speculation.

Now that India is very much an Antarctica power with rights and duties, and actively participating in the ongoing talks on the proposed minerals-regime, its role on the ATS diplomatic chessboard becomes a matter of keen interest for an observor of Antarctica politics. Since India has acknowledged that "the Treaty System needs to be evolved further" one would expect from India sincere and skilful diplomatic efforts to make the ATS more open and less secretive. So long as the minerals-regime talks have a veil of secrecy around them, apprehensions over the intentions of the ATCPs would naturally continue. The ATS is on its way to open up, argue the ATCPs, as now there are nearly thirty

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members of the Antarctica Treaty and since the Canberra Meeting, even the ordinary members have been attending the talks as observers.[140] The cooperation and willingness shown by the ATCPs towards the preparation of the UN study is cited as another instance in this respect. But all said and done, the fact remains that science is not the sole activity taking place on Antarctica today as the commercial exploitation of its marine resources has already begun, and there would be a day when even the Antarctica minerals would be the target. Therefore, some new criterion of membership will have to be evolved so that, as India also believes, all legitimate concerns can find a representation. India's contribution—being a leading non-aligned country and also an Antarctica power—in this respect can be foreseen and should be forthcoming.

The South, it seems, is split on the issue of the Southern continent. Who represents the Third World on the question of Antarctica, India or Malaysia ? What is the best course of action in terms of feasibility and desirability for realising the Third World cause on the Antarctica issue—whether the Indian stand or the Malaysian stand ? Which course of action or which leadership is the Third World going to follow, remains to be seen.

On the other hand, there is an equally urgent need on the part of those who want to replace a 25-years old system on the Antarctica by some other form of a regime, to realise that Antarctica has been so far kept peaceful, non-militarised and non-nuclearised by the ATCPs. These praiseworthy achievements are further augmented by the remarkable contributions of scientists, irrespective of where they come from, on Antarctica. Braving the typical Antarctica hardships, even risking their lives, they have built up a paradise for science. Can mankind afford to risk such gains in a world, otherwise marked by violence, conflicts and rivalries ?

Being in an unique position of both an ATCP as well as a leading non-aligned country, India can act as a balancer between these two divergent positions. It can make an attempt for moderation in the stand of the "radicals" on the one hand, and work for "reformation" from within the ATS. The Indian stake in fact lies in harmonising its national interests with those divergent ones of the ATCPs in the first place and then in harmonising and reconciling the interests of the members of the ATS as a whole with those of mankind. Thus lies before India a difficult challenge coming from the bottom of the world.

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UNITED STATES-INDIA RELATIONS : OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES

By THOM A. TRAVIS*

The United States-India relationship began with great promise, that later dissipated as the two states adopted contrasting positions on many key world issues. US-India disagreements have centred on the Soviet Union, Pakistan and North-South matters, and have led to frictions that will not easily disappear. In this essay, the main manifestations and sources of these nagging differences would be discussed. Then, an attempt would be made to show how greater mutual understanding of one another's perspectives could lead to policy modifications that could promote the closer ties desired by each government.

I

MANIFESTATIONS OF DIFFERENCES

Conflicting Foreign Policy Objectives

The United States and India have quite different images about communism and the Soviet Union. The US finds communism to be ideologically and ethically distasteful, inimical to its economic interests, and the chief threat to world peace. The Soviet Union is seen as an aggressive, imperialistic threat and as the main instigator of revolution and terrorism. The US response and the heart of its foreign policy has been the containment of communism by erecting an alliance system to them in the Soviet-Union, trying to weaken leftist regimes, opposing revolutions supported by Moscow and building a formidable military arsenal to deter any Soviet attack. The US has sought to recruit as many states as possible into its bloc system in order to more effectively counter the Soviet threat.

India has a different picture of communism and important world concerns. India views Soviet intentions with less suspicion and regards the Soviet Union more as a defensive than an aggressive power. It believes that revolution stems less from Soviet instigation than from injustices internal to societies. While India recognizes that the bi-polar conflict cannot be ignored, it considers other issues, such as global poverty, inequality, imperialism, racism and disarmament to be of equal, if not greater, importance. India's response to the bi-polar conflict has been a policy of

* Dr. Travis is Professor Political Science, Bucknell University, Lewisberg, Pennsylvania, USA.

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non-alignment rather than bloc membership, and support of a strong United Nations and of nuclear disarmament rather than reliance on a nuclear balance of terror.

These disagreements have hampered US-Indian ties from the start. The US has not been happy about Indian non-alignment; it believes that non-alignment, specially of a liberal state like India, abdicates responsibility for standing up to the Soviet threat. Moreover, the US has viewed Indian non-alignment as a mask for a "tilt" towards the Soviet Union. India's extensive economic and military exchange and the Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union seemed to have the makings of a tacit alliance. On many key east-west issues, India has seemed to side with the Soviet Union; India appears to use a double standard in evaluating Super Power behaviour, condemning US interventions in Vietnam and Latin America, but saying little about Soviet interference in Afganistan or Africa.

While the US and India have differed on this central theme of United States foreign policy, the US and Pakistan have mainly agreed. This has been the primary reason for American approval of Pakistan and displeasure with India. Despite some pretense of non-alignment, Pakistan has been a loyal member of the western bloc, manifested by its original membership in SEATO and CENTO, its reliance on the West for its most sophisticated weapons, and its public opposition to Soviet interventions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Pakistan even helped to build the anti-Soviet coalition by facilitating negotiations that produced the Sino-American *detente*.

The US has appreciated Pakistan's posture and has rewarded it with ample diplomatic, economic and military support. The Soviet invasion of Afganistan has reinforced United States' view of Pakistan as a key geo-strategic asset and "front line" state, which has made the backing of Pakistan strategic and imperative. Pakistan has adroitly played upon the US antipathy to Russia to boost the level of American aid.

Indeed, Pakistan has become so important to the US containment strategy, that Washington seems to have placed a higher priority on bolstering the Zia regime and its military prowess, than on political reform there; stability of the India-Pakistan regional military balance, or the dangers of Pakistan's nucler programme. As long as Zia's regime remains reasonably stable and loyal to the free world, the United States seems unwilling to make a fuss about its dictatorship; it realizes that the arms it supplies to Pakistan to counter the Soviet Union might instead be diverted to the Indian front. Yet, the US seems trapped here by its geo-political priorities and sees little choice but to continue the arms shipments even at the risk of antagonizing India. The United States probably believes that these arms do not really threaten India because India remains strong enough militarily to discourage any Pakistani thoughts of war.

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The US is firmly opposed to nuclear proliferation and cannot be happy about a possible Pakistani nuclear programme. Yet, under present circumstances, Washington seems unprepared to jeopardize its ties with Pakistan and risk a vindictive response, such as a break with the western bloc which could result from US coercion to halt the nuclear programme. This is why President Reagan has counselled India to work out a regional arrangement on this issue.

These US policies toward Pakistan have understandably bothered India. India resents the attention lavished on Pakistan by the US while India, despite being the primary regional power, is neglected by Washington. The memories of the Nixon/Kissinger "tilt" towards Pakistan in the 1971 Crisis still haunt India. India is not convinced that Pakistan will refrain from using US weapons to strike its territory and believes these arms have made Pakistan less willing to compromise on mutual disputes. India fears that without US pressure, Pakistan will arm nuclearly, forcing India to do the same and thus plunging the region into a dangerous nuclear arms race.

Status quo Vs Change Strategies

The United States and India disagree on other matters too. While the US tends towards *status quo*, India seems revisionist; at least outside of its region it seeks to reshape the international distribution of wealth, status and power in ways sometimes contrary to US interests. The examples abound. The US tends to be suspicious of national liberation movements, like the African National Congress (ANC), South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), while India strongly supports them. The US pursues a cautious policy of "constructive engagement" towards South Africa, while India urges strong sanctions to dismantle that oppressive regime. The US rejects a Palestinian state and India favours one. Washington has ordinarily opposed and tried to overthrow revolutionary governments, such as Nicaragua, Cuba and Angola, while India tends to sympathize with such regimes. The United States has rejected most of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) proposals, viewing them as inimical to its economic interests, as largely irrelevant to the developmental process, and as violations of certain free market principles. Yet, India champions the NIEO, seeing it as essential to Third World development and to a reduction in global socio-economic inequalities.

Varied Views of a Non-Nuclear World

The US, like India, would prefer a non-nuclear world, but under the present circumstances, Washington sees no alternative to the strategy of

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nuclear deterrence and to beefing up its nuclear arsenal with new weapons to maintain parity with the Soviet Union. India has been critical of the very strategy of nuclear deterrence and has urged the Super Powers to pursue more vigorously nuclear arms control and disarmament. Yet, India appears to have come down harder on the US here, which bothers Washington, since it was the Soviet Union that developed the counter-force SS 18 and SS 20 missiles, which respectively destabilized the strategic and theatre nuclear balances and required the US to develop expensive new weapons to catch up. Moreover, the United States has found the Indian objections to be rather contradictory, since India has conducted its own nuclear test, has refused to sign the NPT, and has rejected the regional nuclear free zone favoured by Pakistan and the US.

Capitalist Vs Socialist Development Concepts

India and the US also differ about aspects of developmental processes. India believes that diverse economic models, including socialism, are appropriate for economic development; has incorporated a sizeable public sector into its own developmental mode and has insisted on restrictions on foreign investment to protect its economic autonomy. The US views socialism as an inappropriate developmental model, emphasizes the success of capitalist model states, such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, and sees foreign investment as a powerful engine of development. India sees inequities in the international economy as a major obstacle to development. The Reagan Administration disagrees, claiming that problems internal to states and the failure to use the free enterprise model are the main impediments to development.

So, the United States and India have many disparate views about the world—about how the international system works, about the main sources of world disorder, and about elements of a desirable world order. These disagreements have resulted in rather different foreign policy objectives, priorities and strategies. Some of these differences will likely endure and continue to trouble the relationship. Yet, the improved atmosphere of current Indo-US relations might be conducive to greater mutual understanding and policy flexibility, which would allow more harmony between the governments to evolve. Some suggestions to move the relationship in this direction are offered below.

II

PERSPECTIVES FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

India's International Policies Based on National Interest

The United States needs to better understand the reasons for India's bonds with the Soviet Union. The United States has forged an alliance

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with Pakistan and a partnership with China, India's two main security threats. While the US intended these ties to be directed against the Soviet Union, in fact, India's security has been negatively affected. India has needed an outside power to support it against these rivals and with the US discounted, and the West European Powers unwilling to help, the Soviet Union became a logical alternative. The Soviet Union has turned out to be a loyal, helpful friend to India, providing economic sustenance, diplomatic support and weapons at critical junctures. The US must recognize that its policies might have actually pushed India towards the Soviet Union by denying aid for India's public sector, arms after 1965 and diplomatic support during the 1971 crisis. A healthy friendship requires more reciprocity, which might explain India's reluctance to publicly criticize the Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

More American officials need to understand that India's ties with the Soviet Union have fallen well short of clientship or alliance. India has remained basically western oriented; its intelligentisia is firmly wedded to liberal values, its democracy is well institutionalized, its economy is more capitalist than socialist, and its economic and technological interactions have been mainly with the west. Indeed, the United States presently is India's foremost trade partner and source of foreign investment.

While India and the Soviet Union have frequently taken similar stands on international issues and have signed a Friendship Treaty, these similarities reflect a coincidence of interests and not Indian compliance to Soviet demands. For example, the Friendship Treaty appears to be a pragmatic agreement that served specific Indian needs in the 1970s for symbolic protection against Pakistan and China. This treaty commits neither state to anything more than mutual consultations and has not produced coordinated military or diplomatic policies. The Soviet Union has provided the bulk of India's advanced weapons, but mainly because the US denied such arms or offered them on unacceptable terms and made it difficult for India to diversify the sources of its advanced weapons.

Actually, India has maintained contacts with both blocs and has pursued a largely independent foreign policy based on a pragmatic definition of its national interests. This is what non-alignment means, and India is one of the few members of the Non-aligned Movement that genuinely practices this posture. Some American officials have not understood this and have mistakenly perceived a tacit Indo-Soviet alliance.

Need to Understand Non-Alignment Postures

It might be desirable for the United States to view Indian non-alignment in a more favourable light. The US has lamented the growing Soviet influence in the Third World. If the US can help to solidify the non-alignment of states like India, then at least they can be kept out

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of the Soviet bloc, arresting the Soviet advance. Moreover, non-aligned states can contribute creative ideas to international dialogue and can be valuable bridges between the blocs. For example, the US might ask India to serve as an intermediary to improve its communications with such states as Cuba or Vietnam. Such a request might have special appeal for India which perceives itself as a positive force in international relations and as deserving of a more important world role.

Need for Greater Economic, Technological and Military Exchanges

The United States should try to encourage India to loosen certain ties with the Soviet Union and to strengthen certain bonds with the West without jeopardizing India's policy of non-alignment. Washington might accomplish this by cultivating greater economic, technological and military exchanges with India and by adopting new policy stands.

Now that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is encouraging more technology transfer and foreign investment from the West, the United States should adapt its policies to reinforce this trend. The United States should not let its fear that India might share this technology with the Soviet Union inhibit technology transfer. This fear has been based on a misunderstanding of the Indo-Soviet relationship. India is no Soviet client state and would be foolish to risk its access to western technology by violating treaties which could be written to prohibit such exchange. It is evident that India values western technology and commodities more than those of the Soviet Union. If US technology, such as the super computer, should become more readily available to India, this would boost US-India ties.

It is important for the United States to renew its weapons supplies to India. Here, an obstacle has been Pakistan, which wants to monopolize the flow of American arms to South Asia and has tried to veto arms sales to India. Given the present geo-political circumstances, the United States cannot be expected to substantially diminish its arms flow to Pakistan. However, Washington should attempt to gauge the effects of its arms transfers in the India-Pakistan military balance. It could adjust the type of weapons it furnishes to meet Pakistan's particular defensive needs against Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and not provide weapons such as tanks for flat plain warfare, which are likely to be arrayed against India. Since the US favours peace between India and Pakistan, it does not want to help Pakistan to become militarily stronger than India. For, Pakistan is the revisionist state of the two, coveting some Indian territory and any Pakistani perception of its military advantage could encourage its military action, or at least, discourage a diplomatic solution. To prevent this, the US should scale down the amount and change the mix of new arms it provides to Pakistan and should furnish India with advanced

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weapons too, in order to maintain India's military advantage. Washington should offer these arms at concessional rates and permit co-production, to create an incentive for Indian arms purchases.

Need for Better Understanding of India's Nuclear Perspectives

As for the nuclear issue, Washington needs to better understand India's perspective. India's opposition to nuclear weapons has been demonstrated by the fact, that it is the only state to have tested a nuclear device but not to have deployed nuclear weapons despite certain advantages it might incur. India also recognizes the danger of nuclear proliferation, but seems to oppose the non-proliferation treaty as a matter of principle since it would unfairly preserve a nuclear monopoly in the hands of the existing nuclear powers and perpetuate the uneqaul distribution of power in the world system. Furthermore, India asks why it should preclude its nuclear option by approving a regional nuclear free zone, when Soviet, American and Chinese nuclear weapons would lurk on its very frontiers.

US Should Revise its Opposition to NIEO Recommendations

The US might consider altering its views on north-south issues too. While Third World development is impeded by internal problems, such as overpopulation, wasteful spending and corruption, it is also obstructed by the nature of the international economy, which discriminates against Third World states on conditions of trade, foreign investment and technology transfer. The US should reconsider its opposition to certain NIEO recommendation, such as for tariff revisions, commodity price supports and better terms of aid.

Instead of complaining about India's large public sector, US officials should recognize that some of its European allies, such as Denmark and Norway, also have sizeable public sectors, and that certain public enterprises have made important contributions to Indian development. It would seem more appropriate to stress that India practices a mainly capitalist mode of development that US corporations might profitably invest in.

Need for Recognition of India's Search For Status

Finally, the United States might become more sensitive to India's nationalism, pride and search for status. India's colonial experience was psychologically scarring, as the British deprecated Indian culture, history and achievements. As Indians strive to establish a more self-confident, proud identity, they are understandably sensitive to the opinions of world leaders. Most Indian officials regard their country as a middle level

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power with the potential to become a major power and seek greater international recognition of this status.

American leaders should respond more sensitively to these psychological roots of Indian foreign policy. For example, if Indian leaders do not express effusive appreciation for American aid, US officials should realize that a sense of dignity and desire for self reliance could prevent such a response. Moreover, if India were accorded a more prominent place in US foreign policy, an appreciative Indian Government might be more willing to respond favourably to certain American wishes.

III

APPRAISAL

In sum, the US must accept the reality that India will continue to have close relations with the Soviet Union. It is counter-productive for Washington to complain about these ties and wrong to suspect India's intentions because of them. Instead, the United States should recognize the limits to this Indo-Soviet relationship, such as the basic ideological and cultural cleavages, and India's insistence on autonomy and non-alignment. The US might adopt measures to loosen aspects of these ties (while recognizing that the unravelling could only go so far) and to nurture India's bonds with the West, thereby reinforcing the vitality of Indian non-alignment. US policy could be more flexible on other issues too.

India could also modify some of its views and policies to improve relations with the United States. India should accept the reality that the core of US foreign policy will remain anti-Soviet containment and might try to adapt better to some of the consequences.

India could clarify its non-aligned posture to the United States by showing that it is not biased in favour of the Soviet Union or its allies. For example, India could more forthrightly criticize the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, as other non-aligned states, such as Yugoslavia, have done. Such statements would show that India applied the same standards to the Soviet Union as it did to the United States.

I am aware of the main Indian counter-arguments—that the Soviet Union is a geographically proximate potential security threat that must be placated, that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan actually enhances Indian security by diverting Pakistan away from India, and that private diplomacy will be more successful than public criticism of Moscow. Yet, given the close Indo-Soviet friendship, any Soviet security threat seems distant at best. Moscow's presence in Afghanistan actually complicates Indian security by involving the Super Powers more in the region and

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boosting US arms sales to Pakistan. While private diplomacy probably does work best with the Soviet Union, so it would with the United States.

As for Pakistan, it probably is not useful for India to push for a lessened US political commitment to that country, at least while Pakistan remains a key geo-strategic asset in the US campaign against the Soviet Union. What India might constructively request from Washington, instead, is a more careful calculation of the effects of its arms supply on the regional military balance. Specifically, India could ask for greater US restraint in the volume and type of arms grant to Pakistan and the provision of sophisticated US weapons on favourable terms to India to preserve an Indian military advantage.

Similarly, India's complaints about the mild US stand against Pakistan's nuclear programme might be modified; Indians should understand that a nuclear Pakistan would not serve US interest. They should recall that Washington did place heavy pressure on Pakistan to curb its nuclear programme before the Afghanistan situation. After the Soviet invasion however, US options became more limited. Indians should recognize that in an increasingly interdependent and multi-polar world, power has become more diffused, and the US cannot so easily order states like Pakistan, Israel, or South Africa to do its bidding.

Furthermore, there appears to be some inconsistency in India's position here. India has long favoured the diffusion of international power and has opposed Super Power coercion of weaker states. So it seems contradictory for India to complain about the United States' unwillingness to force Pakistan to change its nuclear programme. If India were to decide for some reason to arm nuclearly, and the US pressured it not to, New Delhi would tell Washington to stay out of its business. This is what Pakistan says too. The Reagan proposal for a regional solution makes sense and should be to India's liking, since New Delhi has long urged the Super Powers to stay out of the region's affairs and to allow the governments there to solve their own disputes.

On the general nuclear issue, India seems to be caught in a dilemma between principle and pragmatic self-interest. India seems right, on principle, to oppose the NPT and a regional nuclear free zone. Yet, if the Indian Government genuinely wants to avoid its nuclear armament, then it must find a way to legally bind itself and Pakistan to non-nuclearization. The most effective way to do this might be for India and Pakistan to sign the NPT and to agree to a regional nuclear free zone.

India and the United States probably have too many differences in objectives, attitudes and policies to be the dearest of friends. It would be healthy for each government to recognize this and not to expect too much from their relationship. Yet, India and the United States share important commonalities, including liberal ideals, democratic governments,

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a commitment to successful Indian development, and a deep desire for accord. One of the most important bonds is the nearly half million Indians who have settled and typically prospered in the United States and yet retain strong ties to their original homeland. This demonstrates that in terms of values, aspirations, and dreams, Indians tend to gravitate towards the West and not towards the Soviet Union (where very few Indians have chosen to live).

Moreover, the United States has a strong vested interest in India's success. Perhaps the most noble objective of US foreign policy has been to seek freedom across the globe.[1] More than any other Third World country, India symbolizes this quest. Despite the obstacles to development along a liberal path, India, with only one brief interruption, has clung to this approach. In order to keep this liberal model intact and to discredit its critics, the United States should nourish the Indian experiment to ensure its success.

Another aim of United States foreign policy has been a search for stability and order. If the US should neglect India, and contribute, even indirectly, to its problems, future Indian governments could become plagued by social unrest. If India should become infected by national disintegration or revolution, global stability sought by the United States would be jeopardized, and the consequences would likely be favourable to the Soviet Union and other radical forces the United States opposes.

The two countries, then, should build upon their similarities, better understand the reasons for their disagreements, have more realistic expectations about one anothers' behaviour, and alter certain policies to bring their ties to greater fruition.

Fortunately, President Reagan and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi have made a start in some of these directions. The Reagan Administration has developed more sophisticated images about Indian behaviour, seems to understand the limits to Soviet-Indian relationship, and has given India more prominence in US foreign policy considerations. The Gandhi Government has adopted a more pragmatic and flexible stance toward the United States, complemented by greater subtlety in statement and better image-building. Both governments have shown an eagerness to make concessions to allow an expansion in cultural, economic, technological and even military contacts. There is still much more to be done, and issues like the Libyan bombing will continue to be disruptive. Yet, in important respects, the US-Indian relationship has been reinvigorated and holds more promise today than it has for quite some time.

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1. Unfortunately, this noble objective has often been submerged by higher priority US foreign policy goals.

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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN BANGLADESH : PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By SHYAMALI GHOSH*

The Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh initially adopted a constitution in 1972 that sought to direct the state power to develop ways and means for the society's transition to a socialistic economic order through a secular parliamentary democracy.[1] *Today, through constitutional changes, Bangladesh is neither a parilamentary democracy, nor does it follow a path to a socialistic economy. Secularism also is no longer a constitutional dictum.*[2] *These clearly indicate changes in the fundamentals of the Constitution (1972), and such changes, wheneuer they occur, require probing in terms of the basis, the process and method of constitution making, constitution-amending and the legitimacy of these processes. The following analysis attempts to explore the Bangladesh case.*[3]

INTRODUCTION

In newly emerged politics there are commitments to economic justice along with politically democratic system constitutions which tend to be sets of core principles and laws which (a) set the political, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian objectives of the concerned states and (b) control the relationships between those who are delegated to govern and the people who so delegate their powers to govern themselves. It follows, therefore, that in societies engaged in national reconstruction amidst increasing social complexities constutional changes should indicate people's awareness for bridging the gap, if any between social aspirations and the existing fundamental laws of the land.

At the outset socio-political pulls and pressures prompt these nascent politics to enshrine some features of two systems, viz. the liberal democratic and the socialist, in their constitutions. The objective obviously is to achieve the ideally best. But even before a workable synthesis of the two is evolved, the process is often disrupted by mutually antagonistic social forces. Vested interest institutions and groups like the military, the bureaucracy, the emergent bourgeoisie, the extreme right reactionaries and left adventurists, and external intrusion, coalesce to make distortions. Consequently, it is the institutions with a coercive apparatus working through a pseudo-democratic set up, that monopolise state power. Values and norms having been relegated to comparative irrelevance, the central position of

* Dr. (Ms.) Ghosh is at the Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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the constitution in such political systems also gets eroded. Bangladesh provides a typical example.

The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh adopted in 1972 has been amended to date at least seven times, four of which were enacted by a Parliament elected under civilian rule and three by Parliaments elected under Martial Law. Constitutional amendments are not unusual in a developing democracy — whereby legitimate popular consent the polity adopts furthers ways and means to operationalise the basic principles of their respective constitutions. In Bangladesh these amendments have not only changed the form of the government or the party system through constitutionally laid down procedure but the constitution has been changed in its fundamentals through usurpations and used repeatedly to legalise the same.

A constitution in a sovereign state being the embodiment of the basic principles agreed upon by the populace for governing themselves has come to be considered as a sanctified document for a nation. And basic changes in that document would signify that there has been a marked change in the majority of the populace regarding the national aspirations, objectives and priorities. But has it been so in Bangladesh ? Have the "Bangalees" (now named Bangladeshis) wilfully changed these since the 1972 Constitution was adopted ? Does the Bangladesh Constitution, as it stand now, reflect the socio-economic-political and cultural aspirations of the people as expressed during the long drawn people's movements that created an independent Bangladesh ? If not what are the reasons and the circumstances that have led Bangladesh presumably into the trap of contradiction where there is a gap between popular aspirations and the sanctified document that is meant to reflect these ? What adds significance to this case-study is the fact that in Bangladesh, as it would be seen, the constitutional amendments have not always followed the due process, nor has there been a people's revolution, but virtually a new constitution with different sets of principles has taken over, while the older one remains nominally unabrogated.

To analyse the "hows" and "whys" of this it is necessary first of all to find out whether the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh was a hastily prepared document representing a small sectional interest, that it proved to be inadequate, and hence the changes.

BASES OF THE 1972 CONSTITUTION

In brief, as it is evident from the document, the 1972 Constitution strove to lay the foundations of a democratic-socialistic society in Bangladesh. If that was so, it rightfully incorporated the police-economic aspirations of the people which had evolved through many popular movements.[4]

What where these aspirations ? To summarise the salient features : an unfettered representative democracy with guaranteed fundamental rights,

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independence of judiciary and socialistic society, with the state controlling the commanding heights of the economy, a multi-faceted rural cooperative system with a view to augment agricultural production cutting across the problems arising of the patterns of land-ownership, and to regulate procurement and collectivisation of the produce to ensure equitabe redistribution so that the actual tiller gets his due share, universal and compulsory primary education, preservation and further development of the Bengali language, its compulsory adoption as the working language for administrative purposes, non violation of the basic tenets of Islam — the religion of 80 per cent plus of the population, no discrimination on the basis of religion or sex, an independent and non-aligned foreign policy and self-reliance.[5]

The situation and the role of the AL which was indisputeably in the lead can be roughly compared to the Indian nationalist movement under the leadership of the Indian National Congress — when mass mobilisation necessitated formulation of long-term economic programmes in addition to the immediate political objectives of securing formal freedom from colonial rule, and the subsequent painstakingly long debates over the emergent constitution which was adopted in 1950.

The Bangladesh Constitution of 1972 similarly, or rather more vigorously, sought to reflect popular aspirations. The main features of the Constitution were : It stated nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism as the four pillars of state policy and promised equality before the law irrespective of race, religion, caste or sex; envisaged people's control over means and instruments of production, state-ownership of the key sectors of the economy, property to be owned by cooperative or individuals as prescribed by law, and property to be acquired by government with or without compensation, it forbade all kinds of communalism, granting of special status to any religion, use of religion for political purposes; the fundamental rights provided *inter alia* safeguards against preventive detention and provided for a parliamentary system with a titular President as the Head of the State, and while the voting age was fixed at 18 the convicted collaborators were made ineligible for both as contestants and voters for any elective office. It did not provide for declaration of emergency and prohibited declaration of or participation in war without parliament's prior consent. It also provided for decentralisation in administration and planning, implementation of public order by elected local bodies, provided for reorganisation of civil bureaucracy including the power to change the conditions of service, and measures against the Members of Parliament for party defection or violation of party whip. It provided for an independent judiciary with further provisions for the High Court Division of the Supreme Court to hold sessions at places other than its permanent seat in the capital. It also made provisions for upholding the principle of secularism.[6] As has been rightly pointed out all these

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features had a specific political background and "each was a result of the demand by people at different stages in the past."[7]

The Constitution-making Process

The Constitution was framed by a Constituent Assembly formed by the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh Order 1972, under the Proclamation of Independence of 10 April 1971. It consisted of all East Pakistani members elected to the National Assembly of Pakistan and the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan in the first General Elections held between December 1970 and March 1971. Signed by 357 members and authenticated by the Speaker the Constitution became effective from 16 December 1972.

BACKGROUND OF THE MAJOR AMENDMENTS 1973–1975

The efficacy of the highly liberal and mildly socialistic provisions of the constitution was to be tested in a situation where the country was facing the problems of resuscitating a war devasted economy and rehabilitation of those who had returned from refugee camps in India in the context of extreme lack of indigenous resources, lack of industrial infrastructure and managerial skills, and lack of united foreign aid for the desired economic growth—the aspirant urban middle-class, the traditional surplus farmers, a colonially trained dominant yet insecure bureaucracy, disgruntled army professionals and the violence-prone armed section of the youth both within and outside the so-called extremist political organisations, irresponsible behaviour of the opposition parties some allegedly having links with anti-liberation forces, intra-party functionalism within the AL, and widespread corruption—created a critical and conflictive situation.[8] As it worsened the first compromise between the "ideal" and "attainable" seem to have prompted the Second Amendment of the Constitution which (a) substituted Article 33 to make provisions for preventive detentions, and (b) incorporated a new part IX-A to include internal emergency provisions under certain circumstances.[9] Both these were meticulously avoided in the original to keep promises made during the long political movements against the Pakistani regime to do away with the "black laws." However, the first Proclamation of Emergency was declared on 28 December 1974. By modifying Article 26 this amendment also secured Parliaments's power to amend any part of the Constitution including the fundamental rights.[10]

But it was the Fourth Amendment that introduced certain systemic changes. The rationale of the changes as spelt out was : the existing system had become irreperably inadequate.[11] The inadequacy it would appear, had sprung from the fact that it did not and could not satisfy the

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manifold aspirations of the participants and supporters of the movements and the liberation war.[12]

While the autonomy movement (1966 onwards) began with the demand for democratisation of the Pakistan political system (which included provincial autonomy on the basis of the Six-Point Formula of the Awami League), in its final stage, during what is known as the anti-Ayub movement (of 1968-69), it became a two tier movement—one for domocratisation and the other for a socialistic orientation of the economy. The latter, in fact, provided the substance for widespread militancy of the urban-rural workers, students and peasants. This combine chose to align with the Awami League for its leading position and pragmatic leadership. On the other hand, the middle-class aspirants, the state-sponsored entrepreneurs, traders and a section of the disgruntled provincial bureaucracy also kept close to the AL for their own reasons. During the localised armed resistances following the post-election military operation and crack-down in March 1971 and later during the actual liberation war, however, it was the former, more widely based grouping, that was the major participant. In the 1970 Election Manifesto, the Awami League, then the centrist principal opposition party, despite lack of intra-party consensus, had declared gradual transition to a socialistic economic order as its ultimate economic objective and indicated broadly measures for initiating such gradual change. It, however, emphasised the primacy of the political question, that is, autonomy which had by now acquired the dimensions of a national question. While the moderate left endorsed the AL stand the extra-moderate left continued to call for a social revolution and was isolated for the obvious lack of objective conditions and also for their individual acts of terrorism. Some of them fought both the Pakistani Occupation Army and its allies and the freedom fighters during the Liberation War. Some others tried to raise a liberation army outside the main flank of the *Mukti Bahini*, and publicised their non-acceptance of the sovereign status of post-liberation Bangladesh by retaining the word "East Pakistan" in their party nomenclature.

However, the limited objective of self-rule having to be achieved through an armed struggle, the dividing line between the immediate and the ultimate objectives was blurred and during the guerrilla warfare, restructuring of the society became equally important to many of the active freedom fighters, bulk of whom came from the students, factory workers, teachers and peasants—the mainstay of the 1968-69 militancy.

Later, with the formal launching of the *Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal* (JSD) in 1972 by some stalwarts from the *Chhatra League* (the student front of the AL) which had its embryonic start during the Liberation War itself and its participation in the Election of 1973 with a promise for "scientific socialism" was a clear pointer for the impetus for socialistic economy in the constitution as also the internal factionalism of the AL. By withdra-

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wing their support from the AL the JSD leadership ultimately was not able to develop into a strong opposition party—but their withdrawal certainly weakened the socialistic orientation within the AL. To this was added the lacunae that the available administrators, law-enforcing personnel and the professional military bureaucracy had all been trained to work for either military dictatorship or an authoritarian system during Pak rule. Their attitudes were incompatible with the changed situation. It was felt by a section of the AL, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and some of its allies, that the political system needed overhauling.[13]

Subsequently the Fourth Amendment of January 1975 replaced the parliamentary form by a presidential one and provided for the introduction of a single party system. Its main features were :

(a) President to be directly elected for five years and the President incumbent was to resign in favour of the incumbent Prime Minister as if he had been so elected.
(b) President was removable by three fourth votes of the Parliament for violating the Constitution, grave misconduct, physical or mental disability.
(c) The existing Parliament was to continue for another five years unless dissolved by the President.
(d) President was to appoint a Vice-President and a Prime Minister and a Council of Minister to aid and advise him.
(e) President might establish a single national political party automatically dissolving all other political parties, and would chalk out the details of such a party.
(f) Members of Parliament refusing to join such a party or ignoring its instructions were to lose their seats.
(g) Special courts, tribunals or commissions to be appointed by the Parliament to enforce the fundamental rights.
(h) President could remove judges on grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity.
(i) The system of local governments by elected representatives was abolished.

The Parliament, however, retained its power to amend the Constitution as per the provisions of the 1972 Constitution.[14]

So essentially what the Fourth Amendment attempted was to change the form of the government and party system and entrust the existing government with certain powers to lay down details of the system. And the amendment was adopted according to the procedure laid down in the Constitution, i.e. by the two-thirds majority of the existing Parliament.

A newly independent country adopts a particular form of government and party system as a necessary instrument for operationalising state

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power towards national reconstruction within a framework evolved during the struggle for independence. Change, therefore, in the form of the government and the party system do not necessarilly indicate changes in national objectives and priorities. In this case also the Amendment did not change the basic principles, namely, nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism—each of which had sprung from grass-root level aspirations.

The constitutional changes certainly marked a wide departure from the conventional liberal democratic framework that the people of the Indian sub-continent have hoped to establish after decolonisation. Naturally, the "revolution" by consent was seen as "undemocratic" by some liberal democrats.[15] Subsequent schemes for decentralisation under the new system, however, would appear to have been geared to a democratic centralist superstructure to be instrumental in establishing a grass-roots level democratic order.[16]

Whether the systemic changes thus sought to be introduced could have better served the country by resolving the chaos and confusion, and helped establish a socialistic democracy remains guess work ; before it could be fully operationalised the new system was abandoned after the assassinations of 15 August 1975.

AMENDMENTS UNDER MARTIAL LAW

Method and Legitimacy

Without going into the details of the conspiracy and the intra-and extra-societal alignments and linkages, for the present analysis it would suffice to state that the post 15 August 1975 changes in the Constitution, which changed the nature of the polity, indicate that the Fourth Amendment was inimical to the interests of the status-quoists and conservative forces in Bangladesh society. It follows that even some provisions of the 1972 Constitution (which was the source of the Fourth Amendment) were not acceptable to them. It can be presumed that they represented a minority opinion, otherwise they would have dominated the constitution-mking process and/or the *Jatiya Sangsad* elected in 1973. But the common threat perceptions consolidated and activated several small gtoups in reaction to strikes against the changes before these could be fully institutionalised. So a situation was created where civic rule was suspended through extra-constitutional and extra-legal means with the use of force. Then under the facade of a civilian President, with the powers of the Chief Martial Law Adminstrator, the constitutionally adopted changes were partially tailored to serve their interests. What is important here to note is : The Fourth Admendment was a package amendment which changed (a) the form of the government and (b) the party system and (c) sought to link the government and the party

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at every level of policy making and administration, but the new regime struck down the more socially relevant part while retaining the form of the government, that is, a Presidential form.

Some details of the above procedure : through radio annoucements the *coup* leader of August 1975 proclaimed Martial Law, made Khondkar Mushtaq Ahmed the President and empowered him to issue Martial Law Regulations which were not to be questioned in courts. Khondkar appointed a ten member Cabinet but without any Prime Minister. Impending byelections were postponed for 6 months, proposed BAKSAL administrative system was cancelled and BAKSAL itself declared null and void, all political parties were banned. Changes made in the Army command made Ziaur Rahman the Chief of Army Staff in place of Gen. Shafiullah. Political prisoners were released and Hindu religious programmes in the Radio/TV stopped temporarily. Khondkar, however, did not dissolve the Parliament, and promised to hold the sessions. But Khondkar "resigned" after the overthrow of the group of killers by Brig. Khaled Musharaf and removal of Ziaur Rahman from the position of the Chief of the Army Staff. Justice Sayam who took over from Khondkar dissolved Parliament and promised elections in February 1977. But the shortsighted adventurist policy of the Army-wing of the *Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal* overthrew and killed Khaled Musharaf and brought back Ziaur Rahman as the Commander-in-Chief who announced himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. President Sayem, however, reiterated that he continued to be the CMLA with three Deputy CMLAs (Zia as one of them), suspended Article 48 (Chapter IV) of the Constitution as amended on 25th January 1975 indefinitely and announced a Council of Advisors. Thus the President was neither bound by the limitations imposed by the 1972 Constitution, nor by the Fourth Amendment which conferred Presidency for a limited period to the then Prime Minister and also laid down the procedure for his succession. The same proclamation omitted part VI A by which the Fourth Amendment provided for a single National Party. In December 1975, the Sayem Government by an ordinance discontinued trials aganist the collaborators of 1971 and removed certain constitutionally imposed restrictions on the collaborators.

By another Proclamation President Sayem deleted the provision of the 1972 Constitution directing that all citizens of Bangladesh would be known as "*Bangalees*". Also was deleted the constitutional (1972) restriction imposed upon use of religion for political purposes (Art. 38 Part III of the 1972 Constitution) parliaments power to establish constitutional courts, tribunal or commisson for the enforcement of fundamental rights as provided by the Fourth Amendment was also deleted.[17]

Besides questioning the merits and demerits of such changes the more important consideration is what was the *locus standi* of the President who was bringing about these changes. He was the chosen successor of a Presi-

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dent who derived his "legitimacy" from a group of law-breakers who had already fled the country and been given asylum abroad. Since these were extra-constitutional methods resorted to in the absence of any revolutionary situation created by the people there does not seem to be any constitutionality or legitimacy of any kind except that a section of the most organised institution of the society that is the armed forces by dint of their possession of coercive instruments could procure legitimacy through the barrels of guns. And in the Bangladesh military (as elsewhere in the subcontinent) it is the Army that predominate.

Sabsequently, under the comparative ease of being a freedom fighter and operating at a time when political elements were in complete disarray and the people mentally paralysed in the aftermath of the August and November murders – Ziaur Rahman—under his *de facto* leadership of the clique evolved a modified Ayubian model of government following a revised version of the Ayubian route.

Ziaur Rahman sought popular legitimacy through a referendum of "yes" and "no" votes for himself only after he had assumed the office of the President and the CMLA (Chief Matrial Law Administrator). An interesting feature was that the ballot boxes for "yes" votes were painted white with President Rahman's face printed on it, and the "no" boxes were plain black. The referendum came at the end of a process in which the then DCMLA, but *de facto*, head of state Ziaur Rahman had carefully built himself up as the "saviour" of Bangladesh by adopting a strategy of neutralisation of enemies, reinforcement of friends and creation of new friends to contain conflict situations. The process was manifested in several measures. On the one hand the Armed Forces, the original support base of Gen. Rahman, was cleared of elements working towards a people's army to initiate a struggle for revolutionary social change (Retd. Col. Zbu Tahir's secret trial and execution symbolised this). On the other, the professionals in the forces were provided with more benefits and facilities. The then Air Chief (another DCMLA and aspirant for power) was removed (1 May 1976) for his alleged association with the orthodox religious section in the armed forces, while a new lease of life was given to the same section among the civil population by abrogation (4 May 1976) of the constitutional provision that prohibited use of religion for political purposes. Of the four basic principles of state policy with which Bangladesh started its political existence viz., democracy, socialism, nationalism and secularism, socialism was qualified as meaning "social justice". Article 10 of the 1972 Constitution, pledging a socialist economy for ensuring a just and egalitarian society, was omitted ; acquisition, nationalisation and requisition of property by authority of law was made compensatory. The word secularism in the Preamble and other places and the *modus operandi* for its realisation, prescribed in Article 12 of the 1972 Constitution, were delet-

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ed, instead "Faith in Almighty Allah" was substituted and the prohibition on the use of religion for political purposes was removed.[18]

All these changes and many others, like inclusion of a new clause urging "friendship with Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity", substitution of the phrase "historic struggle for national liberation" in the Constitution by "war of independence", etc., were introduced through Martial Law Proclamations during the evolution of the new system.

Besides, the once demoralised emergent bourgeoisie was coopted by denationalisation measures and liberal investment policies and by alloting key posts to military personnel and controversial ex-members of the erstwhile Pakistani Civil Service. More support structures necessary for continuance were created within a few months after the referendum : an alliance was formed at the behest of the President of political groups which sponsored him for the presidential contest held in June 1977. The alliance was made to wither away as the President needed to operate through a political party that could distribute patronage over a wide area and weaken other parties. The BNP was therefore created with willing members of the alliance and other new entrants. In the general elections (February 1979), the party scored an overwhelming majority of seats in the *Jatiya Sangsad*.[19]

What is significant is that substantial changes were introduced even before the Ayub-style presidential referendum was staged. But once it was held the "President" became "legitimate." His election later further legitimised his position. But strictly speaking no "constitutionality" seems to have been involved in this.

Then came the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. In a Parliament where the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers were nominated by the President, and were responsible to him and not to the parliament, all the proclamations that changed the fundamentals of the Constitution were put together into one Act and legalised by the BNP-dominated Parliament with the opposition abstaining from voting.[20]

A so-called constitutional government continued to operate despite Ziaur Rahman's assassination till Gen. Ershad, on the plea of failure of the civilian Government to manage the law and order situation and curb corruption, took over power as an interim arrangement.[21] By doing so he committed an offence which necessitated a further amendment of the Constitution unless he wanted to leave a legal gap and could be tried for treason—for even by the Fifth Amendment the Constitution did not provide for such taking over of an elected and functioning civil government.

In order to reach the stage, when such a constitutional amendment would legalise his usurpation of state power, Gen. Ershad followed the now well beaten track of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi variety of a presidential referendum, election of local bodies (*Upazila Parishads*), parliamentary and presidential elections after partially reviving the Constitution

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and amending the Representation of People Order (1972) and off and on banning political activities, arresting political leaders and so on. The process has proved to be more difficult than experienced by Ziaur Rahman for the obvious reason that political forces, although very much fragmented, have again come alive Failure of the Junta to curb corruption or lay the foundation of a viable economic infrastructure have intensified social un rest. But distribution of favour in various forms has enabled him to pass what is called the Indemnity Bill amending the Constitution for the seventh time to legalise all Proclamation Orders, CMLA's orders, Martial Law Regulation, Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Instructions. These were repealed by the Proclamation of Withdrawal of Martial Law on 10 November 1986 and the Constitution revived fully with effect from the same date by his Constitution (Final Revival) Order 1986 in the capacity of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.[22] But these came only after the passage of the Seventh Amendment. This made no further basic changes. His twofold objective, as it appeared when he took over, namely, Islamisation and constitutionally guaranteed role for the Military in the political system remain unfulfilled. His position in this regard however still remains the same.[23]

APPRAISAL

To sum up, the first major amendment—the Fourth Amendment of 1975—was carried out according to the process laid down in the Constitution. The series of changes codified in the second major amendment—the Fifth Amendment of 1979—were clearly unconstitutional which began with the appointment of a successor to the assassinated President without paying any heed to the constitutional procedure although the Constitution was not abrogated. It also debarred the trials of those involved in the killings of 15 August 1975, although the happenings on the day were certainly not the outcome of any civil war. The constitutional changes later introduced were also not ratified by the existing Parliament. The Parliaments which approved these changes were elected only after the CMLAs made themselves the Heads of the State, managed to float their own political parties and secured its majority in the Parliament in rigged elections held under Martial Law. The composition of these parties—from extreme right to extreme left – only signify that these parties are basically alliances of convenience when factions from political parties of various hues become part of a clique that by sheer force of its coercive instruments (of the Military, the Police, and the Bureaucracy also) enjoys overriding powers which the coalescing groups try to capitalise on. And the sponsors, although dominant but initially without legitimacy—allure such coalescing groups with certain favours (in the form of ministerial positions, etc.) to legitimise themselves. In the process the Constitution

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has been used as a handy tool in the legitimisation process and lost its sanctity.

In the Bangladesh case the methods thus applied cannot be said to have been an ideal one to help reflect people's conscious acceptance or otherwise of the change in fundamentals of the Constitution, that is, an exploitation-less society through parliamenttary democracy upholding the principles of secularism and nationalism. But if the alleged manipulations in the parliamentary and presidential elections, the hard bargaining to win over some MPs etc., are any indication, it shows that the stage-managed constitutional changes have not been accepted without question.[24]

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1. See Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, *The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1972), Parts I and II.
2. See Government of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, *The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh (as modified upto 28 February, 1977)* (Dacca, 1979).
3. It is not proposed here to make an evaluation in terms of the two main approaches of constitutionalism, developed under namely the 'liberal democratic', and the 'Marxist' (including the Marxist-Leninist or 'Marxist-Leninist Maoist') concepts. The Bangladesh experience is rooted in the country's socio-political milieu as evolved through societal interaction during phases of external and internal colonial scenarios, and despite having a universal underpinning is uniquely its own. Therefore looking at the changes or even the original constitution through the set prism of these concepts may prove to be inadequate or even inappropriate particularly in view of disagreements prevailing in defining both the frameworks.
4. The quest for a popularly acceptable constitution in the area that now forms Bangladesh began not with its formal proclamation of independence in April 1971, but, to mention briefly, with peoples reactions to the *Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee* in 1950, the *Report of the Constitution Commission* 1961, to the 1962 Constitution, the autonomy and anti-Ayub movements. These oppositional reactions apart, their own aspirations were reflected through the proposals of the Grand National Convention, the points made in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the 21 Points of 1954, the Six Points Formula of 1966, the Eleven Charter of 1968-69, the menifestos of the major political parties like the Awami League (AL) and the National Awami Party (NAP). It is these demands, representing a cross-section of the society and promises made by the accepted political leadership that sustained and widened the base of the democratic movements from 1950 onwards. Finally the AL won a landslide victory in the 1970 Elections with a manifesto and campaigning on the basis of these. Later, the Liberation War of 1971—which was a continuation of the earlier political movements—attributed a much wider social legitimacy to these demands which any political party, delegated to govern them, had to take into account. For more details see, Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1975), Appendix B, pp. 392—96; Badruddin Umar, *Purba Bangalar Bhasha Aandolan O Tatkaleen Rajneeti* (Bengali), (Dhaka, 1975), Part 2, pp. 399—404; Moudud Ahmed, *Bangladesh : Constitutional Quest for*

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Autonomy (Dacca, 1979), pp. 17—63; Talukdar Maniruzzaman, *Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1975); Shyamali Ghosh, *The Awami League, 1949—1971* (Dacca, forthcoming); and A. H .M. Kamruzzaman, General Secretary All Pakistani Awami League, *Manifesto of the All Pakistan Awami League* (Dacca, 1970).

5. See A. H. M. Kamaruzzaman, n. 4. Even parties like the various Muslim Leagues, the Jamat-e-Islami, etc., did not openly criticise these objectives.
6. See the *Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh* n. 1.
7. Moudud Ahmed, *Bangladesh : Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman* (Dacca, 1983), p. 127.
8. For a fuller uuderstanding of the situation see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974 : Economie Crisis and Political Polarization," *Asian Survey* (Barkeley), Vol. 15, no. 2, 1975, pp, 117—28; Zillur R. Khan, "Leadership Parties and Politics in Bangladesh" in Khan and Zafrullah (*Eds.*), *Politics and Bureaucracy in a New Nation Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1980), pp. 72—117; Mosharaf Hossain, "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh," *The Journal of Social Studies* (Dacca), No. 5, October 1979, pp. 1—42; Rehman Sobhan, "Growth and Contradictions within the Bangladesh Bourgeoisie," *The Journal of Social Studies*, No. 9, 1980 pp. 1—27; Nurul Islam, *Development Planning in Bangladesh--A Study in Political Economy* (Bangladesh, 1979); Emajuddin Ahmed, *Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth : Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1980) and Moudud Ahmed, n. 7.
9. Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarkar, *The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary*, Saturday, 22 September 1973, Part III, pp. 6937-6940. The First Amendment was made in July 1973 to modify Article 47 which enlisted exceptions which when enacted upon would not be considered as violation of the fundamental rights—such as right to property. It also removed the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction over proceedings of any court or tribunal set up under the Army Act.
See, *Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarkar, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary*, Sunday, 15, July 1973, pp. 5909-5910. The Third Amendment was enacted to give effect to an Agreement between Bangladesh and India on land boundaries between the two countries. See, *Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarkar, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary*, Thursday, 28 November 1974, pp. 6273—6277.
10. *Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarkar, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary*, Thursday, 28, November 1974, Part V, pp. 6273—6277.
11. See Sheikh Mujib's statements in *The Bangladesh Observer*, 26 January 1975, 30 March 1975, 5 June 1975, 21 June 1975, 23 July 1975 and 24 July 1975.
12. See Mosharaf Hussin and Rehman Sobhan, n. 8.
13. See Moudud Ahmed, n. 7. pp. 223-229.
14. See *Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarkar, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary*, Saturday, 25 January 1975, pp. 397-406.
15. Moudud Ahmed, n. 7, p. 242.
16. For the organisational structure, etc., of the National Party named the *Bangladesh Krishak Awami League* (BAKSAL) and the proposed decentralisation in administrative structure of Bangladesh see, Hashemi Masud Jamil, "The *Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League*—A Political Analysis," M. Phil Dissertation, Jawahar lal Nehru University, 1984. The basic principles of the new system had featured in the pre-Liberation Manifestos of the Awami League. See for example, *Manifesto of the All Pakistan Awami League*, 1970, n. 4, which outlined a thorough change in the system of land utilization and creation of new institutions in the form of a network of multipurpose cooperatives and the establishment of an organisational-cum-administrative nucleus at every Thana (the lowest administrative unit).

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17. For the changes see, n. 2, pp. 126–51.
18. See Ibid., pp. 152—98.
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20. Martial Law was lifted on 6 April 1979 after the Fifth Amendment was passed in the Parliament. See "Amendments in Constitution," n. 2.
21. Announcement made on 24 March 1982.
22. See various news items in *POT* (New Delhi), 1985.86.
23. See his statement, "We have always advocated that the Armed Forces should be partners in the nations' *thought process*." *Times of India*, New Delhi, 9 December 1986 (emphasis added). This is a reminder of two other utterings one by Iskandar Mirza, who while imposing Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958 had said," I have no sanction of law of the Constitution. I have only the sanction of my conscience," and the other by Ayub Khan, when while inaugurating the National Assembly of Pakistan on 8 June 1962 he said, "The Constitution that comes into force from today *represents my political philosophy* ..." (Emphasis added).
24. See for example, Amirul Islam, Bar-at-Law and Abdur Razzak, Bar-at-Law "*Samarik Sasan O Sangbidhanik Prokria*" (Military Rule and the Conslitutional Process), *Dainik Sangbad* (Dhaka), 10 July 1986 and Abu Jafar Samsuddin, "*Sangbidhaner Gurutto, Maryada Banam Sangsodnan*", (Constitution : Importance, Sanctity Versus Amendments) *Dainik Sangbad*, 4 August 1986. Also see speech by Justice (Retd.) Kamaluddin Hossein as the Chief Guest at the Annual Council meeting of Bangladesh *Jatiya Ainjeebi Samitee*. *Dainik Sangbad*, 13 December 1986.

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"DEKHRUSHCHEVISATION" ACCOMPLISHED

By ASHOK MODAK*

Like any other document, the new edition of the CPSU Programme also offers itself for varied interpretations. Recently approved, the Programme reflects the culmination of the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation", which was started by Brezhnev and his colleagues just immediately after the dismissal of Khrushchev from the highest post of the Soviet Communist Party. A reading of various documents, such as reports submitted to Party Congresses held in the period from 1964 to 1986, convey that all these documents expressed different shades of the "deKhrushchevisation" campaign. It is indeed interesting to study the unfolding and the ultimate accomplishment of the "deKhrushchevisation" campaign. The present paper is an elaboration of the view that the Soviet polity has witnessed in the period of more than two decades since October 1964 an accomplishment of the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation."

It was the frontal Khrushchevian attack on Stalin which made the 20th CPSU Congress of 1956 a highly significant event in the annals of Soviet history. The world, however, noticed within eight years after this event that Nikita Khrushchev himself was relieved of the responsibilities of the Party Chief in the USSR. And then the successors of Khrushchev undertook the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation", of course, in a very skilled manner. They were thus quite different in their practice, if compared to their predecessor. As everybody knows, Khrushchev showed extraordinary enthusiasm, first in openly denouncing Stalin in the 20th Party Congress and later in removing Stalin's dead body from the Kremlin Mausoleum in the 22nd Party Congress. Brezhnev and his colleagues, on the other hand, relied on using symbolic words and phrases such as "subjectivism", "voluntarism", "harebrained schemes", and so on while criticising their predecessor. We thus observe that the sophisticated manner in which the Khrushchevian policies and practices were criticised by Brezhnev and Kosygin indicated a change in style on the part of the new leadership. Later events revealed that Khrushchev's successors changed not only the style but also the programmes and policies of Khrushchev as well. It was Andropov who became the Party-Chief after the death of Brezhnev. His term, of course, proved to be a short affair. Chernenko, who later occupied the post of the Party Chief was again in office for a short time. What is notable is the fact that Andropov, and Chernenko as well, carried forward during their short tenures the legacy of reversing Khrushchevian acts. Mikhail Gorbachev, the present incumbent of the highest post in the CPSU, seems to be quite enthusiastic in putting an

*Dr. Modak is Reader, Centre of Soviet Studies, University of Bombay, Bombay.

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end to the excessively utopian and romantic ideas propagated by Nikita Khrushchev. The New captain of the CPSU has indeed completed the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation."

We must first of all, analyse the genesis of the "deKhrushchevisation" campaign. This sort of analysis must be followed by the review of the campaign proper. Such a review will enable the reader to know not only the content but also the different phases of the whole campaign. Finally we propose to compare and contrast the redrafted Party Programme with the original draft approved during the 22nd Party Congress under the leadership of Khrushchev.

GENESIS OF CAMPAIGN

KHRUSHCHEV'S successors reversed or modified some of the Khrushchevian policies pertaining not only to the internal but to the international field as well. We, however, would confine ourselves to the internal field. The internal "deKhrushchevisation" has undoubtedly undergone ups and downs. Khrushchev's heirs opted for taking punitive action against officials, when they came across careless behaviour and the resultant losses to the Soviet Union. They accordingly resorted to typical Khrushchevian practices when no other option was found practicable and useful. We will deal with such ups and downs during the course of the paper, bearing in mind of course, that the whole trend nevertheless substantiated the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation."

It was in the mid 1950s that Khrushchev began his march towards achieving unchallengeable supremacy in the hierarchy of the CPSU. This march as well as the ultimate achievement of supremacy enabled people to notice in Khrushchev a number of peculiar traits. Khrushchev, for instance, had an inimitable urge, on the verge of impatience, to transform Soviet society at a rapid pace. He perhaps believed that a combination of impressive slogans regarding a bright future and attractive schemes for implementing such slogans would enthuse masses to dedicate their energies for the cause of communism. His love for the masses led him to bypass bureaucrats and to issue threats to cadres that they would face stormy mass-discontent, if they failed in delivering the goods. He did not bother for well-settled procedures, if he developed a liking for a particular path for fulfilling his mission. All these traits resulted in equally peculiar practices. Khrushchev thus drew very utopian and romantic pictures of the future of Soviet Union.

He indulged in chalking out a number of harebrained plans and schemes. He rarely cared for the principle of collective leadership. He favoured frequent reshuffling or rotation of cadres. His voluntarism and ad-hocism actually produced a number of erratic economic and administrative policies, in addition to the 'harebrained schemes.' Paul Cocks has given an apt

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description of the exhaustion caused to the heirs of Khrushchev due to the above-mentioned traits and practices on the part of their former boss. The relevant extract runs as follows :

> The Khrushchevian legacy made Soviet leaders not only weary but also wary of hasty, ill-conceived, and sweeping reorganizations. Through his frequently uninformed and forced interventions, officially dubbed 'adventurist and harebrained schemes, Khrushchev sometimes made things different but not always better.[1]

Incidentally, one remembers here how in the past a leader like Khrushchev himself suffered a sort of exhaustion because of Stalinist behavioural patterns. In the opinion of Roy A. Medvedev, "Just as Napoleon's generals eventually grew tired of continuous warfare, so the men in Stalin's entourage were weary of his morbid suspiciousness and the ever-present fear of sudden arrest."[2]

And just as Khrushchev found the way out in launching a campaign of "deStalinisation," leaders since Brezhnev onwards opted for "deKhrushchevisation." They of course, handled the campaign in a very skilled and sophisticated manner.

To anybody who undertakes the analysis of the genesis of deKhrushchevisation, three factors appear significant. First, that heirs of Khrushchev realised that there was a wide gap between inflated claims on the one hand and the actual painful realities on the other. Secondly, they also felt that Khrushchevian attacks on the Stalinist methods contributed to the erosion of discipline in the Soviet society. Finally, they noted that they should take full advantage of the modern scientific and technological revolution. (STR) And that in the new circumstances they must replace the Khrushchevian audacity by a becoming modest.

Khrushchev's Heir's Note Wide Gap between Claims and Realities

It was the Third Party Programme which mirrored all types of ambitious claims of Khrushchev. This programme announced that within two decades after 1961, the Soviet Union would enter the the stage of communism. It contained impressive details not only regarding the achievement of production and distribution targets but also about the timetable of such achievements. The 20-Year Plan of the 1961 Party Programme foresaw a growth of 150 per cent in industrial output in 1960-70. It made a projection about the same rate of growth for national income and for agriculture as well. It also assured the Soviet citizens the highest living standards as compared with the citizens of any capitalist country. That the Programme made highly ambitious claims was stated by Naum Jasny in 1961 itself. The following quote is quite revealing :

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> ...to find an equivalent of the new 20-Year Plan, one has to turn back to Stalin's initial drive with its bacchanalian Planning, the period called by this writer the 'all-out drive', when in February 1932 an output of electric power of 100 billion kwh was planned for 1937 (actual attainment, 36 billion kwh.), and this was by no means the only, or even the worst, target set in this period, which extended from Stalin's pernicious article in *Pravda* of 6 November 1929 to early in 1933.[3]

Leonid Brezhnev, the immediate successor to Nikita Khrushchev, informed Soviet citizens through his Report to the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 that a number of plan-targets of the Khrushchevian Plan then remained unfulfilled. He further provided the following piece of information :

> In recent years such negative features have become manifest as reduced growth rates in production and in the productivity of labour, lower efficiency in the use of fixed assets and investments.[4]

Brezhnev blamed the subjective approach of Khrushchev for miscalculations and ambitious tragets.[5]

Within a decade after the 23rd Party Congress, that is by the end of the 1960s, Soviet masses in general, and leaders in particular must have experienced additional frustrations due to the widening gap between claims made by the 1961 Programme and the lags in various fields of Soviet economy in 1970. The Party Programme thus assured that by the year 1970, "the entire population will be able adequately to satisfy its needs in high quality and varied foodstuffs."[6] It further assured : "The demand of all sections of the population for high quality consumer goods will be amply satisfied."[7] We can compare with these assurances the following extract of the review of Eighth Five Year Plan, submitted by Kosygin to the 24th CPSU Congress held in 1970 :

> In the fish, food and meat—and dairy industries—large losses of raw materials, and departures from technological specifications have occurred, and this has had a direct effect on the quality of the products. . . . The engineering ministries have failed to provide enterprises in the light and food industries and the public utilities with adequate quantities of the latest highly productive equipment. . . . The quality of furniture has not always satisfied the consumer. There have been interruptions in the marketing of crockery, and many household articles.[8]

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Need for Stengthening the State to check Indiscipline

No wonder then that Brezhnev and Kosygin decided to abandon the utopian goals and populist campaigns favoured by Khrushchev. "de- Khrush chevisation" was further expedited by the feeling on the part of the new leaders that some of the Khrushchevian practices, like the suspension of severest punishments, elimination of the use of terror and repealing of draconian labour laws caused the erosion of discipline in later years.

Vladimir Kontorovich indeed observed that the relaxed atmosphere at the top affected lower ranks as well and gradually it became difficult to punish workers for poor performance.[9] He further remarked : "Declines in intensity of work, deterioration of resource allocation, and slowdown of technological progress were the channels through which the relaxation of discipline influenced economic growth."[10]

Some thinkers accused ideological fantasies and unrealistic elements of Khrushchevian days for the naive predictions of human perfectability through social reorganisation. They mainly referred to the following types of pious hopes of the 1961—Programme : "There should be no room for law-breakers and criminals in a society building Communism."[11] What more, it was felt that "the measures of public influence and education would ultimately succeed in putting an end to the judicial punishment of crimes."[12]

Richard Kosolapov, a reputed Soviet thinker, has actually generalised that, "when democracy is not founded on a solid, scientifically based organisational structure, and when teaching the working people expertise in managing social affairs is done badly, one observes a "warping" towards anarchy."[13] He also stated that this 'warping' may cause dislocation or a partial loss of control over social relations, making certain social processes ungovernable.[14]

Vladimir Kudryavtsev also holds the same viewpoint. He finds the origin of the nihilistic attitutde towards law in the USSR in the Khrushchevian concept that the Soviet Union would witness in the near future the withering away of the state and that law would then be replaced with communist standards. His remark is actually reflective of the antidote to the above mentioned nihilistic attitude to the law :

> . . . life has shown that the construction and development of Socialism and the transition to Communism are lengthy historical stages during which the state and law remain major and indispensable tools of social progress.[15]

According to George Breslauer, the rising indiscipline in Soviet society led Leonid Brezhnev to devote a special subsection in his speech at the 24th Party Congress for explaining the importance of "strengthening of the Soviet state." He commented that Brezhnev thus officially rejected the

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doctrinal revision introduced at the 22nd Party Congress, according to which "societal activity would be the principal arena within which popular consciousness would be raised."[16] It is true that Nikita Khrushchev tried to revive the popular and revolutionary aspects of Soviet law by seeking to reduce inequalities of income and possibilities for acquiring personal wealth, and also by reemphasising the supremacy of the Party over the State. As an evidence, one can refer to the viewpoint expressed in the Third Party Programme that the Party and its organisations must take it upon themselves to deal with current administrative matters. Traditionally-minded Party leaders must have disliked this sort of viewpoint, as according to them, the Party would be overburdened due to the administrative responsibilities and therefore it would not find adequate time for ideological and educational training of the cadres. Khrushchev himself stated in his memoirs that the 'thaw' introduced by him in the Soviet society was disfavoured by some Party leaders. It is amusing to quote here a few relevant lines from his Memoirs :

> They (opponents of thaw), even uttered rebukes and said—look, if Stalin were alive, he would not have allowed this. . . . We were consciously rather afraid of this thaw, for fear that it might produce a flood which would inundate everything and which would be difficult to deal with. . . . For this reason we, as it were, restrained the thaw.[17]

Conservatives in the Party indeed held Khrushchev responsible for the outbreak of political dissidence since 1965. They thought that it was the Khrushchevian over-emphasis on practical problems which caused the diversion of the Party's attention from its primary responsibilities and also the belittling of the work of ideological specialists. They thus argued that the political dissidence of the mid-1960s was a logical follow-up of the laxity of the Khrushchev years.[18]

Role of Scientific and Technological Revolution

Khrushchev's heirs indeed accused their previous chief not only for the poor performance of the Soviet economy which was wide of the mark, but also for the deteriorated law and order conditions in the USSR. In fact if the gap between overambitious claims and the tragic realities led Brezhnev and his colleagues to launch the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation," the growing laxity in Soviet society strengthened their urge to further expedite this campaign. The role played by scientific and technological revolution (STR) in this context is also remarkable. It was the impact of the STR which made Brezhnev and Kosygn realise that they must involve different specialists in the process of decision-making. Such a realisation glaringly contrasted with the viewpoint favoured by Khrushchev and even Stalin. The traditional viewpoint believed that Soviet

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leaders possessed a special knowledge of the socio-economic laws of development. Brezhnev and Kosygin rejected this line of thinking, as according to them, the STR, with its increasingly well-educated knowledge-elites and its complex and interconnected problems and decisions has undermined the notion of 'conscious' leadersalp. They thus noticed that the STR actually raised the status of technical and managerial elites. They accordingly recognised the special position of professionals or elites in the management of Soviet society. Khrushchev's successors also noted that the success in scientific and technological revolution very much depended on the managerial and even the cultural revolution. They, in other words, concluded that they must improve their organisational and managerial structure in order to take full advantage of developments in nuclear power, automation, computers, and so on. Such a realisation on the part of Khrushchev's heirs was quite noteworthy against the background of Stalinist years when organisation and technology were treated as mere instruments of policy and agents of change in society. It was in fact noteworthy against the background of Khrushchevian years as well, because although Khrushchev acknowledged the need of organisational changes, he relied on ill-conceived schemes and *ad-hoc* alterations. Brezhnev and his colleagues thus only accorded a significant place to organisation and management in the functioning of the Socialist society, but also undertook in this field some of the important measures which intensified the movement of "deKhrushchevisation." It is possible to elaborate these measures in the following order. 1. Whereas Khrushchev liked hasty, ill-conceived and sweeping reorganisations, his successors opted for cautious, pre-planned and piecemeal changes. 2. If Khrushchev showed interest in radical alterations by political fiat, or by one structural blow, Brezhnev and Kosygin, and later Chernenko and Andropov, favoured an experimental and incremental approach to change. 3. Lastly, Khrushchev liked a phase-dominant and disjointed model of technological innovation. His heirs, on the other hand, adopted a process—and—systems view.[19] As a consequence, the whole emphasis was shifted from "major changes" to marginal improvements, to the accumulation of limited changes as the most befitting means of arriving at ultimately extensive organisational transformations.

PHASES OF "DEKHRUSHCHESVISATION"

Dismissal of Khrushchev in October 1964 enabled new leaders like Brezhnev and Kosygin to start the reversal of a number of his programmes and policies. The process of reversal, described in this paper, as "deKhrushchevisation," underwent different phases. In the first phase, from October 1964 to the end of the sixties, a number of Khrushchevian acts were reversed by Brezhnev and his colleagues. The second phase

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which encompassed the decade of the Seventies witnessed Khrushchev's heirs reincorparating certain traits of their former chief in the Party and state activities. The third and the last phase from the beginning of the present decade is of great significance, because it has shaped the redrafting of the 1961 Party Programme. This phase has thus taken the process of "deKhrushchevisation" to the logical end. The present section of the paper is devoted to describe the first two phases of "deKhrushchevisation," and the following section is meant to elaborate the importance of revisions made in the Third Party Programme.

First Phase

We have already referred to the fact that Khrushchev's successors were fed up with his *ad-hoc* and excessively utopian policies. They probably felt that the unusual concentration of powers made it easy for the previous Party Chief to undertake voluntarist practices. It was natural therefore that they gave utmost priority to the curbing of the powers of the General Secretary of CPSU. In fact it was the same meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU which dismissed Khrushchev that rushed to discontinue the practice of "letting one person combine the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers." It was accordingly decided to offer the former duties to Leonid Brezhnev and the latter ones to Alexei Kosygin. According to T.H. Rigby, "informal understandings were moreover reached, which limited the ability of the First Secretary to dominate the allocation of patronage. There was, in fact, established a norm against disproportionate Politbureau representation by either the Party Secretariat or the Council of Ministers."[20] Leonid Brezhnev indeed followed a new course. In place of the strong personal leadership that Khrushchev sought to furnish with the aim of change, Brezhnev offered consensual leadership for order and stability.[21] Whereas Khrushchev led from the front, took vital policy decisions and bypassed his colleagues when he deemed it necessary, Brezhnev led from the middle.[22] It was in November 1964, that is, just immediately after the overthrow of Khrushchev, that the new leadership decided to revoke the bifurcation of the Party apparatus into separately industrial and agricultural hierarchies. Such a decision of revocation conveyed to the masses that Brezhnev and his colleagues wished to do away with the disruptive effect of bifurcation on the agricultural and industrial sectors. It also indicated that the new leaders were keen on observing the principle of Party legality. The knowledge, that it was the Plenary Decree of November 1962 which bifurcated the Party led Brezhnev and Kosygin to resort to the same type of decree in November 1964 for announcing the revocation order. Khrushchev's successors respected Party legality again when they abolished the RSFSR Bureau in the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, as they nullified the

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decision which was taken by their previous Chief in the proceedings of the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Brezhnev also abolished rather quietly several special boards and commissions created by Khrushchev for supervising the activities of different Party agencies.

The Soviet Communist Party realised that the principles of collective leadership and legality were of utmost significance, because "subjectivism shown by individual leaders of experienced Marxist-Leninist parties was dangerous and harmful both in ideology and politics."[23]

The Khrushchev-type 'individual leaders' were vehemently attacked by Brezhnev in his speech at the 24th CPSU Congress. He stated :

> There are some members in the Party whose activity is for purposes of show, of creating an outward impression. They talk more than others about the need for doing one thing or another, always lecture and exhort everybody. But as soon as the time for practical action comes they manage to remain on the sidelines.[24]

Brezhnev felt that the Khrushchevian acts had caused great harm to the agricultural sector. He therefore undertook a comprehensive programme in March 1965 for improving agricultural production in the USSR. This programme in fact repudiated a number of Khrushchevian practices as it gave blessings to the large number of significant practical measures such as improvement in planning, provision of concrete incentives for boosting agricultural production, doubling of capital investment in agriculture for bridging the gap between marching industry and lagging agriculture, democratisation of the management of farms, introduction of pensions for collective farmers, and so on. That the programme represented a break with the Khrushchevian approach was evidenced in additional features like the removal of restrictions on private sector, offering of low, uniform and stable production norms to farmers, raising of procurement prices to producers, etc.

The Kosygin Reforms, announced in September 1965, aimed at introducing economic rationalization in the field of Soviet industry. We must note as a background to the Kosygin Reforms that due to Khrushchev's commitment to optimism, Soviet consumers began to expect more and more from the Soviet Government. We should also note that if the Khrushchevian policy of bringing pressures on managers curbed the managerial enthusiasm and accordingly resulted in the decline in growth rates, the policy of creating regional economic councils added to the administrative confusion. Thus the Soviet economy experienced a wide gap between high expectations on the part of Soviet masses and the declining capacity of plants and industries to fulfil these expectations. The Kosygin Reforms were an attempt on the part of Khrushchev's heirs to resolve problems faced by the Soviet economy. The package of reforms contained alongwith other measures, the decision to wind up Khrushchevian *sovnarkhozy* (regional eco-

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nomic councils) and to restore economic ministries. It also comprised other proposals like the reduction in the numbers of compulsory indicators from above, the computation of profit as a percentage of capital alongwith the introduction of a capital charge, the recasting of managerial incentives, etc. All these proposals conveyed to citizens that the new leaders were more realistic, and in that respect, they were different from Khrushchev, who relied on exhortations, warnings and utopian ideas. We should, of course, remember that Khrushchev did undertake some steps for improving the performance of the Soviet economy. His action of creating regional economic councils thus aimed at abolishing the so-called empires of industrial ministries, or at ending the evils of departmentalism. In actual practice, the regional economic councils encouraged the growth of localism and autarkical tendencies. Khrushchev also introduced cost-reduction targets in the field of giving incremental bonuses to plant managers. This practice, however, impelled plant managers to ignore quality considerations. It was during Khrushchev's time moreover that Prof. Liberman came out with historical measures of economic reforms. But those times did not witness the official sanction to the implementation of Libermanian Reforms. It is indeed a fact that against the background of ill-conceived and patchy, or partial Khrushchevian reforms, the Kosygin Reforms appeared to be well-thought out and comprehensive measures.

The 23rd CPSU Congress held in March-April 1966 gave considerable attention "to make the admission of Party members more exacting."[25] The Congress amended Party Rules and made it compulsory that fresh applicants to be recommended by senior members of five year's standing and that young applicants under 23 years age first undergo the *Komsomol* training. The Congress moreover stated that the ideological work to be imparted to cadres must be closely associated with life, "for otherwise, it deteriorates into mere *political phrasemongering*."[26] The new leaders thus preferred quality to the quantity of cadres. They also desired that frequent reorganisations of Party, Government, and economic bodies be avoided, as probably they felt that cadres must enjoy security. Brezhnev and Kosygin moreover asked Party bodies "to stop indulging in petty guardianship of government bodies." Their acts thus reflected deKhrushchevisation.

The new trend was indeed in favour of 'elitism' in all fields. New leaders underscored the professionalized character and political status of state officials. Brezhnev, for instance, reported in his speech at the 24th Party Congress that many new comrades with "an excellent political and specialist training" had been promoted to Party leadership and government bodies in the localities, including the posts of first secretaries of the Central Committees of the Republican Communist Parties, and of territorial and regional committees. Brezhnev also stated in the same speech that officials should enjoy full trust and support from authorities, as they were engaged in specialized and difficult tasks.[27] He moreover argued that officials' mis-

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takes should not be treated as reflections either of gross incompetence or ot lethargy towards society. He moreover found it essential to devote a separate paragraph on the appreciation of the Shchekino experiment :

> Concientious and highly productive work must be encouraged and better remunerated. It would be expedient, as the experience of the Shchekino Chemical Works shows, to provide enterprises with broader possibilities for giving incentives to those workers and collectives of workers who make the largest contribution to the development of production, combine trades and adopt a master-like and thrifty attitude to social wealth.[28]

Leonid Brezhnev thus blessed the experiment undertaken by the Shchekino Chemical Combine in 1967, whereby a sanction was given to release redundant labourers and also to increase material differentiation within and between enterprises. The new approach was indeed remarkable as it rejected the viewpoint expressed in the 1961—Party Programme : The state bureaucracy would cease to constitute a special profession."[29]

New stress on professionalism found itself expressed in the viewpoint that persons with specialized knowledge like administrators, scholars, etc, should influence the process of decision making.[30] It was undoubtedly distant from the Khrushchevian approach which held the belief that Party leaders were capable of providing the direction and basic goals in all fields of life. The draft of the *Eighth Five Year Plan (1966-70)* disclosed the new open-ended and empirical approach, as unlike the previous plan-document and also unlike the document of the 1961-programme, it reduced the gap between aspirations and capacities to a very great extent. The fact that during Brezhnev's time the Soviet authorities began to have pragmatic considerations has been summed up by Elizabeth Valkenier in a very lucid manner :

> Propagandistic and politicised writings were, to some extent, relegated by the objective and theoretical publication. Promising tone of the early years was accordingly replaced by a realistic mood. The methodology of imposing views through *diktat* was replaced by that which relied on discourse and debate.[31]

The period of five to six years after the dismissal of Khrushchev thus witnessed the reversal of most Khrushchevian programmes. The new leaders felt that they had succeeded in putting an end to the subjectivism of Khrushchev. They thought that "surmounting the consequences of the personality cult and also of subjectivism has favourably affected the general political and, above all, the ideological situation in the country."[32] The fact that in the mid-1960s, methods of planning were changed and the purchasing prices for agricultural products were raised probably enabled

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Soviet leaders to expect attractive returns in the agricultural sector.[33] Industrial reforms introduced in 1965 also raised the hopes of Soviet leaders regarding the performance of their economy. The 24th CPSU Congress held in 1971, however, heard from Alexei Kosygin that output targets for some types of products then remained unfulfilled and that labour productivity growth was also short of the targets in industry, agriculture and especially in construction.[34]

It seems that in reaction to all such failures, Khrushchev's successors decided to undertake certain experiments in the decade of the seventies for improving the deteriorating health of the Soviet economy. The experiments thus undertaken included such measures as magnification of Brezhnev's image, attempts to inculcate discipline in cadres, stimulus to the growth of the consumption sector, enhancement of the role of the Party in Soviet society and so on. All these measures indicated, at least apparently, that Brezhnev was reincorporating some of the Khrushchevian traits in his activities. All the just mentioned measures must have had then reminded Soviet masses of the respectively resembling Khrushevian practices like self-glorification, frequent reorganisations of various bodies and turnover of party and state cadres, assurances of sweet carrots to Soviet consumers, appreciation of party intervention in administrative affairs and so on. The decade of the seventies indeed marked, to some extent at least, a sort of set back to the process of "deKhrushchevisation." We should not, however rush to conclude that post-Khrushchev Soviet leaders totally abandoned in the seventies the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation. This campaign was the result of a consensus arrived at by Khrushchev's heirs, and a thorough reading of documents and speeches pertaining to the period convey that the process of "deKhruschevisation" was quite prevalent in this period as well. We can at the most observe that like any other process this one also underwent ups and downs. The beginning of the 1980s actually caused further acceleration to this proeess. We propose to elaborate the events that took place in this connection in the period of the seventies; that is, in the second phase of "deKhrushchevisation."

Second Phase

Leonid Brezhnev undoubtedly experienced in the period of 1970s a steady expansion of his role in the USSR. He thus acquired the most visible and prominent place in the central leadership. He also received impressive accolades in Soviet newpapers and books. In 1977 he obtained the titles of Marshal of the Soviet Union, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Defence Council of the USSR. In the same year, he became the Chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, obviously at the cost of Nikolai Podgorny, who lost the membership of the politbureau as well. Brezhnev nevertheless kept himself at a

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distance from Khrushchev. He, for instance, never ignored procedures and bypassed his colleagues. Changed circumstances actually shaped strong political and administrative elites, who began to resist policies and practices also of the General Secretary.[35] Moreover, as per the report, Brezhnev felt it necessary after the assumption of the post of Chairman of the Presidium, that is, after the removal of Podgorny from that post, to assure Soviet citizens that he would never adopt arbitrary and voluntarist policies.[36] History indeed informs us that Brezhnev did not use the accumulated powers at his disposal for challenging the prerogatives of major institutions and for imposing radical changes on the Soviet society. He indeed remained unKhrushchevian in his approach as the supreme leader of the USSR.

We have already described how Brezhnev chalked out a new cadre-policy in the months immediately after the dismissal of Khrushchev. The cadres, which faced bloody purges during Stalin's regime and frequent threats of mass unrest and orders of turnovers during the rule of Khrushchev, enjoyed a type of security and stability under the leadership of Brezhnev. They were, however, stunned when the following warning was issued to them by the General Secretary of the Party in July 1973 : "It is still worse when people who work poorly and do not cope with their duties are kept in their post too long."[37]

The Report submitted by Leonid Brezhnev to the 25th Party Congress devoted a special sub-section for elaborating the cadre policy of the Party. In this sub-section there was a reference to the policy of ending unjustified reshuffling and frequent replacement of cadres. And in the same context there appeared the following warning ; "That is not to say, however, that on the pretext of securing cadre stability, it is possible to leave in leading posts those who fail to pull their weight, as the saying goes, and to cope with their duties."[38] The next paragraph was also quite harsh :

> "He who has lost his ability to make a critical assessment of his activity, he who has lost touch with the masses, who breeds toadies and bootlickers, and who has lost the thrust of the Communists cannot be a party leader."[39]

Later, the plenary sessions, held in November 1979 and October 1980, heard from Brezhnev 'bombshell' speeches listing shortfalls in all sectors and castigating ministers by name. The frank and threatening tone adopted by Brezhnev in his speeches on the topic of cadre-policy reminded citizens of the Khrushchevian practices. Brezhnev indeed imitated his predecessor when he specified guilts as well as those guilty and demanded that the guilty officials be dismissed. He also went to the extent of encouraging masses to criticise their hierarchical superiors. The new mood of Brezhnev was evidenced in the 1977 Constitution as well. Article 58 of the new Constitution thus granted citizens the right to lodge complaints against

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officials, and to seek recourse in a court of law against such officials. Article 49 gave protection to the critics from probable persecution. This Article states that "Persons who persecute others for criticism will be called to account."

This type of excessive stress on exacting norms must not, however, make us conclude that Brezhnev followed the example of Khrushchev. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, neither established Party State Control Commission nor undertook an energetic campaign for fostering status-equalization in the public political arena. The Brezhnevian measures were indeed quite modest, if compared to the Khrushchevian ones. Brezhnev stated in the above referred speech at the 25th Party Congress that "the Party puts a high value on its cadres, has trust in their creative potentialities, and displays concern in fostering and educating them."[40] He rejected the Stalinist type of discipline ; the following extract of his speech at the 24th Party Congress is an indication :

> We have in mind discipline, founded not on fear, not on methods of ruthless administration which deprive people of confidence and initiative, and engender over-cautiousness and dishonesty. What we have in mind is discipline founded on a high level of consciousness and responsibility of people.[41]

George Breslauer holds the opinon that such Brezhnevian statements in connection with the topic of discipline should not be written off as political rhetorics. He argues in this context that Soviet authorities did not show either a purge or a 'great leap forward' mentality. "Indeed, the exchange of party cards during 1973-75 resulted in expulsion of only about one per cent of the party members."[42]

Brezhnev did adopt certain policies in the interest of the Soviet consumer. Thus it was the Ninth Five Year Plan during his term office which for the first time in Soviet history, aimed at expanding the output of Industry 'B' at a faster rate than that of the output of Industry 'A'. The same Plan moreover, projected a faster growth of the consumption fund than that of the accumulation fund. Brezhnev indeed advocated huge Investment in agriculture and showed his readiness to make the heavy industries suffer for this purpose. He moreover insisted that the fruits of the scientific-technological revolution should be combined with the advantages of socialism and the abundance of consumer goods. Soviet masses might have then remembered the Khrushchevian claim that the stage of full-scale construction of Communism would provide consumers with plenty of goods and services. Brezhnevian emphasis on production and distribution of consumers' goods was obvious from his speech at the 26th Party Congress as well :

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> As you know comrades, the draft of the guidelines for the next five years embodies a certain acceleration of the rate of growth of Group B, to exceed the rate of growth of Group A. That is good. The problem is to create a really modern sector producing consumer goods and services for the population, which meet their demands.[43]

Brezhnev explained the significance of the production and distribution of food, consumer goods and services, as in his opinion, the daily life of millions of Soviet peoples relied on the resolution of problems connected with the availability of the above-mentioned necessities. He further underscored the fact that people judged the worth of any system by applying simple norms—whether they succeed in fulfilling their primary needs in the system concerned.

The appearance of Brezhnev as an advocate of the growth of the consumer goods sector should not, however, make us conclude that Brezhnev was appeasing Soviet consumers on the lines of his predecessor. First, he stated in his speech at the 25th Party Congress that during the Tenth Five Year Plan, the government would give first priority to "a further build-up of the country's economic might, an enlargement and basic renewal of production assets and the maintenance of a stable, balanced growth of the heavy industry as the foundation of the economy."[44] He thus backed out from the policy formulated in the Ninth Five Pear Plan, as the task of raising the living standards of citizens was relegated to a secondary status. (It is necessary to point out here that the extract from the Brezhnevian speech, just quoted was printed in bold letters in the official document). Secondly, Brezhnev expressed a legitimate fear that "the growth of material opportunities without ideological, moral and cultural training to citizens might result in the philistine and petty bourgeois mentality."[45] He thus launched an attack on the trend of consumerism. Thirdly, he emphasised through the Article 15 of the 1977 Constitution that there was a sort of *quid pro quo* arrangement between the State's commitment to the welfare of citizens on the one hand, and the State's expectations from citizens on the other.

The emphasis placed by Brezhnev on the expanded role of the Party in Soviet life seemed to be an additional proof of the Brezhnevian immitation of his predecessor. It was thus treated as an example of the backout from the campaign of "deKhrushchevisation." Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution laid extraordinary stress on the leading role of the Party in all spheres of Soviet life. Actually, such a stress granted this Constitution a mark of distinction, if compared to the previous Constitutions of the USSR. Moreover, according to Rigby and Miller, it was since 1971 that primary party organisations within ministries, scientific research institutes and some other state institutions began to enjoy the formal right to keep

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a watch over state officials within their jurisdictions.[46] As per the same source, in the 1970s representatives of the Central Committee apparatus began to interfere in the Central ministeral decision-making processes. When Brezhnev and his colleagues adopted, in the decade of the seventies a centralist-prescriptive form of public administration and undertook campaigns for resolving the problem of human and bureaucratic inertia, Soviet citizens remembered the days of Khrushchev. We have already stated that Brezhnev demanded from officials a high degree of exactitude in their duties. This type of a demand was also a sign of greater use of pressure to make administrators work in their fields.

The Brezhnevian reliance on pressure-tactics was nontheless distant from the policy of interventionism followed by Khrushchev. Brezhnev always underscored the rights and jurisdictions of administrative officials. He observed at the 24th Party Congress that a great responsibility with little power was harmful; as "in that position, even the most conscientious worker frequently finds himself powerless; and it is hard to make him fully responsible for the job assigned to him."[47] Brezhnev also tried to restrict the powers of Party leaders. Thus if his address at the 24th Party Congress commented that the leader should not depend solely on the force of orders,[48] his speech at the next Congress expected that the leader should be sensitive to the needs and requirements of people, and set an example in work and in everyday life.[49] The 26th CPSU Congress got the following message from the Party-Chief :

> Powers—and high powers at that—are vested in leaders so that they could make full use of them. But in so doing, every leader must always remember his lofty responsibility as well—his responsibility to the men and women he has been entrusted with leading, his responsibility to the Party and the people.[50]

G. Shahnazarov 's book—*Socialist Democracy*—gave expression to the doubt that the leading role of the Party might be equated with role by 'diktat'. The following extract from his book is indeed relevant in this context :

> Identification of the leading role of the Party with authoritarian methods is incorrect for serious harmful consequences. To begin with, the representative institutions have their role reduced, becoming a kind of appendix of the appropriate Party organisations. When the latter take it upon themselves to tackle any important matter that require government attention, this involves completely unwarranted circumscription of the organs of government and administration, hampering their initiative.[51]

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The fact that the writer of this book happened to be a leading Soviet thinker indicates that the then prevalent official thinking was in favour of putting restraints on Party-interventions in administrative matters. Brezhnev undoubtedly rejected the methods of ruthless dictatorial fiat. He in fact assured state officials that "bad management" would not be equated with "anti-state" behaviour. He thus continued to carry forward the process of "deKhrushchevisation" in the period of the seventies. He never abandoned the role of a broker in his relationship with institutions, officials, and scientific experts within the Soviet establishment.

Soviet Union actually observed in the last years of the Brezhnev regime a diffusion of power away from the top leadership in comparison with the preceding regime. And the credit goes, partially at least, to the leadership of Brezhnev, who allowed the real power to devolve itself to lower levels in the bureaucracy and society.

In the decade of the 1970s itself, Soviet leaders began to revise the romantic thinking of the Khrushchevian days. As we know, the Third Party Programme which was reflective of the Khrushchevian thinking contained the solemn Party proclamation : "The present generation of Soviet people shall live in Communism."[52] Brezhnev and his colleagues noted that in pursuance of this proclamation they were expected to show the signs of Communism by the beginning of the eighties. They could not however, afford to ignore realities. The way out available to them was to convey to Soviet citizens that the Khrushchevian line of thinking was wrong. Brezhnev, accordingly presented his own interpretation of the stages on the road to Communism :

> The experience of the USSR, of other countries of the socialist community testifies to the fact that laying the foundations of socialism, that is, abolishing the exploiting classes and establishing public ownership of the means of production in all sectors of the national economy, does not yet make it possible to launch the direct transition to Communism. Before this, certain stages in the development of Socialism on its own basis must be traversed.[53]

Brezhnev totally rejected the view that a homogeneous society had emerged in the Soviet Union. His write-up published in the fiftieth anniversary year of the USSR, actually accepted that "an ethnically differentiating type of development has further encouraged nationalistic prejudices and exaggerated or distorted national feelings in the USSR."[54]

Such an official sanction to the realistic line of thinking favoured the publication of a number of monographs and books drawing pragmatic and empirical conclusions regarding Soviet society and polity. Thus sociologists like Bromley, Rogachev, and Agayev, and political scientists like Shahnazarov and Kosolapov came out with very realist assessments of the

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development of the Soviet Union.[55] Shahnazarov made a very relevant observation indicating that Soviet authorities were eager to buy the ghost of subjectivism :

> Not subjective whim and personal wishes but a well-founded, sober, realistic appraisal taking into account all factors that can possibly be noted and evaluated at the present level of social science. Indeed, the development of social analysis and bringing its results to the attention of the widest possible sections of the public is one of the most effective means of combating subjectivism and preventing unfounded and especially patently erroneous decisions.[56]

The Last Phase of deKhrushchevisation

The beginning of the present decade which, in our opinion, inaugurated the third phase of deKhrushchevisation actually conveyed the Brezhnevian feeling that the Third Party Programmes needed to be revised. It was the 26th Party Congress held in March 1981 which offered an opportunity to the General Secretary of CPSU to state that the Soviet advance to communism was being accomplished through the stage of a developed socialist society and that in the changed times, the 1961—Programme needed to be redrafted.[57] He also hinted at the required revision :

> Our point of departure here should be Lenin's precept that the programme establishes only basic principles, that it is impossible and inappropriate to foretell particulars in it.[58]

Brezhnev undoubtedly stressed that neither the Soviet Union then entered the stage of communism nor there was any gurantee that it would enter this stage in the near future. The first official announcement made by him that the Party Programme was going to be redrafted and that it would be pragmatic indeed blessed the demolition of overambitious Khrushchevian thinking.

We have already stated that Khrushchev's successors realised the gap between inflated claims made by Khrushchev and the actual painful realities. We have also stated how they tried to improve the functioning of Soviet economy and polity. That the decade of 1970's observed still new experiments in the USSR, has again been described in the lines above. Ultimately a realistation dawned on the Soviet leadership that it must bid good-bye to the romantic thinking of the former Party-Chief. Surprisingly enough, the prediction made by Rudolf Schlesinger in the following words in 1965 proved right :

> If the authors of the Party Programme are right in their assertion that the carrying out of the reforms envlsaged for the twenty year period will result in a social need for the further steps traditionally

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> associated with 'the higher stage of a communist society', their successors will meet no particular difficulty in drafting, about 1980, another programme headed 'the completion of the building of communism.' If, however, their assumption should prove incorrect, the present programme may be followed by others envisaging still shorter hours, more free services, even better education for all, etc., without advocating a social structure different from that by then in operation.[59]

It is obvious that the latter half of this prediction proved right. The Soviet leadership came forward in the 27th Party Congress to present a new edition of the 1961—Programme, of course, in a subdued and modest voice.

If the Third Party Programme in 1961 further added to the lofty and millenial objectives of Party documents published in previous years, the latest edition of the same Programme published in 1986 gave an expression to the downward march from overambitious goals to the down to-earth aims reflected in documents of immediately preceding years. Thus the 17th Party Congress of February 1934 declared that "the foundations of socialist economy have been built" ; the 18th Congress of March 1939 informed the world that "Socialism, the first stage of communism has been achieved in essentials", the 21st Congress of February 1959 boasted that "the country has entered the period of an extensive development of the communist society ; and the Third Party Programme which was approved in the 22nd Congress of October, 1961 conveyed to the world that the building of a communist society "has become an immediate practical task for the Soviet people."[60]

The Third Party programme actually gave even the approximate date for the completion of communism. It was therefore indispensable for the Soviet leaders to offer a specific content of the imprecise frame-work sketched previously of the shape of communist society. When however, the achievement of full communism became the main item on the immediate agenda, the Party leaders faced problems. Leopold Labez reached the following generalisation :

> There is an obvious incongruity between the renewed insistence on the ideological goals and the prosaic and 'down-to-earth' character of the aspirations of the new Soviet man, aspirations which have something in common with similar appetites in other industrialised and more middle-class societies.[61]

This type of incongruity caused the emergence and spread of consumerism in the Soviet Union. Leaders like Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko then opted for a typical solution. They decided to put "down-to-earth"

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aims before Soviet masses. They, in other words, abandoned calling the achievement of communism as a short term objective. They also began to add certain qualifications to the assertions made in previous documents. Thus the report submitted to the 21st Party Congress of 1959 asserted that the Soviet Union had witnessed a 'full' and 'final' victory of socialism. The Party Programme of 1961 repeated this assertion and the book. "A short course of Political economy", written by L. Leontyev in 1968 continued to stress the same type of claim. This claim has however received a new interpretation in the recent times. As an evidence, we can refer to the following extract :

> The concepts such as "full" and "final" victory of socialism chiefly denote the state of society from the viewpoint of the internal and international balance of the class forces, the possibility or impossibility of restoring capitalism in one country or another. They do not characterise, per se, the positive socio-economic and political essence of the new system in its making.[62]

The new approach thus argues that "Socialism, as such, is a longer stage in the development of the new society in course of its ultimate transformation into communist society."[63] It seems that this approach has shaped the latest edition of the CPSU Programme. Therefore, if the original draft of the Programme declared that the building of a communist society had become an immediate practical task for the Soviet people, the redrafted Programme calls the building of communism in the USSR as "the ultimate goal of the CPSU."[64]

A reference has already been made in this paper to the Brezhnevian attack on consumerism, and to the Brezhnevian viewpoint as well that probably as an antidote to the rising consumerism, the Party Programme needed to be revised in such a way that it avoided the foretelling of particulars of communism. Yuri Andropov, the next General Secretary criticised the practices of relying on 'concocted' definitions and fruitless disputes over words : What is socialism ? What is communism ?[65] He remarked that the society must be studied in real dynamics, with all its potentialities and needs. And in his opinion, the concept of developed socialism was reflective of real dynamics, as it shows "convincingly the dialectical unity of the real successes in building socialism...and accomplishing tasks of still unresolved problems left over from yesterday."[66] He further claimed that this concept conveys that "it will take some time to bring up the lagging rear and go ahead."[67] Later it was the turn of Konstantin Chernenko, the post Andropov Party-Captain to be still more specific in this regard. He expressed the opinion that the proposed edition of the 1961—programme "must give stress on the aims which are attainable for the living generations."[68] He stated in this context that "We must avoid all idealising or running ahead of the course of events."[69] Mikhail Gorbachev, the present

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Party-Captain thought it necessary to underscore the significance of realistic thinking. He found it necessary in his speech at the 27th CPSU Congress to invoke Lenin's writings for reminding the audience that "the Party Programme should not promise more than can be attained."[70] The following lines from the recent Gorbachevian report are self-explanatory:

> As for the chronological limits in which the targets of the Programme are to be attained, they do not seem to be needed. *The faults of the past are a lesson for us.* The only thing we can say definitely today is that the fulfilment of the present Programme goes beyond the end of the present century.[71] (stress added.)

Gorbachev was explicit in referring to the practice of relying on simplistic ideas as one of the faults of the past times. He therefore argued that the proposed draft of the Party Programme would be fulfulled in the next century. He indeed endorsed the prevalent line of thinking in the USSR. This thinking was evidenced in the following manner in one of the issue of *Soviet Panorama* :

> The re-edited Programme is a workable draft. It is a document for today, for tomorrow, and for a longer period. Well, our descendants in the 21st Century will make changes to it if necessary, in accordance with their requirements and possibilities.[72]

REALISTC STEPS TOWARDS FUTURE

The very fact that the Soviet leaders have opted for adopting a new edition of the present Programme and not for having the Fourth Programme as such reveals the current insistence on realism. Incidentally it was again Brezhnev who put forth the proposal of introducing amendments and additions into the present Programme.[73]

There is a reasoning, of course, behind this viewpoint. According to Gorbachev, "the adoption of a new party Programme, initially the Second and then the Third was necessitated by the fact that the goals set in preceding programme had been reached. In our case the situation is different."[74]

It is easy to substantiate the Gorbachevian argument. Thus the First Party Programme was fulfilled by the successful October Revolution and accordingly it was in 1919 that the Party adopted the Second Programme; which aimed at building a socialist society in the revolutionary land. The Third Programme which was approved in the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 aimed at building the Communist society. We have already alluded to the fact that as per the present thinking in the USSR, the claim of 'full' and 'final' victory of socialism is also disputable. Naturally, the present leaders can not dare to start the buildidg of a communist society under the banner

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of the Fourth Party Programme. The new edition of the Programme clearly states that "the CPSU does not set itself the aim of foreseeing in detail the features of full communism."[75] It argues moreover that "any attempts to go ahead too fast and to introduce communist principles without due account taken of the level of material and spiritual maturity of society are doomed to failure and may cause losses of both economic and political character."[76]

New edition of the CPSU Programme is really full of evidences to support the viewpoint that the Soviet Union has observed for the period of more than two decades since the adoption of the Third Party Programme a kind of dilution of utopia. If, for instance, the second part of the Third Party Programme was entitled as "the Tasks of the CPSU in building a communist society;" the same part of the new edition of Programme is led by the following heading : "CPSU's tasks in upgrading socialism and making a gradual transition to communism." If the original Party Programme claimed that within two decades after 1961, "the USSR, will possess productive forces of unparalleled might", the redrafted Programme merely expresses a modest wish in this regard : "The country's production potential should double and be radically and qualitatively renewed already by the year 2000."[77] The new edition totally omits the following claim made by the original Programme : "the USSR will surpass (within two decades) the technical level of the most developed countries and occupy first place in the world in per capita production."[78]

The Third Party Programme assured that by the year 1980, "the commodity-money relations will become economically outdated and will wither away."[79] It was Alexei Kosygin who refuted this statement in his speech at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971. Kosygin thus pointed out : "In our country commodity money relations have a new, socialist content. It stands to reason that we reject all the erroneous conceptions that substitute market regulation for the guiding role of state centralised planning."[80] The latest edition of the Party Programme also follows Kosygin and argues : "Commodity-mony relations must be used to fuller extent in conformity with the new content that characterises them under socialism to improve efficiency in production. . . ."[81]

As for the agriculture, the 1961 Programme expressed a hope that in future, the abundance of production in collective farms would enable farmers to wind up their respective individual plots.[82] New edition of the Programme, however, gives blessings to the coexistence of small-scale private agricultural holdings and collective as well as state farms.[83]

Original draft of the Third Programme conveyed to Soviet masses that within ten to fifteen years since 1961 the service rendered at public catering establishments would improve tremendously and in consequence of this, public catering would take precedence over home cooking. The same draft further promised that "a ramified network of childrens institutions' will

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make it possible for more and more families, and in the period from 1970 to 1980, for every family to keep children and adolescents free of charge at childrens' establishments, if they so desire."[84] New edition of the Party Programme, on the other hand, has spent a full paragraph for glorifying the role of family in the Soviet society : ". . . the Party considers it necessary to pursue a line towards strengthening the family, rendering assistance to it, in the performance of its social functions, upbringing of children . . . and so on."[85]

Whereas the 1961—Progamme gave an assurance of rent free housing for all citizens by the end of 1970s,[86] the redrafted Programme hints at the possibility of the solution of housing problem by the year 2000.[87] The assurance given by the 1961—Programme that public transport facilities (tramways, buses, trolley-buses, and subways) would become free in the course of the decade of of 1970s[88] is conspiously absent in the newly edited Party Programme. And the favour showered an egalitarianism through the following statement of the Third Party Programme is also eclipsed in the new draft of the Progrmme "work on government staffs (will) eventually cease to constitute a profession."[89] The new edition of Party Programme actually avers : "the CPSU will facilitate further increases in the activity of the unions of *professionals* scientific, science and technology, cultural education . . . and other voluntary societies, bodies of the people's social self-activity."[90] (emphasis added.)

The 1961 — Programme was confident regarding the emergence of social homogeneity as well. It asserted that with the victory of communism, class-differences, socio-economic and cultural distinction and differences in living conditions between town and country side would disappear.[91] Later year, however, observed that Soviet leaders and thinkers were not sure of the emergence of homogeneous society just with the victory of communism. It should be remembered, "that classles society and structurally homogeneous society are not at all synonymous." The same thinking gave the following piece of advice :

> One should carefully consider, the outstanding social distinction involving the character of work and pay for it, and the conditions and living standards of various population groups. Far from disappearing in the next few years, these distinctions will remain for a relatively long time as a necessary condition of social progress at the stage when material incentives are still of great significance."[92]

The revised draft of the Third Party Programme gives credence to the views expressed in such quotations. As per the redrafted Programme, Soviet society aims at the establishment of an eventually classless structure of society. The same draft informs us that this aim is compatible with that of achieving *gradual disappearance* of substantial differences in the socio-

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economic, cultural and living standards between town and countryside.[93] The latest edition of the Party Programme thus feels that socio-economic and cultural differences will be wiped out in a gradual manner. The disappearance of these differences will not, indeed be an immediate aftermath of the classless society.

The common masses should better keep in mind that the present stage of developed socialism will remain in existence for a sufficiently long time. And there are bound to occur certain contradictions and difficulties in this stage. The book, *Developed Socialism : Theory and Practices*, oft-quoted in the lines above is replete witth suggestive remarks.

1) "Socialism is not a ready-made system, by which mankind will be made happy overnight. The realisation of this truth is that which distinguishes the champions of scientific socialism from the present-day advocates of utopian socialism. To expect in our day that the new society would emerge in a perfect, ultimate form with ready-made prerequisities, absolutely corresponding to the historic task, is nothing but political naivety."[94]

2) "Under victorious socialism too, the favourable changes in the objective material conditions of life do not automatically involve similar, corresponding changes in the people's consciousness, their social and moral development."[95]

3) "Socialist democracy does not and cannot spring forth full-grown like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. It goes through many stages of development and improvement, gradually maturing as the tasks of socialist and communist construction are solved and the grim legacy of the old system based on exploitation is gradually overcome in social relations and in prople's consciousness."[96]

4) "In society no phenomena exist in their pure form. If socialism were being raised on one of the islands of the wondrous continent of utopia everything might be built strictly according to the prescriptions of a preconceived pattern. But it is growing out of the old society and in a far from idyllic situation."[97]

All such quotations and extracts are indicative of the trend prevalent at present in the USSR. Khrushchev's successors have undoubtedly brought into focus the basis or 'nucleus' dynamics of the internal Soviet development. Their innovation thus went quite beyond the Khrushchevian practice of drawing simplistic and romantic pictures of the Soviet Society. The recently redrafted Party Programme has fully expressed the official awareness of concrete problems faced presently by the Soviet society. As somebody has stated: a theory may be grey, but green is the practice. This practice has led Khrushchev's heirs to call Khrushchevian theories as too simplistic and unattainable.

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NON-ALIGNMENT : ITS CONTINUED RELEVANCE

By RAMA RAO*

The concept of non-alignment, as it is understood by the vast majority of people who wish to live in peace with their neighbours and the world at large, originated in India in the pre-Independence era. Indian national leaders had visualised that the Second World War would end Western colonialism in Asia and Africa and that India would regain its independence after two centuries of alien domination and exploitation. They had rightly judged that the Second World War, despite its ideological overtones of democracies versus dictatorships, was essentially a war initiated by one group of powers to regain, and of the other to retain their colonies. Whatever the precise shape of the post-War world, Indian national leaders were clear in their minds that their most important tasks on regaining independence would be to improve the economic condition of the mass of our people, secure social justice, and provide for minimum public health and educational needs. That after four decades of prodigious effort and expense, we seem to be standing still like the proverbial toiler trying to ascend a treadmill, is a different issue. The fact remains that Indian leaders, aware of the paramount and urgent need for improving the lot of the common man, wanted to be left alone to attend to their problems. They wanted no part in Great Power rivalries. They also saw the need, in the larger interests of all and especially of the poor and newly liberated countries, for the latter to recognise the virtues of non-alignment as well as its practical utility in a world torn by strife. The argument that the larger the body of non-aligned countries, the larger the area of peace and to that extent, the less the arena of conflict is irrefutable. Basically the concept of non-alignment is sound. It was very relevant when the idea first took shape in India and remains equally relevant and valid today.

I

ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONCEPT BY THIRD WORLD LEADERS

THE idea of non-alignment was implicit in the discussions at the Bandung Conference in 1955 that coincided with a phase of vigorous interference in the affairs of poor and Third World countries by the world's strongest power. The process of 'containment' of the Soviet Union, its war time ally, by the United States had started earlier ; in fact soon after the end of the Second War. When the Soviet Union succeeded in developing its own bomb—the recognised symbol of international power—

*Col. Rama Rao (Retd.) is at the Birla Institute of Scientific Research, New Delhi.

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efforts on the part of USA to contain the Soviets also grew. Alliances which were built up in Europe were extended to the Middle East and to South East Asia. In East Asia, the earlier hostility towards Japan abated and Japan was drafted, though in a passive way, into the alliance system designed to encircle the Soviet Union.

Third World countries that were outside or had managed to stay outside the two dominant alliance systems realised the dangers inherent in the growing antagonisms between the two alliance systems, i.e. the two power blocs. Their own survival, according to leaders of Third World countries, depended on reducing the chances of Great Power rivalries escalating into war, since once war starts, neutrality of states would not be respected by belligerents unless it suited the latter.

Accordingly, the First Conference of the Heads of Third World countries was held at Belgrade in September 1961. The Conference Proclaimed non-alignment as a practical and workable strategy for the peace loving Third World countries. The preliminary meeting of Heads of State of leading non-aligned States held at Cairo earlier (in June 1961) appropriately defined a non-aligned country as one that

a) has adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of States with different political and social systems and non-alignment;
b) has consistently supported and supports movements for national independence;
c) is not a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
d) if a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; and
e) if it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.

The definition of non-aligned states, as outlined by leaders of the Movement in June 1961, though not foolproof, served to bring together many Third World countries, those that had emerged as free countries at the end of the World War II as well as others in Africa, Asia and Latin America who in one way or other were being exploited by the developed world. The first conference, to its credit, not only reaffirmed the principles of non-alignment but also expressed their determination to support the people of countries still under colonial rule in their just struggle for independence. Support for the people of Algeria and Angola in their struggle and the recognition of the right of Palestinians for a homeland of their own were unanimously approved. So was the support to countries, such as Cuba that wanted the evacuation of foreign bases from their soil.

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The leaders of non-aligned countries expressed their determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies.

The leaders very correctly reasoned that should war between the Super Powers break out, it could escalate into a nuclear conflict in which event the non-aligned and neutral States would suffer as much as, if not more, than the combatants. In October 1964, the Second Conference of Heads of State of Non-aligned Countries was held at Cairo; it was noteworthy in that the Organisation of African Unity and the League of Arab States were associated as observers. Although the Vietnam War was soon to enter a particularly destructive phase, non-aligned leaders felt that super power rivalry had somewhat subsided after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Conference reiterated its support to movements for national liberation of people still under colonial rule—particularly Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia). Support for Palestinian people was likewise reaffirmed.

Successive conference of non-aligned leaders since then have reaffirmed these principles, with the assembled delegations at each conference predictably also discussing other current problems of concern such as racial oppression in South Africa and Super Power pressures on some Third World countries. The Lusaka Conference September 1970, stressed this as well as the need for bringing to an end South Africa's occupation of Namibia. It also expressed concern at the rebellion in Zimbabwe. Subsequent conferences, quite appropriately, devoted more and more attention to economic issues affecting the Third World, such as the need to raise their share of international trade, reasonable preferences in the matter of exports of manufactures and legitimate assistance from international financial institutions. However political and security issues continue to engage the attention of non-aligned nations, simply because they continued to be under pressure in one way or another from the dominant power. Some issues particularly concerned one or a few countries. at least on the surface, while others were of general concern to the Third World as a whole. Among the latter was the issue of Third World countries providing military bases on their soil to one or other Great Power, and more generally Great Powers positioning their rapid deployment or other intervention forces in areas considered to be strategically useful to the Great Powers(s) concerned. Although such deployment would seem to be directed against a rival Great Power, the real purpose underlying the positioning of rapid deployment and other intervention forces is, to intimidate Third World countries of the region. The build up of Diego Garcia and other bases on the periphery of the Indian Ocean littoral were advertised as moves in response to the cruising of the Soviet Fleet units in

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the Indian Ocean and of their inferred attempts to secure bases on the East African and Arabian coasts. Later, the positioning of US nuclear missile submarines in the region, it was suggested, was part of the United States, deterrent strategy. The oil crisis of 1973 however showed that US military deployment in the region was against countries of the region. In that particular case, American statesmen had threatened Arab oil producers of possible occupation of oil fields by forces.

The Non-aligned Movement's consistent stand, as expressed in their Resolutions from time to time and at every session of the UN General Assembly, that the Indian Ocean be declared a 'zone of peace' from which Great Powers should vacate their bases thus stood vindicated.

Likewise, during the course of the Indian crisis of 1979-80, following the seizure of the American Embassy by Iranian students, the United States staged an abortive commando operation to free American nationals and later reportedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons too.

VULNERABILITY OF THE THIRD WORLD

The Third World has serious economic as well as security concerns and are vulnerable on both counts. The Non-aligned Movement was born because people who had freed themselves from colonial bondage, as well as others who had just managed to stay independent for a variety of reasons, but remained poor and undeveloped, became aware that they could safeguard their freedom only by staying together as a group imbued with the same ideals. An equally important need was economic development. Here again, close cooperation among the non-aligned would help, it was realised. Economic development in its turn would reduce the vulnerability of non-aligned countries both economically and strategically. Shortly after India became free, Mahatma Gandhi had pointed out that although the country had gained political 'swaraj' it had yet to attain economic swaraj.

This in fact applies to all Third World countries in that they are economically weak and unless their economies improve their vulnerability would remain. Third World countries, by and large, are very vulnerable because of population pressures and a weak or non existent economic infrastructure, a legacy of centuries of colonial domination. Most of these countries depend on the export of one or at the most a few primary products derived from agriculture or mining. Because of increasing pressures on land and inherent uncertainties associated with agricultural operations in developing countries, export earnings from agricultural products tend to shrink. In any case, the United States, the leading grains exporter can operate market mechanisms to the disadvantage of the Third World. This is even more so in the case of mineral ore exports, such as tin, copper and bauxite, for which the customers are the industrialised countries. This and currency adjustments (not to say manipulations), fixing import and export

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quotas in respect of goods/products selectively for different countries are considered standard international economic tactics. But the rules of the game are framed by the dominant powers of the "free world." As Third World countries have realised to their cost, these rules are designed to suit the dominant powers, although it must be admitted that the most dominant one is not averse to compelling its allies to upvalue their currencies (as in the case of West Germany and Japan) or imposing such trade restrictions as further its own interests.

These activities may be considered to be normal market strategies/tacties of dominant economic powers, without any political overtones. In the Great Power-Third World country economic and trade relationships, as they have developed in the post Second War period, however, economic and political strategies of the dominant super power are intertwined.

Immediately after the Second World War, the United States was the only power that could produce and effectively use the nuclear weapon. The Bernard Baruch Plan was put out to freeze this situation, so that US could effectively influence the course of events in Europe and elsewhere. This confidence was not misplaced since USA's allies as well as its erstwhile adversaries were crippled economically and their first task was to rebuild their countries and restore the confidence of their people. Britain, France and the Netherlands had lost or were about to lose their colonies and had to rebuild their homelands. Germany and Japan had been devastated. Additionally, Germany had been partitioned.

The Soviet Union had suffered grievous losses; over 30 million people had perished and the better developed parts of Soviet land had been devastated. US leaders then feared that the general state of affairs in West Europe were such that Communism could exercise a strong appeal to the war weary peoples and that the Soviet Union would exploit the situation to its advantage. The Soviets, for their part, feared that the West supported the Soviets during the war purely to overcome Hitler and that once Nazism was defeated, USA and the West would revert to their traditional anti-Soviet attitudes.

Inevitably the cold war was born and has continued ever since except for brief periods of lull. It was resumed by the late Seventies. US objectives in resuming the cold war and sustaining it at high intensity are—firstly to keep its West European flock together. West Germany understandably is apprehensive that the continued positioning of nuclear weapons on its soil, and the revival of doctrines such as a 'nuclear war can be waged and won' that it can be 'controlled' and that the unstated enemy (the Soviet Union) can be coerced into suing for peace by the threat of further escalation and annihilation of Soviet industry and population centres, could trigger a war by accident or miscalculation. Secondly, USA now enjoys a significant margin of superiority in frontier areas of technology such as computer technology, space weapons fabrication and deploy-

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ment, construction of hypersonic aircraft, laser and particle beam technology, production and use of ablatory and radar suppression material for coating satellites and hypersonic aircraft, and in miniaturising nuclear weapons. US defence establishments and indeed most US policy makers argue that by continuing the build-up of space vehicles and weapon systems, the United States will gain a decisive lead in nuclear weaponry and therefore in coercive capability, and the Soviets would be left far behind and so be incapable of influencing global events.

This overwhelming superiority over the Soviets that US forces have already achieved is to be further reinforced by augmenting the latter's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. The official argument is that the Soviet Union already has a large nuclear arsenal and USA has perforce to modernise and strengthen its own forces. In the United States' grand strategy, the new generation of chemical and biological weapons provide it with yet another option; US can threaten the use of these weapons against Soviet forces located on the Soviet-East European borders. The victims would be Soviet, East European and West German peoples and troops. The USA's home territories and even its troops would be relatively immune. West Germany, reluctantly though, has been having nuclear weapons on its soil and now chemical weapons as well. These could attract Soviet attention.

Third, should the Soviet leaders attempt to 'catch up' with the leading Super Power, the process of keeping up would be so expensive that it would subject Soviet economy to severe strains, and hopefully according to Western analysts, generate social unrest and weaken the Soviet Union.

Fourth, this process of further building up nuclear, space and chemical arsenals and the underlying threats of possible nuclear and chemical war would serve to retain USA's wavering allies in its fold.

Super Power Rivalries and the Third World

Discerning observers of the Third World—the non-aligned ones in particular—are seriously concerned about several developments over the past decade and more. The Super Powers' nuclear arms build-up is the outward manifestation of something very sinister. The basic unsettling factor in the post-Second War era has been the "struggle for the world product" as one US academic described it while discussing UNCTAD proceedings. The former colonial powers acquired and retained colonies in order to exploit the natural resources of the colonies. The super neo-colonial power of today is the most avid consumer and stock-piler of certain critical materials. It wants to control the countries—particularly Third World contries—that own such resources. When a government that wanted to follow an independent foreign policy came into power in the copper rich Chile, that country was destablised by covert means and a

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more amenable government brought in. Earlier, Guatemala had suffered the same fate when its government wanted to impose restrictions on US multinationals that virtually controlled almost every activity in that country. While the smaller Third World countries that own raw materials face the threat of coercion, destabilisation, invasion and occupation, the larger non-aligned countries face the threat of destabilisation and military threats from surrogates.

If the Soviet Union remains a distant second in the nuclear and space race, its power to restrain US in the latter's dealings with the Third World would be severely restricted and the United States be free to coerce the non-aligned directly or through its surrogates.

The non-aligned countries are weak individually but non-alignment can be viable if these countries attain self-reliance economically, technologically and militarily. They have far to go. However, should they act with wisdom, they could intensify cooperation amongst themselves to increase mutual trade, technology transfers, learn to cooperate at the political level, and so attain collective self reliance. Diverse as they are, they have to realise that they can exist as independent entities only by unreserved mutual cooperation. The most serious threat to the non-aligned is from some amongst their own ranks who accept the role of surrogates of the dominant power and pose security threats to neighbours. The rulers of a surrogate country may secure personal advantages but the people are unlikely to benefit, Popular movements in Third World countries in favour of non-alignment already exist. These need to be strengthened. That the Non-aligned Movement, which at first was derided as being 'immoral' but later earned respect and was considered a factor in moderating tensions in the world and thus promoting peace, has also to be remembered.

The Third World is vitally interested in preserving peace and in fostering mutual cooperation amongst themselves and the rest of the world. The first step is to intensify mutual cooperation, strengthen themselves and thereby strengthen the forces of peace. Their role is thus not only to save the poor from exploitation and threats of war but also to save the Great Powers from mutual destruction.

II

NON-ALIGNMENT UNDER STRAIN

Towards the end of the Vietnam War itself, President Nixon had recognised that it was pointless for US forces to continue their operations in Vietnam ; that in fact it was the wrong war at the wrong place and at the wrong time. The best course for USA to follow would be, he had argued, to cut its losses and extricate itself from the quagmire into which it had landed. The President had also understood China's strategic message con-

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veyed in 1969, by its unprovoked attack on Soviet troops in the Ussuri sector, namely that China was prepared to break its relationship with the Soviet Union for good. USA studied this signal and warily set about opening communications with the People's Republic, through the good offices of President Yahya Khan of Pakistan.

This phase in which the United Stater was recovering from the Vietnam shock was the period of *detente*, when non-alignment on the part of some Third World countries was tolerated. However, following the oil shock of 1973, USA in order not to lose its hold on oil rich West Asian countries created its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in a move to be able to coerce countries owning natural resources by force, or the threat of the use of force, as necessary.

This necessitated the building up of its forces, nuclear as well as conventional. The process revived the Super Powers' arms race besides creating tensions in sensitive areas in the developing world. The Salt II Agreement patiently negotiated and signed by representatives of the Super Powers was not ratified by the United States, which was the clearest indication to the world that US did not relish the idea of near strategic parity with Soviet Union and would build its weaponry so as to regain overwhelming superiority. Slowly at first, but steadily, US started rearmament stimulating a like build up of its weaponry by the Soviet Union. USA's principal allies, the West European countries, remained close to the United States because of the oill crisis, although by reason of their concern for retaining their markets in East Europe, their denunciation of the Soviet Union was somewhat muted.

To the Third World, however, there seemed no end to their economic and security concerns. The economies of the non-oil owning Third World had suffered on several counts. First, the soaring oil prices put their economies to severe strain because of increased foreign exchange drain. Secondly, the costs of essential manufactures and machinery that they had to import from developed countries, had soared, relatively, even higher than oil prices. Third, to add to their miseries, because of adverse weather, erosion of forest cover and spread of desert conditions, the poorer countries began experiencing food shortages too. Internecine quarrels amongst them further increased their vulnerability. This in fact is the most serious obstacle to regional peace and the orderly development of poor nations. Conflicts amongst Third World countries are invariably triggered by external agencies who can then easily intervene in the affairs of the region.

From the mid-seventies, USA and its Western allies had succeeded in devising methods to reduce their dependence on Middle East oil. Although oil prices kept rising till the early eighties, oil producers' influence over the Western industrialised nations declined due to several reasons. Industrialised nations developed their own oilfields (e.g. Britain,

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Norway, Canada and USA); developed techniques for using other energy materials; endeavoured to tap perennial energy sources such as solar, wind and ocean energy and more important, devised effective measures to increase fuel efficiency so that energy wastage by industry, commercial and household sectors was brought down spectacularly. All these reduced the demand for Middle East oil which in turn affected oil prices and the cash reserves of oil exporters. For their part, most oil exporters had succumbed to the persuasive arguments of Western arms merchants to purchase expensive armaments, which in a real crisis would be of little avail to them. These deals helped the West to recover far more from oil producers than what the former might have paid for oil imports. The transactions also helped the west to recover its weapon development costs besides acquiring the power to influence the ruling elite in the region and introducing East-West conflicts.

The process of colonisation and decolonisation had resulted in some of the newly independent countries having ethnic or other groups with close affinities with similar groups in a neighbouring country or countries. Wisdom and statesmanship on the part of leaders of the former colonial countries and the Third World generally, in most cases, has succeeded in maintaining harmonious relations between different groups within their countries making it possible to devote their energies to improving the lot of their people. However, no Third World country is immune to destabilisation operations by a Great Power that utilises local dissident groups to create unrest, harass law abiding citizens, disrupt transport operations, trade and other activities and carry out sabotage operations. A method preferred by a Great Power for carrying out such operations in a Third World country that tries to pursue an independent policy, is to recruit another Third World country, a neighbour of the intended victim, as its surrogate for creating unrest and eventually to invade the chosen victim.

Since the collapse of *detente* in the late seventies, Great Power interference in Third World countries has increased considerably. In Central and South America, described as their 'backyard' by US statesman, US intervention whether overt or covert, is obvious. The purpose of intervention has always been the same, namely to support the incumbent regime usually a military dictatorship favourable to US and to ensure that popular movements against their dictator rulers are crushed, Likewise in countries where popular governments may have come to power, US responses have been to mount covert and or overt operations to bring them down and instal pliable rulers in their place. Guatemala in the fifties, and Chile in the seventies, provide examples of covert operations, while Grenada is a glaring example of unprovoked military aggression by the world's mightiest power against a tiny country lacking natural resources whose only fault was was that it tried to build an airport in order to attract tourists and earn some revenues. It is difficult to understand the

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sense of insecurity of the mightiest country which invaded a country which had no army, navy or air force and whose total population was less than one third the strength of women auxilliaries of the American Army. This action no doubt gave the world a clear idea of the working of the United States government leaders and of the popular American mood which apparently wants to be reassured of American strength after their reverses in Vietnam, Iran and Lebanon.

The other and equally ominous feature of US policy is the vastly increased use of the covert arm, the CIA. In Nicaragua, the distinction between covert and overt operations has disappeared. The aim here is to punish people of a developing country for their attempts to be independent. Nicaraguan people's struggle is really the struggle of the entire Third and Non-aligned World. Regional surrogates, out of fear of the big power, as well as out of greed and selfishness of their leaders, provide bases, manpower and facilities for the big power for destabilising other Third World countries.

The Central American States are very vulnerable because of the shadow of the 'Big Brother.' They are likely to have a tough time given USA's scant regard of world opinion and of international norms respecting the sovereignty and integrity of Third World countries and of the right of people to chose their own form of government. USA has now gone further and defied the International Court of Jusiice as well. This is a development of utmost seriousness since other expansionist countries too, with or without USA's tacit approval, may threaten their smaller neighbours in disregard of international norms.

Taking a cue from USA's intervention operations some regional powers are also playing the Great Power game; South Africa in Namibia and in Southern Africa generally, China in some of the countries across its borders, and Pakistan in South and South West Asia are cases in point, as is Israel in West Asia.

Namibian peoples' struggle for freedom has rightly been receiving the unqualified support from the non-aligned of all continents. The motives of the oppressor power—racialist South Africa—are strategic as well as economic. Strategically, the longer South Africa holds on to Namibia, the greater the chance of destabilising neighbouring Angola which has a socialist government. South African armed incursions into Angola have been increasing in frequency as well as in intensity. These raids make it easier for the dissident tribal leader, CIA sponsored Jonas Savimbi, to organise forays into Angola. And unrest in Angola provides an excuse for South Africa io position its forces close to the Angolan borders. It is well to remember that when Angola became free, the CIA had mounted a two-pronged covert operation in Angola in order to put into power in that country a pliable right-oriented government. The northern part of Angola was to be destabilised by some Africans and mercenaries led by Holden

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Roberto while in the southern sector Jonas Savimbi was to operate, as he is still doing. Although Angolans have rejected these self-styled leaders sponsored by the CIA, the latter is stepping up operations in Angola through Jonas Savimbi. From South Africa's point of view, the longer CIA is interested in and finances operations inside Angola, the easier it would be for it to suppress the Namibian freedom movement.

Apart from the much-advertised ideological argument of resisting the spread of Communism USA and its principal Western ally Britain, have important economic objectives in desiring to keep Namibia under South African control and as a corollary in fomenting unrest in Angola (and other front-line African states). Namibia is an portant source of uranium for Brisain and USA. Its Rossing Mines are controlled by a British multinational, *Rio Tinto Zinc* providing Britain with all the uranium it needs. Namibia is also well endowed with vanadium and iron ore besides diamonds. South Africa's endeavour for sometime has been to the exploit to maximum the diamond fields and other valuable natural resources of Namibia, so that before it is compelled to vacate Namibia, it would be denuded of its riches.

Industrialised countries' exploitation of Namibia is in the traditions of Western colonial rule. Since the oil crisis of 1973, developed countries under USA's leadership, have been closely cooperating with each other to solve common problems pertaining to international trade and especially to step up exports of their manufactures to developing countries. (UDCs) A trilateral commission's report ("Triangle Papers 21 : Trade in Manufactured Products with Developing Countries Reinforcing North-South Partnership, 1981") draws attention to the fact that—

> Northern exports are skill and technology-intensive in contrast to the labour-intensive consumer goods imported from developing countries. Comparative advantages and relatively large gains from trade (for the North) are evident from this product composition of trade.

Further,

> Developing countries, despite their recent impressive growth in export of manufactures, remain much larger buyers than sellers. In 1979, imports of manufactures from the industrialised countries by all developing countries, including OPEC countries, exceeded the export of manufactures to indurtrialised couhtries by a factor of 3.5. Although that ratio will probably fall in the future, developing countries are a much more rapidly growing market for the industrialised countries than the OECD bloc itself.

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Developing countries cannot afford to be complacent about this imbalance in North-South trade. The consequences of this imbalance are, firstly UDC's have to contract external loans to pay for imports. Secondly, because many UDC's sell the same type of products, they compete with each other (the buyers encouraging such competition), and eventually secure lower returns on their exports. Thirdly, as indebtedness of the UDC's rises, pressures from international financial organisations to devalue their currencies also increase. Directly or indirectly UDC's currencies are devalued and their exports secure lower and lower returns in real terms.

The only way out for the Third and Non-aligned World is to cooperate earnestly with each other so as to raise South-South trade, technology transfers and mutual credit arrangements. As at present, the UDC's are supporting the technological and economic advancement of the developed and rich, at the expense of their own people. This is a serious challenge to the leadership in all countries of the Third and Non-aligned World.

Just as rival principalities were exploited by the Western colonial power in India so that it could gradually extend its control over the entire subcontinent, the non-aligned countries now run the risk of being reduced to the status of vassals by a Great Power using surrogates among the non-aligned.

External agencies utilise the real or imaginary grievances of one Third World country against another to maintain discord amongst them. A useful and indeed essential first step is for Third World countries to firmly resolve to settle mutual differences by peaceful methods. The continuing Iran-Iraq War is an unfortunate development which had harmed not only the two contestants but also Islamic countries and the Third World as a whole. In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity, symbolises African solidarity. This would become really effective, if developing countries in Africa manage to disengage themselves from the embrace of a Great Power. African countries wisely decided that although their frontiers may have been irrationally fixed by departing colonial powers, it is best to leave them as they are. In South America, happily the countries have learnt to live at peace with their neighbours.

Serious challenges to the Non-aligned Movement have come from West and South Asia. In West Asia, a Great Power is well entrenched because of its formidable presence in NATO and even more because of its surrogate, Israel, Until the countries of the region cultivate thew ill to cooperate with each other, the beneficiaries will be Israel and its its patron.

In South Asia, a regional country, with the tacit as well as open support of two powers has invaded its neighbour four times during the past four decades. As is well known this victim is India. India feels, and rightly so, as recognised by all unbiassed observers, that it can save itself and the rest of the Third World by strengthening non-alignment and fostering closer economic and technological cooperation amongst them. This has been

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India's consistent stand and India in all modesty can claim some success. Expansionist powers' dislike of India is, indirectly, a measure of India's success as an ardent advocate of non-alignment and as its coordinator during the past four years.

III

APPRAISAL

The recently concluded Non-aligned conference at Harare took due note of the United States' ominous shadow on Third World countries struggling to free themselves from the vicious grip of industrialised countries on their economies and the former's efforts to destabilise countries that endeavour to follow independent foreign policies. The three issues that engaged their attention were the military and economic threats posed by South Africa to Angola and other frontline states of Southern Africa namely Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. USA for its part, with South Africa's cooperation, is actively assisting rebel activities inside Angola through its agent Jonas Savimbi. As a discerning American scholar, Wayne S. Smith has observed :

> So long as South Africa can keep Savimbi attakcing MPLA (the ruling party in Angola), it knows it can hang on to Namibia. Therefore for America to join South Africa in support of Savimbi is a sure prescription for continuing the turmoil in Southern Africa, not for ending it.

("A trap in Angola", *Foreign Policy* (New York, N. Y.), Spring 1986, pp. 61-74).

As long as fighting continues in Angola, South Africa can hold on to Namibia. Hence the Non-aligned Movement's insistence that Namibia be freed. But mere words may not go far, as the oppressed and long suffering majority in South Africa have realised.

United, frontline states can do much in support of Namibia and Angola besides reducing their own vulnerability.

Similar unity has yet to be forged among the States of Central America so that all of them may maintain their freedom.

South-South solidarity on economic and technological issues will contribute far more to their bargaining power *vis-a-vis* the dominant power than the Third World realises. The non-aligned must now evolve practicable measures for improving mutual trade, accelerating the pace and scope of joint ventures and technology exchanges. While political resolutions and solidarity can and do help in forging unity, the hard and silent paddling under the surface that economic and technological cooperation

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connotes is what can take the Third World more quickly to its cherished goal.

South-South cooperation ought to be the guiding principle in technology transfers as well as joint marketing of primary commodities and minerals produced by the non-aligned and Third World generally. In respect of technology transfers, perhaps bilateral joint ventures among the non-aligned could be planned and executed quickly and at less cost than otherwise. Further cooperation in one area will lead to cooperation in other areas such as cooperative marketing of primary products and amongst more members of the Non-aligned Movement. This is the path of collective self-reliance which leaders of the non-aligned countries at Harare advocated.

The Third World produces as few exportable agricultural products such as jute, cocoa, coffee, tea and spices. Although producer countries are able to realise better prices for the commodities now than in the past, their production costs too have gone up. Bulk marketing of these products, as at the London tea auctions, however is in the hands of industrialised countries which are able to process the products, package and market them, making in the process enormous profits. As a West African nationalist had observed, "We sell a bushel of cocoa crop for a dollar and later import a small bar of chocolate toffee for the same dollar."

The Third World also owns valuable mineral riches, which are non-renewable resources and hence have to be husbanded carefully. Ores have to be sold but rather than sell ores at nominal prices, as India does with iron, bauxite and manganese ores, if these are refined and metal and metal products sold instead, value added benefits would accrue besides taking the country forward on the path towards self-reliant industrial development.

As in the case of agricultural products, the international marketing of mineral ores is controlled by industrialised powers. Prices for important metals such as copper, tin, nickel and chromium are fixed by international cartels and individual producers, such as Chile or Zambia in the case of copper, and Bolivia, Indonesia and Malaysia in the case of tin, may not have much to say in the matter. However, if Third World producers of these commodities could come together and evolve cooperative marketing strategies they stand a better chance of realising fair prices for their products. Leaders of the Non-aligned Movement can ill afford to neglect this vital area. It holds the key to the future well being of the Third World.

On these issues as well as those of support for people struggling for national independence and the need to ban nuclear war, the non-aligned countries have stood together. This is satisfactory indeed but there are several other problems too that the non-aligned either as a group or as individual countries have to face. As a matter of practical wisdom non-

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aligned conferences do not discuss issues which are purely bilateral, i.e. affect only two countries. Should bilateral issues be thrown open for discussion at these gatherings, other more serious issues affecting the poor, underdeveloped and oppressed countries and people are likely to be bypassed and the gainers would be the neo-colonial and industrial powers. Yet the non-aligned have a duty to themselves in this regard. Some non-aligned have fought with neighbours. The Iran-Iraq War is in its seventh year and there is no sign of a ceasefire. It will probably stop only when the United States decides that both countries are sufficiently impoverished so that they can be easily managed by remote control. If the non-aligned countries individually support one or other warring country regardless of which country resorted to force to attain its own ends or to satisfy the ego of an individual ruler and the non-aligned collectively choose to avoid facing the unhappy fact, the Movement's standing and utility cannot but erode over time.

The non-aligned countries as a group have to exert themselves to persuade Third World countries, firstly to keep away from alliances with Great Powers and secondly to desist from using or threatening the use of force against other Third World countries but to resolve differences through mutual discussion and other peaceful processes.

Small countries, most of them newly independent, and unable to defend themselves against Great Powers. During the past few years several small countries have been destabilised by covert action and some by invasion. The security of small countries thus ought to be a matter of earnest concern to the entire Third World. Given the impracticability of the Third World militarily opposing the use of force by the most powerful country in the world, the non-aligned can persuade the big power to exercise restraint only if they stand together and strengthen their bargaining power by acquiring collective self reliance.

The non-aligned have condemned terrorism and rightly so but is not state terrorism, i.e. unprovoked military aggression and threats of further aggression against a small country, merely because the invading power suspects that the small country may be encouraging terrorism, the most serious challenge to peace-loving countries ? The non-aligned have to learn to deal with state terrorism in order to survive as free countries.

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GORBACHEV VISIT : A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By S.C. PARASHER*

The greatest victory is one in which nobody is defeated and all can share in the victory.
Lord Buddha

International relations are still governed by the Law of the Jungle underneath a thin veneer of simulated civilization. Leviathans of Hobbes even today show their nature in tooth and claw despite the United Nations which remains as a consequence more divided than united. It is a paradox that the Security Council has created more insecurity than security in the world. Its deliberations resemble those of Godfathers who sit round the table to haggle for their territories and trade human beings for their profit and not that of statesmen helping to create a world of peace and order. Peace is the price that the weak have paid to the strong for their survival. Pax Britannica prevailed when Britain ruled the waves. Pax Americana replaced it when the United States of America established its supermacy in nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. USSR poses some threat to these neat little arrangements for world order and the modern way of international life which boils down to who controls whom. East and West now face each other like 'gladiators spoiling for a fight' under the banner of noble ideals like human rights, liberty, equality and freedom of choice. But shorn of verbiage it is a sordid struggle for world domination and the age-old exploitation of the small by the big. Is it really a fight to bestow the blessings of these noble principles to the common humanity or a struggle between capitalism and communism ?

If it were really so then communist China, villain of the piece till yesterday would not be paraded as ally of the free nations as they call themselves today ? It seems that effective national interest like effective demand is based on the power-pull of haves in international society.

The ideals thus become weapons in the warfare for supremacy in the world. Neighbours as a consequence seldom display good neighbourliness. They remain intent on spreading themselves and more often clash with each rather than cooperate with each other. Britain and France, for example, have fought bitter wars in the past in search of imperial possessions. It is, therefore, somewhat of a relief that India and Russia have not harboured any such designs on each other in the course of their long chequered history. They have remained good neighbours during all these centuries. The European history, on the other hand, is a history

* Shri Parasher, Secretary General, Indian Council of World Affairs and Managing Editor, *India Quarterly*.

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littered with wars and conquests over the other races to squeeze them white, The 'white man's burden' has broken black man's back. The Western nations hunger for territories continued and in this pillage and plunder of ther nations they sometimes combined with each other and sometimes turned against each other. It was succinctly put by the famous British Prime Minister Palmerston that 'England has no permanent enemies nor permanent friends. It has only permanent interests.'

International relations have thus been governed by the wheelers-dealers of imperialism. Our relations with Russia have been a refreshing contrast to such power hungry political wolves on world prowl since the dawn of history.

The British imerialism, however, wanted Indians to believe that Russia was the greatest threat to their country while it gnawed at our vitals all the time. India, for it was the central garrison of its empire which extended from New Zealand to New Foundland. It guarded its sea routes from East to West and safeguarded its possessions in the east and the middle-east. Russia lay across the borders of its vital possessions and, therefore, a contingent threat to its hegemony. Communist Russia after 1917 became almost a nightmare for them. But it was in fact Russia which was encircled by the imperialists before 1945 and by the western alliance after the second world war. India is central to such a strategy in this part of the world. During the days of the Empire, for example, when the ruler of Afghanistan showed a little inclination towards Russia, the British marched their army through Khyber in what are known as Afghan wars to instal their own puppet on the throne. Counter-revolution inspired by Churchill in the early twenties of this century against Soviet Russia provided a ready base in this country. Those who are familiar with imperial history and diplomacy of dominance were not surprised over the creation of Pakistan in the sub-continent which has proved its worth in the present developments in Afghanistan. The truth is that despite the worst prognostications of British imperialism, Russia has never invaded India even once. The few Russians who came over to our country in the last few centuries were all sympathetic to our cause and bemoaned imperial stranglehold on our lives and economy. Gherasim Levdev, for example, came to India in the eighteenth century and stayed here for twelve years. He returned home with great admiration for our civilization and culture. He found that the Factors of John Company treated "Indians in a more cruel manner than the most blood-thirsty ruthless beasts." He deplored "their insatiable greed for enrichment to the detriment of human race." An eminent Russian Indologist Andrei Snesarev wrote about the contemptuous and haughty attitude of the British towards the Indians. He described their government as "rapacious commercial administration by foreigners who consider the people they have enslaved below themselves in mental, moral and physical respects." Another visitor from that

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country said that India was subjected to the "violence of a resentful merchant and. . . the rapacity of a callous official." An eminent Russian Professor Ivan Minayev came here towards the end of the nineteenth century. He noted that the British rulers considered Indians as "a lower race and treat them with contempt." He described the key role that possession of India played in the preservation of their empire and ascribed British ascendency in Europe, the middle-east and Asia to the "British domination in India." ' The whole British policy," he said, "was shaped by fear of losing India."

II

The First War of Indian Independence termed by the English as the Great Mutiny of 1857 sent shivers down the spines of the European imperialists. The British thrown out of America found a haven in India. But their stupid arrogance and unconcern for Indian susceptibilities brought them on the verge of a collapse here as well but for our internal bickerings and dissensions. Punjab had given them a tough time before it was subdued but once subdued, the petty chieftains became really subdued and the Nabhas and Patialas sent their forces to help out the Company Bahadur from its cowardly doom.

The Russian Tsar had been beaten by the British in Crimean war a little earlier. He secretly rejoiced at the English discomfiture but was afraid of its consequences on its own oppressed people. The enlightened Russians, however, welcomed national resistance to the Company's mindless tyranny and were appalled at its merciless suppression. A noted British historian wrote that during the Mutiny the corpses of Indians were hang by the British soldiers on each branch of the trees that lined the road between Kanpur and Lucknow. A Russian painter Vereshchagin who visited India twenty years later showed in his famous painting the brutality of British rule in India. He depicted Indians tied to the muzzles of guns in a row while the white officer barked "fire". Marx in 1857 described Indian army as "the first general centre of resistance which the Indian people was ever possessed of." The British later became "extremely cautious" in recruiting Indians in the army and ensured that they were kept aloof from the mainstream. Marx and Engels called it "national revolt". Lenin later observed that "The chief danger of the sepoy uprising lay in the native army going over to the insurgents." But, he said that "The British were saved by different ethnic groups", a weakness they manipulated to the full during the whole of their raj.

England was in India to exploit it to its advantage ; civilizing role of which the imperialists boasted was a mere guise. According to Marx "The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization is laid bare before us" in India. It is disguised in respectable forms at home

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but in colonies "it goes naked". It was not a coincidence that the imperialist country became richer and the colony poorer. A noble mind like that of Burke in England was revolted at the miseries that the Factors of John Company were heaping on the Indians. "There is nothing", he said in a magnificent speech in the House of Commons, "before the eyes of the natives but an endless, hopeless prospect of new flights of birds of prey and passage, with appetites continually renewing for food that is continually wasting. They never displayed any sympathy for Indians or understanding of their culture. They exploited them and returned home with their loot." In a moving passage he bemoaned that "their prey is lodged in England ; and the cries of India are given to seas and winds to be blown about in every breaking up of the monsoon over a remote and unhearing ocean." His warning that "let us do what we please to put India from our thoughts, we can do nothing to separate it from our public interest and our national reputation" went unheeded by a people whose scions were becoming instant Nabobs from the plunder of the natives. It enriched their country as well. Marx provided an explanation for it. "The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother country and were turned into capital," he wrote. He added that "During the whole course of the eighteenth century, the treasures transported from India to England were gained much less by comparatively insignificant commerce than by the strict exploitation of the country, and by colossal fortunes extorted there and transmitted to England." It was colonial exploitation at its worst. He called it "bleeding process with a vengeance." "They destroyed" the Indian society, Marx said "by breaking up the native communities and by levelling all that was great and elevated in their native society...The historic pages of their rule in India report hardly anything beyond that destruction." Colonialism flourished for Marx "through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation."

III

Lenin is key to a better understanding of policies pursued by the Soviet Union in its relations with other countries. Lenin was a great revolutionary, a great leader, a profound thinker and one of the most outstanding statesmen of his age. His revolutionary fervour was tempered by his incisive understanding of contemporary reality and the application of Marxist theory to the logic of the emerging situation. Those of his successors who deviated from his formulated policies have had to return to them after sobering experience. It is, therefore, important to briefly examine his views on our country to understand Soviet Union's relations with us.

Lenin was interested in India because it was a great civilization; a rich country made poor by colonial exploitation and provided for him an ex-

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cellent laboratory to analyse imperialism. India, according to him, suffered from "the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers." He compared Indian national movement with their own struggle against the Tsar. Lenin accused Britain in 1913 of supporting "reaction in Asia" and called British administration in India 'dictatorial'. He truly assessed the importance of our country for British imperialism. It had in India "long ago created a base for extending colonial possessions, strangling nations and attacking Soviet Russia." "The British bourgeoisie", he said, "derives profit from the many millions of the population of India... than from the British workers."

Lenin was one of the foremost leader of the communist movement who recognized liberation movements in the colonies as a great step forward in human emancipation. He equated the Indian National Congress with the "Formation of Indian nation" and in 1917 compared its demands similar to what was "being fought for here in Russia." Even the correspondent of London *Times* wrote at that time that the "British officialdom in India was denounced as the counterpart of the Chinovniks who ruled and ruined Russia in the name of the Tsar." Lenin wrote in 1915 that "we cannot be against wars of national liberation...Would we not be for India against Britain ?"

IV

Enlightened India was also interested in developments in Russia and compared Indian conditions with those obtaining in Russia under the Tsars. Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1905 that "there is much similarity between the governance of India and that of Russia. The power of the Viceroy is in no way less than that of the Tsar." He added : "we, too, can resort to the Russian remedy against tyranny. We can also show the same strength as Russian people have done." Nehru saw in USSR "the greatest opponent of imperialism." He said in 1936 that "If the future is full of hope, it is largely because of Soviet Russia and what it has done."

Lenin's support for our freedom movement was reciprocated by the Indian National Congress which pledged "solidarity of the Indian people with the enslaved peoples of the world and the peoples of the USSR." They considered Soviet Union a friend of those who were struggling for freedom. Mahatma Gandhi said in 1942 that if Russia lost the war who would then care for "the interests of the world's poor." He had spoken as early as 1928 that "an ideal, that is sanctified by sacrifices of such master spirit as Lenin cannot go in vain." The great sage, Rabindranath Tagore hailed USSR as "the morning star ushering in the dawn of the new age." Nehru was highly impressed by "the advance of the Soviet Union in education and culture" in "two brief decades full of war and civil strife" despite "what appeared to be usursmountable difficulties."

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He praised its "amazing and prodigious efforts to create a new world out of the dregs of the old." It was an example to emulate. "If others could do it, why not we ?," he observed.

Our national leaders were sometimes misunderstood by foreign observers of the Indian scene and they called this genuine appreciation of the Soviet Union as partisan. Our national movement was firmly rooted in the Indian soil and Mahatma's philosophy of truth and non-violence and Nehru's democratic socialism were a fine blend of all that was best in the East and West. Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were as firm believers of their peaceful methods of social change as Lenin was of his revolutionery socialism. They were engaged in the transformation of their societies, and the regeneration of human spirit in their own ways. Lenin while true to his political philosophy was as conscious of other approaches to the goal of human resurgence. He showed an amazing flexibility in the application of theory to practice. He creatively applied his philosophy to the historic conditions prevailing in the world. He was, therefore, in favour of co-existence amongst states in various stages of their development. Lenin had observed as early as 1905 that in the liberation movement "the Russian revolution has a great international ally—in Asia". He foresaw as early as 1905 that "all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world" and wanted "every nation to take part in shaping the destiny of all mankind." He justified Soviet support to them for two reasons. One that as a progressive successful revolutionery government "It is our duty" and two, that "it is in our interest."

V

The British interest however, lay in preserving its empire in India. Britannia could then maintain its domination over Asia, Africa, Middle-East and expose Soviet frontiers from this side of Asia. When demand for Indian independence became irresistable, creation of Pakistan also became an imperial necessity. And true enough Pakistan now serves geo-political and geo-strategic interests of the western bloc. It is an important link in its policy of Soviet containment, In war games satellites are needed and not independent friends. Nehru's policy of non-alignment, therefore, came under heavy weather from both the Super Powers. It surfaced when Nehru in his deep faith in international institutions took Kashmir issue to the Security Council, USA taking its cue from Great Britain politicised the issue in favour of Pakistan.

Soviet Union under Stalin was equally opaque in its vision and forgetting Lenin spoke disparagingly of Indian leadership. Nehru said that "the whole basis of Russian policy appears to be that no essential change has taken place in India and that we still continue to be, the camp followers of the British." He added that "that of course is complete nonsense,"

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and "if a policy is based on nonsensical premises it is apt to go wrong." Stalin's policy like that of the US appeared to Nehru to be expansionist. Soviet Union, however, was soon to reassess its policy towards India and adopt a more enlightened approach.

Kashmir was the acid test of the sincerity of Super Powers towards India. US and UK became protectors of Pakistani interests and they threw their full weight on its side regardless of the facts of the case. Nehru was well aware of India's geo-political importance. "India has much to give, not in gold or silver or even in exportable commodities, but by virtue of its present position." "Future of Asia", he added "will be powerfully determined by the future of India." USA policy, therefore, was a Machiavellian mix of blackmail and blandishment : entice India if possible, increase Pakistan threat if that failed.

India under Nehru or his successors could have chosen easier and faster rate of growth with American dollars but then there was invisible price to it. And that price Nehru was not willing to pay. "They expected something more than gratitude and good will" observed Nehru "and that more I could not supply them." India's loss is Pakistan's double gain and its raison d'etre from the western point of view. Nehru complained of "concerted attempt to build up Pakistan and build down, if I may say so, India." Stalin and the communists fared no better. He found them "aggressive," and had "little doubt that Russia has encouraged them and can certainly stop them if it so chose", He still felt that "our relations with the United States as with the United Kingdom in political and economic matters are far closer....We have practically no such relations with the Soviet." But the United States of America did not treat the developing nations including the most populous democracy of the world as equals or cared for their views and interests. Official America had become obsuse. "It is astonishing," said Nehru "how naive the Americans are in their foreign policy." On another occasion, he observed "there is an extraordinary crudity about their utterances and activites."

The American and British stand on Kashmir irritated India. They both supported Pakistan inside and outside the Security Council. Nehru feared that it would lead to the two countries "enter a phase of trying to exterminate each other" and "I find the American and British people skating merrily on this very thin ice over the deep ocean."

A free India with independent foreign policy did not suit the global strategies of both Britain and the United States. Pakistan provide them with a sure foot-hold in this region and they understood the strategic location of the Kashmir valley. It was, therefore, natural for the military strategists and foreign policy makers of these countries to covet this territory. British imperialism created Pakistan and the western bloc's global concerns have sustained it with political support, economic sustenance and military hardware. Pakistan provides them with a stick to browbeat

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India, a springboard for action in West Asia, and a striking distance to the Soviet Union.

Anglo-American policy was, therefore, directed towards incorporation of Kashmir with Pakistan, failing which to neuteralize it. The Security Council was utilized in the early fifties to achieve the first objective and secret overtures to Sheikh Abdullah were meant to achieve the latter.

Soviet Union even under Stalin soon realized the dangers that it posed to it. It came back to Lenin's thesis on Indian freedom and spoke for the first time in 1952 in the Security Council against British and USA policies on Kashmir. India's independent stand on Korea at that time further strengthened feelings in the USSR that India should be supported in its policy of non-alignment. Nehru was, however, a little hesitant about it even when he was embittered by the US forward policy in Asia and elsewhere. He described it as "naive" laced in "strong language and powerful emotions" and based on the assumption that "all problems can be solved if there is enough talking and shouting about it."

Soviet Union suggested in 1954 a Non-aggression Treaty with India based on Panchsheel but Nehru preferred technical and scientific help "to build up India". His visit to the Soviet Union in 1955 was one of discovery for him. Its leaders heard him with respect on lessening international tensions. "It would be a good thing for the world if the West would understand you as much as we did," commented Bulganin. Nehru found in Soviet Union "a marked change" which gave him "hope for the future" and "substantial reason for hoping for peaceful approaches and settlements." Manila and Baghdad Pacts in the meanwhile looked like encircling India militarily and Pakistan made no secret of its reasons for joining these pacts. USA further irritated India by declaring that Goa was a 'Portugese province' which brought NATO protection to the Portugese in India. Khruschev and Bulganin on their return visit around that time were warmly welcomed in India. Khruschev allayed fears of Nehru that his party maintained separate contacts with the Indian communists or encouraged them in their violent methods in the country. He appealed that Indian and Soviet relations should not be "disturbed by misunderstanding". He assured Nehru that "we want to be friendly with you but not to separate you from your other friends."

1956 proved a diffieult year for us over Suez crisis with Britain and Hungarian revolt with the USSR. Nehru took a principled stand on Hungary which West considered as soft on the Soviet Union and Khruschev thought it was hostile to his country. In not so subtle a manner, he reminded Nehru of Kashmir and since Nehru refused to change his position, Soviet, Union did not support India on Kashmir in the Security Council. Soviet leaders soon realized that this pique may

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harm their long term interests in Asia and vetoed resolution on Kashmir which was brought up by the Anglo-Americans a month later.

Chinese bellicosity against India in the sixties was the touch-stone of Indo-Soviet relations. China wanted Soviet Union to take a stand against India. The Soviet Government knew that the Chinese were precipitating incidents on the Indian border not for territorial claims but to weaken India in international forums and create hurdles for the Soviet Union towards peaceful coexistence. Khruschev publicly affirmed that India and Russia were "good neighbours and great friends". He however, wavered in 1962 probably because of the aftermath of the Cuban missiles crisis and urged on Nehru to accept ceasefire. He, however, called the Chinese attack on India "madness" and said that the Soviet Union will not support any aggression against it.

Kosygin was less enthusiastic about us in the beginning and US played a diplomatic card by agreeing to make him a mediator in Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. The Americans hoped that it would distance Russia from India. Tashkent Agreement followed but USA probably did not realize that it had unwittingly agreed to the USSR role in South Asia. Pakistan, however, befriended China and provided a bridge for secret Nixon-Kissinger negotiations with that country. USSR and India were soon confronted with America-Pakistan-China Axis. It was an immense gain to American diplomacy in Asia as well as Europe, Russian borders were now exposed from China to Turkey. India and Russia as a consequence came closer because of these fresh developments.

The Generals of Pakistan were emboldened by the new axis and the powerful military aid from America and China. It made them tough at home, tyrannous in East Pakistan and menacing towards India. The bloody repression in East Pakistan made millions of Bengali Pakistanis to flee to India for their life from their home land. Their leader Mujib-ur-Rehman had won an absolute majority in Pakistan Assembly but the General's solution of Pakistan's democracy was to physically eliminate the majority. Nixon-Kissinger combine forgot human rights and unmindful of the destruction of democracy in Pakistan continued to support its military junta. Indira Gandhi raised moral, and ethical issues as well as the refugee problem for India in the international forums but the West responded by backing the wild men of Pakistan. More than ten million people had crossed over to India but our Prime Minister's pleas remained in vain. Contrast it with the two million Afghans who have been encouraged to cross over to Pakistan from Afghanistan in the last few years and the howls that it has raised in western capitals and the righteous indignation generated in America and the billions of aid and arms it has poured into Pakistan. It was USSR which came to India's aid in this hour of crisis not of her own making.

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India and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1971 which is a milestone in their interrelationship. It includes "effective appropriate measures to ensure peace and security of their countries;" "enduring peace and friendship... between the two countries and their peoples;" "respect for India's policy of non-alignment" and "further development of ties and contacts ... in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sports."

When Pakistan resistence was in near collapse in Bangladesh war, Nixon sent nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise towards the Chittagong port ostensibly to save 18 American lives in East Bengal. The American enterprise petered out when it transpired that the Russian naval ships were not far behind.

Brezhnev spoke warmly of India in 25th CSSU Congress. Soviet Union gave its full support to India's stand that Indian Ocean should be made a Zone of Peace. Janata government after 1977 talked of genuine non-alignment but made few changes in the Nehru-Indira foreign policy towards Russia which it termed as "an important factor for peace and stability in Asia and elsewhere."

Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980 strengthened Indo-Soviet co-operation in pursuit of peace. She thought it paradoxical that while West talked of peace, it made weapons of destruction more sophisticated and far more deadly. For West peace seems to grow out of the barrel of a gun and rearmament is recommended as the best way to disarmament. Nuclearization of army, navy and air-force; deployment of missiles all over Europe takes the world nearer to self-destruction where neither capitalist nor socialist will survive.

Co-existence, acceptance of political and economic differences ; peaceful resolution of conflicts, are the only alternative to human extinction. Mahatma Gandhi said so on the spiritual plane ; Nehru advocated it at the political level with his Panchsheel and Lenin defended it dialetically. But those who get emneshed in the orthodoxies of dialectical materialism do not always apply it as a dynamic concept to unravel the complexities of a high-tech society in which means of production and forces of production have undergone a material change while the world hangs by a slender thread thanks to the nuclear armageddon. Indira Gandhi in her last years of premiership continued to warn the world of the peril to which war mongers were pushing it. Soviet Union supported Indira Gandhi in her efforts towards peace and disarmament.

Rajiv Gandhi came to power at a time of mounting national as well as international problems the chief of them being human survival. He has devoted all his energies to the creation of conditions in which world peace is possible. The vital first step towards it is nuclear disarmament. He was the moving force behind the Six-Nation Initiative which was welcomed

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by the USSR but was cold-shouldered in Washington. The Soviet Union now accepts that "confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively in the forms of peaceful competition and peaceful contest." But it is the great democracy of the United States of America which is unfortunately refusing to see this stark reality or is willing to engage in a peaceful competition to prove the superiority of its system over its rivals.

Mikhail Gorbachev has now initiated new thinking on relations between the states in an atmosphere of peace. An excellent example of it is provided by India and the USSR which have different social and political systems but have lived in peace and amity with each other. Panchsheel as propounded by Nehru has shown the way to peaee and security in the world. The wild West, however has not yet given up its doctrine of 'Balance of Power' which has now been amplified into "Balance of Terror." It must give way to "Live and let Live" if the world is to survive into the twentyfirst century. Gorbachev advocated in his historic address to the 27th Congress of the CPSU (Feb. 1986) "new and increasingly persistent efforts aimed at curbing the forces of aggression, stopping the arms race delivering mankind from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and consolidating peace on earth." He follows Lenin's advice : "Don't set about new tasks on the basis of old approaches because nothing will come out of it." On his recent visit to Delhi Gorbachev observed on November 25, 1986 that "survival of mankind must be placed above all interests, and the security of any one state is inconceivable without security for all." "The situation", therefore, "urgently calls for a new approach to security issues, a new thinking in politics and a new philosophy in international relations." He stressed on "Principles of peaceful coexistence". He reiterated that "the high degree of interaction between the USSR and India makes for greater potential for the forces of peace and for a more secure future in the world." He praised Non-aligned Movement as "a unique force in modern times." He supported "the United Nations Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" and called for the "Demilitarization of Indian Ocean." He said that "improvement of relations with China will not detract from our relations with India."

Rajiv Gandhi has continued Nehru-Indira tradition to build bridges of understanding between the nations. "Indo-Soviet Friendship", he said in May 18, 1986 "demonstrates how two peoples with different social systems can establish a firm relationship of understanding and work for a larger common cause." He added, "Friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union are an integral element of our foreign policy." Gorbachev visit to Delhi in Novcmber 1986, "shows the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to friendship with India." "It is a friendship", he emphasized "which has supported us in our moments of anxiety and helped us in building a modern economy." Whether it is Bhilai or Bokaro, infrastruc-

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ture for our heave industry, modernization of defernce equipment, economy or the American Enterprise in 1971, it is USSR which has come to our aid and help. It was Jawaharlal Nehru who said in 1946 that the Russians "are our neighbours in Asia and inevitably we shall undertake many common tasks and have much to do with each other." Despite some trials and tribulations, vicissitudes and differing world perceptions, Indo-Soviet relations have measured up to his prophetic vision.

"The endurance and vitality of this friendship," said Rajiv Gandhi, is not mainly based on "material gain". It reflects the deep values which humanity holds dear — "abborence of imperialism ... struggle against colonialism and racism ... shared comitment to the principles of human equality and social justice." And it is in the pursuit of these ideals in Nehru's noble words that "we play a brave part in the shaping of events and ... have the joy of great and noble venture and the feeling that our steps are merging with those of history."

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BOOK REVIEWS

CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION*

A Review Article

Subrata Banerjee has done a yeoman job by producing the book "Culture and Communication" which is based on papers and proceedings of the seminar on the occasion of Patriot-Link anniversary celebrations. The book has interesting preface written by the Editor of the Patriot-Link, Mr. R.K. Mishra in which he says :

> There is political democracy in the country, but it is reasonable to say that democratisation of attitudes and of the spirit has not yet taken place.

He further adds :—

> We know the concept now prevailing in a powerful country in the world is that, by the end of this century, the most important capital intensive industry will be the 'mind-management' industry.

Starting with Mr. Mishra's premise one would not be wrong to draw the conclusion that communication and culture act and interact on each other. One who controls the media will in future control the thought process of the people. This could lead to a totally new kind of imperialism based on the minds of people. Churchill has said that wars are finally fought and lost in the minds of human beings. Pandit Nehru has said that the man behind the machine is more important than the machine itself.

Paradoxically, while Punjab had a Green Revolution, and a very high per capita income in the country, "obscurrantism and fanaticism and irrationality have gripped the minds of the people." Mr. Mishra claims, "this is because the battle was not fought in the field of culture, in the field of communication."

The seminar papers brought out in the book indicate that communication and culture are both subject of intense scholarly pursuit.

The term culture has several meanings and a variety of connotations. A very broad, rather holistic view of the culture encompasses the recognised, approved, shared and continuing pattern of behaviour of a group, whether small or large. Thus all the beliefs, values, behaviours and relations constitutue the culture of a group. On the other hand, to some, culture means only the creative arts. It is remarkable that in the book both

* Subrata Banerjee : *Culture and Communication* (Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1986), xxxii, 148 p., Rs. 90.

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the viewpoints of culture find expression. The common meeting ground for various streams of culture is communication. Communication in this book is treated as both the product of the society and a model of the society.

Dr. P.C. Joshi in "Problems of Cultural Planning of India" traces the history of cultural change in our society through Britsih period and poses a pertinent question : how is it that no political party in our country has a cultural policy ? The strong cultural values that the political workers of independence struggle had have been lost. Value loaded political culture of pre-independent India helped the politicians to communicate and identify with the masses. On the other hand, today's politicians use cultural performers to influence the voting behaviour of the masses.

The strong caste heirarchy with an inbuilt 'jajmani system' helped to perpetuate the mass culture for long. But with the weakening of the feudal social system, culture was left unprotected and unguarded. Now it is left entirely to the patronage of government establishments. It is further argued that with the advent of new communication technologies that are capital intensive, dependence on established government further increased. But when culture is fed and supported by the establishment, it loses its mass character and becomes an elitist commodity.

At one end we find planners, scientific and political workers ignoring the cultural dimension of development. At the other end we find cultural workers unaware of the economic, scientific and political dimensions of culture. A new perspective on culture, therefore, must have as its basic premise the bridging of the gulf between specialists in the field of culture and experts in the fields of history, economics, science and politics.

The point that I wish to make is that the Communication Revolution brings us very close to an explosion of vast opportunity. But it brings us close to an explosion of great dangers as well. The Communication Revolution can help poor countries and poor people to achieve in decades what developed countries achieved in centuries. For vast masses in countries of sub-continental dimensions like India, the Communication Revolution can be a great weapon in the fight against poverty and backwardness. The conquest over time and space opens up vast possibilities of conquest over preventible evils of illiteracy, destitution and disease in a vastly reduced time span.

In order to bring the culture back to masses and to use the communication media as vehicle of change and revolution, Dr. Joshi emphasizes the need for communication system that has inbuilt mechanism of two-way dialogue.

Prof. Yash Pal in "Communication—Challenges, Needs, Problems" has taken up the issue of modern communication technology and its efficacy to bring about socio-cultural transformation of masses. While conceding the supremacy of inter-personal communication for effective change, Prof.

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Yash Pal points out to the dangers that lie ahead if new communication technology leads to centralised system of a few communicating with infinite number of masses. From a technocrat's point of view, he visualises interactive communication system that serves the poorest of the poor of the land with a right combination of satellites, earth stations and computer terminals. It is argued, it is possible to provide a country-wide communication net-work.

Prof. Yash Pal further says that technology of the 19th century and up to the middle of 20th century was to quote him "somewhat tyrannical, in one aspect." Machines, particularly large machines, made in a certain way, forced us use these for the purpose for which these were invented. Today all this has changed. He puts it in a very interesting way :

"To me, one of the most exciting things, about what is happening and happened just during last 30 years or so, is that the new type of technology can itself liberate us from the tyranny of technology itself. Let me explain what I mean ? Today it has become possible to have small subsystems, which can do the kind of functions, mechanical and some time logical which a human mind does. This is largely due to our energetic developments of electronics, solid state electronics, computers which are a part of it (small tiny computers and not the large ones) and partly also of space which help us bridge distances and various other aspects. I am not talking of value. It has nothing to do with values, just functions and operations. And they are excitingly versatile."

Subrata Banerjee deals with another aspect of communication technology in his review :

"When we speak of the challenges of 1990s, it is a challenge of technology. Technology brings about social change because it changes the entire process of production. You talk of microchip technology. It is not changing merely the communication world, it is changing the whole world of production, the whole management of production, the system of production."

We have to understand that technology changes human relations but human consciousness does not keep pace with the change in technology or the chage in human relations. Hence there is need for a conscious approach to the question of communication so that it can mediate between technological changes, changes in human relations and changes in consciousness. This has became very necessary because today technology is changing very very fast. Unless a conscious effort is made to bridge this gap between change in technology and change in human consciousness, many problems can arise and have already arisen.

He sees modern media systems as the instruments of control that are converted into targets. A new market situation is being created where supply creates demand and not the vice versa. Even in international field new technology enables a country to influence the minds of the peoples

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of other countries directly at individual levels. Banerjee once again stresses the need for participation in cultural systems and the use of communication technology as vehicles of social upliftment.

In India, next to radio, cinema is the most widely used medium of mass communication. It has the largest audiences. Cinema audiences cross the barriers of literacy and income. Mr. N.V.K. Murthy in 'The Role of Cinema as a Communicator' lauds the role of Hindi cinema as a force of national integration. But, at the same time, he warns of the damages the escapist cinema is causing to the people especially the young. Once again, the potential of the cinema as an agent for social well-being is brought home.

The book which is based on contributions by eminent mediamen and thinkers evokes thinking and poses the challenge whether the human being should be the subject of the process of the change or a passive object of change. It claims that media can play with the roles depending on how it is used. In the Indian context today whre the electronic media has come under very severe criticism for unabashed projections which are far removed from objectivity the challenge seems to be real. It is proposed for this generation, to resolve this challenge and use the media for building a happier, healthier more democratic and really egalitarian society.

S. N. DHAR*

* Prof. Dhar is in Indian Institute of Mass Communication, New Delhi.

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INDIA

Foreign and Security Policies

HEMEN RAY : How Moscow Sees Kashmir. Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1985, vii, 150 p., Rs. 125.

THIS is a short but comprehensive account of Russian interest in Kashmir and diplomatic moves to further their interest in this sector of India. The author, a specialist on Soviet affairs, has presented his views and analysis in seven chapters, dealing chronologically from Tsarist times to the Indo-Pakistan conflicts of 1965 and diplomatic triumph at Tashkent in the winter of 1965-66. Also included are fourteen useful appendices which are extracts from the statements of Soviet dignitaries and other documents which are intended to provide support for and amplify the observations made in the text by the author.

In the opening chapter titled "In Tsarist Days", the author has endeavoured to show, citing Soviet sources, that Imperial Russia had an interest in penetrating into Kashmir and gaining control over Gilgit in order to safeguard Russian territory adjoining the Hindukush ranges. He has also cited evidence to show that Kashmir's rulers unable to bear the overlordship of the British, sought Russian help to liberate them from British rule. This is one side of the coin. The other which the author could have discussed for greater clarity, is Britain's policy which sought and succeeded in clearing Afghanistan of Russian presence by arranging for the return of Russian territory south of the Amur to Amir Abdur Rahman in exchange for a small tract of the Amir's territory that lay north of the river. This provided an easily definable river frontier between Russia and Afghanistan. Further, Britain secured Russian commitment to respect Afghanistan's neutrality under British auspices. (See the terms of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907). Concurrently Britain encouraged and supported China (considered to be a weak power at that time and amenable to pressures) to penetrate Sinkiang so as to keep the Russians well away from the frontiers of Britain's Indian Empire. Thus Tsarist interest could well have been to prevent Anglo-Chinese penetration of Sinkiang, which could have served as a buffer between the British, Russian and Chinese empires.

The second chapter dealing with Russian strategic interest in Kashmir draws attention to Stalin's belief that India, despite having gained independence continued to be under the British and therefore under Western influence. The reason for this was that India remained in the Commonwealth, continued its earlier economic relations with Britain and there was relatively little radicalism. By the early fifties, however,

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and more especially after Stalin's death, Russian leadership recognised that India's foreign policy was based on non-alignment and friendship with all countries. Russian leaders, beginning with Krushchev and Bulganin appreciated India's stand. They had realised that the United States, in furtherance of its own geo-strategic interests would gather Pakistan in its orbit and strive to pressurise India. The US-Pakistan military alliance, consequent induction of US arms into Pakistan and USA's refusal to sell modern arms to India proved the point. Pakistan as a member of CENTO and SEATO, and more especially its leasing of airbases from which the United States could operate reconnaissance aircraft to spy over Soviet territory, posed threats to the Soviet Union. These developments have been well covered by the author.

In the Post-1965 era there was a slight change in the United States attitude towards the sub-continent. The reasons for this are well known. The Shah of Iran was building up his country's economic and military muscle. His aim was to make Iran the dominant pnwer in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region. He was a staunch supporter of USA and assumed the role of its junior partner in the region. This arrangement suited the United States and hence Pakistan's value for it declined, enabling the Soviet Union to work out a formula for peaceful co-existence among the major countries of the sub-continent.

Crucial to any discussion of India-Pakistan relations is the question of Kashmir. Pre-Second World War Britain wanted Afghanistan as a buffer between its Indian Empire and Russia. Hence it ceded the Waken area to Afghanistan so as to prevent direct contact between India and Russia. Not so well remembered was Britain's interest in Iran and what the United States now describes as South-west Asia. For maintaining indirect control over South west Asia, Britain wanted the north western region of the Indian sub-continent, hence, at the end of the Second War when it realised that it had to quit India sooner than later, Britain divided India into residual India and Pakistan, hoping that the latter would remain loyal to it. Britain also wanted the Gilgit area of Kashmir to be tagged to Pakistan. Britain had also expected, as did Pakistan, that Kashmir would accede to Pakistan. When the Maharaja of Kashmir hesitated, Britain supported, not to say encouraged, Pakistan to attempt to annexe the state by force. Since India did not show sufficient determination to secure the vacation of aggression, Pakistan remained in control of the western segment of the state. The battle arena then shifted to the UN Security Council where Britain and the United States were able to provide full support to their protege Pakistan. Meanwhile, the people of Kashmir having had a taste of how Pakistani troops and irregular forces behave, opted for accession to India.

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By the early fifties, USA had concluded that India would be closer to the Soviet Union and hence were determined to support Pakistan. This, they reasoned, would serve not only to check India but also to utilise Pakistan to further US interests in the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula generally. These considerations, in US perceptions, seem to be valid as much today as in the fifties when Pakistan was formally enrolled as an ally of USA. In contrast, the Soviet Union having closely studied US poiicies and actions in Europe, West and East Asia and in this region realised that the United States was keeping the Kashmir issue alive for the sole purpose of containing India and discouraging it from moving closer to the Soviets. Hence Krushchev had declared, while on a visit to Kashmir in 1955, that "the question of Kashmir had been settled by the people of Kashmir." Krushchev was only stating an obvious fact. Further, as the author has noted : "After China's invasion of India (1962), US and Britain thought that it was a golden opportunity to apply pressure on India to let Kashmir join Pakistan." To this end they pressured India to have direct talks with Pakistan. In fact Duncan Sandys, then a British Cabinet Minister, had declared that he had twisted Pandit Nehru's arm to secure concessions for Pakistan.

China's attitude towards Kashmir is of equal concern to India. As the author has clearly brought out in a chapter appropriately titled "Kashmir and the Chinese Perfidy", China was playing a double game even during the period of "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai." China had publicly made no statement recognising Kashmir's accession to India, while it had privately assured Indian leaders of its support for India's position. Subsequently, realising that Pakistan's objective in joining the US-sponsored CENTO and SEATO was merely to secure USA military and strategic support in order to deal with India from a position of strength, China privately assured Pakistan of its support on the Kashmir issue. After its invasion of India, China began openly supporting Pakistan. In particular (in 1964) Zhou and Chen Yi repeatedly promised China's support to Pakistan so that the latter could settle its conflict (with India) to its satisfaction. But apparently the Soviet Union failed to realise the full significance of the Sino-Pakistani Alliance, which Chen Yi had affirmed would continue "even after you (i.e. Pakistan) have got Kashmir and we (China) have got Taiwan."

In the late fifties China secretly encroached on Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area and built a road across it linking Tibet with Sinkiang. As brought out by the author, China vainly sought Soviet support in its venture against India.

The Soviets fully supported India in Krushchev's time. This was only slightly modified while Brezhnev was in charge. Brezhnev proceeded on the assumption that Pakistan's alliance with the United States and China

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was only regarding Kashmir. He thought that if Pakistan and India could reconcile their differences, the former would move close to the Soviet Union. This was the reason for Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan, besides providing technological assistance by building a steel plant.

It was only later, when Pakistan's role in bringing together and aiding the development of a quasi-military alliance between USA and China, that the Soviets seem to have realised the extent of Pakistan's commitment to its two patrons. All these, however, were post-1965 developments.

The author however could have drawn attention to the unfortunate fact that we chose to be blind to realities in the immediate post-Independence period. We too readily assumed that once partition came about, Pakistan would settle down to solve its own problems. We did not cater to the possibility, indeed the near certainty, of Pakistan's rulers pursuing a one-point programme of anti-Indianism as the cardinal element of their state policy. Likewise attention could have been drawn to our serious lapse in not insisting on China respecting Tibet's independence. This lapse not only harmed the Tibetan people but also this country.

Altogether, however, the author has dealt with the subject of Kashmir in adequate detail and presented his facts and arguments objectively. The book ought to be read by all students of contemporary affairs and specially by those who are in a position to guide and influence Indian national policies.

Birla Institute of Scientific Research,
New Delhi.

R. RAMA RAO

GAUTAM SHARMA AND R. S. NAGAR (EDS.) : India's Northern Security—Chima, Nepal and Bhutan. Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, x, 243 p., Rs. 140.

THE volume under review is a compilation of papers presented at a seminar organized by the Department of Military Science, Gorakhpur University in 1983-84. The papers cover both the Northwest and Northeast regions and also China, Nepal and Bhutan. Besides, there is a brief general section dealing with the "Psycho-political Dimensions and Changing Dynamics of Security of India's Northern Borders"—an issue of perpetual concern for India's defence and strategic planners.

Most of the contributors to the volume are either retired army personnel some of whom are now working in educational institutions and/or those

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who are associated with the research and teaching of defence studies. A striking feature of the volume is, therefore, the military approach to security. In such a framework observations like "big nations do not have security problems *vis-a-vis* their small neighbours," sound both logical and convincing. The age-old principle of "the survival of the fittest" is the basic premise of the point of view in which security is identified with physical or military power. Defence preparedness and building up of armaments, including nuclear weapons, will be the inevitable response of the people who hold this contention.

From the Indian point of view it will be the changes in the Super Power defence policies and their mutual relationships and also those of India's neighbours, particularly China and Pakistan, which will be the necessary inputs calling for all security responses and reactions. This indeed is the contention of Capt. Garg's article on "Sino-US-Pakistan Nexus and Afghanistan."

But it is now accepted that security can neither be defined on militaristic lines nor can it be effectively maintained through defence preparedness alone. The political and economic aspects of security are as important and may even be more pressing at times. Unfortunately, this has been ignored by and large by most of the contributors.

However, the two articles, one by K. R. Singh and the other by S. D. Muni, stand out as exceptions. K. R. Singh highlights the geo-political dimension of the various sectors of India's northern frontier and their military implications. S. D. Muni's analysis of Nepal's peace zone proposal brings out the vagueness of this now well known foreign policy posture of Nepal and Indian reservations and apprehensions as also the positive response of countries like China, Pakistan, etc.

The articles are simple narration of facts and events; they are of descriptive rather then of an interpretative character. Papers on China, Sino-Indian boundary dispute and their normalisation process or Sino-Pak strategic consensus do not, therefore, add anything more than the already available published literature on the subject. On the contrary, at some places the narration is so broad and sketchy that even the essential legal and historical facts have not been put across accurately. For example, the status of Bhutan has been described as that of a protectorate (Major R. Avtar). Aparna Tripathi writes that "in 1861 Sikkim (a vassal of Tibet) became a British protectorate with Bhutan, Assam, Ladakh and Kashmir following suit."

A conspicuous omission in the volume is an editorial essay with a conceptual account of "Security" on a theoretical framework within which the articles written by different authors were meant to be organized for the sake of building up a running argument.

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Printer's ghost stalks the pages of the book with spelling and other errors in abundance.

Department of Political Science,
Punjab University,
Patiala.

MANORAMA KOHLI

UPENDRA BAXI (ED.) : MASS Disasters and Multinational Liability : the Bhopal Case. N.M. Tripathi (P) Ltd., Bombay, 1986, Paperback : xii, 230 p., Rs. 80.

When I glance at the whole book, which is called a non-book, I am inclined to say with a celebrated French author : "I have culled a bouquet of varied flowers from other man's gardens, and nothing is my own but the string that binds them." Yet much is his own in the Introduction, Upendra Baxi, Director (research) of the Indian Law Institute, has provided in the preliminary xii pages a touch of his ingenuity.

Basically, the rest of the pages in the book offers a collection of the rare documents of the litigation initiated by the Union of India against Union Carbide Corporation in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, presided over by Justice Judge John F. Keenan. The law suit or action was filed on April 8, 1985 on the question whether the US Court assumed the jurisdiction or could deny it on the ground of *Forum non Conveniens.*

That too, only a few leading documents out of the mass of material for publication included the nature of this litigation, the kinds of issues involved, the justification for the Sovereign Union of India's appearance as a Plaintiff against a US multinational in an American forum, Union Carbide Corporation's Motion to dismiss these actions on the ground of *forum non-Conveniens*, Memorandum to Opposition to UCC's Motion and Memorandum of individual Plaintiffs.

What does this strange high sounding ivory tower expression of *forum non-conveniens*, in simple terms, mean ? It does not mean simply an inconvenient forum. The essence of this doctrine which originated in Scotland and is recognised by its law is that a Court even though it possesses proper jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, may in its discretion declare or relinquish jurisdiction of a case when it is of the opinion that the end of justice would better be served by trial of the action in another forum. There is no injustice in asking a man to go home and sue in his own Courts. According to the Supreme Court of America, the

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fact that damages awarded may be smaller in the home Courts of the claimants is not by itself a ground for interfering in adequacy of that forum.

The UCC's litigative strategy is clear : let the Bhopal victims seek justice through the Indian courts; the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), in which the UCC holds 50.9 per cent shares, will be in a position to satisfy damages claims beyond $95.3 million, clearly inadequate by all standards, including those of the UCC whose proposals for settlement which, as noted, contemplate at least $ 350 million. In other words, the result sought to be achieved by the UCC was that it had no real liability for mass disaster in Bhopal caused by its acts of commission and omission.

About 3,500 actions, civil and criminal had been filed by victims in Bhopal and approximately 145 actions involving more than 2,00,000 Plaintiffs, of whom 9 were Americans had been consolidated before Judge Keenan. The total damages claimed in the proceedings by the Union of India, and other damage suits, were estimated at a staggering $ 150 billion. The reported maximum for which the UCC was prepared to settle was $ 350 million as against the Union of India's reported non-negotiable settlement amount of $ 1 billion (Rs. 1,250 crores). Sophisticated analyses of compensation and rehabilitation of the gas victims would work out an amount, taking the effects on survivors over a quarter century, close to $4.2 billion.

On the night of December 2-3, 1984, an unprecedented industrial disaster occured in Bhopal, horrendously described as another Hiroshima ("Bhoposhima"). Methyl isocyanate (MIC), a highly toxic and lethal gas leaked out from the Chemical plant of Union Carbide Corporation in large quantities. Over 2000 people were killed and about 2,50,000 suffered injuries, some of them are serious and permanent.

However, this is the only book which has recorded the basic documentation concerning the Bhopal litigation and as such for the first time, the public at large are having an access to such vital documents through the courtesy of the editor's friend and colleague Dr. Clarence Dias, President of the International Centre for Law in Development, New York. For this Upendra Baxi shall be appreciated. This should be seen in the contert of the complexities of the historic litigation, and the targeted readership.

"Bhopal definitely invites us," Upendra Baxi writes, "to an endeavour to regenerate a moral community, based on a fellowship of human suffering." It was this fellowship that Karl Marx had in mind when he said : "The existence of a suffering humanity which thinks and of thinking humanity which is oppressed will necessarily be unpalatable for the passive animal and the world of Philistines....The longer circumstances give thinking humanity to reflect and suffering humanity time to rally, the more finished when born will be the product that the world carries in its womb."

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The translantic ambulence chasers moved with jet speed on December 7, 1984, the first law suit against Union Carbide Corporation was filed by American lawyers in the United States on behalf of thousands of hapless and faceless clients who were the victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy. Since then, additional actions had commenced in the USA. The New York judge, John F. Keenan who ruled on May 12, 1986 that the proper forum for hearing the Bhopal gas leakage case was an Indian Court and not a court in the USA, imposed three conditions that could go a long way in mitigating the blow for the Indian side.

The three conditions imposed in 68 page judgement are that the Union Carbide management in the US will subject itself to the jurisdiction of Indian Courts, that it will accept any judgement of an Indian court subject to "minimal requirements of due process" and that the Carbide management will accept US Federal rules of civil procedures with respect to the production of documentary evidence of witness requested by the Plaintiff (Union of India).

These three conditions imposed by the judge are important because if these were not there, any judgement passed by a Court in India would not have been enforceable against an American Company having its headquaters in the USA. After years and years of litigation, the Carbide management could have escaped payment of damages on the plea that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of an Indian Court. This ruling makes it subject to such jurisdiction.

The only ones who are the real losers in the case are the American lawyers who had visited Bhopal and got the faceless gas victims to affix their thumb impression on papers authorising these attorneys for their cause of receiving compensations from the US courts. In view of Indian laws making the Union of India the sole authorised party to sue Union Carbide Corporation, these American lawyers stand to lose their briefs.

Meanwhile, the Government of India is examining various suggestions with regard to the place and the level at which the case should be filed in India. The Government of India is understandably very keen that "due process of law" should not be curtailed in any manner. The US Court in its judgement suggested that the Indian Courts trying the case against Union Carbide Corporation should observe all procedures.

New Delhi

BROJENDRA NATH BANERJEE

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT

S. R. MAHESHWARI: Rural Development in India: A Public Policy Approach. Sage Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, 281 p., Rs. 145.

INDIA is a land of villages. There are 5.76 lakh villages in India and 93.3 per cent of the inhabited land has a rural base. Out of the 685.18 million population in 1981, 525.46 millions, that is 76.69 per cent live in rural areas. Hence the development of rural India is crucial for the overall development of the nation. However it is observed that there is a steady decline in the share of the primary, essentially rural sector, to the net domestic product from 50.1 per cent in 1970-71 to 40.9 per cent in 1978-79 at current prices. The net domestic product accruing from the rural population, measured per capita and at constant prices has virtually remained unchanged over the years. It was Rs. 395 in 1970-71 and Rs, 408 in 1978-79. All rural development efforts during the period seem to have been ineffective in raising the per capita rural income and thereby the quality of life in rural areas. The picture is more dismal when one looks at rural life with a perspective of equity and income distribution. According to a recent estimate (1981) there are 350 million (nearly 50.0 per cent of total population) people in India who live below the poverty line and 300 out of these 350 million live in rural areas. They lead a life of perpetual want and suffering. They are the teeming millions who are not able to procure for themselves two square meals a day; they belong to families who are not able to send their children to school, families where malnutrition among children is rampant, infant mortality rate is high. life expectancy is low, diseases dominate, work opportunities are few and far between, wages are quite low and superstitions galore. They are the millions who live on the hope of a better tomorrow. For whom "existance" is a struggle; they are the oppressed, depressed downtrodden and exploited sea of humanity. Since the days of "Garibi Hatao" in India they are the capital on which a government "sells" itself. The plethora of political circuses and bureaucratic as well as intellectual gymnastics in India run in the name of these "forgotten" people. The concern for the rural population is partly an outgrowth of a genuine and honest human value-frame and also in an unconscious way reflection of an enlightened self-interest through which a bloody revolution can be stalled and a violent competition for scarce resources arrested. Efforts have been afoot for their development for nearly four decades. Still results are far behind expectations. Several micro studies over the years and across the country have mirrored the defects in policy formulation, planning and implementation as well as grassroots problems from the perspective of clientele and functionaries in

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rural development efforts. The situation warrants a review in retrospect of the variety of efforts in rural development.

It is in this context that I welcome Professor Maheshwari's book *Rural Development in India* as a useful addition to the administrative history of rural development efforts in India. This book comprises 14 chapters of which the first and the last are written as "Prologue" and "Epilogue." The second chapter is a historical overview of rural development efforts in India since the Bengal famine of 1858. This is followed by six chapters which are devoted to such specific efforts as Community Development Programme, Panchayati Raj, the Intensive Agricultural District Programme, the SFDA-MFAL which displayed a "concern for the marginal man," the Drought Prone Areas Programme and lastly the Integrated Rural Development Programme. So far, the organic linkages among the six programmes, that is the way in which the feedback for one specific programme paved the way for the subsequent programmes has been well identified. For instance, the failure of the CD programme to enlist people's participation and boost agricultural growth led to the launching of the Panchyati Raj and the IADP. Likewise, the failure of the IADP to promote equity along with growth led to the SFDA and MFAL on the one hand, which was purported to take care of class imbalances, and to the DPAP which was purported against regional imbalances. The failure again on the target group approach led to the cluster and household approach in the form of IRDP. Upto this point the chapters present a well-knit overview. In addition four other rural problems have been presented in four chapters. They are on rural credit, land reforms, agrarian unrest and the growth of interest in harnessing technology for rural development. It would have been better had land reforms and agrarian unrest been treated together. In all these chapters again, the author's concern has been mainly to trace the administrative history, though, there is a sections on evaluatlon in some of the chapters, such as those on the CD and the IADP, while in some others the evaluation is covered in a brief way under "concluding observations." Even these evaluative observations are based on secondary data obtained from national reports. Micro studies based on primary data have been thoroughly ignored. As an interesting dimension which cuts across all efforts in rural development, there is also a chapter on rural development bureaucracy. Thus, in all, there are 14 chapters which constitute the book *Rural Development in India*.

The "Prologue" attempts to identify the contingencies of rural life in India and attempts an overview of representative definitions of rural development. The definitions considered are not adequate enough to reflect the cosmic dimensions of the concept of rural development. Rural development in contemporary India, as I view it, has two dimensions-

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One of them is growth at the individual level through the raise in per capita income and quality of life, and at the state and national levels, through iucreases in productivity and total production in agricultural and allied sector as well as the non-agricultural rural sectors. The other component of rural development is equity: at the individual level, a movement towards the goal of a classless society and at the area level, in terms of promoting regional parity or spatial balance. The definitions presented and discussed miss the dimensions of regional parity. Spatial balance is very significant in rural development analysis in a country like India which is essentially a land of villages with diverse ecological features and development levels.

There is also a reference to Japanese experience in rural development efforts and the lessons therein for India. The reference is repeated at a few others places in the book and I will treat it later. The author has also referred to the various international organisations interested in rural development though the context of reference is not clear.

The second chapter is an administrative history of rural development efforts in India especially before independence. References have been made to several experiments right from the agricultural experimental farms of Saidapet (1871), Poona (1880), Kanpur (1881) and Nagpur (1883), the individual efforts of Gandhiji (1920), Tagore (1921) as well as that of YMCA at Madras (Martandam experiment). The governmental efforts have also been traced. In doing so a table has been presented which shows that the expenditure of the Government went up from Rs. 240 lakhs in 1921 to Rs. 387 lakhs in 1940 on "nation-building" departments such as education, medical services, public health. agriculture and industries. The author extols this rise in expenditure when he observes: "It was under such a political dispensation (dyarchy) that development administration, particularly rural development, received considerable encouragement from the government." This opinion needs to be contended. Except agriculture the other heads of expenditure fall into the joint sectors, that is the rural and urban sectors. Further, it is essential to analyse public expenditure in terms of per capita outlay as well as in terms of total public expenditure. The author would have presented a more realistic picture of the governmental attention to development in general, and rural development in particular, through such analysis.

The chapter of Community Development Programme has been very well drafted. That should be considered as the best in the book. It is clear that the grassroots structure of rural development efforts in India has turned a full circle when it is seen that before the CD programme the VLW was a specialist and the CD made him a generalist or a multipurpose worker. In 1986 the VLW is no more a generalist as the trend is again towerds specialisation of work. For instance, the Department of Agriculture is having

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its own village level workers called agriculture assistants, the Health Department has its own workers and now the VLW is mainly concerned with the IRDP programmes.

The Community Development programme was essentially an infrastructure or area development programme and thus failed to promote equity and regional parity. It would have been better had the author compared Community Development projects of India with the Chinese models of development which flowed from Tachai. The transition from the Community Development chapter to the chapter on Panchayati Raj has been quite natural and smooth.

In the chapter on Panchayti Raj the auther rightly represents the national opinion when he quotes (p. 55) E.M,S. Namboodiripad to say : "Democracy at the Central and State levels, but bureaucracy at all lower levels—this is the essence of Indian polity." The contributions made by Panchayati Raj, as identified by the author (pp. 55-56), appear to be little more than modest. Again the causes identified for the decline of Panchayti Raj (pp. 56-58) are not supported by any studies.

There is an adequate treatment of the Asoka Mehta Committee Report on Panchayati Raj. In this context the author approves the recommendations of the Asoka Mehta Committee for "Open Participation" of political parties in Panchayati Raj elections by describing it as a legitimisation of reality. We have two experiences in recent times in "Open Participation"—in the elections from West Bengal and Tamilnadu. Though the elections went off, still a certain amount of violence could not be checked. Do we have a law and order machinery which can effectively control political rivalries at the grassroots level, and especially at the time of elections? "Open Participation" will endanger the security and peace of the weaker and depressed sections of society. It may be good in principle but does not fit into the realities of an oppressive society.

The chapter on "Intensive Agricultural Development Programmes" traces the factors that led to the programme as such and also its contribution to the Indian economy through the "green revolution." Only the "greener" aspects of the "green revolution" have been highlighted. The fact is that it was successful only in parts of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and the whole of Punjab. It totally Ignored the distributional aspects and social, economic justice, though it promoted a higher degree of growth and self-reliance. This has been recognised in setting the sixth chapter—"Concern for the Marginal Man." But the right place would have been the chapter on IADP itself and its section on evaluation.

The chapter on "Concern for the Marginal Man" has brought into relief the dynamics of transition from the infrastructure area development approach to the target group approach, the administrative system of SFDA and MFAL at the district and block levels, the roles and functions of per-

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sonnel at various levels, etc. It is painful to note that 76 per cent of rural households, with a break up of 55 per cent small farmers and 24 per cent agricultural labourers, own only 20 per cent of the cropped area. In discussing these programmes the author has very aptly observed that "...quite a sizeable number of members of the target groups were not even aware of the SFDA and MFAL and had thus no knowledge of the schemes mant for them." This is exactly what I had discoveaed in an empirical study made by me in Karnataka in 1977 on "Responsiveness to Development Programmes from Educational Stimuli in Rural Areas," later published as *Education and Rural Development* in 1980.

The chapter—"Drought-Prone Areas Programme"—has traced the growth of rural development efforts which took the shape of the Drought Prone Areas Programme in 1972. There is also a discussion of the terms of and realitles in the implementation of the programme but the issue of diversion of funds has not merited the attention of the author. The expenditure on road works which is efficially accorded the lowest priority, as also noted by the author, is very much higher than expected as borne out by a recent study on RLEGP at our Institute and the expenditure is also infructuous and unproductive as the roads invariably get washed away following the rainy season.

The chapter—"Integrated Rural Development Programme"—is loosely knit. There is no critical examination, for instance there is no reference to the cluster approach. Though there is a shift from the target group approach to individual household approach to offset class imbalances, even the Cluster approach of the Integrated Rural Development Programme as did the Community Development Programme of 1950's promotes regional imbalances. This point has been totally missed. By the very nature of the programme the choice of a cluster depends upon the level of development of the area. A group of villages with a main villages having minimum infrastructure facilities such as a cooperative society or a rural bank, a milk or poultry dairying unit, marketing faciiity etc., qualify to be a "Cluster." In this way relatively underdeveloped areas are left out by design and regional imbalances would increases. In the table on the administrative structure of the Integrated Rural Develompent Programme at the State, district and block levels (p. 124), the people's representatives are conspicuously missing. This is an omission.

Chapter 9 is devoted to "Rural Credit." The Administrative history of rural credit in India, right from the days of "taccavi" loans has been traced. There is a reference to the periodically conducted all India Rural Credit Surveys and also a discussion of the regional rural banks. The chart on Rural Credit Agencies (p. 130) leaves out private institutional agencies. It is unfortunate, as the author has also rightly highlighted, to observe that

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every alternate rural person still depends on private money lenders. The total membership has been considered as important in a review of the position of agricultural credit societies in India. This would be a little misleading. Membership of cooperative societies is also taken by eligible beneficiaries to get money under subsidy component for development schemes. In fact, there is also a scheme under which full membership fee is paid to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes by the government. Hence increase in membership is not an indicator of development of cooperative credit.

There is a review of rural credit performance and field problems have been identified. Several studies have shown, including a study I did recently on Interested Rural Department Programmes (for the IIEP, UNESCO, Paris) on "Planning and Management of Education. Within Integrated Rural Development Projects," that rural credit is invariably out of tune with the development cycle. For instance TRYSEM is planned to integrate the training or non-economic and human resource development input with subsidy and credit or the economic input. But the financial input is either delayed by several months (or even a year) or it may not be forthcoming at all. Likewise cooperative loans are given to farmers after the crop season is over. This mistiming of rural credit should have been recognised and discussed.

Chapter 10 is devoted to land reforms. States have been classified and identified as poor, average and those having significant performance. The reasons for a given level of performance and factors inhibiting or facilitating performance have been left out. The chapter on land reforms has no reference to the Bhoodan Movement. This is surprising as the author advocates in the end the Gandhian model of development. Again the Japanese model of land reforms is advocated. (p. 152). This is repeated at another place. (pp. 224-25).

The chapter on agrarian unrest traces its growth right from the 17th and 18th Centuries. The author attributes the roots of agrarian unrest in India to the constitutional provision of universal franchise (p. 159), and believes that it would have erupted independently of the green revolution. This will be a matter for debate. The author has missed a reference to several movements in India which are essentially agrarian unrests ; for instance there is no reference to the outgrowth of naxalism in the Telengana region and in Kerala states, the Tamilnadu Farmers' Movement, the farmer's agitations in a few other states in recent times such as those in Karnataka and Maharashtra, etc. Even the *Chipko* and *Appiko* Movements can be looked at as agrarian unrest and there is no reference to them. In a sense this chapter is incomplete in several respects. The administrative dynamics and rural realities have uot been linked to agrarian unrest.

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Chapter 12 is titled "Technology for Rural Development." Several efforts, both governmental and voluntary, have been identified. The author rightly advocates the use of "appropriate technology" but fails to say what it is. I have my sympathies with him in this regard. However at two places there have been a rather unfair criticism of scientists (p. 172) and engineers. (p. 173) The author observes : "The engineers, have for instance, contributed to environmental degradation, energy exhaustion, radioactive contamination and increased disaster probability." It is the politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists and vested interes groups who would be responsible and not engineers for the situations described !

Chapter 13 is devoted to rural development bureaucracy. Though the Indian Civil Service was heavily criticised by political leaders before Independence still they continued with the system later. The author ascribes three reasons for this reconciliatory posture. (p. 176) "Class consciousness" between the leaders and the bureaucrats is not recognised at all. He is quite apt when he observes that, "what was originally revenue and general administration, has been mobilised for rural development functions." (p. 178) In fact even now the district administrative head in some of the States, like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, is called a District Collector which was his pre-independence job of collecting revenue. In Karnataka for instance, he is called as the Deputy Commissioner, as his job is to commission development projects at the district level and act as a Deputy to the Commissioner at the State level.

There is a vivid and lucid description of the administrative machinery at the central, state, district and block levels in this chapter. There should have been a discussion of the problems of management, vertical and horizontal coordination, integration across departments, mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation, etc. An independent chapter on the "delivery system" would have filled the gap.

The "Epilogue" has not emerged in a natural way out of the treatment of material in the earlier chapters. Several new aspects have been discussed such as Orissa's Economic Rehabiliation of the Rural Poor Programme, research in rural development, rural development and social tensions, etc. The attention given to voluntary efforts in rural development which is, of late, expanding and exerting its influence has not been given attention.

Several problems have been identified in evolving a satisfactory model of rural development in India. Lack of an information system, low levels of people's participation, corruption and toutism, etc., are some of them.

In the end, the author advocates the Gandhian model of development. "The Gandhian model of rural development needs to be given more serious attention, and the country's leadership must show courage and foresight to adopt it." (p. 224) I am not aware of any Gandhian model

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which could fit into a modernising and forward-looking economy like the Indian at present. Rural development today is very different from what Gandhiji thought in the 1920's. Let us not put the clock back when the country is thinking of moving towards the 21st Century. Only the Gandhian values of peace, love, truth, honesty and non-violence can be the basis of rural development.

The author surprisingly advocates the Japanese model (pp. 224-25) again. Japan pursued a military solution to land reforms under General Mac-Arthar. How can we follow Gandhi and MacArthur at the samc time?

To sum up, this is a very useful book to the beginners to develop a par-spective about rural development in India. It is useful to the practitioners to look at their efforts in retrospect. The criticisms I have made of the book are marginal. They should not devalue the substative effort that has gone into the writing of this book which is based on several invaluable documents and reports submitted over the years.

Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore

A. S. SEETHARAMU

EDUCATION

M. R. BHIDAY : From Isolation to Mainstream : Higher Education in India. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, xii, 314 p., Rs. 150.

SOME books are of interest as much, or perhnps more because of the context in which they emerge than the materials between their covers. Present book is one such in the context of the national debate that is going on in the country on the "New Educational Policy."

The book beginning with a Foreword by the author himself, which is a sad commentary on the part of all concerned, in which he states that when the xerox copies of the above book was sent to many educationists for their comments three years ago, none of them sent their reactions as a result of which the author was forced to bring out the book as it is by writing both tha Preface and Foreword himself. The author claims that most of the issues that are raised in the "New Educational Policy" document have already been discussed by him in the book, and highlights some of the common points therein.

Further, the author earnestly feels that a critical evaluation of all educational, research institutions and universities is urgently needed and a

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reference to this effect is made by the author who conducted a study in six areas in six universities of the affiliating type in Maharashtra. The six areas were : social justice, provision of high skills and new knowledge, effectiveness, quality, integrity and efficiency of academic programmes, adequacy of governance, resources available, purposes and performances.

The book consists of eighteen chapters (p. 314), each one devoted to specific issues of higher education.

The first chapter deals with "A New Concept of Universities in India" which discusses matters such as the New role of the Indian University, national policy, the UGC policy-frame organisational model, organisational goals of a university, etc., etc.

While discussing the major shortcomings of the Indian universities in the second chapter, the author touches aspects such as the legislative framework, autonomy and decentralization, democrotic functions, rational relationship, flexibility and dynamism, and harmony and balance.

The third chapter deals with the organisational models for higher education in India under which he covers such issues as the approaches to university organisational structure, the essential requirements, the two structural principles and the basic rules for the application of decentralisation concepts.

Chapter four deals with the four tier structure in which the author proposes the new structure of the university which can attain the objectives of higher education in the state through these four tiers. Under this are studied the role of government in higher education, the practical solution, relation with the UGC, functions, powers and responsibilities of the state commission for higher education, inter-relationship of organisations, etc.

Chapter five deals with the organisation design of the university for development; the author discusses issues such as new theories of organising higher education, policy concerns for the future, uncertainties of future trends, policy concerns in higher education, administrative set-up, authority structure, affiliation processes and decentralization with coordinated control.

Chapter six deals with the District Academic Boards and the University's central Academic Council under which the author discusses the college curriculum and the implementation of curricular policy and change and describes the functions of the District Academic Boards and the University's Central Academic Council.

Chapter seven deals with the District Subject Committees of Studies (DSCS) and the University's Central Boards of Studies (CBS); the author discusses the theory of curriculum development, barriers to curricular construction and evaluation of the curriculum and the functions of the District Subject Committees of Studies (DSCS) and the University's Central Boards of Studies (UCBOS).

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Chapter eight deals with the Senate, the District and the University Senate and their composition.

Chapter nine deals with the Executive Council or the Syndicate in which issues such as education by indirect action, domination by current society, shortage of dynamic leaders, the District Management Council and the University Advisory Council and their compositions are discussed.

Chapter ten is devoted to issues regarding the other bodies of the universitp—Boards and Committees in which the functions regarding the different boards such as the Board of Post-graduate Teaching and Research, Board of Extension Services, Board of Planning and Development, Board of Multi-Disciplinary Studies, Board of Distance Education, Board of intra-sport, recreation and fine arts are discussed in detail.

Chapter eleven discusses the issues regarding monitoring, evaluating and the planning processes in Indian universities and colleges, the role of the planning group, their way of working, questions on teachers and academic organisations, students, research and post-graduate education, part-time education, university and community, affiliation, recognition and approval, etc.

In chapter twelve, the author deals with Academic management through Committees of Experts in which the issues relating to general principles and functions of the committee are discussed. Committee for University-Industry Interaction and Science and Technology Entrepreneurs Part (STEP) Committee for selection and appointment of teachers, persond promotion and finance are also discussed in detail.

Chapter thirteen deals with the officers of the University, the new position of officers under which the selection and appointment of VC's, Deans, Rectors and Pro-Vice Chancellors and their duties and responsibilities are also discuseed.

Chapter fourteen deals with the legal aspects of University management under which issues relating to employees relations and unions, nature of the faculty-University relationship, rule of law and concept of civil disobedience, Joint Consultative Committees are discussed.

Chapter fifteen deals with the sciencc of the assessment of performances in which the general systems concept, learning systems, system hierarchy, load on teachers and students. standardising comprehensive assessment of students, are all discussed.

The author in chapter sixteen demands a better deal for youth in terms of better educational and vocational programmes more suited to their needs.

In chapter seventeen, the evaluation of the new structure of the Indian Universities is discussed by the author by raising issues relating to assessing effective outlines and proposes strategies for changing values by education.

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In the last chapter, the author raises issues regarding evaluation of accountability in the new structure, wherein he presents the modular design of the office staff for each officer.

At the outset, the author needs to be congratulated for having put in so much of effort and materials into the book. It is an exhaustive work which attempts to tackle most of the relevant issues in higher education which stand in the way of national development. Even while granting absolute autonomy of colleges, as advocated by the author, appears to be the panacea for remedying most of ills of the management of colleges and universities, one should exercises greater caution while advocating autonomy for, unless it is coupled with accountability, the remedy may be worse than the disease. Hence a proper blend of autonomy and accountability is what is actually needed. Similarly the concept of participative-management also needs to be looked at in this perspective, for too much of participative-management has its own weaknesses.

Further, while discussing the planning and management strategies, the role of national bodies like the CABE, AICTE, NCTE, NCERT, NIEPA in this aspect has not been given much emphasis by the author. It would have been a welcome gesture if the author had bestowed some more serious thought on coordination of these bodies with national organisations like the Union Ministry of Education and the National Planning Commission and about the conceptual and functional linkages among such organisation, bodies and agencies both at the national and the state level. While focusing his attention on promotional aspects, it would have been relevant if the author had discussed organisational policy for recruitment and transfers of faculty members in the colleges and universities.

Similarly, discussion of problems regarding student unrest, which is a a burning issue, and establishing a grievance cell for quick redressal for students, teachers and administrators would also have been appropriate. While drawing inferences and putting forth arguments it would have been better if the author had supported the same by some systematic study or literature review.

The book offers perceptive insights into the problems of higher education and is written lucidly and in an appealing style for all kinds of people. It can be no doubt recommended to all concerned with education – be they planners, administrators or academicians.

Institute for Social & Economic Change, Bangalore.

M. D. USHADEVI

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—MANAGING EDITOR).

ARASARATNAM, Sinnappah. *Sri Lanka After Independence—Nationalism, Communalism and Nation Building* (Centre for South and South East Asian Studies Monograph, 5). Centre for South and South East Asian Studies, University of Madras, Madras, 1986, iv, 92 p. Rs. 20. Paper.

This monograph analyses political developments since independence. The author discusses the role of various heads of the Government, role of political parties, emergence of Buddhist and Sinhala hegmony, Sinhala Communalism, Sinhala–Tamil relations and the Tamil Elam movement. The author deals with the political and economic policies adopted by the heads of the Government upto 1985 in chronological manner i.e. since independence to 1956 under D.S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala ; 1956 to 1959 under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike ; upto 1964 and 1970-77 under Mrs. Bandaranaike ; 1965-70 under Dudley Senanayake ; 1977-1985 under Jayawardene first as Prime Minister and then as President since 1978. The publication based on lectures of the author, shows how the initial liberalism and constitutionalism got diluted under the pressure from majority forcing the minority Tamils to start struggle for preservation of its political and cultural identity.

BALDEV SINGH. *Self-Reliance and Technology* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 31). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1986. 56 p, paper.

Approach of self-dependence or self-reliance as enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi, has generally been pursued by India aad has been the accepted national policy as indicated by the Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi in the Foreword to the 7th Five Year Plan (1985-90). This monograph while highlighting the measures taken in this direction through the sucessive Five year plans, focusses attention on the country's scientific and technological potential and the contribution science and technology may make to its self-reliant growth and development.

BARPUJARI, H.K. *Ed. The American Missionaries and North-East India (1836-1900 A.D.) : A Documentary Study.* Spectrum Publication, Guwahati, 1986. lvii, 322 p. Rs. 160.

This is an assessment of multifarious activities of American Baptist missionaries in North-East India where they played a significant role in the socio-economic-cultural life. The documentary study traces early history of Baptists' evangelisation—success and failure, problems and difficulties, contributions in the fields of linguistics, education, culture and moral and political events, and other developments which had affected their operations. The second part deals with the lives and conditions of cross-sections of the people with whom the missionaries worked and lived. It includes American Baptist Foreign Mission Society's Correspondence : Assam Field (1836-1900) preserved at the archives Colgate School of Divinity, Rochester NY ; correspondence with the foreign secretaries, journals of the missionaries reports, circulars, resolutions, appropriation and administrative measures in regard to the mission, excerpts from the Baptist Missionary Magazine, official documents of the Government of

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India, pieces of Bronson's Family papers and Assam Mission Conference minutes ; these make the study authentic and interesting.

DIALOGUE BETWEEN TRUSTED FRIENDS : Official Friendly Visit by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to India, November 25-28, 1986. Allied, New Delhi, (1987). 110 p.

Collection of documents and an editorial appeared in *Pravda* December 1, 1986.

GHOSH, P.K. and GUPTA, G.S. *Fundamentals of Leasing and Lease Financing.* Vision Books, New Delhi, 1985. 130 p. Rs. 80.

Discusses various aspects of leasing and lease financing including the legal accounting and tax aspects.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT. *Members of Lok Sabha First to Eighth Lok Sabha : A Study in Socio-Economic Background.* Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1986. vi, 34 p. Rs. 15. Paper.

It provides age, educational and occupational background of the members of 1st to 8th Lok Sabha and information in respect of members of the Seventh and Eighth Lok Sabha about their participation in the freedom struggle, their previous experience in legislative bodies, special interests etc.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT. *National Energy Policy.* Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1986. v, 67 p. Rs. 20. Paper.

This brochure discusses the growth of energy resources and main forms of energy coal, petroleum, hydro and thermal and nuclear electric power, and the non-conventional sources of energy, through the various five year plans. It also mentions efforts made towards evolving a viable energy policy.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT. *Population and Family Planning (1975-1983)* (Parliament Library and Documentation Service, Documentation Series). Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1986. 119 p. Rs. 12. Paper.

Contains references to important documents like books, monographs, reports, periodicals, press clippings etc being received and maintained in the Parliament library.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT. *Transport in India.* Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1986. v. 64 p. Rs. 15. Paper.

Transport which is a vital public service, plays a very significant role in the growth of industry and commerce. In India the transport system is still in a state of inadequacy despite the implementation of six five year plans. This brochure describes growth of the various modes of transport during the different plan periods and steps taken towards framing of a national transport policy. A select bibliography is given at the end.

INNAIAH, N. *State Government and Politics : A study of Andhra Pradesh Politics 1885-1986.* Scientific Services, Hyderabad, 1986. 271 p. Rs. 100.

Commencing with the birth of the Congress Party in 1885, this study discusses the evolution of state politics, its development, emergence of Telugu Desam Party, its fall and victory in 1985 assembly elections. It also describes personalities who have ruled the state.

KAMATH, P.M. *American Foreign Policy : Who Makes It ?* (Harold Laski Institute of Political Science Publication no, 39). Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad, 1985. 46 p. Rs. 15. Paper.

Bombay University Professor in the 31st Annual lecture of the Harold Laski Institute of Political Science dwells on the American foreign policy formulation. He discusses the centres of foreign policy formulation within the government as formal or constitutional and those outside as the informal or non-constitutional.

KRISHNA KUMAR. *The Problem of Curriculum. (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 32).* Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1986. 28 p. Paper.

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Considers the problem addressing the three questions viz what is worth teaching from learner's view point and from value of knowledge view point ; how should it be taught and how are the opportunies for education distributed ?

MANI, P.R.S. *The Story of Indonesian Revolution 1945-1950* (Centre for South and South East Asian Studies Monograph, 6) Centre for South and South East Asian Studies, University of Madras, Madras, 1986. xii, 114 p. Rs. 30. Paper.

The author who was Army observer and war correspondent in South East Asia later joining Indian Foreign Service on the advice of late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, provides an eye witness account of revolution. He describes background, role and personalities of the leaders viz Sutan Sjahrir, Dr. Mohamed Hatta and Dr. Soekarno, and India's contribution to the revolution.

MISHRA, Kiran. *Hearths and Fields : Changing Life of Nishing Women of Arunachal Pradesh.* Satvahan, New Delhi, 1985. 112 p. Rs. 65.

Supported by Indian Council of Social Science Research and affiliated with the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies this study examines the traditional and changing role, thinking and life style of women in the Nishing Society, under the influence of development and modernization.

PADMANABHAN, C.B. *Inter-State Variations in Financing of Education : A Regional Dimension* (NIEPA Occasional Paper, 11). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1986. 28 p. Paper.

The Kothari Commission which identified sources of inequalities and steps to be adopted for overcoming these, called for greater concern for financing of education both in the magnitude and the manner of release to different parts of the country-state, districts, block or tehsils and different institutions. This paper focuses attention on the inter state and intra state variation in financing and makes out case for wiping out such disparities for achieving equality of opportunity in Indian education.

REDDY, E.S. *Struggle for Freedom in Southern Africa : Its International significance.* Mainstream, New Delhi, 1987. 148 p. Rs. 30. Paper.

It is a collection of the writings and texts of lectures by the author an international civil servant with the UN who had been the Principal Secretary of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and later the Head of the UN Centre against Apartheid. This collection not only provides a rich insight into the manifold aspects of freedom struggle in South Africa but also highlights laudable role played by India in it and contribution of NGO's to the United Nations efforts for Freedom in South Africa and Namibia. The author's personal involvement with Africa as a whole and contribution to promoting action by governments and organizations against apartheid and in support of the libration struggles, enhances its value in terms of authenticity and reference.

SUBRAMANIAM, V. *Glimpses of Buddhist Culture in India Including Four Dance Dramas.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983. 122 p. Rs. 50.

It includes four sanskrit dance dramas namely 'Parimala Madhaveeyam', 'Prabuddha Mekhaleeyam', "Khemanguli Maleeyam, and Mahakanya Sagha Natakam", to glorify Buddha through song and dance. The author whose dance dramas have been choreographed and performed by leading dancers in India and North America, discusses the change from a secular to a religious basis for the arts in India through the Bhakti movement and its effect on Buddhism and some of the socio-historical aspects of musical composition and provides socio-historical information on the lesser known legacies of Buddhism.

SURYANARAYAN, V. *Ed. Rehabilitation of Sri Lankan Repatriates--A Critical Appraisal* (Centre for South and South East Asian Studies Monograph, 7). Centre

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for South and South East Asian Studies, University of Madras, Madras, 1986. 67 p. Rs. 20. Paper.

The centre for South and South East Asian Studies organised an international seminar on "Rehabilitation of Sri Lankan repatriates" on August 11, 1986. This monograph contains three papers by Dr. V. Suryanarayan, Mr. M. Vamadevan and Mr. R.R. Sivalingam, submitted at the seminar. The first paper provides back ground to the repatriation of Indian citizens from Sri Lanka following the implementation of the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact. Effectiveness of the programme implemented to rehabilitate the Sri Lanka repatriates in Tamilnadu is assessed in the second paper. The third paper makes suggestions for proper approach and schemes for their rehabilitation.

TWENTYFIVE YEARS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT : Documents of the Gatherings of the Nonaligned Countries 1983-1986. 2 V. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1986. Paper.

Brought out at the time of the Eighth summit at Harare.

VENKATARAMAN, R. *The Role of Private Member of Parliament* (Harold Laski Institute of Political Science Publication, 142). Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad, 1986. 18 p. Rs. 10. Paper.

The Vice-President of India in this G.V. Mavalankar Memorial Lecture, 1986, highlights importance of role of Private member in Question time and legislative work citing examples of some prominent members.

VYAS, Arvind. *Some problems of Accumulation and Growth in a Socialist Economy* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 33) Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1986. 34 p. Paper.

It is a study of investment policy in a socialist economy during the extensive and intensive phases of its growth. The issues examined here are determination of the rate of investment, pattern of investment, the choice of techniques and investment projects, and the efficiency of investment.



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